A View from South Asia Countries of Origin: Changing Contexts, Perceptions, & Policies

Executive Summary

As the strongest Arab economy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is home to 13.4 million foreign residents. Hence, much of the success of the ambitious Vision 2030 reform masterplan hinges upon how migrant labour is considered within these reforms. This makes enhancing the understanding of migration dynamics in the Saudi socio-economic context critical.

Against this backdrop, this paper aims to expand the understanding of drivers, policies, and perceptions linked to migration to Saudi Arabia from South Asian countries of origin. The report looks at how the migration stakeholders in South Asian countries of origin perceive the institutional context and migratory environment in Saudi Arabia, and how these perceptions shape labour migration. Additionally, the study examines how future changes in migration policies, and socio-political and economic dynamics in South Asian countries of origin influence labour migration to Saudi Arabia.

The study adopts a corridor approach by focusing on South Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The analysis relies on existing literature and secondary data supplemented by qualitative data collected via key informant interviews (KII), where possible.

Introduction 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is a stable economy with a GDP of USD 1.07 trillion that stood as the 19th largest economy in the world as of 2023 (The World Bank 2024, Vision 2030, 2016). Two prominent characteristics of the Saudi economy are its dependence on oil and foreign labour. Traditionally, much of Saudi Arabia’s economy has depended on natural resource revenue, and for many years the government has been attempting to reduce this over-dependence. In recent years, the revenue generated by oil has been over 40% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP. Similarly, much of Saudi Arabia’s labour force is composed of foreign workers. After numerous efforts over the years, beyond nationalization and Saudization policies, data for the fourth quarter of 2024 shows the share of migrant workers in the total labour force (including domestic workers) at 77%, and the share of foreign workers in the private sector alone at 79% (GLMM 2025a; GLMM 2025b).

The ambitious Vision 2030 reform masterplan, launched in 2016, is the latest effort to diversify Saudi Arabia’s economy and society. One of its key themes is a thriving economy, which aims to place Saudi Arabia among the top 15 economies in the world, making the labour market reforms under this theme highly relevant to migrant workers. The reform program aims to invest in education and training to build a national workforce that is ready to take up future employment opportunities in the Kingdom and focus on enhancing efforts to ensure that education and vocational training systems are aligned with market needs. Saudi Arabia is indeed concerned about the relatively low labour force participation rate of nationals, which was 51.3% as of Q4 2023, relative to 73.8% of non-nationals (General Authority of Statistics 2023), and the prevalent skill mismatch in “the labour market as citizens may not be well equipped with skills that are needed by the private sector” (Hasanov, et al. 2021, 5270). Therefore, the reform document further underscores the goal of “attracting the talents we need” and states that “[a]chieving our desired rate of economic growth will require an environment that attracts the necessary skills and capabilities both from within the Kingdom and beyond our national borders” (Vision 2030 2016, 37). To achieve this, Vision 2030 outlines ambitions to improve living and working conditions for expatriates by enabling foreigners to own real estate in certain areas, improving their quality of life, and allowing for the establishment of more private schools to accommodate more foreign-born students. Moreover, the reforms aim to adopt a simplified and more efficient system for issuing visas and residence permits. All these efforts are aimed at attracting and retaining the best nationals and non-nationals in the workforce in Saudi, since the having “the finest Saudi and foreign minds…in the Kingdom will contribute to economic development and attract additional foreign investment” (Vision 2030 2016, 37).

Despite the prominence of non-nationals in the country’s labour force and their expected input in the ambitious national socioeconomic reform process, some key features of the Saudi labour market are a cause of concern for sending countries’ societies and migration stakeholders. One is the employment segregation of nationals and non-nationals in the public and private sectors. The public sector employs the larger share of nationals entering the market, while private sector employment is dominated by non-national workers as stated earlier in this introduction. As noted by Hasanov et al. (2021), the public sector jobs – where most nationals are employed, are well-paid, enjoy more job security and benefits, and involves fewer hours than in the private sector. Another key feature is the distinct wage gap not just between nationals and non-nationals in the private sector, but also among non-nationals based on country of origin. For instance, workers originating from Western countries are often paid more than those originating from Arab countries. In contrast, the latter are paid more than Asians (GLMM 2017), while migrant workers originating from Sub-Saharan African countries are at the bottom of the pay scale. Such significant wage disparities by countries of origin are largely due to variations in reservation wages of migrant workers based on the standard of living and employment opportunities in their countries of origin, as well as the minimum wages set for them in Saudi Arabia negotiated through Bilateral Labour Agreements (BLAs).

