Introduction
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) play multifarious roles in supporting the economic development and diversification processes of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The leading Gulf SWFs, such as Mubadala and L’imad – formerly ADQ – in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Public Investment Fund (PIF) in Saudi Arabia, collectively deployed 137 billion USD in regional investments from the beginning of 2023 through September 2024.[1] Strategic investments are increasingly tied to defence considerations, especially in a rapidly changing regional context characterised by shifting threat perceptions, budgets, human resource issues, and military supplies from partner states, along with a continuing diversification of international relations and engagement in foreign- and security-policy coordination within the GCC.[2]
From roots in leveraging defence exhibitions as ‘strategic signalling’ to show industrial aspirations and bolster economic diversification plans,[3] Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other GCC countries, have gone on to advance their security and economic interests through state-owned companies. These include Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and EDGE, respectively, and an increasing range of subsidiaries and associated companies. Whilst the majority of these remain in state hands, ownership structures can be complex, yielding a variety of relationships with SWFs.
As SWFs grow in size and sophistication, they can become decoupled from the oil revenues that frequently finance them, thus becoming financially autonomous entities funded through returns alone. This gives the larger Gulf SWFs enhanced flexibility, resources, and potential to drive growth in sectors, such as defence, that national leaderships deem strategically significant, irrespective of fluctuations in the global hydrocarbon market. That being said, the last major jump in international oil prices in 2022 placed many Gulf SWFs in advantageous positions to build their assets through larger capital injections. Against this background, the policy report focuses on the role that Oman’s, Saudi Arabia’s, and the UAE’s SWFs play in these countries’ defence sectors and related industries that could be dual-use. The contribution argues that there is diversity in how these states use SWFs to support their defensive needs, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE leading the way in driving growth and consolidation through strategic investments.
Oman
Oman’s sovereign wealth fund plays a more understated and indirect role in the defence sphere, reflecting the Sultanate’s distinct strategic priorities and resource constraints. The Oman Investment Authority (OIA) operates less as a driver of a formal military-industrial complex and more as a stabilising and enabling institution, aligning economic management with selective investments that carry latent defence relevance. This approach is shaped by Oman’s longstanding emphasis on diplomatic engagement and its comparatively narrower industrial base, which together reduce the impetus for building large-scale, state-owned defence conglomerates akin to those seen in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.
Instead, the OIA’s contribution lies in fostering economic sectors and infrastructure that can support dual-use outcomes, embedding defence utility within broader development objectives. As of 2023, the OIA had combined assets of about 51 billion USD, focused mainly on public market assets (global equity, fixed income bonds, and short-term assets) as well as non-tradeable, private market assets (real estate, logistics, commercial and industrial projects).[4] Through these carefully positioned domestic holdings and partnerships, it supports capabilities in logistics, aviation, and industrial services that may indirectly serve military needs while remaining commercially oriented. This model highlights a quieter form of defence integration, where sovereign investment supports resilience and optionality rather than pursuing overt defence industrialisation. The OIA’s approach also aligns with its role in addressing the Sultanate’s budget deficits, the debt position of state-owned companies, and other sources of economic weakness in the aftermath of the sharp drop in the global price of oil in 2014, with a view toward attracting more inward investment from abroad.[5]
Still, the OIA has some exposure to defence-related companies, including, for example, a 42% share in Oman National Investment Company (TANMIA), which helps build SMEs and industrial capacity that could supply dual-use sectors such as logistics, manufacturing, and maintenance. The OIA also holds full ownership of Oman Air and Oman Airports, while maintaining 100% control of Asyad Group, which operates the ports and free zones in Sohar and Salalah, along with the port of Duqm. The OIA is not the only actor in these dual-use environments, however. Other projects, such as the expansion of Duqm port, are being developed with a consortium including British and Bahraini investment, as well as Belgian marine infrastructure and port operating companies.[6] Accordingly, the OIA applies sovereign investments in defence-related sectors that it deems strategic, but does so in a manner that does not crowd out foreign investments.
Saudi Arabia
Sovereign wealth funds have emerged as pivotal instruments in shaping Saudi Arabia’s military-industrial complex, functioning not only as financial investors but also as strategic coordinators of national defence ambitions and instruments of state consolidation. Anchored by the Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia’s approach reflects a broader state-led effort to align capital deployment with long-term security and economic diversification goals under Vision 2030. Increasingly, evidence points to a collaborative ecosystem in which the SWF works alongside regulatory and industrial bodies to advance defence localisation, technological transfer, and human capital development. In this way, the PIF plays a key role in building out the Kingdom’s domestic defence production capacity and industrial depth.
