A Front Line Drawn in the Sand: Jihadism Creeps into Northern Benin and Togo

The creeping spread of jihadist groups in northern Benin and Togo has gone largely unnoticed because it has been slow and methodical. Initially confined to the borders with Burkina Faso and national parks such as Park W and the Pendjari region, instability has now spread further inland. Armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda are using infiltration, local recruitment, and violence against civilians to systematically undermine state control.

Despite efforts by local governments to improve social services and economic opportunities—such as through the Savanes Emergency Program in Togo or community development projects in Benin—living conditions continue to deteriorate. Unemployment, poverty, and ethnic tensions, particularly within Fulani communities, are exacerbating instability. The arrival of refugees puts additional strain on already limited resources and exacerbates social conflicts and land disputes.

This study is based on extensive field research, including 274 interviews in the affected regions. It highlights the repeated failures of international and national responses, which are often characterized by a lack of understanding of local dynamics. Experience with counterterrorism in the Sahel suggests that the same mistakes are now being repeated in the Gulf of Guinea countries.

Militarily, Benin and Togo face a growing threat from two jihadist groups, Katibat Sékou Mouslimou and Katibat Abou Hanifa, operating from Burkina Faso. These groups, coordinated under the leadership of JNIM (Al-Qaeda's offshoot in the Sahel), have established cross-border networks that enable them to attack security forces while maintaining their bases of operation outside Benin and Togo. Their strategic goal is not immediate territorial control, but rather the creation of a buffer zone that weakens state authority and creates favorable conditions for their influence in the long term.

The responses of the two governments differ. Benin's military has improved its counterterrorism tactics and prevented territorial losses, but remains vulnerable due to a lack of combat experience. Togo, on the other hand, has launched a preventive military operation, Koundjoaré, to secure its border, but jihadist attacks continue. The situation is further complicated by rising crime, livestock theft, and local conflicts, which are blurring the lines between banditry and insurgency.

One of the key findings of this study is that jihadist expansion is not solely militarily motivated but is deeply linked to socioeconomic grievances. Economic hardship, poor governance, and ethnic rivalries provide recruitment opportunities for jihadist groups. Without urgent measures to improve local governance, resolve land conflicts, and integrate marginalized communities, the region risks suffering the same fate as the Sahel, where state authority has collapsed in many areas.

International involvement remains crucial, but lack of coordination and knowledge of local conditions hamper effective intervention. The lessons from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger highlight the risks of delayed action. If northern Benin and Togo are to resist the growing jihadist threat, a comprehensive strategy combining security measures with sustainable socioeconomic investments is needed.

As the front line against jihadism in West Africa continues to shift southward, the fate of northern Benin and Togo serves as a warning sign. Without decisive and informed intervention, these lines drawn in the sand could soon become permanent.

This article was written by Mathias Khalfaoui, an independent French consultant specializing in human security issues in West Africa, with a particular interest in coastal states. Through his extensive field missions, he has gained a deep understanding of local dynamics.