The foreign workers in Saudi Arabia mainly originate from neighbouring Gulf countries, African countries, Southeast Asian countries, and South Asian countries. In 2022, 46% of all of the non-national population in Saudi Arabia originated from the five South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan (GLMM 2022). Hence, much of the success of Vision 2030 hinges on how the migrant population, specifically those originating from South Asia (SA), perceive it and feel associated with it. Against this backdrop, this paper aims to expand the understanding of drivers and perceptions linked to migration to Saudi Arabia from South Asian countries of origin. The analysis aims to provide evidence on how the migration stakeholders in South Asian countries perceive the institutional context, policies, and migratory environment in Saudi Arabia, and how such perceptions shape migration flows from South Asia to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the study examines how future socio-political and economic dynamics in South Asian countries of origin influence labour migration to Saudi Arabia. The study adopts a corridor approach by focusing on South Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and relies on existing literature and secondary data supplemented by qualitative data collected via key informant interviews, where possible (see annex for details of interviewees).

South Asia - Saudi Arabia Corridor 

In Saudi Arabia’s labour market, migrant workers originating from South Asia play a key role. In Q4 of 2023, of the total employed population over 15 years of age in Saudi Arabia, 75% were non-nationals (GLMM, 2023). In 2022 a total of 7,459,892 South Asian origin migrants were in Saudi Arabia. Of them, 16% were from Bangladesh followed by 14% each from India and Pakistan.

 Similarly, Saudi Arabia plays an important role as a country of destination in each of these South Asian countries. In 2023, Saudi Arabia was the key destination for Bangladeshi migrant workers (Siddiqui, Sultana, and Nasrin, et al., 2023) while, in Nepal, Saudi Arabia accounted for 30% of all departures in 2021/22 (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, 2022). Saudi Arabia also received 17% of all registered migrant workers from Sri Lanka in 2022 (SLBFE, 2022). From Pakistan, in 2023, nearly 61% of migrant workers headed to Saudi Arabia. Based on available emigration clearance data, in 2023, a total of 200,713 Indian migrant workers headed to Saudi Arabia (ADBI, ILO and OECD, 2024).

Data Availability 

As seen in the above discussion, Saudi Arabia is a key destination for all South Asian countries considered. Among South Asian migrant workers, most are relatively lower-skilled. In the context of data production, the General Authority for Statistics (GAStat) conducts censuses as well as labour and economy related surveys on a regular basis. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development regulates and manages employment in the Kingdom, and the General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI) registers foreign employees. The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) program serves as a reliable retabulation of Saudi official data and meta data source for the stock of South Asian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia.

Recently published Saudi data[i] enables disaggregation of workers by gender, education level, and sector of employment, (excluding the domestic sector). With regards to sending countries, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have rich administrative data produced by the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) and the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), respectively. In the case of Bangladesh and Nepal, the Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility (CESLAM) and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) are key institutions producing reports with migration data. Compared to these four countries, the migration data available in India is limited. This is mainly due to the nature of the institutional framework for regulating migrant workers in India (see section 3 for discussion on institutional framework and Table 2 for a summary of data sources used in this study).

 Institutional Framework in South Asia 

The five South Asian countries focused on in this study are well established as labour-sending countries and over the years have developed institutional and policy frameworks to govern labour migration in general, as well as specifically to Saudi Arabia. In each of the countries discussed, migration governance is handled by a designated ministry in the central government, while regulation of migrant workers and recruitment agents is handled by an institution falling under the purview of the said ministry (see Table 3). Except for Pakistan and India, all countries have policy frameworks to cover labour migration. In all five countries, recruitment agents play a key role in matching potential migrant workers with employers in Saudi Arabia. All five countries considered have either an MoU or a BLA with Saudi Arabia. Below is a summary of the institutional context in the countries considered.

Such a strong institutional framework for labour migration among South Asian countries is a result of the high outflow of migrant workers from the region, due to socio-economic push factors in each country, as well as pull factors in the Gulf region. South Asian workers became a preferred choice in Gulf countries following the oil boom due to their characteristics such as “docility, political neutrality, flexibility, willingness to work at manageable wages and readiness to work hard” (Rajan and Oommen 2020, 2). Similarly, when Saudi Arabia started reaping the rewards from oil and the demand for migrant workers grew, South Asian countries were experiencing lower levels of economic progress. Hence, migration was a lucrative livelihood option for many South Asians. Their poor socio-economic conditions, wage differentials, and abundant employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia were key factors that contributed to labour migration proliferation from South Asia. As such, temporary labour migration of individuals leaving family behind and regular remittances were common features of labour migration from South Asia to Saudi Arabia (see discussion in Section 6 for more recent trends).

Perceptions in South Asia about Migration to Saudi Arabia

Over the years, the institutional and policy context in Saudi Arabia has evolved to protect and uplift the well-being of migrant workers and to ensure that migrant labour contributes to achieving national goals and aspirations. However, due to varying national interests and priorities, such efforts within the institutional and policy landscape and practices are often perceived asymmetrically by the policy makers in Saudi Arabia and those in the sending countries. This section now highlights and explains the interpretations and perceptions held by sending countries about Saudi Arabia’s institutional landscape and practices for labour migration.