Developing the Kingdom’s domestic defence capabilities and localising production have become pressing priorities in light of the turbulent geopolitical context that Riyadh must navigate. Before the current bout of Iranian missile attacks against Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic and its Yemeni ally, the Houthis, exposed the country’s vulnerabilities by damaging oil installations and depots in Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019 and Jeddah in 2022. While Washington remains Riyadh’s security partner of choice – emphasised most recently by the acquisition of 48 F-35 fighter jets and 300 Abrams tanks from the US, along with the Kingdom’s designation as a major non-NATO ally[7] – the United States’ inability and unwillingness to insulate its Saudi partner from foreign aggression has provoked thinking about diversifying defence ties and strengthening domestic capabilities. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia has accompanied its efforts to pursue a NATO-style mutual defence guarantee from the United States with hedging towards China and Russia, the 2025 Saudi-Pakistan mutual defence agreement, and investments in the Kingdom’s own military-industrial capacity. Further movement in these areas could significantly shape the future trajectory of PIF involvement in the Saudi defence sector, following on from building a global presence in 2017, establishing a military-industrial base from 2020, and beginning to consolidate and prioritise strategic sectors in the present day.
Within this ecosystem in flux, the PIF’s current role as an anchor of state capitalism and coordinator of different state-aligned defence-sector entities manifests in the symbiotic relationship between Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI). Established in 2017 by the PIF, SAMI is one of the cornerstones of the Saudi defence industry and is licenced and regulated by GAMI. For its part, GAMI was set up in 2017 by royal decree but is not owned by the SWF, though it is overseen by the Higher Committee for Defence Industry and the Council of Ministers, which are headed by Crown Prince, Prime Minister, and PIF Chairman Mohammed bin Salman. SAMI and GAMI coordinate within this constellation to maximise the domestic benefits of defence procurement and integrate foreign partnerships into local manufacturing and education initiatives. Through the Public Investment Fund, capital allocation is thus tightly integrated with regulatory direction via GAMI and industrial execution via SAMI, enabling the Kingdom to leverage foreign partnerships for technology transfer, workforce development, and domestic production capacity.
Several illustrative cases demonstrate how this model operates in practice. On the one hand, PIF relies on SAMI to act as a facilitator of technology-transfer partnerships, as opposed to moving capital outside the Kingdom to invest in defence companies abroad. Such SAMI-led partnerships include a long-standing relationship with Northrop Grumman[8], which has focused on capability and workforce development, academic exchange, and projects including aerospace systems, cybersecurity, and command-and-control systems, although details are not made public. There is also a joint venture between SAMI and Lockheed Martin that was agreed upon in 2021, with SAMI holding 51%. The partnership comprises the local production and maintenance of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, the development of missile defence systems, technology transfer, and Saudi workforce training, expanding recently to include system integration, software technology, and advanced manufacturing.[9] Other SAMI collaborations are with the UK’s BAE Systems, specifically through International Systems Engineering (ISE) and BAE Systems Arabian Industries – the result of a merger between BAE Systems Saudi Development and Training (SDT) and Saudi Maintenance and Supply Chain Management Company Ltd (SMSCMC).[10] SAMI also works with Turkish partners Baykar on drone technologies, Aselsan on electronic warfare and defence systems, and Fergani Space on space and satellite technology development.[11]
On the other hand, GAMI sets policy and functions as a regulatory authority with strategic policy functions. GAMI collaborates with SAMI and is engaged in an industrial participation agreement with Raytheon since 2020.[12] In 2024, this agreement was extended to include the manufacturing and testing of parts of the Patriot missile defence system with steel from the Arabian International Company (AIC) and final assembly, integration, and testing by SAMI.[13] There have also been meetings between Raytheon and a SAMI subsidiary, Advanced Electronics Company (AEC), bought from BAE systems, in May 2025 about expanding cooperation in precision strikes and sensor technologies.[14]
Finally, the PIF rounds out the picture with direct investments in dual-use sectors. In aerospace, the PIF is investing in military systems, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), and spare parts to build the local defence sector.[15] It is most directly involved with: GDC Middle East (established in 2015, 80% owned by PIF and 20% owned by Ajwa Aviation Holdings), which aims to ensure consistent aerospace and defence industry capabilities[16]; The Helicopter Company (THC), which was established in 2018[17]; Riyadh Air (launched in 2023 and owned by PIF); and AviLease (an aircraft leasing company established in 2022), which advances aviation infrastructure, including Airbus and Boeing fleets.[18] The PIF has also expanded into global space services, including satellite communications, geospatial, and PNT (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) through establishing the Neo Space Group in 2024.[19] In 2025, the PIF announced 40 billion SAR (about 10.67 billion USD) in investment opportunities to strengthen local industries, including defence.[20]
