Once again Alexander Lukashenko stands under strong political pressure in this moment. A fully-grown economic crisis and the perception of threats in terms of security policy especially from the East are currently forcing him towards a cautious process of rapprochement to the West. The president in his 23rd year in office sees himself conflicted between two external expectations: Russia expects loyalty and abidance to the current alliance - without the massive financial support from Moscow Lukashenko would hardly be viable. According to Russian logic – the key word here is Ukraine – abidance to the alliance also means the sacrifice of democratic experiments and especially of a real romance with the EU. Due to the liberation of political inmates in August 2015, the West is giving Lukashenko a massive political and financial leap of faith at the moment but does indeed expect improvements in the democratic organization of the elections.

One might feel reminded of previous periods of swinging between East and West; the strong leverage and the dependence from Moscow on one hand, and the only source of economic diversification that is left for Belarus facing the economic challenges within Russia, namely the EU, on the other hand simply don’t leave Lukashenko hardly any other option than an ongoing balancing.

In the last months, the EU has shown first steps towards new ways that one could go with Belarus in case of the currently improved relations: the European Investment Bank will be active in Belarus on a financial scale; discussions over the future configuration of the Eastern Partnership, in which Belarus had been involved without a plan of action so far, are being held. A human rights dialogue and a coordination forum about the cooperation between the EU and Belarus have been established; an initiative concerning the state of law alongside the United Nations is in the course of preparation. Especially among the Middle-Eastern European states a distinct intensification of contact to Belarus has been observed in the last months, notably due to possibilities of economic cooperation arising from the suspension of EU sanctions. In Brussels as well as in other European capitals one does not bar the idea of possibly making wider offers – provided that Lukashenko sends at least a goodwill gesture towards observing certain core values of the EU more closely. The national election on September 11th is therefore a central indicator in the decision of which shape Belarus’ willingness to cooperate with the EU can take. The next prospective indicator of that sort will probably only be the presidential election in 2020.

Election’s key aspects

The Central Electoral Commission gave the go-ahead for the election campaign for the Chamber of Representatives on June 6th 2016 when President Lukashenko fixed September 11th as Election Day. After the electoral commissions being built, initiative groups were registered for fielding candidates for the parliamentary election by signature collection until July 12th: in order to field a candidate, at least 1.000 signatures of registered voters from the respective election district are necessary. Between July 3rd and August 1st, the signatures for the assembly of candidates were collected or candidates were directly fielded by political parties or the workforce of companies and organizations. Thus, 630 applicants have been found for the 110 places in the parliament. Those are 130 more than for the parliamentary election in 2012. Once the signatures and the documents concerning the fielding candidates by parties and workforce have been inspected, the candidates are registered. Between August 11th and September 10th, the registered candidates are, thus, allowed to campaign. Once again in this election, the early voting, which has often been criticized in the case of Belarus, is allowed from September 6th till September 10th before the actual Election Day on September 11th. On September 16th at the latest, the results of the election will be published in mass media. The election of the Chamber of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus qualifies as having taken place if at least 50 percent of the registered voters cast their vote.

The election for the Upper House, the Council of the Republic, which takes place at the same time, can only be influenced indirectly by the citizens: the candidates are fielded by local councillors and the government from July 25th till August 19th, and are elected between August 25th and September 13th during the joint meetings of the local councillors of one region. Thus, on September 30th, eight members of the Council of the Republic of each of the seven regions of Belarus can be confirmed. The state president nominates eight further members of the Council of the Republic. The newly elected members of the Council of the Republic will supersede their former colleagues in mid-October.

Situation of the opposition

Not much has changed in the last month in the domestic political situation in Belarus which has not been modified for years. There is a power vertical with broad control over organizations that support the system and that are closely linked to the public system. The political opposition and large parts of independent civil society organizations are marginalized and often unknown among the population; or one keeps its distance to them out of fear of negative consequences by publicly controlled authorities. In this context, the oppositional parties do field candidates but some have already announced that they will possibly withdraw these candidacies before Election Day because they don’t judge the current elections to be free and fair, and, thus, do not want to be a part of the process. Others, among them especially those parties that have to be described as close to the system, hope for an entry to Parliament in the style of the parties that are present in the Russian Duma beyond Edinaja Rossija. A third category forms the initiative “Tell the Truth” around the former presidential candidate Tatsiana Korotkevich. This young initiative sees itself as part of the opposition on one hand but campaigns, on the other hand, for a dialogue with the government under the given circumstances. And they are heard. Instead of a boycott of the elections, as discussed in other parts of the opposition, “Tell the Truth” speaks out for motivating the highest possible number of voters to vote.