Saudization/Nationalization

Saudization/nationalization policies have been in place in Saudi Arabia for a long time to increase the employment of nationals in the Saudi labour market. Traditionally, employment in the public sector in Saudi Arabia is reserved for Saudi nationals, while the private sector predominantly employs foreign workers. The Saudization/nationalization efforts aim to reduce the reliance of private firms on foreign workers. However, the sending countries’ interpretation of these Saudization/nationalization policies in Saudi Arabia is more nuanced. For instance, literature identifies that the nationalization efforts in Saudi Arabia have, in theory, restricted employment opportunities for non-Saudis in the private sector of the Saudi economy (Jamal 2023, Adham 2023). Similarly, the labour reforms implemented under the ongoing Saudi Vision 2030 are “aimed at employing more Saudis in the private sector to tackle the unemployment rates thereby reducing dependence on foreign migrant labour” (Jamal 2023, 6). However, the literature underscores that “Saudization policies impact migrants differently based on the professions and the sectors in which they are employed” (Jamal 2023, 7). Qualitative interviews conducted with stakeholders from South Asian countries were also of the view that Saudization/nationalization policies would have minimal impact on South Asian migrant workers, as these are mainly involved in low-skilled and blue-collar work that Saudi nationals opt out of. At the same time, stakeholders in South Asian countries expressed doubts about the efficiency of these efforts despite their having been in place for a long time. As such, the stakeholders perceive that Saudization and nationalization efforts would have a minimal impact on migration trends from South Asia.

Nitaqat 

The Nitaqat program (meaning ‘bands’ or ‘zones’) sets out distinct quantitative quotas for firms according to size, economic sector of activity, and profession, while outlining incentives for compliance and penalties for non-compliance. Literature notes that the Nitaqat policy applies to Saudi private firms that employ over ten employees (Peck, 2017). As such, while both Saudization and Nitaqat are aimed at boosting the employment of Saudi nationals in the private sector, Nitaqat is linked to the employer’s commercial activity and size. Nitaqat has intensified in scope and magnitude of previous Saudization policies to the extent of limiting the entry of migrant workers into the Saudi labour market. Moreover, the political obstacles to migration where “employers are obliged to follow nationality-based quotas limiting the number of workers of certain nationalities, including Indians and Bangladeshis” (Jamal 2023, 7) further limit opportunities for migrants from SA to Saudi Arabia. Literature notes that because Nitaqat imposes strict sanctions on firms for non-compliance, it has “a high compliance rate but imposes significant costs on firms” (Jamal 2023, 6).

The Kafala System 

Until the recent reforms intended to cancel the rule for most categories of foreign workers, for decades the ‘kafala’ (sponsorship) system has been the main instrument that controls labour migration to Saudi Arabia. Under the kafala system, every migrant worker requires sponsorship by a ‘kafeel’ (sponsor), which could be a Saudi citizen, entity, or business. In some instances, like for domestic workers, the kafeel could be a non-Saudi individual as long as he or she meets the required conditions to hire a migrant worker (Jamal 2023). Migrants can remain in the country provided they have a working visa or are sponsored by a kafeel. Sending countries often have a negative perception about the kafala system, with literature noting that "both migrants and Saudis manipulate the kafala [system] through the illegal practices of black-market work visa trading known as ‘free visa,’ which is thought to be the cause of disorganization of the labour market" (Adham 2023, 1747)

Similarly, the literature underscores that the kafala system ties workers to their sponsors for their residency and work permits, resulting in vulnerability related to this dependency. The previous requirement for workers to obtain an exit permit from their kafeel before leaving Saudi Arabia further contributed to abuse and exploitation by employers. For instance, in cases where abuse or other grievances are encountered by workers, it can be very difficult to hold their kafeel accountable. Since the kafeel withholds the workers' passports and dictates their exit from the country, workers may be subjected to blackmail or other forms of physical and verbal abuse when attempting to raise their concerns with their employer or with authorities (Bouri 2023). Similarly, attempts by migrant workers to run away from or leave such employers are often treated with criminalization or deportation (Bouri 2023). Moreover, Bouri (2023) notes that “the kafala system gives kafeels complete control over migrant labourers and their legal status in ways that undermine the contractual basis of the system.” Bouri (2023) explains that domestic workers are often denied reasonable work hours, have to work in more than one home, and often do work that is outside of their agreed-upon scope of work. Similarly, they experienced isolation in the home, mobility restrictions, barriers to seeking help, lack of privacy in living arrangements, physical violence, and verbal abuse. Additionally, a common complaint from migrant workers was that their kafeel did not pay wages on time or at all. Such complaints resonate with Sri Lankan migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. For instance, SLBFE data on complaints from 2015-2020 show that most complaints from migrant workers are from those in Saudi Arabia (see Table 4). Despite the absence of a breakdown of the type of complaint by country of destination of migrant workers, the larger share of complaints from Saudi Arabia allows us to assume that the distribution of the nature of complaints at the total level is reflective of Saudi Arabia. On such a basis, most complaints are related to employment, and by extension to the kafala, such as breach of employment contract, non-receipt of wages, not sent back after completion of the contract period, and overload of work, to name a few (see Figure 1)

