Introduction
This policy report investigates the strategies adopted by the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the global race for critical minerals, with a focus on defence and security aspects. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Oman have been developing distinct and to a certain extent competing mining strategies aimed at securing investments, supply chains, and international partnerships in the field of critical minerals, both domestically and abroad. This effort, in which sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) play a driving role, is primarily related to the GCC states’ industrial ambitions in the innovation sector, with technology and artificial intelligence (AI) at the forefront; in the UAE, investments in minerals and metals also display a defence nexus. Given this background, the report addresses the main geopolitical, security, and defence dimensions of the GCC states’ race for critical minerals. It highlights the growing cooperation with the US on the topic, and how security and defence collaboration with African countries tends to follow, especially for the UAE, the signing of mining deals. The policy report ends with a discussion of policy considerations and recommendations for the European Union.
SWFs and Mining Ecosystems: Comparing Strategies in the GCC States
For the GCC states, investing in critical minerals and the development of mining sectors is a shared priority. This takes place in the context of the economic diversification process beyond hydrocarbons. Minerals and metals are key to the transition towards renewable energy and crucial to the industrial and digital transformation in the Gulf through advanced technologies, artificial intelligence, and data centres. They also play an important role in the building of competitive national defence industries.
Against this background, each GCC country has been developing its own mining strategy, with similarities and differences. For all the GCC states, the green transition constitutes a relevant factor in mining investments, although innovation-related and technological-industrial factors appear even more decisive in orienting governments’ strategies. This is primarily due to the geopolitical dimension related to the global technological race: the GCC states aim to become global leaders, aware that advanced technology is an instrument of power above all. By contrast, a country like Qatar, whose wealth stems from liquefied natural gas (LNG) and not from oil, is in less of a rush regarding economic diversification if compared, for instance, to Saudi Arabia, given the likely persistence of demand for LNG as a transitional fuel and Qatar’s own sizable reserves. Within the GCC, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose strategy also displays ambitions of becoming a regional mineral power[1], is the most interested in acquiring minerals and metals to be used for the country’s national defence industry. Differently from other GCC states, a minerals-defence nexus can be clearly identified in the Emirati strategy. Defence-related dimensions are three-fold: the growth of the Emirati national defence industry, since the UAE is already a weapons exporter; the development of advanced technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) for defence-sector applications; and the implementation of the national climate change strategy of the armed forces, aimed at curbing carbon emissions.[2]
The importance of the mining sector in the GCC states’ strategies is underlined by national Visions, the agendas for a future beyond hydrocarbon dependence that each GCC country has elaborated to guide economic diversification. For instance, Saudi Vision 2030 aims to position mining as the third pillar of national industrial growth,[3] part of Riyadh’s plans to produce at least half of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030.[4] In the UAE, the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 identifies metals as the third most important driver of economic diversification since, as the UAE Energy Strategy 2050 highlights, the country aims to integrate traditional and clean energy resources. The UAE, which is working on its first mineral resources strategy, estimates that the mining sector’s share of non-oil gross domestic product (GDP) will reach 5% by 2030.[5] In Oman, the government plans to increase the mining sector’s GDP contribution from 1.4% in 2020 to 10% by 2040, according to Vision 2040.[6] Regarding Qatar, the National Development Strategy does not explicitly focus on mining, although it makes a reference to ‘the metals sub-cluster’ and the government’s willingness to “specialise in low-carbon metals and explore downstream products in the aluminium sector”.[7]
Together with official documents and Visions, the assignment of the mining file within the machinery of government helps to frame each leadership’s mining strategy. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar include mining within industry-focused ministries, namely, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, respectively. Oman, by contrast, houses the file within its Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The UAE, similarly, has placed the mining sector under the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure while giving its Ministry of Investment purview over agreements abroad. The great number of Emirati port concessions and ports under construction in Africa and, to a lesser extent, Latin America,[8] strongly supports the UAE’s ambitions in the mineral trade and underlines the importance the Ministry of Investment attaches to this file.
In addition, differences emerge with respect to the focus of mining investments in each country. Saudi Arabia and Oman, the two largest GCC countries in terms of territory and citizen population, invest heavily in the domestic mining sector; Muscat focuses only on exploiting mineral deposits located within its territory. Meanwhile, domestic resources constitute only a minor dimension of the mining strategies of Qatar and the UAE.
