The paper is structured into five sections. It begins with sections one and two by outlining a conceptual discussion of Chinese foreign policy, aiming to provide a foundation for understanding the underlying principles that drive Chinese foreign policy philosophy. Section three discusses China’s presence in the Western Balkans and discusses the path dependency approach of Chinese foreign policy. Section four presents a discourse analysis of Chinese foreign policy to examine the specific language China employs when discussing Kosovo, Serbia, and the normalization process, based on an analysis of 82 texts totaling over 30,000 words, that include official statements, speeches and interviews from officials largely from 2008 to 2024. Section five adopts a more critical, attitudinal perspective, situating China’s approach within its broader interests in the Western Balkans. Drawing from official Chinese statements, UN Security Council speeches, MFA briefings, and diplomatic visits, the paper traces China’s positioning toward Kosovo, a subject which, to date, has been largely unexplored in Kosovo. At its core, the paper also identifies a consistent pattern of rhetorical distance paired with alignment with Serbia.
The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, China’s discourse on Kosovo is grounded in a legalistic framework in appearance or rhetoric and opportunistic in practice. However, even in its legalistic appearance China always ignores ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence in 2010. Second, China’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans is not neutral, but explicitly aligned with Serbia, both rhetorically and technically, and this makes Serbia a key platform for Chinese influence in our region, as other studies have shown.1 Third, despite its support for the EU-led normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in principle, China undermines the process by refusing to endorse its objectives, distancing itself from the notion of “normalization,” and promoting a status quo that favors ambiguity over resolution. For China, Kosovo is not an issue that needs to be resolved, but a Western design liberal-democratic project that needs to fail. In other words, China’s position on Kosovo has largely remained the same since 1998, and viewing Kosovo’s “solution” in a way that best fits interests of Sebia, which, as this paper seeks to show, is largely because of Taiwan.
The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, China’s discourse on Kosovo is grounded in a legalistic framework in appearance or rhetoric and opportunistic in practice. However, even in its legalistic appearance China always ignores ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence in 2010. Second, China’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans is not neutral, but explicitly aligned with Serbia, both rhetorically and technically, and this makes Serbia a key platform for Chinese influence in our region, as other studies have shown.1 Third, despite its support for the EU-led normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in principle, China undermines the process by refusing to endorse its objectives, distancing itself from the notion of “normalization,” and promoting a status quo that favors ambiguity over resolution. For China, Kosovo is not an issue that needs to be resolved, but a Western design liberal-democratic project that needs to fail. In other words, China’s position on Kosovo has largely remained the same since 1998, and viewing Kosovo’s “solution” in a way that best fits interests of Sebia, which, as this paper seeks to show, is largely because of Taiwan.