The reforms introduced in Saudi Arabia in 2021 aimed to address these issues. As a result, now most migrant workers are allowed to leave the country or switch jobs without their employer’s consent upon completing their contracts, or during the contracts if the employer is informed within a specified timeframe (ALJAZEERA 2021, Migrant-Rights 2021). However, despite these reforms having improved the employment conditions for migrant workers, they are criticized by South Asian migration stakeholders as insufficient. In addition to limitations in the reforms, they are criticised for covering only 6.7 million workers, while approximately 3.6 million domestic workers, farmers, shepherds, home guards, and private drivers, and another 3.5 to 4.4 million undocumented workers, "who are already among the most vulnerable and least protected” are systematically excluded from benefiting from reforms (BWI 2024, 7). On the other hand, South Asian stakeholders are of the view that rather than lifting the exit permission requirement, it only shifts obtaining exit permission from the employer to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (The Kathmandu Post 2021).

Moreover, migration stakeholders in South Asia are sceptical about the limitations of implementing and enforcing these rules and regulations and are concerned about their impact on migrant workers’ human rights violations (Bouri, 2023). Moreover, critics perceive that reforms “do not address the systematic discrimination, weak enforcement, and prohibition on migrant workers joining or forming a union” (The Kathmandu Post 2021). The perception of limited implementation of rules and regulations related to labour migration was also echoed in qualitative interviews. Moreover, the qualitative data reveals that previously the kafala system limited the possibility for migrant workers to change employers, and that these restrictions contributed towards migrant workers having a lower preference for Saudi Arabia. However, now with the changes introduced to the kafala system, the preference for Saudi Arabia has improved.

Iqama

Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, migrant workers are required to apply for a residency permit, also known as an iqama, at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development. The iqama, which is the migrant workers’ proof of being legally allowed to live and work in Saudi Arabia, is issued by the Ministry of Interior through the Directorate General for Passports. During a migrant worker’s time of employment in Saudi Arabia, for all travel into and out of Saudi Arabia, migrant workers need to apply for an exit/re-entry permit through the Ministry of Interior. As per the Saudi Labour Law, the iqama – which is in place to ensure legality and related protection for migrant workers, has to be renewed annually, and the related costs are borne by the employer. Nonetheless, literature underscores that in practice, "this is discretionary and varies based on migrants’ experiences with sponsors/employers". (Jamal 2023, 6)

Literature in South Asian sending countries shows that after the increased iqama fees, “employers now pay 8,600 riyals (USD 2,300) per year to the labour ministry for each worker's iqama,” which totals to approximately 11,000 riyals per worker, when the cost of insurance is also added (The Business Standard 2024). This high cost for employers results in their reluctance to obtain an iqama on behalf of the workers, leaving migrant workers unemployed or undocumented. Evidence from Bangladesh shows that the BMET receives over 1,000 complaints annually from migrant workers, and approximately 80% are related to iqama and employment issues in Saudi Arabia. For instance, there were 2,200 in 2023, while in the six months up to October 2024, BMET had already logged 1,133 complaints.             

While the iqama and Nitaqat are positive developments regarding the employment of Saudi nationals in the labour market in Saudi Arabia, the stakeholders in South Asia view them as policies that increase the cost for employers to hire migrant workers, and provide an indirect incentive for employers to adopt practices such as delaying the iqama and not reporting migrant workers in order to avoid fees. South Asian stakeholders underscore that such practices by employers render migrant workers undocumented, which enables employers to source cheaper labour. For instance, as shown by BWI (2024, p.22), for one Indian worker in Saudi Arabia, when his “iqama expired, and he asked the company to renew it, he was ignored- with the expectation that he would illegally continue working, against his consent”. At the same time, South Asian stakeholders are of the view that the increase in iqama fees on expatriate workers to encourage hiring of Saudis has had a limited effect. As already discussed under the Saudization policy, nationals are selective in the types of jobs they accept, and do not typically take low-skilled or low-level positions often filled by South Asian workers.

Family Unification and Permanent Migration 

The Saudi Arabia migration environment is primarily structured around temporary labour migration with limited opportunities for permanent settlement and family unification. Nonetheless, in recent years, Saudi Arabia introduced reforms encouraging permanent residency and family unification. Yet, the stakeholders in sending countries continue to focus on the limitations of such policies and perceive these efforts in a different light. For instance, literature notes that though the Premium Residency Program and its Gifted Residency and Special Talent Residency seem like a step towards inclusivity, in reality, they contribute to perpetuating existing inequalities (Akıncı, 2022; Ellermann, 2020). Moreover, stakeholders in sending countries view these special types of citizenship opportunities to be out of reach for most long-term middle-class migrants in the country and accessible only to a privileged segment of migrants. As such, migrant workers and stakeholders in sending countries see the process of naturalisation in Saudi Arabia as a rigid and inaccessible option (Jamal 2023, 8).