For all the GCC states, SWFs play a key role in mining investments inside and outside national boundaries, alongside state-led companies and holdings. Therefore, SWFs are important but not hegemonic players in the implementation of national mining strategies. Nevertheless, as the GCC states display a state-led and top-down economic model, the co-presence in each country of mining investments and activity from varied economic actors does not undermine the strategic outcome, since the effort is designed and pursued by the state through complementary business branches, referring to the same central power. In Saudi Arabia, the majority of Ma’aden, the country’s main mining firm, is owned by the Public Investment Fund (PIF) – the Kingdom’s largest SWF – and aims to develop the full supply chain: exploration, processing, refining, and manufacturing, with investments estimated at 48 billion USD.[9] As of mid-2025, Saudi Arabia has attracted approximately 32 billion USD in mining investments, centred on iron, phosphate, aluminium and copper.[10] Regarding the Kingdom’s strategy abroad, Manara Minerals, a joint venture between Ma’aden and PIF, is the foreign acquisitions tool.
In the UAE, the SWF Mubadala is directly involved in mining investments, and the most influential person is Sheikh Tahnoon Al Nahyan, Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi, UAE National Security Advisor, and the brother of Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. In fact, SheikhTahnoon chairs both the Emirati AI company G42 and the national mining company, called International Resources Holding (IRH), itself a subsidiary of the International Holding Company, which is owned by Abu Dhabi’s ruling family and whose structure and varied investment portfolio resemble an SWF. IRH’s goal is the control of the full Emirati supply chain: mining, trading, extraction technology, and investments in logistics and infrastructure, focusing abroad on copper, cobalt, nickel, manganese, graphite, rare earth metals, tin, tantalum, and tungsten. At the domestic level, the UAE is exploring metal and mineral deposits in northern emirates, searching for chromite, aluminium, and raw steel. This occurs especially in Fujairah, where the Emirati mining sector and adjacent industries – like the manufacture of cement and building materials – are based. The Khalifa Industrial Zone in Abu Dhabi also hosts a lithium processing facility.
Qatar’s mining strategy is also centred on SWFs: The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) is at the forefront of Doha’s efforts, together with Qatar Mining, a fully state-owned company established in 2010 for partnerships and investments in the sector. On the domestic front, Qatar is one of the few producers of helium, a gas used in science, medicine, the technology industry and semiconductors. Since 2013, the country has built production, storage and loading facilities in Ras Laffan.
Oman focuses on the domestic mining sector with its state-owned Minerals Development Oman, established in 2016, working on upstream and downstream projects, aiming to reduce dependence on refineries abroad; the export dimension is left to Oman Minerals Trading Company. Traditionally known as the ‘land of copper’, Oman aims to restart copper extraction after a thirty-year stop, also exploring chromite, silica, gypsum, and limestone.
All the GCC monarchies have a state-led approach to mining, which mirrors blurred boundaries between public and private sectors, and a firm, top-down guidance on strategic sectors. In this framework, however, GCC states’ mining strategies display significant differences. Saudi Arabia and the UAE seem interested in the direct control of the whole supply chain, from upstream to downstream investments. The Emiratis often connect minerals to infrastructural investments, as the Ministry of Investment’s responsibility for foreign aspects of the mining file suggests. This approach differs from Riyadh’s reliance on signing joint ventures to achieve goals through international partnerships, as in the case of the 2025 agreement between Ma’aden and the Australian Midana Exploration Pty Ltd-Hancock, or the 2023 deal between Ma’aden and the American firm Ivanhoe Electric, which both intend to boost exploration efforts in the Kingdom.[11] While Abu Dhabi also inks joint ventures, it tends to buy mining concessions rather than provide investments to others in return for the future supply of raw materials.[12] Qatar shows an indirect, mediated approach, as it is entering the mining sector through the financing of investment companies. In 2024, QIA invested in TechMet, a Dublin-based mining investment company working across the entire critical minerals supply chain and will control 4% of the company. TechMet is supported by the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
The GCC States’ Mining Strategies: Geopolitical, Defence and Security Dimensions
The GCC states pursue a multi-aligned approach to international politics, refraining from taking a side in the US-China systemic rivalry. In the mining sector, this translates into investments and cooperation with multiple global partners, with the UAE clearly acting in direct competition with Beijing in Africa.[13] The main goal of Gulf governments is to attract and forge bilateral investments on minerals and metals, in addition to developing and/or upgrading domestic refining capabilities. Dubai and Riyadh specifically aim to boost trade relations to become mining hubs, also through conferences and exhibitions, such as the Future Minerals Forum in Riyadh. In such a context, the GCC states are shaping multiple international partnerships on mining and, most recently, they have stepped up bilateral cooperation with the US.
