In Germany, consumer food prices have risen by approx. 40 per cent since late 2019.[1] Nevertheless, the price level in Germany is rather low compared to other European countries. According to surveys conducted by the Federal Statistical Office, Germany ranks 19th out of the 35 European countries examined in terms of food prices. In Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and Austria, among other countries, food prices are higher than they are here.[2] This is likely due to a certain competitive relationship between the different suppliers active in the food retail sector, even though Aldi, EDEKA, the Schwarz Group (Lidl, Kaufland) and REWE already account for approx. 85 per cent of the market.
In general, competition is not only driven by prices (including promotional prices), but also by the relevant product range (breadth, depth), the services offered (apps, opening hours, etc.) and the location of the retailers’ stores. It is the Bundeskartellamt’s task to protect free and fair competition. To this end, the authority has a wide range of legal instruments at its disposal and applies them on a regular basis – also and in particular in the food retail sector. The Bundeskartellamt ensures that competition is maintained in both food production and food retailing in terms of prices, quality and choice. This is how consumers get to enjoy sufficient choice between different food product offerings.
Merger control proceedings
The Bundeskartellamt extensively uses the tools available to protect competition in the food retail sector. This applies in equal measure to the sales and procurement sides, retailers and manufacturers, merger control and the control of abusive practices.
An important proceeding focused on the sale of the Real stores by Metro AG and the SCP Group in 2020/2021. In this merger control proceeding the authority carried out an in-depth examination of the takeover of Real stores by the Schwarz Group (Kaufland) and EDEKA. Kaufland had notified the authority of its intention to take over 101 Real stores, EDEKA wanted to take over 27 stores. As part of such merger control proceedings the authority examines each individual supermarket location within a clearly defined regional radius to determine the acquiring company's market share and the extent to which it will increase as a result of the merger in this regional market. If a company’s market share in the regional market exceeds the 40 per cent threshold, the statutory presumption of market dominance applies. The 40 per cent threshold provides an important indication for the decision of whether a merger may have to be prohibited or can only be cleared subject to remedies.
The definftion of the relevant geographic market is based on the findings as to which food retail stores consumers can access within a reasonable period of time. In our assessment we considered self-service stores, supermarkets, discounters and organic supermarkets as alternative options for consumers, but not specialist stores such as bakeries or drugstores. This detailed investigation provided the Bundeskartellamt with an almost complete nationwide picture of the regional food retail markets. Regional consumer purchasing behaviour was surveyed throughout the country using data from the Payback bonus programme. This detailed study provides a nuanced picture of the German food retail landscape and how consumers access and use these stores for their purposes. Only in this way can an accurate regional analysis of the competitive conditions be carried out based on in-depth economic examination of a large number of retail markets. The regional markets defined in this way and the market shares determined raised significant competition concerns about the takeover of more than thirty Real stores.
The Schwarz Group subsequently decided not to proceed with the takeover of altogether nine stores. In a total of 27 cases EDEKA had to refrain from the notified acquisition of Real stores, undertake to carve out retail space for competitors or close stores. The authority thus ensured that medium-sized competitors from the food retail sector were also given the opportunity to take over some stores. We required the owners of the Real stores to sell stores with a procurement volume of 200 million euros to medium-sized companies, not to Kaufland or EDEKA. This not only strengthened the role of small and medium-sized businesses as important sales alternatives for suppliers, but also contributed to protecting competition on the procurement side. This goes to show that the Bundeskartellamt continuously and closely monitors the food retail sector and is determined to use the instruments at its disposal to protect competition.
Potential market foreclosure through vertical integration
Competition problems can also arise where food retailers take over food manufacturers or processors. The Bundeskartellamt closely examines these so-called vertical integration cases. Such takeovers can of course also have positive effects, for example more efficient control of production and distribution. In addition, reliability of supply can be improved. However, it is equally clear that there may still be potential competitive threats involved. Market foreclosure, for example, can occur and harm other manufacturers or retailers. Against this background, the Bundeskartellamt examines the effects on the market in cases where food retailers take over food manufacturers.
Examples are the indirect acquisition of Uckermärker Milch GmbH by EDEKA (2025) and REWE’s acquisition of 50 per cent of the shares in both specialised beverage wholesalers Trinks GmbH and Trinks Süd GmbH (2023). In addition, the Bundeskartellamt closely examined the Schwarz Group’s takeover of Erfurter Teigwaren GmbH (now Bon Pasta GmbH) and the acquisition of Altmühltaler Mineralbrunnen GmbH by Aldi (2022). In the context of our investigations in these cases we reached the conclusion that the buyers or suppliers concerned still had sufficient alternative options in the relevant markets and that no significant foreclosure effects were to be expected. One example where vertical integration was reversed is the sale of REWE’s subsidiary Glockenbrot to Harry Brot (2025). We could clear the acquisition because the disintegration only slightly changed the competitive situation for other market participants, and because Harry Brot still faced other effective competitors in the market for pre-packaged bread and baked goods, which was mainly affected in this case. The Bundeskartellamt also examines mergers between food manufacturers. For instance, the authority prohibited the takeover of Vion slaughterhouses by Tönnies in June 2025. The takeover would not only have strengthened Tönnies’s market position to the detriment of smaller competitors, but would also have had negative effects for farmers as Tönnies would have gained a dominant position in the pig and cattle slaughtering and processing sector in regional catchment areas. Meat producers would have had hardly any alternatives to switch to for their procurement and slaughtering purposes.
