Based on the current developments, the EU-led normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is perceived to be entering another dangerous stalemate at a time when both countries are politically rather busy. Kosovo went through its third parliamentary election (on June 7) in eighteen months and still faces uncertainty with respect to forming institutions and offering stability, while Serbia is entering a possible transition after President Aleksandar Vučić said he would resign and trigger early presidential elections. In other words, it is not clear if the EU has/will have reliable partners to move the normalization dialogue ahead. Based on the EU’s own description of the process, the goal remains a comprehensive legally binding normalization agreement, which is largely seen as a euphemism for some kind of recognition of statehood of Kosovo. However, the gap between that goal and day-to-day politics has become very wide. Therefore, comprehensive and legally binding normalization remains illusive. If no significant breakthrough in the dialogue occurs in the meantime, the most likely outcome by 2030 is perhaps “peace through management,” which would mean enough calm to avoid a major crisis but not enough courage to close the major points of dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. That may look stable from the EU/Brussels’ point of view. However, from Kosovo’s point of view, it is still not a good deal because it keeps Kosovo in the waiting room, at least with respect to Euro-Atlantic integration.
According to the evidence reviewed in the process of preparing this paper, the best realistic target for 2030 is perhaps on how the EU has structured the process, with a smarter target being staged normalization. This would mean having Serbia stop blocking Kosovo regionally, both at the EU level and internationally, recognizing Kosovo documents and symbols (to some degree, some level of recognition already exists), encouraging the Kosovo Serbs from the north to become part of the public institutions, and accepting a practical relationship of equals, as stipulated in the Agreement on the Path to Normalization (APN). Kosovo, on the other hand, would move to regulate the self-management framework for Kosovo Serbs inside its constitutional order, restores trust in the north, and handles rule of law issues with more coordination with the EU and NATO. Whereas the EU would deliver a clear and symmetrical conditionality. As a result, Kosovo becomes a candidate country, gains membership at the Council of Europe and would establish contractual relations with NATO. If those steps move together, the dialogue could still produce a real and positive shift by 2030. If they do not, the region will remain one incident away from another crisis, even if there is no open conflict. For Kosovo, that would mean more waiting, more unfairness, and more wasted time.