The Saudi case shows a clear defence localisation strategy with a strong role for the PIF and SAMI, especially in encouraging foreign defence companies to commit to the economic diversification agenda of Saudi Vision 2030 and find a multitude of ways to contribute to it. Furthermore, the strategic relations between SAMI and the sectoral regulator GAMI highlight the hand-in-hand partnership between strategically deploying capital, attracting advantageous investments from abroad, and crafting a legislative environment conducive to both. In security terms, the PIF’s role in coordinating and underwriting these symbiotic ties helps Saudi Arabia stay on target to localise 50% of military equipment spending by 2030[21], while from a labour perspective, it means contributing to the Kingdom’s Saudisation, or Nitiqat, strategy, which aims to boost the employment of Saudi citizens in the private sector.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE’s strategy is predicated on building a critical mass and contributing to the rapid rise of a military-industrial complex that buys the state greater autonomy and reduces reliance on key allies in certain areas. That being said, since the UAE received “Major Defence Partnership” designation in May 2025, over and above the “Major Non-NATO Ally” status that the US has bestowed upon Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, there will be more opportunities to develop joint defence projects.[22] In particular, the Global AI Infrastructure Investment Partnership with BlackRock and Microsoft has assumed a much greater focus on advancing US security interests over time[23], building on decades of close treasury and intelligence ties between the two countries.
The UAE is less rigidly committed to leveraging SWF investments as a localisation tool, with domestic production constituting a less stringent requirement as is the case in Saudi Arabia. The Emirates’ primary goals have been to identify critical sectors, achieve rapid growth, and consolidate these achievements with the help of institutions headed by experienced leaders. In this regard, the phenomenon of ‘double hatting’ between multiple roles across government agencies and state-owned enterprises and investment vehicles contributes to the UAE’s relatively unique concentration and agility in political and economic decision-making. The UAE facilitates the rapid restructuring of SWFs on a frequent basis, with a view toward maximising efficiency and institutional logic in light of evolving expectations, priorities, and political environments.
Since 2021, the UAE’s Make it in the Emirates forum complements its globally renowned International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX). This simultaneity illustrates the country’s dual approach of localising manufacturing where possible while remaining engaged with international production processes, a strategy mirrored in the behaviour of Emirati sovereign wealth funds. To implement this approach in practice, flexibility is key for SWFs in the UAE, both in terms of wedding domestic output with international integration, on the one hand, and openness to institutional reshuffling, on the other.
Two of the country’s ‘market-shaping’ SWFs – Mubadala and L’imad – represent cases in point for this iterative, non-rigid approach to interest-maximising investment. Mubadala is owned by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and is chaired by UAE Vice President Shaikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan. It is mainly concerned with projects that are important to the Abu Dhabi economy, including the defence-relevant sectors of energy, infrastructure, and aeronautics. In 2017-2018, Mubadala merged with Abu Dhabi Investment Council and Aabar, which were focused on industrial assets, helping the state build critical mass across these key areas and limit duplication of efforts and investments.[24] Another instance of institutional right-sizing occurred in 2019, when Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC) – at the time 60% owned by Mubadala – was folded into the newly established EDGE Group, thus exiting Mubadala’s direct orbit. These shifts demonstrate that institutional restructuring can move in multiple directions. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that these changes remain internal to the highest levels of sovereign decision-making in the UAE. EDGE Group’s Chairman Faisal Al Bannai’s other positions and board memberships place him in regular contact with central figures in the SWF-political-leadership nexus in the Emirates, including President Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
It is Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince who chairs L’imad, a newly established SWF that in January took over Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding Company (ADQ), an assertive fund valued at around 260 billion USD in assets at the time of the merger. ADQ was building a portfolio of advanced manufacturing, logistics, and energy investments, many of which could be considered dual-use. One example is Abu Dhabi (AD) Ports Group, which operates ports, industrial zones, and logistics corridors worldwide while contributing to supply-chain resilience and furnishing considerable potential for applications in the field of military logistics. Mubadala also operates in this space, investing in aerospace manufacturing and MRO through subsidiaries such as Strata and Tawazun, which help localise defence manufacturing and attract foreign defence companies such as Lockheed Martin[25], Boeing[26], and Thales.[27] In terms of energy security and possible connections to military logistics, Mubadala and ADNOC, the national oil company, are developing green hydrogen (through electrolysis, making it the least carbon-intense form of hydrogen available) and blue hydrogen (produced from natural gas when mixed with superheated steam) infrastructure.[28] Central to the strategies of both funds in the area of dual-use production is bridge-building between the dual imperatives of localisation and attracting foreign technology and expertise, as agreements with American giants Lockheed Martin and Boeing illustrate.