International Partnerships
In November 2025, Saudi Arabia and the US signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on securing uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical mineral supply chains, building upon the memorandum of understanding (MoU) on critical minerals agreed in May 2025. The UAE and Qatar joined the US-led Pax Silica in January 2026: it is an initiative launched in December 2025 and aimed at securing the resilience of the supply chain for silicon and minerals needed for AI, semiconductors and technology-related advanced manufacturing. In January 2025, the Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund ADQ – part of the sovereign investment platform L’imad since early 2026 – and the US company Orion Resource Partners established an Abu Dhabi-based joint venture to invest in minerals and metals in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In 2024, when the US designated the UAE as a Major Defence Partner, both states stressed “ongoing efforts to cooperate on strategic investments in hard infrastructure and critical minerals supply chains in Africa and emerging markets”[14] to diversify sourcing. Qatar is also cooperating with the US on critical minerals, though indirectly.
Some of the mining agreements the GCC states are separately reaching with the US display a specific defence intent. Following the 2025 strategic framework between Riyadh and Washington, Ma’aden signed a binding term sheet with MP Materials, backed by the US Department of War, under which MP Materials and the Department of War will jointly hold a targeted 49% stake, and Ma’aden no less than 51%, in a new rare earths refinery in Saudi Arabia. According to the deal, Ma’aden and MP Materials “aim to explore opportunities to jointly develop a vertically integrated rare earth supply chain in Saudi Arabia”, including mining, separation, refining, and magnet production.[15] Heavy rare earths are key components of the United States’ most advanced defence capabilities, such as F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, and Predator drones.[16] In May 2025, Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA) and the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement – the governmental entity dealing with the UAE’s defence capabilities and procurement – signed an MoU with the American aerospace company RTX to explore the production of gallium, a metal key to the manufacturing of semiconductors and defence products like advanced radars, in the UAE.
Among Riyadh's other collaborations on minerals and metals are a critical minerals cooperation partnership with the UK and an MoU with India, both signed in 2025. Since 2024, the Kingdom has also opened up to joint investments with Chinese mining companies, focusing on processing and producing lithium and copper. Beijing also invested in the exploration of minerals in the Kingdom; it was instrumental in the first exploration of uranium deposits from 2017 to 2019.[17] Since 2024, the Emirati IRH collaborates with Indian companies (KABIL, OIL, OVL) through a state-to-state MoU aimed at “securing a comprehensive supply chain for critical minerals”, focusing on project identification, due diligence, development strategies, risk management, and offtake strategies.[18] Furthermore, as part of the UAE-India-France Trilateral Cooperation Partnership, established in 2023, Abu Dhabi can match its logistics and trade hub with India and France’s expertise in processing and refining minerals. In October 2025, Oman signed with Türkiye an MoU to explore collaboration on critical minerals.
