For nearly five decades, the Islamic Republic has shaped every aspect of life in Iran. Its politics, its culture, its public sphere, and the private hopes of its citizens. Few writers have observed this long arc of history with as much clarity and persistence as Amir Hassan Cheheltan, one of Iran’s most distinguished contemporary novelists. Living in Tehran yet unable to publish his work in his own country, Cheheltan occupies a unique position: both inside and outside the system, both witness and critic, both participant and chronicler of a society in constant tension.

As Iran faces one of the most turbulent periods in its recent history – marked by widespread protests, economic hardship, and a deepening crisis of legitimacy – Cheheltan’s voice offers a rare combination of literary insight and political realism. His reflections on the past 47 years of the Islamic Republic illuminate not only the roots of today’s unrest but also the possibilities and limits of change.

In this written interview, Cheheltan speaks about the evolution of Iranian society, the meaning of the current protest movements, and the uncertain political future of a country caught between reform, repression, and the longing for a different tomorrow.

You have lived through the entire history of the Islamic Republic. When you look back over these 47 years, what stands out to you as the most defining transformation of Iranian society?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan: During this time, the Islamic government has secularized Iranian society. Iranian society is now more secular than ever before, and more so than a Western observer could imagine. Women have also come to a new understanding of their civil rights that is very different and, of course, more profound than they had in mind half a century ago.

How has your personal experience as a writer in Iran shaped the way you interpret the country’s political and social trajectory?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan: The feeling of discrimination and injustice under the rule of an ideological regime, the use of immense violence to expand the government's power, as well as severe censorship that makes it impossible to express opinions, is what drives my reaction to these conditions.

Many observers argue that today’s crises are rooted in decisions made in the early years after 1979. Which foundational choices do you consider most responsible for the current political and social tensions?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan: The roots of the crisis can be traced to the fusion of religion and government, as well as the idea of ​​individual and unaccountable government, which is embodied in the Iranian Constitution. Of course, the rulers have added to the scope of the crisis by arbitrarily interpreting this law.

Iran has experienced several waves of reformist hopes – in the 1990s, the early 2000s, and again in the late 2010s. Which of these “missed reform moments” do you see as the most consequential, and why?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan: Real reforms only occurred during Khatami's presidency. Its results were evident in ​​civil society, relative freedom of the press, and the weakening of book censorship. It was during this period, and through his efforts, that the Ministry of Intelligence, which had been killing opponents, critics, and intellectuals, was exposed and introduced to society.

At what point, in your view, did the gap between state and society become so wide that trust could no longer be restored through incremental change?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: The 2009 presidential election was a turning point in the distrust of the people, especially the middle class. In this election, people felt that their votes had been stolen. This feeling was expressed in the slogan “Where is my vote?” The ballot box generally lost its credibility and brought distrust of the regime to a new height.

The recent protests have been described as the most far-reaching in decades. What distinguishes them from earlier movements such as those in 1999, 2009, or 2019?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: This time, the Bazar was the initiator of the protests, and it had an economic origin. These protests soon spread to most cities in Iran, involving all urban classes. The unhealed wounds left by the suppressed movements of 1999, 2009, and 2019 had created a concentrated anger that the government could not contain except through mass killings. This mass killing, which took place mostly over the course of just two days, is unprecedented in the history of Iranian and even world movements. It is no exaggeration to say that with this killing, the history of Iran has been divided into two parts; the period that came before this killing and the period that came after it. This latter period has only just begun.

You have spoken about the population’s fear of chaos or war – a fear the state often exploits. How does this fear shape the dynamics and limits of today’s protest movements?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: The people of Iran are now very angry, desperate and hopeless. They may even seek refuge in Satan to get rid of the current situation. An angry person is not afraid of anything and does not care about the outcome and result of what he does, and this is extremely dangerous. In an Iranian proverb, anger is considered equivalent to madness. An angry person does not have the patience to listen to sermons. Instinct rules over him.

The younger generation has grown up with crisis as a constant condition. How does this shape their political imagination and their willingness to challenge the system?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: The aspiration of the new generation is life. This generation wants life; a normal life that is free from anxiety and worthy of human dignity, and this is what has been denied to it. The Iranian regime does not recognize human privacy and interferes in the private lives of citizens. This generation is fighting for life and will not stop until it achieves it. This generation knows that Iran is a rich country because of its resources, and therefore cannot tolerate poverty and corruption.

Do you believe these protests have the potential to create long-term political change, even if they are suppressed in the short term?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: Make no mistake about it. The country is at a dead end, and there is no possibility of any real reform. Iran has no choice but to change, a true and fundamental change. Some even believe that this change must be achieved at any cost and by anyone.

You have argued that reforms, despite being difficult, remain the only realistic path forward. What would meaningful reform look like under the current political structure?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: To avoid revolution, which often has uncertain results, I believe the surest and least expensive way for a society to progress is through reforms. But in the current situation, the government has closed all avenues for reforms. The rulers are benefiting from this situation and, of course, they have also put the country on the verge of collapse.

Is there still a political centre within the system capable of initiating reform, or has that space been hollowed out entirely?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: In the last twenty years, there has been no sign of rationality in the hard core of power in Iran.

How do external conflicts – for example with Israel or the United States– influence the regime’s stability and its willingness to change?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: I feel that the international community is not ready to accept an all-out war in the Middle East. This war could quickly engulf the entire region. The Iranian government is also aware of this. Moreover, there is an apocalyptic mindset in a significant part of the Iranian government that welcomes this war with all its destructive dimensions. For these people, it does not matter what dangers such a choice may have for Iran.

When you imagine Iran’s political future, which scenario seems most plausible to you: gradual opening, deeper authoritarian entrenchment, or an uncontrolled collapse?

Amir Hassan Cheheltan​​​​​​​: The collapse and chaos resulting from statelessness are my nightmare. Of course, I am not worried about a deeper totalitarianism in governance because models like North Korea are rejected by Iranian society. I must admit that I have also lost hope in a gradual opening. I fear that if this situation continues, society will lose hope for the future. A hopeless society easily succumbs to nihilism.

The questions were submitted in writing by Oliver Ernst on February 5, 2026.