Deepening the partnership at the 11th EU-Korea Summit

Background

The Republic of Korea has become one of the EU’s most important non-European partners over the past two decades. One of the most important building blocks was the conclusion of the free trade agreement in 2011[1], which since then has led to a doubling of the trade volume between the two sides (2025: € 124bn). The EU is now the third-largest trading partner of Korea; for the EU, Korea in turn is the eighth-largest trading partner. Further milestones of the partnership were the framework agreement establishing the strategic partnership (2014) and the framework agreement on participation in EU crisis management operations (2016). But even under the von der Leyen II Commission, in office since 2024, there have already been steps to deepen cooperation: this includes the signing of the second Security and Defence Partnership of the EU with a non-European country, which took place in November 2024. South Korean companies have become important, and above all fast suppliers for European armed forces, especially for Poland (largest buyer of Korean weapons in the EU) and Romania. Companies of the Republic of Korea can also participate in consortia that benefit from the EU’s SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program[2], provided that their share does not exceed 35% of the total value of the contract. The Republic of Korea hopes for the suspension of this limitation, but unlike Canada did not sign an agreement that would lift this in exchange for financial participation. In 2025, the EU also associated the Republic of Korea with the research framework program Horizon Europe. In view of the deteriorating geopolitical and geo-economic overall situation for both sides, both sought to renew the framework of cooperation in the field of trade and to explore deeper cooperation in other areas.

Key Results – More Than Just a Digital Agreement

At the summit, Commission President von der Leyen emphasized the growing strategic importance of the partnership, especially for economic security and innovation.

The most striking success of the summit was the signing of an agreement on digital trade[3]. This digital trade agreement complements the existing free trade agreement of 2011, enabling the removal of unnecessary barriers to online trade, and strengthening legal certainty for companies operating on the European and Korean markets. It also includes the legal recognition of electronic contracts and signatures, facilitates cross-border data flows, and prohibits the mandatory disclosure of source codes, while high standards of protection for personal data and privacy are to be maintained.

A second signal was the conclusion of a competitiveness partnership between the Republic of Korea and the EU, which is intended above all to ensure better coordination in the fields of economic security and industrial policy. Driven by a high-level economic dialogue, synergies between already existing dialogues on economic security, industrial policy, and trade are to be created[4]. In addition, both sides intend to launch a high-level energy dialogue, among other things to better coordinate efforts in the field of energy security.

In the area of security and defence, the existing cooperation - already strengthened through the security and defence partnership[5] - is to be expanded in the areas of cyber and maritime security as well as disinformation. In addition, both sides agreed to work toward the opening of negotiations on an agreement on the security of information “to facilitate the exchange of classified information and pave the way for […] closer cooperation”. Furthermore, both sides welcomed the conclusion of negotiations on a basic agreement on passenger name records (PNR), which is to be signed and ratified promptly. This is intended to enable more effective combating of cross-border crime, especially illicit drug trafficking.

The joint declaration also indicates that the cooperation begun last year in Horizon Europe is to be continued in the research framework program of the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (2028–2034).

Common Language on Geopolitical Challenges

Although the People’s Republic of China is not explicitly mentioned a single time in the entire declaration, the question of how to deal with an increasingly aggressive China was addressed throughout the declaration - be it through a joint commitment to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the call for peace in the Taiwan Strait, or the rejection of unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. The same applies to the mention of “freedom of navigation and overflight and protecting critical undersea infrastructure.” Indirectly, the willingness of both sides to address macroeconomic imbalances and steel overcapacities also refers to China.

Both sides expressed themselves more explicitly regarding support for Ukraine (including the demand for “ensuring justice for victims,” reconstruction of the country, the importance of the sanctions regime) and regarding the condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression as well as support from third parties for Russia, including North Korea. At the same time, there was a clear commitment from the EU side to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Regarding the situation in the Middle East, all sides called for de-escalation, demanding the “ensuring of freedom of navigation and safe transit passage in the Strait of Hormuz”, the protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure, as well as respect for international law.

Analysis & Commentary

Since the beginning of the second von der Leyen Commission, the EU has consistently sought to strengthen ties with like-minded countries worldwide in all policy areas. This summit also fits into this logic. The strength of the bilateral relationship is now reflected in the multitude of concrete cooperation initiatives. These are based not only on the shared values of both partners, but also on the recognition that South Korea, especially in the high-technology sector, can play a key role in the EU’s greater diversification efforts.

The common formulations regarding North Korea, Ukraine, the Middle East, and (indirectly) China show the high degree of alignment on current geopolitical challenges, at present, which exists to such an extent only with a few international partners of the EU. European Council President António Costa rightly expressed demonstrative thanks for the support of the Republic of Korea for Ukraine.

For some projects, such as the “high-level dialogue” on economic issues and the competitiveness partnership, not all observers are yet clear what the concrete focal topics will be. However, the impulse to coordinate more closely with partners worldwide on issues of economic security and industrial policy - where both the Commission and many Member States advocate for stronger EU instruments - is fundamentally to be viewed positively. In this way, the risk is reduced that, in very sensitive areas, uncoordinated European initiatives might alienate important partners - as has repeatedly happened in the past.

Cooperation with the Republic of Korea has now reached a remarkable depth. However, the discussions about stronger participation of Korea in the SAFE program or in shaping instruments in the field of economic security also show that the EU must soon make fundamental decisions in dealing with its international partners about whether European resilience can be ensured by the EU alone or only in conjunction with like-minded third countries.

[1] Officially, the agreement only entered into force in 2015, but had already been provisionally applied since 2011

[2] Under SAFE, the EU provides financial support in the form of loans of up to €150 billion. Objective: increase defence investments of the Member States through joint procurement

[3] The agreement can be found here

[4] https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13884/20/during-11th-bilateral-summit-eu-and-south-korea-aim-to-strengthen-security-partnership-and-modernise-free-trade-agreement

[5] The text can be found here