Finally, the strategic investments of Emirati state-owned conglomerates involved in the defence sector merit examination, even though they are not officially considered sovereign wealth funds. Founded in 2019 as a vehicle for investing in defence-sector-adjacent companies in aerospace, robotics, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing[29], the Strategic Development Fund (SDF) is now a subsidiary of EDGE. The fund has made a number of recent transactions, including an economic intelligence joint venture with Quantcube established in April 2025.[30] Another major institutional Emirati investor is the state-owned conglomerate International Holding Company (IHC), whose chairman is the UAE’s National Security Advisor Shaikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan and is majority owned by Royal Group, which he chairs.[31] Through divisions focused on investments and acquisitions across different industries[32], IHC has made strategic inroads into the dual-use technology sector. Furthermore, Al Seer Marine, a subsidiary of IHC, maintains commercial relationships with Chinese partners, creating potential pathways for the integration of Chinese-origin marine electronics and surveillance-related systems.[33] Affiliated entities such as RTS (secure communications), PAL Technology, and G42 (AI) are also relevant. As defence sectors become increasingly intertwined with emerging industries and dual-use considerations (such as finance, infrastructure, telecommunications, and aerospace), the number and range of Emirati SWFs and state-owned investors – along with instances of institutional reshuffling to meet the demands of the day – are set to grow.
Conclusion: To Compete or not to Compete?
Sovereign wealth funds across the Gulf are increasingly embedded in defence-industrial development, but they do so through distinct ownership models, risk appetites, and strategic priorities. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund operates as a central coordinating vehicle aligned with Vision 2030 and its strong focus on localisation. In contrast, the UAE’s Mubadala Investment Company and L’imad – alongside defence conglomerates such as EDGE Group – pursue a more outward-facing model that leverages international partnerships, export-oriented growth, and multi-regional deal networks. The Oman Investment Authority, by comparison, reflects a more selective and distributed approach, embedding defence-adjacent investments within broader infrastructure and logistics ecosystems while maintaining flexibility through shared ownership structures. Together, these models illustrate how Gulf SWFs are converging on defence as a strategic sector, even as they diverge in how directly they control, scale, and internationalise their defence-industrial engagements.
State-owned investment vehicles such as the Public Investment Fund, Mubadala Investment Company, and L’imad underscore the central role that governments play in the defence sector while also highlighting that, in emerging domains, factors like expertise, technology transfer, and cost often make joint ventures necessary or advantageous. The OIA, meanwhile, raises the possibility of lower percentage ownership. It shares control with other ministries or even with friendly foreign governments or consortiums in businesses with marginal dual-use potential, such as broader infrastructure projects related to ports and airports. In Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, there is increasing evidence of a collaborative approach between the SWF and other state entities in support of defence and other projects, including in the fields of manufacturing and education. The centralised coordination between PIF subsidiary SAMI and GAMI is instructive in this case. The UAE, meanwhile, manifests collaboration in the form of institutional interchangeability and flexibility.
