Kosovo holds the potential candidate’s status for the EU. The journey to EU integration remains difficult for three main reasons: non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU member states, lack of reforms in the technical aspect of the measures stemming from the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the European Reform Agenda (ERA), and the EU’s lack of political readiness and willingness for enlargement.
All EU non-recognizers do not recognize Kosovo because of domestic politics and the risk of legitimizing sectional movements such as the Catalans and Basques in Spain or the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. In terms of internal technical reforms, they have stalled due to short-lived governments and insufficient majority to push forward the legislative processes. On the other hand, since the refugee crisis of 2015, far-right Eurosceptic parties have even pushed the center-right parties in the EU to take stricter positions regarding EU enlargement, thus causing an enlargement sluggishness of the European Union in general.
Despite the complications of the integration process, Kosovo made limited progress towards integration. It signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2015, which is the first contractual agreement between Kosovo and the EU. In 2016, it approved the European Reform Agenda, and in 2016 the European Commission proposed visa liberalization for Kosovo after meeting the requirements.
However, the SAA and ERA remain at best half-finished. Kosovan citizens have often received “good news on visa liberalization” from Parliament and the European Commission but have not yet been granted liberalization. Dialogue with Serbia and visa non-liberalization consume political discourse about the EU. Political leaders more often go to Brussels to negotiate with Serbia than discuss political, economic, and social reforms that Kosovo must complete to become part of the EU.
To discuss this topic, D4D had three panelists invited to Tuesday’s Salon: Teuta Sahatqija, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo; Lulzim Peci, Executive Director at KIPRED and Donika Emini, Executive Director at CiviKos. Three main lessons learned from the discussion: the instability of governments leading to the non-completion of full mandates negatively affects European reforms; geopolitical momentum should be used, and the five non-recognizers are the key to Kosovo’s EU integration.
Government instability and European integration
During the discussion, it was said that the problem of Kosovo’s domestic policy and the instability of governments leads to short-lived governments that do not complete full terms and cannot bring laws forward, which get returned to the government after the end of the short-lived term.
Frequent shifts of governments constantly change the negotiating parties, always portraying Kosovo as a non-serious partner in internal reforms and talks with Serbia.
Kosovo should also have a political coordinator who coordinates the ministries in implementing the laws and measures of the SAA and ERA. Besnik Bislimi, current deputy Prime Minister, could be the coordinator who may transfer the reforms to his next colleague after the end of his term.
Therefore, in addition to the importance of the stability of full-fledged Kosovo governments, it is essential that political parties, which are all pro-European integration, cooperate on the integration agenda and pick up the stalled reforms, which would prevent legislative measures from returning to government and be incorporated into the legislative agenda of future governments.
Geopolitical moments of European integration
Since recent EU memberships, from Croatia in 2013 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the EU has slowed the enlargement pace. Historically, geopolitical movements have influenced the EU enlargement process, such as the Baltic countries, Eastern European countries, Greece and Cyprus. So, EU integration is not a purely technical process, which ends when the requirements are met. It heavily depends on the domestic policies of the member states. It is therefore important that governments use favorable momentums.
For example, in 2015, Kosovo may have probably received visa liberalization in the same package with Georgia and Ukraine, but the issue of Demarcation with Montenegro blocked the political process in the country. Six years later, although Kosovo met the requirements, the political momentum in the EU and the rise of the far-right and the anti-immigration sentiment raised hesitance among key EU countries towards granting visa liberalization to Kosovans.
Therefore, the current government should keep in mind to use the momentum in foreign policy because it may take a long time to reappear again (if at all). For example, last year, Kosovo received more attention from the White House regarding the dialogue with Serbia that ended with the Washington Agreement in September 2020. The very fact that the President was the mediator shows momentum for Kosovo, which should use the USA re-engagement in the dialogue process and its parliamentary majority in the Kosovo Assembly and push the reforms and decisions that were impossible to be reached by the past government.
Kosovo’s European integration process is linked with the dialogue with Serbia, just as North Macedonia’s integration process included the resolution of the name issue. The government should not focus too much on re-negotiating past agreements, as reopening the already negotiated topics would not advance but rather reverse the dialogue process.
Five non-recognizers
Among the main challenges blocking EU integration are the five non-recognizers (Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, and Cyprus), as recognition would open Kosovo’s perspective for NATO and the EU.
An essential focus of the current government but also of the pro-EU countries should be the approximation to the five non-recognizers. Non-recognizers, although they have not recognized Kosovo, benefit from the security that the state of Kosovo provides to the Balkans and Europe. The Government of Kosovo should do more in lobbying among non-recognizers through a meritorious diplomatic service. Because the current diplomatic service often serves more the internal clientelism of political parties in Kosovo, where embassies become places to settle the clientele, rather than places to lobby for Kosovo’s foreign policy.
Therefore, final recommendations to advancing in EU affairs include having a proactive government; use the political momentum and its parliamentary majority to push the issues forward; being a reliable partner of friendly countries, and not ignore the dialogue with Serbia, which is a political process related to the technical process of European integration.