Bosnia and Herzegovina has voted and remains trapped in the status quo

No appetite for change

After three years of a severe state crisis caused by the separatist ambitions of the RS government, alongside stagnation in the EU accession process and the associated reforms, one might have expected a mood for change to emerge at the elections. Yet even 31 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, the country remains deeply divided into a Bosniak-Croat-dominated entity and a Serb-dominated entity. It is still under the supervision of a High Representative of the international community, while the European Union Force (EUFOR, Operation Althea) helps maintain stability. Fundamental reforms have long been overdue.

The funeral of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić, one of the worst war criminals of the Bosnian War, held in Belgrade with public honours on 7 September, in the midst of the election campaign in BiH, drew leading RS politicians on a pilgrimage. It not only reopened old wounds but also demonstrated once again, in an alarming manner, the role of blind nationalism.

Against this political and historical backdrop, the country remains trapped in the prevailing circumstances. There was, and still is, no sign of a mood for change. On the contrary, the elections largely confirmed the existing balance of party-political power, although more than half of voters stayed away. This highlights widespread political lethargy or frustration – assuming that the official turnout figures are accurate at all.

Who, after all, could they have voted for to bring about fundamental change? For example, the opposition parties SDS and PSS/PDP in RS, which has been governed continuously for twenty years by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and its partners, pursuing an increasingly Serb-nationalist course. Yet it is precisely the SNSD, under its leader Milorad Dodik (67), who was convicted of separatism by the highest court in BiH in 2025 and had to step down as President of RS, that has emerged stronger from the elections at every level. Although his conviction prevented him from standing, Dodik appeared on most election posters, boasted of his good connections with both Putin and Trump, and regards his party’s strong result as an endorsement. The party secured victory for its candidates for the Presidency of BiH, Željka Cvijanović (59), and the presidency of RS, Savo Minić (52), while increasing its share of the vote in the parliamentary elections, at least in percentage terms. It is frequently reported that political and economic dependencies, benefits and material inducements influenced a considerable number of voters in RS. New electoral technologies cannot prevent this clientelism, which is also familiar in the Federation of BiH. SNSD voters may also have been motivated by defiance, rallying behind their president and his party against outside intervention by the High Representative and the state-level judiciary.

There is no sign of a new, strong political force with popular leadership capable of bringing a fresh impetus across ethnic divides. There are numerous small parties, among which the principal national parties – the Bosniak SDA, the Serb SNSD and the Croat HDZ BiH – dominate alongside the Social Democrats of the SDP. The SDA, the country’s strongest party, has been in opposition since 2023, having previously held government office almost continuously. It gained 2.5 and 6.2% in the parliamentary elections. Only in the election for the Presidency did its long-serving leader Bakir Izetbegović (70), with 34%, trail the Social Democratic incumbent Denis Bećirović (50), who won 38.1%.

Criticism that Izetbegović received far fewer votes than his party, the SDA, in the Federation’s parliamentary elections is not entirely convincing: many Bosniaks also vote for a Croat candidate in the presidential election, whereas in parliamentary elections they vote along ethnic party lines. In the Federation, almost 240,000 votes were cast for the Croat member of the Presidency, but only around 133,000 for Croat parties in the Federation’s parliamentary elections – a difference of some 107,000. Had a good third of those Bosniak voters who voted for the Croat member of the Presidency instead supported Izetbegović, in line with his 34% result, the gap between his vote and the SDA’s would have been small.

The main obstacle to a possible Izetbegović victory was Semir Efendić, still a young politician at 43. Unlike Izetbegović, he, like the Social Democrat Bećirović (50), received significantly more votes as a presidential candidate than his Party for BiH (SBiH) did in the Federation. In other words, both candidates had considerably greater electoral appeal than their parties.

Efendić has been mayor of Novi Grad Sarajevo, one of the City of Sarajevo’s four large municipalities, since 2012. In 2021, he left the SDA for the SBiH, which he has led ever since. He came third in the election for the Bosniak member of the Presidency with 25.7%.

The SBiH is entering the 42-seat House of Representatives with three seats and 5.5% of the vote. In the 98-seat Parliament of the Federation of BiH, its 9.1% is expected to yield nine seats. Across the Federation’s ten cantonal assemblies, it will hold 19 of the 289 seats, up from ten in 2022. Socially conservative, unitarist and pro-European, the SBiH could become the kingmaker in government formation at state level and in the Federation.