While on paper, Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s simultaneous prioritisation of the development of local defence production capacities appears to create a recipe for competition, their approaches in reality are likely complementary and capable of reinforcing the relatively unique features of each country’s own political economy. What is clear already, however, is that the investment strategies of these two leading Gulf powers have helped transform them from exclusive consumers of foreign weapons and defence technologies to producers and exporters in their own right. The UAE, for instance, is engaged in building defensive ecosystems inclusive of a number of states as part of its expanding reach into regions such as Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These hold longer-term promise as economic or defence ties in which the UAE is not the customer, but is increasingly a supplier of choice, opening new channels of expertise, capabilities, and resources to the Emirates. EDGE, for instance, has blossomed with the help of Mubadala-incubated EDIC, boasting sales increases of 500% in just under five years through 2024, with a growing client roster.[34]
Launched in February 2026, the Israeli-American war with Iran has highlighted the obvious utility of indigenous defence industries, especially for those states which have borne the brunt of Iranian aggression and lack strategic depth. However, their respective advancement in building these industries is linked not only to SWF capital and the implementation of their respective national Visions, but also to matching defence supplies with demand and exposure. In terms of addressing drone warfare and other emerging threats in a cost-effective manner, there are likely to be more strategic investments following on from recent deals with Ukraine. Whilst the GCC states’ military doctrines and some aspects of their foreign and security policies may evolve to meet additional threats, particularly from Iran and the Houthis, major changes could carry with them new security risks associated with red lines crossed in the current confrontation. To limit, for instance, the destructive potential of attacks targeting individual states’ industrial capacity, it would make sense to spread production across GCC state borders and engage more deeply in joint defence production initiatives. SWFs have a role to play in advancing multi-country investments in dual-use sectors that are ready to respond and rapidly ramp up efforts to meet changing security and defence conditions.
The paradox going forward, however, is that these efforts conflict with SWF activity in some defence industries, which aims to build individual state autonomy through import substitution over the longer term. Though strengthened industrial partnerships between GCC nations would accelerate the achievement of critical mass and improve strategic depth by spreading production facilities around the Arabian Peninsula, they do not contribute to state autonomy, strictly defined – unless this objective becomes more closely associated with pooled sovereignty at the GCC level. On the other hand, continuing to pursue a qualitative military edge with the help of the United States also does not on its face advance autonomy, though it promises greater near-term security returns; after all, the Gulf’s THAAD and Patriot missile defence systems have proven their worth in recent months. At the same time, doubling down on relations with Washington preserves the potential for long-term partnership on an equal footing with the United States, especially in the domain of emerging technologies. These dilemmas are being debated across Gulf capitals, and it is likely that different GCC state powers will arrive at different answers to these difficult questions. In any case, the mobilisation of sovereign wealth will play a key role in facilitating the execution of these agendas going forward.
Endnotes
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[2] Mason, Robert 2024: From “Relative Autonomy” to “Relational Autonomy”? A Reappraisal of GCC State-Building and Foreign Policy, in: Journal of Arabian Studies 14:2, pp. 289–308.
[3] Mazzucco, Leonardo / Alexander, Kristian 2025: Defence Exhibitions in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia: Strategic Signalling, Industrial Aspirations, and Economic Diversification, in: Defence & Security Analysis 41:4, pp. 1–23.
[4] Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs 2025: 2025 Oman Investment Climate Statement, US Department of State, 09.2025, in: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/638719_2025-Oman-Investment-Climate-Statement.pdf [15.11.2025].
[5] Al Ajmi, Nasrulah 2024: OIA Boosts Oman Vision 2040 Accomplishments, 28.09.2024, in: https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1159773/business/economy/oia-boosts-oman-vision-2040-accomplishments [15.11.2025].
[6] The Marine Executive 2025: Port of Duqm Gets $500M Expansion, 25.05.2025, in: https://maritime-executive.com/article/port-of-duqm-gets-550m-expansion [21.11.2025].
[7] The White House 2025: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Solidifies Economic and Defense Partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 18.11.2025, in: https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-solidifies-economic-and-defense-partnership-with-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/ [21.11.2025]; Doyle, Kevin / News Agencies 2025: Saudi Arabia Designated Major Non-NATO Ally of US, Gets F-35 Warplanes Deal, Al Jazeera, 19.11.2025, in: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/19/saudi-arabia-designated-major-non-nato-ally-of-us-gets-f-35-warplanes-deal [21.11.2025].
[8] Walid Abukhaled, the CEO of SAMI from 2020-2024, was the former Chief Executive of Northrop Grumman in the Middle East.
[9] Tactical Report 2024: Saudi SAMI-Lockheed Martin JV: Upcoming Fields of Cooperation, 30.09.2024, in: https://www.tacticalreport.com/daily/63025-saudi-sami-lockheed-martin-jv-upcoming-fields-of-cooperation [15.11.2025].
