The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung together with its partners “Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies” and the Peres Center for Peace brought together experts to analyze the initiative and discuss the various aspects of its potential impact on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Dr. Uzi Rabi, head of Tel Aviv University’s Department of Middle Eastern and African History, introduced the speakers:

Professor Shimon Shamir of Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies presented five main points that are new in this Initiative and that set it apart from all others. Firstly, this new proposal is all encompassing for all parties, including the Arab League. Furthermore, this document was not presented to the international community as all have been in the past. In the text it specifies the Israeli government and its people which present a big opportunity for the new Coalition. It was brought in Hebrew and Arabic to all communities to ensure that no person was left out of the loop. Third, it mentions twice in the text that within the agreement there would be full peace and a normalization of relations. This is a big commitment from the Arab world and is the only condition mentioned more than once in the entire document. Fourth, it states that there will then be an end to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Finally, the most problematic section discusses an agreed upon resolution for refugees. It goes back to UN Resolution 194 which Arabs understand as granting the Right of Return, but it was never interpreted as such by the Israelis. Although sounding very positive, all of the aforementioned points do not come without a price. The Initiative does not call for negotiations with the Israelis, nor does it necessarily demand any compliance. The Arabs believe their proposal is self explanatory. It is clear to the Israeli public that Resolution 194 does not grant the Right of Return, but for the Arabs it does. Consequently, in the 2002 proposal there is a demand for the Right of Return. Despite these issues, the Israeli public should know that there are enough reasons to enter into negotiations that may bring positive results. Instead of waiting for the Arabs to amend their Initiative, Israel should present her own. The ideal place in history to implement this proposal is today. There is a general consensus for peace within the Arab World and Israel needs to accept this.

Professor Shlomo Avineri, of the Jerusalem Hebrew University’s Political Sciences Department acknowledged that it is the first time Israel has an offer where the Arab world wants peace and normalization which is a victory for Israel. It asks Israel to reconsider its negative position and to affirm the following three points, still without negotiations. Israel is to return all territories that were conquered after 1967 which includes the Golan to its real border, not the internationally recognized one, and the disputed territory belonging to Lebanon. Secondly, the refugees should have the right to return to their homes. Finally, the Arab League has asked Israel to accept a Palestinian state on the land of 1967, including Gaza. The problem with all of these demands is that Israel must first accept them before she can enter into negotiations. Israelis must appreciate that this is a victory for Zionism and Israel and must respect all initiatives that could lead to negotiations. Israel must invite the Arabs to come and discuss ’’every’’ issue. The ball is in our court but there must be no illusions. Avineri made the distinction that there was no “take it or leave it” statement, but just “take it” and this is not how you ask for something.

Regarding the issue of negotiations, Professor Shimon Shamir said that if the document called on Israel for talks it would be easier to accept. However, in spite of all these shortcomings, what is important is that the agreement involves the entire Arab League. Professor Shlomo Avineri answered that, in regards to the Saudis, their lack of cooperation based on the normalization is not justified. Clearly negotiations only happen between rivals, and the Saudis are not even really enemies, so coming to Israel is in no way a sign of normalization. Furthermore, the Initiative has said that Israel has to accept all conditions, but in international negotiations both sides must present their positions without demands and he claims to be doubtful about the manner in which the Arabs approached the Initiative. To Shamir, the Arab position, in the end, is that of the Palestinians. A peace agreement will be in regards to other things. Now that they have sent a delegation they came with the “demands”. Israel can show her position by sending the same back as a sign of willingness to open a discussion.

Professor Josef Kostiner, former director of the School of History at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, stated that his immediate position is that Israel should have been much more positive in her response to the proposal and should have made an effort to push along the process. He is, however, skeptical about the Initiative itself. When trying to analyze naturally, and doing an in depth examination, the document is not as positive as it sounds. The Saudi Kingdom came out with the Initiative in February of 2002 which is interesting because they prefer to generally not be involved. They want to be closer to the radical countries and are trying to open a negotiating table on their behalf. There is also the geopolitical aspect in which they themselves have a small army but a very close connection to the United States. They are also moving through globalization while still being a mainly oil producing state. Since the 1970’s they like to be involved in areas of conflict to fix them and have good credit among the world. The Saudis have also historically boasts many years of diplomacy through their money. It provides them an element of security. The conflict for the Saudis means a lot, as conflict breeds radicalism. The Wahabi ideology that is practiced in the Kingdom has been problematic for them and reflects badly on the nation. The Saudis need to reach a place of neutrality to stop producing radicalism and they believe this can be reached through a comprehensive peace agreement. The Saudis have no direct interest in a solution whether it brings good or bad to the Palestinians, but to manage the conflict so radicalism will not emerge.

In the end, the entire Initiative is all about faith. It is important, however, to really study the text and understand it is special and positive by offering direct talks with Israel. They specify that there is no military end to the conflict, which has been the only method exercised until today to settle past debts. He concludes by saying that “Israel always takes heed of the war declarations of the Arabs. Maybe they should do the same with this peace agreement.”

Professor Asher Susser, former director of the Moshe Dayan Center, stated that everyone is in agreement that the proposal is a historical step for the Arab World and Israel. However, the main problem lies in the refugees. Israel’s reaction to the proposal itself was not right regarding the refugees. In Israel, though, there is a universal consensus that the Right of Return is not an option, but all other matters are open for discussion. There are a lot of documents that have come out of the process, but the Arab Peace Initiative is the only one translated into English. The dynamic of Oslo was very positive for Israel with the Palestinians and this progress transverse to the territories. The Second Intifada came and Hamas then began to gain more political power in the territories. Hamas today does not support a two state solution, nor do they support the Initiative. This then stops a lot of what Israel is trying to do, if Hamas does not behave as a legitimate partner in the negotiation process. The most important thing, however, is that the Arab League has chosen Fatah as a legitimate leader. The two states solution does then lack its attraction as we see a divided Palestinian people that pose a barrier to any real progress. Today it is 2009 and Israel would be smart to join and accept the proposal. They should give life to a two state solution because it is a consensus in the Arab world. Those who express their support for a two state solution are the real Zionists. If Israel says no, Susser chuckled, “have we lost our minds?” Even if you read the Arab Peace Initiative, seven years after its creation, the issues inside are more applicable to 2009 than they were at the time of its conception. Israel should have seen this coming and presented itself as the supporting partner.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that the Israeli public left with a very different perspective on the Initiative itself and could formulate their opinions with more substance. It seems that all scholars, leftist or right wing, have all come to the conclusion that the Arab League has presented us with a great opportunity. Israel, Zionism, and its followers should not take this for granted.