Most of the opposition parties are still limited in their political actions. Some organizations, among them the party “Belarusian Christian Democracy”, do not get registered and can therefore act in legal grey areas at best. One has taken notable distance from the formerly perceivable active oppression of the opposition in Belarus, however. The number of permitted public opposition events stays rather small but the participation in non-permitted demonstrations does not lead to arrests and prison sentences anymore like it used to. Currently, many activists and politicians of the opposition see themselves confronted to high fines issued by the security apparatus.

The currently cautious process of rapprochement between Belarus and the EU is broadly seen as negative in the opposition. More than a few consider this rapprochement as wrong in the sense that from their perspective it would mean a legitimization of the Lukashenko system. However, an alternative, pragmatic approach for the contact with Belarus in different circumstances of security policy has not been submitted by the opposition yet. Furthermore, the hope that a change in Belarus might also be possible with Lukashenko, which is sometimes perceivable outside of Belarus, is not shared here.

The situation in the primary race

In reference to the parliamentary election, the question of how deep the desired change could possibly be has to stay unanswered for now. Indeed, one must be critical of the fact that only three out of 30 suggestions of the ODIHR concerning the election procedure have been followed. The implementation of the remaining suggestions has been postponed to post-election times; according to the authorities, those suggestions require changes in the electoral law and could therefore not have been implemented during a deadline of six months before the Election Day as is required by law.

At least one suggestion of the ODIHR was followed and the composition of the election commissions was changed. However, this happened only on the level of constituencies and regions and not on a local level on which the votes are actually counted on Election Day. The possibilities for observing the count of votes in the polling stations and the possibilities for candidates to raise complaints have been broadened, though. An additional yet smaller sign of an increasing openness is the involvement of a representative of the independent Belarusian journalists’ union in the media committee of the Central Election Board.

There have been complaints by the opposition during the formation of initiative groups and during the fielding of candidates in the current campaign. Representatives of the opposition have notably reported that members willing to run for election have been pressured at their workplace in order to deter them from their participation in the election. It is quite difficult, however, to prove causality in individual cases in that context. Election observers also referred to exploitation of administrative resources for the support of pro-government candidates.

According to the observation group “Human Rights Activists for Fair Elections” the liberties in collecting signatures and the execution of information stands and informative talks on the doorstep have indeed improved. Although only few legal parameters have changed the political pressure on the candidates of the opposition seems to be smaller in general in this election than in previous elections. But the picture is inconsistent: a deputy chairman of the United Civil Party, Nikolai Kozlov, and a deputy chairman of the movement “For Freedom”, Ales Lahviniec, could not get registered as candidates; according to the authorities, there have been violations in the registration process. Other famous opposition representatives, among them the deputy chairman of the movement “For Freedom”, Yuras Hubarevich, or the two leading figures of the initiative “Tell the Truth”, Tatsiana Korotkevich and Andrej Dzmitryeu, could get registered.

It has to be judged as an important improvement of the circumstances for this election that President Lukashenko instructed the Central Election Commission not to restrict the number of international observers. Invitations to ODIHR/OSCE and the election observers of the Commonwealth of Independent States have already been issued. The Council of Europe shall be invited as well. If this will also hold for the European Parliament has not been clarified yet.

According to a widespread opinion in the opposition these changes and stipulations are not sufficient. What is especially criticized besides the general climate and the non-registration of candidates is the fact that representatives of the opposition only had limited access to the regional and constituency commissions. The counting methods of the government and the opposition differ but basically one can say that out of more than 500 fielded members of the opposition for the commissions only roughly 50 were admitted. While around 90 percent were rejected here the commissions accepted over 90 percent of those candidates that were fielded by organizations that support the government. Fielding not more than 0.08 percent of all possible members of the commission, the opposition’s possibilities to influence the elections within the commissions are without any doubt quite limited. On the other hand the opposition sends no more than approximately 500 candidates to apply for a total 66.000 commission members – undoubtedly a surprisingly meagre number, which raises questions for the reasons.

A stable coalition in the opposition for the first time?