Abuse of market power
Apart from merger control, proceedings examining potential abuse of market power are another important tool the Bundeskartellamt can use. We are currently examining whether the beverage producer Coca Cola may be abusing its possibly existing dominant position in relation to retailers. The proceedings focus on the question whether Coca Cola’s rebate structure creates incentives for food retailers to display also less popular Coca Cola products on their shelves, which could result in competitors being excluded. The authority also initiated abuse proceedings against EDEKA after the company had required manufacturers (brand manufacturers and private-label manufacturers) to pay a compensation within the context of EDEKA’s introduction of the Payback bonus programme. The examination focuses on whether EDEKA provided an adequate consideration in return for the fees to be paid by the manufacturers. These proceedings illustrate that the Bundeskartellamt focuses equally on all market players, both retailers and large manufacturers.
Reactions to the special report
In November 2025, the Monopolies Commission, an advisory body to the German government, presented a special report on competition in the food supply chain. It concluded that concentration, particularly in the food retail sector, had increased significantly over the past twenty years. At the same time, average profit margins had risen. An increase in consumer prices had also been observed.[3] According to the Commission, there are indications that the price increases in the food retail sector are partly due to competition problems in the retail sector.[4]
This interpretation of the developments is not without controversy. For example, a statement by the Thünen Institute within the context of a comprehensive monitoring process shows that rising food prices are primarily caused by higher costs in the manufacturing and retail sectors. In the Institute’s view, climate change and soil degradation contribute to price increases, as do disrupted supply chains and new trade barriers.[5]
The Bundeskartellamt will continue to examine the findings of the special report in detail. For the time being, it should be noted that the conclusions drawn by the Monopolies Commission do not entirely correspond with our findings from a large number of proceedings. For example, the low level of food prices compared to other European countries tends to indicate a certain degree of competition between the large German food retailers.
There are many indications that individual discounters act as price setters for certain products. When prices are raised or lowered, their competitors usually follow suit immediately. From a competition law perspective, linked competitive responses do not violate competition law provisions as long as the companies do not enter into collusive agreements. The role played by price transparency in the food retail sector (promoted by price comparison websites such as smhaggle) in lowering or raising consumer prices remains unclear. However, high price transparency generally encourages tacit agreement on pricing, although such monitoring and reaction processes cannot be deemed to constitute a violation of competition law
At the same time, several aspects of the special report point in the right direction. On the one hand, the Monopolies Commission advocates not only considering locally defined markets in merger control proceedings (in a similar way as under Section 19a GWB), but also taking a holistic view of markets.[6] In fact, we already consider mergers from such a perspective. We take cross-market effects of mergers into account when dealing with cases of vertical integration and possible barriers to market entry. On the other hand, case law has set clear guidelines for us: When determining market shares, we must define both the geographic and product markets very precisely.
The Bundeskartellamt is open to the proposal to subject completed proceedings to an ex-post review in order to gain insights into the effects of our decisions on the market. Finally, as suggested by the Monopolies Commission, the competence to enforce the EU Directive on unfair trading practices in the food supply chain (known as the Unfair Trading Practices [UTP] rules) should be transferred to the competition authority, as is the case in other European countries.[7] This is because the UTP Directive is a secondary competition law and the proceedings it governs are closely modelled on those of the competition authorities. In this way, the enforcement of competition law and the UTP rules could be coordinated more closely and take place in a much more efficient way.
The Bundeskartellamt can use a powerful set of instruments counteracting increasing concentration of the markets and protecting free and fair competition. We use these instruments consistently, as demonstrated by a large number of proceedings, including in the food sector. In doing so, we protect competition for the best prices and the best quality while also helping to ensure that consumers have sufficient choice. Competition law also protects competition in procurement markets, that is in the relationship between retailers and manufacturers. Selective legislative measures are deemed useful, for example with regard to the transfer of UTP enforcement competence to the Bundeskartellamt.
[1] Elena Bobeica et al.: When groceries bite: the role of food prices for inflation in the euro area, European Central Bank / Eurosystem, 25 September 2025, www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/ date/2025/html/ ecb.blog20250925~7fd65a388a.en.html [last accessed on: 13 January 2026].
[2] Felix Richter: Lebensmittelpreise: Deutschland im europäischen Mittelfeld, Statista, 14 November 2025, https://de. statista.com/infografik/ 35461/lebensmittelpreise-in-europa/ [last accessed on: 13 January 2026].
[3] Monopolies Commission: Wettbewerb in der Lebensmittellieferkette, Monopolies Commisssion Special Report pursuant to Section 44(1) sentence 4 GWB – p. 11, K5.
[4] Ibid., p. 44, para. 57.
[5] Anne Magarian: Vom Hof bis in den Einkaufskorb: So entstehen Lebensmittelpreise, Thünen, Institut für Marktanalyse, 21 November 2025, www.thuenen.de/de/themenfelder/maerkte-handel-zertifizierung/vom-hof-bis-in-den-einkaufskorb-so-entstehen-lebensmittelpreise [last accessed on: 13 January 2026].
[6] Monopolies Commission, loc.cit., para. 301, see endnote 3.
[7] Ibid., paras. 405 ff.