Lack of Coordination, Occasional Competition Between GCC States
As with other sectors, the GCC states are not cooperating on critical minerals, although they are all investing in the field and consider mining investments as strategic. Some cases emphasise how GCC states’ mineral investments are disconnected from one another – as they search for the same mineral/metal in the same country – or even in competition with one another. Two cases are particularly illustrative of the lack of coordination between GCC states: Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Qatar has invested in Brazil’s mining sector since 2017.[19] Saudi Manara acquired in 2023 a 10% stake in Brazil’s base metals company Vale Base Metals, focusing on copper and nickel.[20] In 2025, the UAE signed with Brazil an MoU for joint investments in mineral exploration, development, processing, and marketing.[21] In the DRC, the Emiratis have been the first Gulf player to entrench mining deals. In 2023, the Abu Dhabi-based gold trader Primera Group signed a 25-year deal with the Congolese government to acquire export rights for artisanally mined ores, and to develop at least four sites[22] (for tin, tantalum and tungsten). But in 2024, DRC retook full control of the gold-export joint venture due to slumped shipments, renaming it DRC Gold Trading: many observers, and UN experts among them, raised doubts on Primera Group’s operation due to lack of transparency, resulting in a near-monopoly over the export of legal artisanal gold.[23] In 2025, the Emirati IRH acquired a 56% stake in Alphamin Resources, the owner of the big Bisie tin mine, highlighting UAE’s enduring interest for the Congolese mineral sector. Saudi Arabia signed an MoU on mining with DRC in 2024,[24]and the Congolese government is now working to strengthen mineral ties also with Riyadh to diversify investors.[25] In 2025, Qatar’s QIA announced a 500 million USD investment in Ivanhoe Mines, the Canadian company that operates the DRC's largest copper mine, plus a zinc mine in the country.[26] The deal was followed by an MoU between QIA and Ivanhoe Mines to support the company's efforts to find and develop sustainable supply of critical minerals. The UAE re-entered the gold sector in DRC when, in April 2026, the Dubai-based Paradigm Holdings announced a gold supply agreement with the Congolese government to formalise a gold supply network from DRC,[27] aimed at enhancing Dubai’s hub role for trade. This new investment emphasises the business potential the UAE still has in the country, as well as the persistency of a pattern of competition on critical minerals vis-à-vis the other GCC states.
Security Implications and Defence Cooperation
Early indications suggest that rising investments abroad in the mineral and metal sector generate security implications for the GCC states. Mining plants need to be physically protected. Gulf governments have an interest in supporting defence capacities in partner countries once mining deals are signed. Furthermore, mineral resources can be located in unstable or even conflict-torn countries, as often occurs in Africa. Regarding Saudi Arabia and Qatar, direct mining investments abroad are still fewer and at an early stage compared to the UAE: this makes it difficult, so far, to appraise any hypothetical security correlations.[28] Conversely, the increase of security and defence agreements by the UAE after the signing of mining deals is clear and recurrent on the African continent. In the Emirati strategy, concessions for commercial ports and logistics areas are also used to trigger security and defence agreements in the same countries: these projects have been frequently followed by heightened cooperation in the defence-security field.[29] This reveals both a spill-over effect and an Emirati interest in directly protecting its investments, gradually shaping areas of influence abroad.
Since Emirati infrastructural projects have started before mining ones, these can be analysed to anticipate how the UAE will likely behave to support security in countries of investment after mineral deals are signed. In Nigeria, the UAE finalised a deal for niobium exports in 2022 and in 2023, Abu Dhabi and Abuja signed an MoU on military defence cooperation, comprising technology transfer, intelligence, training of military personnel, procurement of military equipment, platforms and ammunition.[30] This pattern repeats itself elsewhere in Africa too. In the DRC, the UAE delivered thirty armoured vehicles to the army in 2021 while the first agreement for tin, tantalum and tungsten was signed only in 2023: however, after the mining deal, the UAE reportedly funded the Kinshasa police academy, and provided training for the counter-terrorism unit of the Légion Nationale d’Intervention, and for members of the Police Nationale Congolaise.[31] In 2025, Emirati-DRC defence cooperation has registered a rise, occurring as the war between the army and M23 rebels escalated. This coincides with new mining investments by the Emiratis (e.g. a joint venture for a copper-cobalt refining; IRH’s acquisition of a majority stake in Alphamin): the Kinshasa government ordered in 2025 more than 100 units of mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles from the UAE.[32] In Kenya, the UAE signed in 2024 an MoU on mining, and governments are currently in talks to strengthen defence cooperation, with a focus on the air force and the countering of the Al Qaeda’s affiliate Al Shabaab. The Emiratis’ primary import items from Angola are diamonds, gold, and copper bars: the countries inked in 2025 an MoU on mining. In 2025, the Emirati defence conglomerate EDGE announced that it was ‘in the final stages’ of securing an agreement with Angola’s Ministry of Interior to deploy a comprehensive border security programme to the country. The programme will be delivered by BEACON RED, an EDGE entity specialising in security solutions. In this way, the UAE is reshaping its approach to security assistance abroad, relying on a more flexible, business-driven and state-controlled component that sits outside the armed forces.[33]
Beyond Africa, this Emirati model has been deployed in South America as well. In the case of the Emirati mining cooperation with Brazil, defence industry cooperation has quickly followed. In 2021, the UAE signed an agreement with Brazil for the provision of copper, tantalum and nickel. In 2023, EDGE opened its first ever international office in Brasilia, and some cutting-edge defence industry acquisitions have paved the way for projects on advanced anti-ship technology and aerospace.