To ensure successful family unification, Saudi Arabia introduced various strategies, such as allowing only specific occupations to sponsor family dependents, with eligibility being tied to income and profession (Ameen, 2023; De Bel-Air, 2023). However, stakeholders in sending countries perceive these rules and levies as strategic measures to discourage migrants from bringing their family members to Saudi Arabia (Ernst & Young, 2017). For instance, literature highlights that family levies and the implementation of VAT are some of the main reasons forcing some families to leave Saudi Arabia (Jamal 2023, 6). At the same time, one South Asian stakeholder responding to the key informant interviews (KIIs) was of the view that most migrant workers from South Asia to the Gulf are not interested in taking their families to the Gulf, as they can save more if migrating alone. A KII respondent also noted that the restrictive social setup in Saudi Arabia is another reason for migrants to opt to leave their families back in their countries of origin. Among those who bring family to Saudi Arabia, the limited scope for naturalization prompted them to see Saudi Arabia as an interim stop in their ‘stepwise migration’ process to other countries of destination, such as those in the West.

Concerns on Labour Migration to Saudi Arabia 

Despite the long history of migration between South Asian countries and Saudi Arabia, the existence of an elaborate institutional context, and the recent reforms of labour and migration policies in the Kingdom, South Asian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and their related stakeholders continue to have a few key grievances. The following section outlines these concerns.

Working Conditions 

One of the main areas of concern for South Asian sending countries to Saudi Arabia is poor working conditions. For instance, Weeraratne and Gunawardena (forthcoming) highlight how migrant female domestic workers face various types of harassment, not limited to verbal, mental, and physical abuse during work. A Nepali KII respondent was of the view that, when confronted with poor working conditions, Saudi Arabia adopts various strategies instead of actively working to address the root problem. Some of these strategies include looking for alternative countries of origin, such as Africa instead of SA. Other strategies include signing of double contracts – one for the migrant workers to leave the South Asian countries of origin and a second contract in Saudi Arabia; not allowing any presence of international agencies such as the ILO or IOM to establish in Saudi Arabia; and maintaining an unequal balance of power between the countries of origin and Saudi Arabia.

Vulnerability 

Poor working conditions easily translate into high vulnerability among migrant workers. In the case of Sri Lanka, recent statistics on complaints made by migrant workers show that the largest number of complaints is made by those in Saudi Arabia. This is due both to the high number of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia as well as the distinct vulnerability profile there. In 2020, complaints accounted for 16% of departures from Sri Lanka to Saudi Arabia. Strict religious and cultural restrictions also make migrant workers from Sri Lanka more vulnerable. For instance, as highlighted by Weeraratne and Gunawardena (forthcoming), migrant female domestic workers may be (or feel) restricted from going out on their own, which contributes to limiting their access to support when abuse occurs at the place of employment. In reaction to the high vulnerability of Sri Lankan migrant workers, especially females heading to Saudi Arabia, in 2013, Sri Lanka applied a higher minimum age of 25 years for female migrant workers heading to Saudi Arabia, while 23 years was applicable for other Middle Eastern countries, and 21 years for all other countries (Weeraratne 2016). This higher age barrier was specifically imposed to send more mature women to Saudi Arabia who would be less likely to find themselves in a vulnerable situation. Similarly, Nepal had a higher minimum age of 24 years for Saudi Arabia, while for other countries it was 18 years (CESLAM 2019). The imposition of age barriers for labour migration for women is a common response from South Asian countries in protecting their migrant workers.

Forced Labour and Non-Protection of Wages  

Forced labour in Saudi Arabia is another concern harboured by South Asian migrant workers and their stakeholders. Literature shows evidence of various aspects of forced labour among migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, including a high prevalence of wage theft. Impact (2023) defines wage theft as delayed payment, underpayment, and non-payment. For instance, Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA) (2021) highlights that “among the countries of destination…Saudi Arabia has registered the highest number of cases of wage theft, at 292 cases [out of 388 cases].” More recently, data from a survey by Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI)[i] (2024, p. 27) on forced labour collected between April and May 2024, shows that “as many as 63% of the 193 respondents…were not able to terminate employment with reasonable notice or leave their jobs when their contracts expired” (see Table 5). As noted by BWI (2024), a Nepali migrant worker who was hired through a manpower agency in Saudi Arabia had a salary lower than directly hired employees and was paid a lower overtime payment than others. When he wanted to leave the job, the company asked him to pay USD 1,390 to approve his exit. Unable to pay this amount, he “continued to work with his employer, against his consent, under forced labour conditions.” Another common mechanism for forced labour is retention of the worker’s personal documents, such as passports and iqamas. BWI (2024) shows that 65% of migrant workers in their sample reported that their employer retained their personal documents. Highlighting all of these, in June 2024, the BWI lodged a complaint focusing on Saudi Arabia's failure to observe ILO conventions on forced labour, in parallel to Saudi Arabia’s bid for the 2034 FIFA World Cup.