Two women in the state Presidency

In the elections for the Presidency of BiH, alongside the Bosniak Social Democratic incumbent Denis Bećirović (50), the incumbent Serb member Željka Cvijanović (59) of the SNSD comfortably defeated the young, relatively unknown opposition candidate Marinko Božović (41; 26.4%) of the SDS, winning 55.6%. He is mayor of Istočna Ilidža, a Sarajevo suburb whose population is 93% Serb.

On the Croat side, the HDZ BiH candidate, 39-year-old Darijana Filipović, won 46.5%, defeating Slaven Kovačević (54) of the Democratic Front (DF), who received 30.6%, and Zdenko Lučić (59), the candidate of the coalition around HDZ 1990, with 22.9%.

With long-serving incumbent Željko Komšić (62) of the DF barred from standing after two consecutive terms since 2018, Filipović won decisively. Komšić, a former Social Democrat, had already served two terms in the Presidency from 2006 to 2014, to the persistent displeasure of many Croats. They did not recognise him as a genuine Croat representative because his election depended heavily on Bosniak votes. Darijana Filipović’s election has provisionally resolved this problem, but not fundamentally at the constitutional level. An economist, Filipović is a deputy leader of HDZ BiH and has been a member of the House of Representatives since late 2018, most recently chairing its Foreign Affairs Committee. She represents generational renewal in HDZ BiH and the country’s European perspective.

Voters in the Federation of BiH elect the Bosniak and Croat members of the rotating three-member Presidency, while those in RS elect the Serb member. This electoral arrangement based on ethnic groups means that in the Federation it is not the absolute number of votes that matters, but the relative majority among voters who have chosen either a Bosniak or a Croat candidate.

Darijana Filipović therefore takes her seat in the Presidency with 46.5% among voters for Croat candidates, although the second- and third-placed Bosniak candidates received considerably more votes. The aim is precisely to ensure that all three peoples are represented in the Presidency. The President of the Federation of BiH is elected indirectly by the Federation’s House of Representatives and House of Peoples.

In the election for President of the RS entity, the incumbent RS Prime Minister Savo Minić (52) comfortably defeated Professor Branko Blanuša (57) of the opposition SDS, winning 52.3% to his opponent’s 41.8%. In the early presidential election of November 2025, triggered by Milorad Dodik’s forced departure from office, with repeat voting in February 2026 due to electoral manipulation, Blanuša had only narrowly lost with 48.1%. This time, however, his defeat was clear. The professor of electrical engineering entered politics from outside the usual party career path.

New coalitions or old ones?

Government formation at state level and in the Federation of BiH hinges on whether the SDA, the strongest party with 19.7% nationwide and 30.6% in the Federation, will return to office or whether governments will again be formed without it, as in 2022.

The outgoing state-level government, led by the Serb-nationalist SNSD (16.9% nationwide; 39.2% in RS), the Croat HDZ BiH (7.8% nationwide; 13.6% in the Federation) and the Trojka alliance of Social Democrats (SDP; 9.3% nationwide; 15.4% in the Federation), the Bosniak-conservative NiP (4.1% nationwide; 6.6% in the Federation) and the liberal Naša stranka (NS; 2.4% nationwide; 3.9% in the Federation), has lost its majority of seats. It could nevertheless regroup with the SBiH (5.5% nationwide; 9.1% in the Federation) and other small parties, even though this constellation was far from convincing in the previous legislative term, instead resulting in stalemate and obstruction. The House of Peoples consists of three caucuses of five Bosniak, Serb and Croat delegates each. Since the SNSD is expected to retain a blocking minority of three delegates in the Serb caucus, enabling it to obstruct government action, there is an argument for including it in government again. The same probably also applies to the Bosniak SDA and the Croat HDZ BiH.

A government of the three leading ethnic parties, as in 2019–2022, would therefore also be possible; these parties have a majority in both chambers of the BiH Parliament – the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples. They are the Bosniak SDA, the Serb SNSD and the Croat HDZ BiH. They would, however, need another three seats for a majority. A government without the Croat HDZ BiH would also be conceivable, as in the Federation in 2001–2003 and 2011–2014. All these arrangements have existed before.