Conclusions and Policy Considerations for the European Union
Mining investments represent a shared priority for GCC states, engaged in energy and digital transitions and to a lesser extent in the development of national defence industries. For Saudi Arabia and Oman, the focus is also on attracting foreign investments to exploit domestic mineral resources. However, as is the case in other strategic sectors, the GCC states pursue similar goals through different strategies, prioritising competition and national gains over cooperation and collective achievements. Multi-aligned foreign policies push the GCC states to bilaterally partner on mining with state powers of all geopolitical shades.
In such a framework, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are increasing agreements, partnerships and joint projects on mining with the US. These deals can be seen in the wider context of the GCC states’ technology-industrial rush, as minerals are key to semiconductors, AI and data centres, renewables, and defence products. Since 2024, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have increased technological agreements with the US, to a certain extent reducing their Chinese tech investments. In 2025, companies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh received authorisations for the import of advanced American semiconductors. This is likely to foster further GCC partnerships with the US on critical minerals, as part of a broader innovation-driven cooperation.
Given this background, the EU and European states should consider the following:
- On strategic sectors like critical minerals, GCC states’ top-down strategies and “Visions” combine well with the Trump administration’s state capitalism, showing similarities in how the state intervenes in markets, and to a certain extent in how state power is approached and handled. This, together with GCC states’ tendency to work autonomously and not collectively on mining investments, reduces spaces for bloc-to-bloc GCC-EU cooperation.
- To improve industrial and workforce skills in the mining sector, the GCC states need to widen international partnerships and boost technical education. The EU and European states should focus on these dimensions to shape potential collaboration. For instance, the EU should explore cooperative programmes to upskill and reskill GCC states’ learners and professionals at the European Raw Materials Academy, established in 2023 as part of the European Critical Raw Materials Act. This may be a first step towards EU-GCC cooperation on critical minerals through education activities.
- Both GCC and EU states are facing energy transitions and defence industry build up, with the latter triggered respectively by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022) and the Iran war (2026). The EU should explore the possibility to include critical minerals in the EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue. The goal should be to develop a cooperation framework for joint investments starting from shared needs and complementary expertise on mining. Afterwards, this could pave the way for bilateral agreements, partnerships, and projects between Gulf and European states.
- Supply chain resilience is also related to maritime security because of trade: securing mineral supply chains should be included in the maritime security cooperation area of the EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue. This would allow the EU to involve the GCC states in a multilateral conversation on critical minerals, starting from a security focus.
- Especially on the African continent, direct EU competition with GCC states on minerals and metals is unrealistic for Brussels, given the financial power, agile bureaucracy and the less risk-averse approach of Gulf governments. On mining, the EU should explore win-win synergies with the GCC states in Africa, partnering in complementary projects related to energy, renewables and climate change, and infrastructure.[34] For instance, trilateral EU-GCC-African approaches to critical minerals-focused cooperation at the state-to-state level could be considered, echoing the triangular cooperation patterns proposed in Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa.
Endnotes
[1] Duffau, Éleonore / Jourde, Mathilde / Collet, Martin / Michelet, Maxence 2025: La diplomatie climatique des monarchies du Golfe: levier d’influence et outil de puissance [The Climate Diplomacy of the Gulf Monarchies: A Lever of Influence and an Instrument of Power], Note, Observatoire Défense & Climat, The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), 05.2025, in: https://defenseclimat.fr/la-diplomatie-climatique-des-monarchies-du-golfe-levier-dinfluence-et-outil-de-puissance/ [01.06.2026].