Human Rights  

Migrant workers from South Asia perceive that the protection of their human rights in Saudi Arabia is at a relatively low level. This concern is further validated by the rules in Saudi Arabia, which prevent collective action and migrant workers from forming trade unions. Moreover, the absence of international agencies that can protect and ensure the rights of migrant workers is also a notable feature of Saudi Arabia. This is highlighted by the recent complaint lodged by BWI against Saudi Arabia (BWI 2024).

Asymmetry of Power 

Due to the high importance of Saudi Arabia as a country of destination to each of these sending countries in South Asia, none of these governments are able to have a voice in improving the conditions for their migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the diversification policies in Saudi Arabia as a country of destination have led to competition amongst each of the South Asian countries, as well as African countries for the same types of skills groups and occupations. Such competition further limits any effective negotiations with Saudi Arabia for improvement. As such, other than banning female workers or imposing higher age restrictions, South Asian countries have not been successful in reacting to conditions in Saudi Arabia.

Comparative Preference 

Migrant workers from Nepal prefer to go to more liberal countries than Saudi Arabia for foreign employment. As such, as mentioned by one KII respondent, “Nepali workers are not proud to say that they work in Saudi Arabia.” Despite a lower wage, they often prefer to work in alternative countries of destination if they have a choice. This is mainly due to the perception that Saudi Arabia applies a more restrictive rights regime in comparison to other destinations, including other Gulf destinations. Another KII representative from Sri Lanka echoed this. He mentioned that, previously, Sri Lankan migrants didn’t like to migrate to Saudi Arabia for employment due to the many restrictions, such as dress code and lack of freedom to go out during their off day. Now, with the minimization of many of these restrictions, the preference for Saudi Arabia is somewhat improving. Still, the religious restrictions in Saudi Arabia compared to other Gulf countries are discouraging. As commented by stakeholders in Sri Lanka, migrants have a lower preference for employment in Saudi Arabia relative to other Gulf countries, yet numbers are high because Saudi Arabia salaries are attractive. Thus, this lower preference is not reflected in departure statistics. A similar sentiment is expressed in the context of all South Asian countries represented by a regional stakeholder. For instance, South Asian migrants may prefer to go to Europe over Saudi Arabia or the Gulf, but some still decide to go there due to attractive salaries, geographic proximity, and relative ease of entry.

Cost of Remittances 

Remittances from foreign employment play a key role in the South Asian region’s economy. For instance, in 2023, Nepal received USD 10.9 billion in remittances, which accounted for 26.5% of its GDP – the highest share in the region. “The sustained share of remittances, at around 25% of GDP for over a decade, contributed to an estimated 32% reduction in poverty [in Nepal]” (KNOMAD 2024, 38). Among alternative countries of destination, Saudi Arabia plays an important role in remittances to the region. In Sri Lanka, remittances from Saudi Arabia in 2023 reached USD 542.65 million, which accounted for 9% of total remittances received by Sri Lanka (USD 5,969.56 million) (CBSL 2023). Figure 2 below depicts bilateral remittances from Saudi Arabia to the five South Asian countries considered. The largest amount of remittances from Saudi Arabia was received by India, which was USD 13,052.35 million, while the lowest was received by Sri Lanka, which was USD 1,475 million. However, it is important to note that official remittances to Sri Lanka were on a declining trend due to the socio-political crisis in Sri Lanka. Moreover, statistics from 2021, which were affected by the COVID-19 crisis, may not reflect a normal year.

Preference for a country of destination is also influenced by how much migrant workers can remit to their families left behind. In addition to their salary, in this context, migrants also consider the cost of remittances. Table 6 below depicts the cost to remit SAR 750 to each of the South Asian countries in February of 2024. Among the five countries considered, the lowest cost of remittances is reported for Sri Lanka, which is SAR 22.10. As a percentage of the amount remitted, this was 2.95%. The highest cost of remitting from Saudi Arabia to South Asia is associated with Bangladesh, which is 11.98% of the amount remitted or SAR 89.82. As such, it is important for Saudi Arabia to consider mechanisms to reduce the remittance cost to all countries other than Sri Lanka, which reports over the threshold of 3% identified by the Sustainable Development Goals-related Indicator 10.c.

 Reintegration 

Saudi Arabia, as a country of destination, is very specific about the temporary nature of the migration inflows. Ideally, in such contexts, efforts for successful return and reintegration should be a “shared responsibility between origin and destination countries” (Wickramasekara, 2019, p.12). South Asian stakeholders believe that, while Saudi Arabia clearly presents labour migration as temporary, it provides limited support or frameworks for migrant workers' return and reintegration in South Asia.