It has to be highlighted that the opposition – at least in the center-right wing – has come to some agreements before this election, resulting in a fairly stable coalition since November 2015. The United Civil Party , the party “Belarusian Christian Democracy” and the movement “For Freedom” are striving for attuned positions and a unified appearance. The approach is new: the opposition used to sway between total fragmentation and completely unified appearance for over two decades; both approaches turned out to be unsustainable. Therefore, certain logic speaks in favour of a middle course with a coalition of only a few parties. In the scope of the coalition, the three parties were not only able to agree on a common list of candidates for 93 constituencies but also campaigned together and helped each other out with places on electoral lists. 67 candidates applied for candidate status on the list of the United Civil Party, which is registered in Belarus. Among them were 30 members of the non-registered party “Belarusian Christian Democracy”. However, it is not unlikely that those parties or individual candidates will withdraw their candidacy before the election, which could disturb the image of a first-time coalition in this form. As of now, the coalition’s clout is suffering from the fact that one of two Belarusian EPP observer parties, the Belarusian People’s Front, decided in a close run against the participation in the middle-right wing coalition. Thus, 60 individual candidates applied for a registration for the Belarusian People’s Front. Due to this fact and to the fielding of more applicants from the remaining opposition parties there will most probably be more candidates from the opposition on the ballot in most constituencies. The expectably low election outcome for the opposition will be further marginalized by this discord.

Since the middle-right wing coalition and broad parts of the remaining opposition hold the opinion that the government does not allow for fair elections, numerous parties set themselves to organizing a massive area-covering election observation in those constituencies where the fielded opposition candidates seem especially strong and promising. The election observation organization “Right to Choose”, which was founded together with other parties, coordinates the allocation of observance in the constituencies.

Among the group of parties and organizations that reject the elections as unfree and unfair is a movement which held a Belarusian National Congress in Mai 2016 and which is organized around the former political inmate and social democrat Mikola Statkevich and the former “Tell the Truth” leader Vladimir Niakliayeu. Said congress shall claim the right to the unification of the opposition as unique organ of coordination. At the moment, the middle-right wing coalition and the remaining parties and organizations of the opposition are negotiating a further reunion or congress in August which shall include registered oppositional candidates and shall function as an instrument of mobilization and symbolize the starting signal of the immediate campaign. What appears problematic in this context is that Mikola Statkevich, one of the leaders of this initiative, is already publicly calling for protests for the day after the election – regardless of the actual course of the elections.

Prospect

After having taken a peace-supporting role in the Ukraine-crisis and after recently having been able to prevent at least a temporary additional direct deployment of Russian troops on its national territory, the Belarusian government obviously wants to thoroughly take its chance to resume a direct full-value dialogue with the EU, the USA and international organizations. By all indications, it is not ready yet for substantial concessions concerning the freedom of elections – among others probably also due to the suspicion from Moscow. In the hope of the West’s willingness to compromise considering the situation of security policy in Eastern Europe, Minsk is orienting itself rather in the direction of a sneak-through with some additional window-dressing in order to get access to new credits, direct investments and new technologies in the end. Minsk would not be averse to beneficial negotiations about the treaty of cooperation and partnership with the EU, the complete abolition of all sanctions, the loosening of the visa regime and access to new dialogue platforms such as EuroNEST.

Whoever is evaluating this strategy from Minsk one must, of course, consider that the intended reinforcement of the Belarusian foreign policy’s Western vector is certainly less based on values than the West would wish but is plainly an outcome of the Belarusian economic and financial necessity. Much evidence suggests, however, that this diversification also follows the goal to become more independent of Moscow wherever possible. A conclusion whether this would be an advantage or a disadvantage for the EU should compellingly only follow from a synopsis based not merely on the values that Europe represents, but also on the realities of security policy. It is obvious that Minsk does not intend a change in the current system of power but, much to the contrary, the stabilization thereof.

The situation is hard to resolve for the Belarusian opposition: it stands between the Western ambition of stability at the EU’s external border on one hand and the danger of further internal rootedness in the Belarusian system on the other hand. If the elections are perceived as neither free nor fair by the West or if there are even protests, leading almost inevitably to arrests in Belarus, the obstacles for a further commitment of the EU towards Belarus would increase on one side. On the other side, the possibilities of having any impact are hardly likely to increase for the opposition. And what options are left for President Lukashenko in case the EU will not be able to maintain its current commitment due to negative internal developments in Belarus concerning the elections? Solely an eastward perspective.