[2] Ardemagni, Eleonora 2024: Minerals (also) for Defence: Unlocking the Emirati Mining Rush, ISPI Analysis, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 23.07.2024, in: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/minerals-also-for-defence-unlocking-the-emirati-mining-rush-181525 [01.06.2026]; Ardemagni, Eleonora 2025: The Minerals-Defence Nexus in the UAE’s Strategy, Note, Programme Climate, Environment, Security, The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), 04.09.2025, in: https://www.iris-france.org/en/the-minerals-defence-nexus-in-the-uaes-strategy/ [01.06.2026].
[3] Vision 2030 2026: Strategy for the Mining Sector, in: https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/strategies/strategy-for-the-mining-sector [01.06.2026].
[4] Public Investment Fund (PIF) 2025: How PIF is Shaping the Future of Saudi Arabia’s Mining Industry, 29.04.2025, in: https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/news-network/2025/how-pif-is-ensuring-a-resilient-supply-of-saudi-arabia/ [01.06.2026].
[5] Emirates News Agency-WAM 2024: Mining Show 2024 Kicks Off in Dubai, 26.11.2024, in: https://www.wam.ae/en/article/b6e28cz-mining-show-2024-kicks-off-dubai%E2%80%8E [05.06.2026].
[6] Invest Oman 2026: Unlocking Oman Mineral Wealth, in: https://investoman.om/start-investing/sectors/mining-31 [01.06.2026].
[7] National Planning Council 2024: Third Qatar National Development Strategy (2024-2030), p. 17, in: https://www.npc.qa/en/planning/nds3/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf [01.06.2026].
[8] In Latin America, DP World operates in Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
[9] El-Shaeri, Nour 2025: Saudi Arabia highlights mining reforms and investment drive at Peru conference, Arab News, 06.10.2025, in: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2617936/business-economy [01.06.2026].
[10] Narayanan, Nirmal 2025: Saudi Arabia attracts $32bn in mining investments amid sector reforms, Arab News, 16.07.2025, in: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2608258/business-economy [01.06.2026].
[11] Maaden 2025: Maaden Establishes a Joint Venture with Hancock Prospecting to Accelerate Exploration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 29.12.2025, in: https://www.maaden.com/news-insights/latest-news/maaden-establishes-a-joint-venture-with-hancock-prospecting-to-accelerate-exploration-in-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia [01.06.2026]; Al-Arabiya 2023: Saudi Maaden invests in Ivanhoe, establishes joint venture to explore mineral sites, 16.05.2023, in: https://english.alarabiya.net/business/economy/2023/05/16/Saudi-Maaden-invests-in-Ivanhoe-establishes-joint-venture-to-explore-mineral-sites [01.06.2026].
[12] See the IRH’s CEO interview. Financial Times 2024: Abu Dhabi conglomerate embarks on flurry of mining deals, 26.05.2024, in: https://www.ft.com/content/2885f8da-cafc-4bc6-b15b-1c5275db1280 [01.06.2026].
[13] Wajid, Asna 2025: The geopolitics of the Gulf States’ push for critical minerals, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 31.07.2025, in: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-middle-east/2025/07/the-geopolitics-of-the-gulf-states-push-for-critical-minerals/ [01.06.2026].
[14] U.S. Mission UAE 2024: U.S.-UAE Joint Leaders’ Statement Dynamic Strategic Partners, U.S. Embassy and Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, 23.09.2024, in: https://ae.usembassy.gov/u-s-uae-joint-leaders-statement-dynamic-strategic-partners/ [01.06.2026].
[15] MP Materials 2025: Maaden and MP Materials Collaborate to Establish Full Value Chain for Rare Earth Magnetics, Press release, 14.05.2025, in: https://investors.mpmaterials.com/investor-news/news-details/2025/Maaden-and-MP-Materials-Collaborate-to-Establish-Full-Value-Chain-for-Rare-Earth-Magnetics/default.aspx [01.06.2026].
[16] Baskaran, Gracelin 2025: What’s in the New U.S.-Saudi Minerals Agreement?, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 19.11.2025, in: https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-era-us-saudi-minerals-cooperation [01.06.2026].