The five parties affiliated with the European People’s Party (EPP) – the Bosniak SDA (9 seats), the Serb SDS and PDP/PSS (2 seats each), and the Croat HDZ BiH (4 seats) and HDZ 1990 (1 seat) – endorsed a joint EU accession policy in a common declaration in Sarajevo in June 2026. With 18 of 42 seats, they could form a pro-European coalition excluding the Serb SNSD together with other partners (SDP/5 seats, SBiH/3 seats, NiP or DF/2 seats each). Whatever happens, the political landscape remains fragmented and difficult, but several options exist. What is missing is a clear, effective majority pulling in the same direction on the most important political issues for the country’s future.

In the Federation of BiH, the outgoing coalition of SDP, NiP, NS, NES, HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990, without the SDA, has lost its majority, holding 48 of the 98 seats. It could regain that majority by bringing in the SBiH with its 9 seats. Equally, the EPP partners SDA (32 seats), HDZ BiH (14 seats) and the electoral alliance around HDZ 1990 (3 seats) could govern with one additional partner.

In RS, the SNSD (34 seats) and its coalition partners retain a clear majority of 53 seats against the opposition parties’ 30. There is little to support speculation that the SNSD might govern alongside the Safe Srpska electoral alliance (PSS) of Banja Luka’s young mayor, Draško Stanivuković (33). Led by the PDP, which Stanivuković chairs, the alliance overtook the SDS in RS with 14.1% (+3.8%; 12 seats), compared with the SDS’s 12.1% (−2.9%; 11 seats). In response to the alliance, the PDP’s parliamentary group leader in the National Assembly and former defence minister Igor Crnadak (54) left the party and founded PDP RS, which stood together with Nebojša Vukanović’s (47) For Justice and Order movement (ZPiR). The alliance won 4.6% in RS (4 seats) and 2.4% at state level (1 seat).

In the election in RS for the Presidency of BiH, Vukanović secured a notable 17%. His candidacy, however, further reduced the opposition’s already slim chances of success in that election.

In the Federation of BiH’s ten cantons, which have their own assemblies and governments, the Bosniak SDA gained 8 seats and now holds 75 of the total 289 seats across all cantons. HDZ BiH gained 5 seats, bringing its total to 59.

By contrast, HDZ 1990 and its coalition lost 4 seats and now hold only 11. The Social Democrats (SDP; +4 = 38) and the SBiH (+9 = 19) also made gains. The NiP, a rival of the SDA, lost 6 of its 20 seats. The DF of outgoing Presidency member Željko Komšić likewise suffered heavy losses, losing 7 of its 19 seats.

The use of new electoral technologies and voter turnout

The new electoral technology, used nationwide for the first time to authenticate voters through fingerprints and ID scanning and to count votes electronically, worked reasonably well overall despite some problems. However, around half of polling stations opened slightly late because of technical difficulties, and many consequently closed late as well. With one exception, the technology did not fundamentally alter the election results: what stands out is a further significant decline in turnout, ranging from 39.8 to 46.9% depending on the election. Turnout for the BiH House of Representatives was 51.5% in 2022, compared with 42.4% this time. Alongside public frustration, electoral technology probably played a role here by preventing multiple voting and the addition of extra ballot papers. Yet the reliability of turnout figures is questionable. If the number of registered voters, over 3.3 million, is assumed to be unrealistically high given an estimated population of only 2.8 million, the low turnout becomes considerably less stark.

The electoral register is outdated; many emigrants remain listed, but few of them vote. In previous elections, the number of voters abroad was usually below 50,000. This time, around 48,000 citizens were registered to vote from abroad. Deducting 30% for minors from an actual population of 2.8 million and adding only 48,000 overseas voters would yield approximately 2 million eligible voters. With 1,416,262 people voting for the BiH House of Representatives, turnout would then be around 70% – not a poor figure. This would cast citizens’ political participation in a very different light.

The introduction of the new technologies was pushed through against domestic resistance by the High Representative of the international community, CSU politician Christian Schmidt (69), who stepped down at the end of June 2026. SNSD leader Milorad Dodik (67), in particular, fiercely attacked the electoral technologies. Targeted disinformation campaigns were directed against the new equipment. Its purpose, however, was to prevent as far as possible the electoral manipulation repeatedly criticised in the past, such as voting in the names of deceased people or falsified ballot papers, and to strengthen confidence in the electoral process.