Future Trends 

Global Drivers 

Future projects in Saudi Arabia, such as the 2034 FIFA World Cup and the development activities of Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia’s plan to build the tallest building, etc., mean increased infrastructure and construction projects for South Asian stakeholders. This would also mean increased demand for workers, especially migrant workers. However, there are competing global trends that may decrease the supply of migrant workers to Saudi Arabia. One is the increasing global care deficit and the high demand for care workers globally. This excess supply would lead to two main implications. First, workers in other sectors (i.e., hospitality) or occupations (i.e., housekeepers) would also upskill themselves and seek employment in the highly demanded and well-paying care sector, leading to shortages in other sectors and occupations. Second, when Western countries also face demand for care workers, the relatively high preference for employment in such countries with their fewer cultural restrictions, better protection for migrant workers, and potential for naturalization, would mean a lower supply to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the relative ease of migrating to competitor countries would also contribute to decreasing the supply of migrant workers to Saudi Arabia. For instance, the introduction of the Job Seeker Visit Visa scheme in the UAE in recent years has served as a great pull factor attracting potential migrant workers to the UAE, as it minimizes red tape in migrating for employment. For example, a job seeker's visit visa grants permission to a foreigner to search for a job without requiring a host/sponsor in the country, for one trip[i]. This would significantly influence potential migrant workers' decision between the UAE and Saudi Arabia as a destination.

South Asian Trends 

As a region, South Asia is expected to grow at 6% and 6.1% in 2024 and 2025, respectively (World Bank 2024). However, “the region does not create jobs nearly fast enough to provide employment for its growing population” (World Bank 2024, 26). Specifically, with only an average of 10 million jobs created per year in absolute terms since 2000, the working-age population grew on average at 19 million per year. This was a key contributor to the steady supply of migrant workers from South Asia to Saudi Arabia. Another is the growing climate vulnerability of the region. The World Bank (2024) identifies that the agriculture sector in South Asia, which employs almost half of the region’s working-age population, is particularly susceptible to climate vulnerability. The World Bank (2024) underscores that when faced with climate change, labour market adjustment in terms of international migration is prominent in South Asian households, while income from remittances adds to their resilience. In the face of growing climate issues and the inadequacy of employment opportunities in the South Asian region, the outflow of migrant workers to Saudi Arabia is expected to continue.

This outlook may be tapered if the region succeeds in “faster job creation, especially the creation of more productive jobs, [that] may also slow emigration” (World Bank 2024). Moreover, given that “much of the strength of output growth in the region is attributable to India” (World Bank 2024, 17). India’s economic performance may have an impact on migration outflows from the region. Specifically, India’s recent promising performance in employment creation (80 million new jobs between 2017-18 to 2021-22) (Ministry of Finance, India. 2024). If ongoing investment drives in India translate to better prospects locally, this may slow migration from India and South Asia as a whole. As revealed by a KII respondent, India is currently investing heavily in upskilling, infrastructure, and a smart city project, which are bound to yield substantial progress and employment opportunities within India. Similarly, growth projections for India in 2025 are promising, ranging from 6.8%-7.2%, (Business Standard 2024). IMF further expects India to grow by 6.5% in 2025 and 2029, respectively (IMF 2024, 12). At the same time, over recent years, the unemployment rates in India have fallen from 4.2% to 4.1% and 3.2% during 2020-21, 2021-22, and 2022-23, respectively (Ministry of Labour & Employment 2024). For 2028, unemployment in India is projected at 3.68% (Ministry of External Affairs 2024). In such a context, Indian workers may prefer to migrate internally instead of internationally, which might decrease the supply of unskilled migrant workers to Saudi Arabia.

In the case of Bangladesh, the recent socio-political unrest has changed many dynamics in the country. Prior to this unrest and the appointment of an interim government in August 2024, Bangladesh was already facing economic challenges, including high inflationary pressure, slow growth in job creation, unemployment, stagnant private sector investment, and declining foreign reserves (Raihan and Sen 2024). On the political front, the interim government is expected to pave a path for permanent leadership in Bangladesh. Going forward, remittances from migrant workers would continue to be an important driver for growth in the economy, as economic issues related to inflation, unemployment, and possible efforts to increase tax collection may contribute to greater labour migration from Bangladesh in the near future, generally, and to Saudi Arabia in particular. Climate mobility is another growing issue for Bangladesh.

Similar to Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have also experienced socio-economic and political unrest in recent years. In 2022, Pakistan experienced multiple challenges, including political instability, depleting foreign reserves, depreciation of the currency, higher inflation, and severe floods. These contributed to creating major threats to the financial stability of the Pakistani economy. As such, while migration and remittances have been a major contributor to the Pakistani economy, the possible continuation of these social, political, and economic issues would further promote labour migration from Pakistan to the rest of the world, including to Saudi Arabia. The future trends in labour migration from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia are dependent on the economic situation of the country, which in turn is dependent upon the implementation of the IMF Stand-By Arrangement, fiscal restraint, and external financing. However, future migration flows from Pakistan would continue to struggle to diversify the skill composition of migrant workers and continue to send a majority of low-skilled males, mainly employed in transport, construction, and industry sectors.