[17] Katamoura, Suzan / Asiri, Haleema / Aljaseem, Qusay 2018: Uranium/Thorium Resource Assessment in Saudi Arabia, International Atomic Energy Agency, in: https://conferences.iaea.org/event/146/contributions/5274/contribution.pdf [25.10.2026].
[18] International Resources Holding (IRH) 2024: IRH Announces Landmark Strategic Partnership, 10.09.2024, in: https://www.irh.ae/irh-announces-landmark-strategic-partnership/ [01.06.2026].
[19] Daniel, Isaura 2017: Gulf country has USD 5 billion invested in Brazil, Arab-Brazil News Agency, 26.09.2017, in: https://anba.com.br/en/gulf-country-has-usd-5-billion-invested-in-brazil/ [01.06.2026].
[20] Mining.com 2023: Saudi Arabia’s Ma’aden to acquire 10% of Brazil base metals firm, 30.07.2023, in: https://www.mining.com/web/saudi-arabias-maaden-to-acquire-10-of-brazil-base-metals-firm-statement/ [01.06.2026].
[21] Economy Middle East 2025: UAE, Brazil formalize mineral exploration MoU for energy and mining collaboration, 10.01.2025, in: https://economymiddleeast.com/news/uae-brazil-formalize-mineral-exploration-mou-for-energy-and-mining-collaboration/ [01.06.2026].
[22] Al Jazeera 2023: UAE signs deal to develop mines in eastern DR Congo, 18.07.2023, in: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/18/uae-signs-deal-to-develop-mines-in-eastern-dr-congo [01.06.2026].
[23] Bankable Africa 2026: Paradigm Holdings opens new DRC-UAE gold export route, 01.05.2026, in: https://bankable.africa/en/mining/0105-2855-paradigm-holdings-opens-new-drc-uae-gold-export-route [25.10.2026].
[24] Mining.com 2024: Saudi Arabia signs mining deals with four nations, 10.01.2024, in: https://www.mining.com/saudi-arabia-signs-mining-deals-with-four-nations/ [01.06.2026].
[25] Magid, Pesha 2025: Congo courts Saudi mining investors to help curb China dominance, Reuters, 14.01.2025, in: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-courts-saudi-mining-investors-help-curb-china-dominance-2025-01-14/ [01.06.2026].
[26] Ecofin Agency 2025: Qatar to Invest $500 Million in Ivanhoe, Kamoa-Kakula Copper, 17.09.2025, in: https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/1709-48765-qatar-to-invest-500-million-in-ivanhoe-kamoa-kakula-copper [01.06.2026].
[27] Bankable Africa 2026: Paradigm Holdings opens new DRC-UAE gold export route, 01.05.2026, in: https://bankable.africa/en/mining/0105-2855-paradigm-holdings-opens-new-drc-uae-gold-export-route [25.10.2026].
[28] In 2025, the DRC government signed several agreements with the Qatari Al Mansour Holding (owned by the cousin of the Emir) on copper, cobalt, gold mining and refining, the development of industrial units for the treatment and refining of minerals, and security and defence. Bankable Africa 2025: DR Congo Secures Deals Totalling $21 Billion with Qatar’s Al Mansour Holding, 04.09.2025, in: https://bankable.africa/en/mining/0409-1643-dr-congo-secures-deals-totaling-21-billion-with-qatar-s-al-mansour-holding [01.06.2026]. Qatar has been at the forefront of diplomatic talks between the DRC and Rwanda, and between the DRC government and M23 rebels.
[29] Ardemagni, Eleonora 2023: One Port, One Node: The Emirati Geostrategic Road to Africa, ISPI Analysis, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 13.06.2023, in: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/one-port-one-node-the-emirati-geostrategic-road-to-africa-131893 [01.06.2026].
[30] Ministry of Defence Nigeria 2023: FG Strengthens Bilateral Relations with UAE, 11.03.2023, in: https://defence.gov.ng/2023/03/11/fg-strengthens-bilateral-relations-with-uae/ [01.06.2026].
[31] International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024: The UAE as a security partner in Africa, 12.2024, in: https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2024/12/the-uae-as-a-security-partner-in-africa/ [01.06.2026].
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