Without Schmidt’s decision to provide the necessary funding from the public budget, the technologies would not have been introduced, as the political will to allocate the funds was lacking. Back in 2024, his “transparency package” had also introduced stricter party-financing rules, measures against sham parties and electoral lists, polling-station committees that were as impartial as possible, and greater independence and oversight powers for the Central Election Commission (CEC).

Overall, the introduction of electoral technology caused various problems, but also produced historically rapid initial results on election day and significantly fewer complaints about physical electoral fraud at polling stations. Manipulation shifted towards influencing voters beforehand through vote-buying, pressure or misuse of public funds for campaigning. Comparing individual polling stations or municipalities with markedly different turnout in 2022 and 2026 could, however, provide a more precise assessment of the new technology’s effects.

Transparency of election results and invalid votes

Unreliable voter registration and the long wait for the Election Commission to present provisional official final results, which had not happened by 14 October, do not contribute to the transparency of election results. The reasons cited are the complex electoral system at different levels, problems with the electoral technology, and bureaucratic corrections to records in individual cases. The electoral register would require a fundamental revision of population registers.

Moreover, the Election Commission’s website does not provide a clear, transparent presentation of results and parliamentary seat allocations that would make it easy to gain an overview. Publicly available analyses based on post-election surveys, offering more detailed information on voting behaviour or movements of voters between parties, are virtually non-existent.

As of 9 October, five days after the elections, the Election Commission reported that 98.71% of polling stations had been counted for the Presidency of BiH. Of 3,338,785 registered voters, 1,415,978 voted (42.41%). There were 1,353,992 valid ballot papers (95.62%); 4.38% were invalid (2022: 6.55%), most of them blank. In total, 61,997 votes were invalid.

By comparison, in Germany’s Bundestag elections, only 0.8% of first votes for candidates and 0.6% of second votes for parties were invalid. Results for the BiH House of Representatives are available from 98.69% of polling stations. Here, 1,416,262 citizens voted (42.42%). Only 91.32% of ballot papers, or 1,294,212 votes, are valid; 3.29% are blank and 5.39% invalid for other reasons, amounting to 122,969 votes (8.68%) in total. Around 8.4% of votes were also invalid in the 2022 election.

There are 2,102,188 registered voters for the Parliament of the Federation of BiH. Results are available from 98.77% of polling stations. A total of 837,550 citizens voted (39.84%), with only 91.50% casting valid ballots. There are 71,166 invalid votes (8.50%).

There are 2,055,906 registered voters for the Federation of BiH’s ten cantons, slightly fewer than for the Federation’s parliamentary election. A total of 98.71% of polling stations have been counted. With 821,928 ballot papers, turnout stands at 39.98%. Valid ballots account for 92.19%, and invalid ballots for 7.81%, or 64,161 votes.

RS has 1,236,597 registered voters. A total of 98.12% of polling stations have been counted. There were 579,242 voters (46.84%), 7 percentage points more than in the Federation. The share of valid votes is 90.85%; 52,978 ballot papers (9.15%) are invalid.

For the RS presidential election, results are available from 98.07% of polling stations. Turnout was 46.85%, with 579,362 voters; the number of invalid votes was 27,386 (4.73%).

Explanations given for the high share of invalid votes include the complexity of voting and postal voting, errors in using the new electoral technology, and the deliberate casting of invalid ballots as a protest. The fact that only 4.4% of votes were invalid in the presidential elections, compared with 7.8–9.2% in the various parliamentary elections – roughly twice as many – suggests that the complexity of parliamentary voting does indeed play a role.

Conclusion

The elections failed to signal a political breakthrough with a new constellation of parties, particularly in the Serb part of the country. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity for a new government that sets reform priorities to move the country forward. The coalition negotiations of the coming weeks and months will be crucial.

Another decisive factor will be whether, following its electoral success, the leadership in the Serb entity chooses a more pragmatic course of cooperation for the benefit of the entire country, or continues to pursue a destructive separatism that ultimately also harms progress in RS. Responsible political leaders in RS should recognise that the EU respects federalism and subsidiarity, and that joint EU membership for BiH and Serbia would bring substantial benefits to citizens in RS as well. Continuing the nationalist course would squander this opportunity.

If the opportunity for reform following these elections is not seized, BiH will fall further behind in the EU accession process and remain mired in stagnation. Responsibility rests with the elected politicians.

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The provisional election results are included in the annex to the country report in the PDF version.