Key Takeaways

• PLA Navy’s (PLAN) has witnessed an unprecedented expansion from a ‘modest sized, coastal, brown water navy’ to the ‘largest Navy in the world’ and its evolving focus from ‘offshore waters defence’ to a combination of ‘“offshore waters defence” with “open seas protection”. The political and strategic underpinnings of this expansion were articulated by President Xi Jinping in his 2017 statement that China’s defence modernisation would be complete by 2035 and that its armed forces would transform into world-class forces by mid-21st century. 

• The doctrinal shift along with other factors such as the Maritime Silk Road, near continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), its first overseas facility at Djibouti and anti-piracy patrols have progressively enlarged the footprint of PLAN and are in consonance with China’s stated policy of becoming a great maritime power.  China’s naval strategists have underscored the imperative of adopting a ‘Two Oceans Strategy’ i.e. the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific as theatres for operations for PLAN. 

• China’s actions in the past two years have resulted in apprehension amongst European nations and USA and its internal and external actions have created unease. China’s global aspirations are also being spelt out clearly, which reflects a confident China under a strong leadership.

• As a consequence, other nations are realigning their foreign policies. India has not acceded to China on the Galwan Valley incident but is negotiating to resolve the issue.  Germany has revised its ‘Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific Region’ and is looking for partners in the IOR to uphold multi-lateral world order and free trade, for which India is a natural.  Reiterated was the need to understand underlying Chinese thought-process and rebuild credible alternatives in Indo-Pacific based on free world values.

• There was little concern about China’s presence in the Indian Ocean earlier as China could not sustain its presence. Since 2008, China has maintained a continuous presence in the IOR by deployment of counter-piracy task forces and has progressively evolved its naval doctrine from ‘requirement of logistic support for ‘Out of Area’ contingencies’ in 2010 to ‘open seas protection’ in 2015, strengthening the argument that China needs to be capable of protecting its interests, business and citizens overseas, like other navies.  The 2014 docking of a Chinese submarine at Colombo port and the 2016 Maldives’ water crisis showcased China’s capabilities, interests and political commitment in establishing itself in IOR. 

• Historically, China has utilised commercial activities to secure its maritime interests which include the Belt and Road Initiative and protecting its sea lines of communication including its energy supplies. With considerable investments, citizens and commerce in the region, it has justification to strengthen its foothold in the region.

• It has expanded its engagement across the IOR and stepped up diplomatic, political and strategic collaboration with littoral islands including training of personnel, strengthened Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), acquisition of ports and increased surveillance and mapping exercises by various means to acquire oceanographic data, critical for naval deployments.  China's ability to acquire dual-use ports and increase its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) will determine its future role in IOR. 

• IOR nations have sought alternative security partners to avoid dependency on a single country. Concerned with sovereignty and cross-rivalry between major nations, these nations have engaged with other countries including China to address their concerns such as illegal fishing, natural disasters, trafficking and climate change. 

• India’s greatest strengths are its geography as witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic, understanding requirements of IOR community and Maritime Domain Awareness. However, India would need a combination of traditional and non-traditional approaches to security to deal with China’s expansion in IOR. 

• By 2035, PLAN’s assessed force levels would include four to five aircraft carriers, 110 destroyers and frigates and 20 replenishment ships. The increase in number of replenishment ships will enhance its long-range deployment capabilities.

• In recent years, Chinese naval strategists have been increasingly influenced by Sir Julian Corbett’s ‘Control of Seas’.  Focus areas for PLAN are likely to be South China Sea, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean in decreasing order of priority. By 2035, China is likely to mark the beginnings of becoming a global maritime power and is likely to progressively expand to, what Prof. Andrew Latham terms as, the third, fourth and fifth island chains, by 2050.   

• China is concerned about its strategic vulnerabilities in the IOR and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the proposed Kra Canal are intended at reducing its ‘Malacca Straits Dilemma’. It has employed various means such as Oceanographic research vessels, deep sea fishing, setting up and expansion of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance facilities providing naval platforms to Pakistan and conducting exercises with Iran, Pakistan and Russia to increase its influence in the region.   

• It is also in the process of creating strategic maritime hubs. China’s port acquisitions are focussed on Mediterranean, Western Europe, Panama and Nicaragua canals.  While these acquisitions are purely commercial and do not have facilities required to support naval operations, China can upgrade them as logistic support or naval bases in future. 

• While the PLAN was created in 1949, it was only in 1984 that two PLAN ships left their coastal waters and visited Karachi. Since 2008, PLAN has a permanent deployment in IOR.  Assessment of annual patterns indicates permanent presence of six to eight ships in the IOR in the form of Anti-Piracy Escort Forces and intelligence/ hydrographic survey ships and an annual deployment of two submarines for a period of three months from 2013 to 2018.

• Since 2007, Indian Navy has permanently deployed ships along routes of ingress and egress in the IOR such as Malacca Straits, Gulf of Aden and Southern Indian Ocean to provide MDA along with Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft. PLAN ships are continuously monitored during their presence in IOR and hydrographic and surveillance ships are escorted out of India’s Exclusive Economic Zone.  While commercial ports permit ‘operational turn around’, additional facilities are required to support naval operations which is currently available only at Djibouti.

• As Net Security Provider, India has a comprehensive engagement policy in the region.  This includes training of 1000 naval personnel from 30 countries at any given time, building capacity and capability of maritime forces in the form of ships and improving their capability to operate them. Coastal radar networks have been established in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles and talks are on with other countries to establish coastal radar networks to create comprehensive MDA. It shares data with IOR countries through its International Fusion Centre and International Multi-Agency Centre.  Indian Navy also conducts coordinated patrols with other navies such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Mauritius and Seychelles.

• Based on PLAN’s assessed force building and commitments, a maximum of 20 ships in the Indian Ocean along with logistic ships may be deployed in the IOR. Its carrier battle groups are likely to take decades to operationalise and deploy.  Its 100,000-strong PLAN Marine Corps is evolving to project power, support China’s global presence and secondary roles along China’s borders.

• Cooperation with other countries in the form of communications compatibility and security agreement (COMCASA), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the proposed Maritime Information Sharing Technical Arrangement (MISTA) will improve Indian Navy’s capabilities in terms of MDA logistic sustenance. 

• India’s Defence reforms are not theatre, country or threat-specific but synergise and integrate capabilities to support envisaged role of India in the global comity of nations.