In Sri Lanka, the economic crisis and the related economic context resulted in a greater push for outward migration from the country, including to Saudi Arabia. These include migration being promoted at the macro level, as well as households resorting to migration as a micro-level coping mechanism. Given that Sri Lanka’s economic issues will likely continue into the next 3-5 years, trends in labour migration may continue to be a dominant coping mechanism in Sri Lanka, and the trends in departures to Saudi Arabia are likely to continue. At the same time, Sri Lanka has been struggling for many years to change the skill and destination compositions of migrant workers, to promote greater departure of more skilled workers, and to capture new destinations. Specifically, while Sri Lanka’s migration policy of 2008 notes skills and destination diversification as priorities, from 2010 to 2022, on average, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait still accounted for 78% of departures.[i] Similarly, when skilled workers accounted for 23% of all departures in 2010, by 2022, this had increased only to 30%[ii]. However, the limited success in these efforts indicates that in the near future, most migrants from Sri Lanka would continue to be low-skilled workers, including female domestic workers heading to the Middle East. The direction that Sri Lanka would take in terms of addressing ongoing political instability and managing the economic crisis and underlying socio-economic issues is subject to the outcome of the upcoming general election. The possible change of power and related socio-political and economic implications may change the dynamics for labour migration from Sri Lanka. Similarly, the progress of the ongoing macroeconomic and fiscal reforms, debt restructuring, and structural reforms will set the tone for the economic situation in Sri Lanka. Unfavourable economic conditions will serve as a strong push factor for labour migration to the rest of the world, including to Saudi Arabia.

Unlike the experience of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, the Nepali economy is at a stable position as of late 2024 and saw a near absence of any political or social challenges[iii]. Specifically, the World Bank projects a favourable position for the Nepali economy with a GDP growth rate of 5% on average, over FY 25-26, a shrinking trade deficit, a current account surplus, a shrinking fiscal deficit, low inflation, and a stable banking sector (World Bank 2024). As such, there is less likely to be new pressure for labour migration from Nepal to Saudi Arabia, other than the ongoing migration trends, where a large proportion of households have an overdependence on remittances as a ‘lifeline’ to their income (KNOMAD 2024).

Nepal’s key destinations are Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia. With the end of Qatar World Cup, the demand for labour from Qatar declined, while demand from Saudi Arabia is on the rise. Similarly, Malaysia’s demand for Nepali workers has declined. Given that the same type of Nepali migrant workers go to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Malaysia, the decline in demand in the last two would translate to a greater supply of migrant workers from Nepal to Saudi Arabia. Stakeholders are of the view that labour migration from Nepal to Saudi Arabia will continue, and within the next 5 years, other countries of destination will be unable to surpass Saudi Arabia in importance as a destination for Nepal.

In general, the South Asian economies suffer from a poor investment climate that will continue to leave a gap in employment opportunities for this region. Moreover, reform delays in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and related economic instability, will serve as push factors for labour migration from this region in general, including to Saudi Arabia (KNOMAD 2024).

Conclusion and the Way Forward 

This paper examined the labour migration trends and provided an evidence-based analysis of how migration stakeholders in South Asia perceive the labour migration environment and priorities in Saudi Arabia and how their perceptions shape migration flows along the South Asia to Saudi Arabia corridor.

The analysis provides valuable insights for shaping the future trajectory of labour migration to Saudi Arabia, and to further align the migration environment in Saudi Arabia with its Vision 2030 program. As identified in the analysis, a few areas to focus on for further research and improvement of existing policies include:

• Diversify countries of destination: There is a strong demand for South Asian migrant workers in the Gulf – low-skilled workers due to their hard-working nature and lower demands, and high-skilled workers due to their technical competencies. However, large external shocks, such as realignment of global trade, regional instability, and a shifting investment landscape could destabilize this demand. It is thus crucial for sending countries to diversify their migrant workers’ destinations as well as have measures in place for urgent repatriation, when and if needed.

• Carefully consider the costs incurred by firms related to foreign workers, as well as the potential implications for undocumented migration in Saudi Arabia, when implementing policies such as Nitaqat and modifying residency regulations.
• Improve implementation and enforcement of rules and regulations pertaining to migrant workers.

• Revisit enabling international organizations such as ILO and IOM to establish offices in Saudi Arabia.
• Pay attention to the type of recruitment conducted in countries of origin to ensure attracting the workers with the required skills to Saudi Arabia.
• Facilitate the return and reintegration of migrants in their countries of origin. Saudi Arabia prioritizes attracting temporary migrant workers but pays little attention to their return and reintegration. Saudi Arabia should thus consider strategies to support the return and reintegration of temporary migrant workers, for instance drawing inspiration from South Korea's successful Happy Returns Program.
• Understand the strategies adopted by competitor countries of destination to attract migrant workers. i.e., the UAE and its Job Seeker Visit Visa scheme.

• Reduce cost of remittances from Saudi Arabia to countries in South Asia, to enhance and sustain Saudi Arabia's attractivity to migrants. For example, the UAE introduced in 2023 a framework for “use of local currencies in cross border transactions and cooperation for interlinking payments and messaging systems between India and the UAE” (KNOMAD 2024, 37). This may act as a pull factor for migrants to head to the UAE instead and deter skills and talents useful to Saudi Arabia's reform process to choose to Kingdom as a destination.

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