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[12] General Authority for Military Industries 2020: General Authority for Military Industries Signs First Industrial Participation Agreement with Raytheon Saudi Arabia [08 January 2020], 28.01.2020, in: https://www.gami.gov.sa/en/news/general-authority-military-industries-signs-first-industrial-participation-agreement-raytheon [15.11.2025].
[13] Defense Arabia 2024: Raytheon Saudi Arabia Expands Localization Opportunities Through Strategic Partnership with GAMI, 15.04.2024, in https://english.defensearabia.com/raytheon-saudi-arabia-expands-localization-opportunities-through-strategic-partnership-with-gami/ [15.11.2025].
[14] Tactical Report 2025: Saudi Arabia: Al-Musallam-Russell Meeting Boosts SAMI-Raytheon Defense Ties?, 05.06.2025, in: https://www.tacticalreport.com/daily/63579-saudi-arabia-al-musallam-russell-meeting-boosts-sami-raytheon-defense-ties [15.11.2025].
[15] Public Investment Fund 2026: Aerospace and Defense, in: https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/strategy-and-impact/the-program/aerospace-and-defense/#supplierportfolio_e=0 [08.04.2026].
[16] Public Investment Fund 2026: GDC Middle East, in: https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/our-investments/our-portfolio/gdc-middle-east/ [08.04.2026].
[17] Public Investment Fund 2026: The Helicopter Company (THC), in: https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/our-investments/our-portfolio/the-helicopter-company/ [08.04.2026].
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[20] Hassan, Nadin 2025: Saudi Arabia’s PIF Offers $10.67bn Investment Opportunities to Strengthen Local Industries, Arab News, 12.02.2025, in: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2589938/business-economy [15.11.2025].
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[22] US Mission UAE 2025: Joint Press Statement on U.S.-UAE Major Defense Partnership, US Embassy & Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, 20.05.2025, in: https://ae.usembassy.gov/joint-press-statement-on-u-s-uae-major-defense-partnership/ [08.04.2026].
[23] Steiner, Christopher n.d.: Microsoft and BlackRock look to extend AI domination in their fields with $30B fund, index42, in: https://www.index42.com/articles/microsoft-blackstone-ai-fund [08.04.2026]; United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025: UAE/US Framework on Advanced Technology Cooperation, 16.05.2025, in: https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/5/16/16-5-2025-UAE-US [08.04.2026].
[24] Touazi, François Aïssa 2019: Gulf sovereign wealth funds, Foundation for Strategic Research, 28.02.2019, in: https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/gulf-sovereign-wealth-funds-2019 [08.04.2026].
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[27] Strata 2025: Strata Achieves a 38% Growth in Aircraft Components Manufactured and Exported in 2024, Strata: A Mubadala Company, 27.01.2025, in: https://www.strata.ae/press-release/strata-achieves-a-38-growth-in-aircraft-components-manufactured-and-exported-in-2024/ [30.11.2025].
[28] ADQ 2021: Mubadala, ADNOC and ADQ form alliance to accelerate Abu Dhabi Hydrogen leadership, 17.01.2021, in: https://www.adq.ae/newsroom/mubadala-adnoc-and-adq-form-alliance-to-accelerate-abu-dhabi-hydrogen-leadership/ [15.11.2025].
[29] SDF 2026: Investing in Technologies of the Future, in: https://sdf.ae/ [08.04.2026].
[30] Malin, Carrington 2025: SDF & Quantcube to form economic intelligence joint venture, Middle East AI News, 10.04.2025, in https://www.middleeastainews.com/p/sdf-quantcube-joint-venture/ [15.11.2025].
[31] IHC 2025: Leadership, in: https://www.ihcuae.com/leadership/ [08.04.2026].
[32] IHC 2025: Portfolio, in: https://www.ihcuae.com/portfolio [08.04.2026].
[33] Global Flow Control 2024: Al Seer Marine Secures $80 Million Financing from China’s Bocom to
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[34] EDGE 2025: EDGE Group – A Champion in the UAE’s Global Rise as a Hub of Advanced Manufacturing and Defence Technologies, 29.05.2024, in: https://edgegroupuae.com/news/edge-group-champion-uaes-global-rise-hub-advanced-manufacturing-and-defence-technologies/ [21.11.2025].
