Albania
Judiciary reform and rule of law progress
The 2025 Rule of Law Report presents Albania as having achieved notable milestones in judicial reform, specifically citing the completion of the first instance vetting process for judges and pros-ecutors, steps towards increased judicial independence, and the adoption of the 2024-2030 Cross-Sector Justice Strategy. These developments are important for aligning with EU Chapter 23 requirements and, on the surface, address long-standing corruption risks.
However, a critical examination exposes a more nuanced and less optimistic picture. While the vetting process has dismissed corrupt officials, the sustainability of reforms is threatened by persistent administrative backlog, unfilled magistrate positions, and recurring delays in perfor-mance evaluations. The High Justice Inspectorate, central to ensuring accountability, remains under-resourced, and the system’s longitudinal resilience is undermined by ongoing political in-terference and lack of operational coordination between governance bodies.
The result is that while the architecture of reform exists, its application remains partial and in-consistent, a point underscored by independent observers who highlight that improvements in the administration of justice are fragile and susceptible to reversal without deeper structural commitment.
Media freedom
The report acknowledges incremental gains on media pluralism and the protection of journalists, referencing improved protocols for investigative safety and legal initiatives for editorial inde-pendence. Nevertheless, these advances are insufficient to counter deeply entrenched prob-lems: media ownership remains concentrated among business groups with overt political ties, undermining true editorial independence, and there is a persistent lack of transparency in state advertising allocations. Intimidation, both legal (via strategic lawsuits) and societal, remains a functional tool against critical journalism.
EU monitoring mechanisms and Council of Europe platforms consistently note that improve-ments in Albania's global press freedom ranking are largely a result of regression in neighbour-ing states rather than transformative change at home. Self-regulation is weak, direct political influence over the public broadcaster persists, and reforms are too often shaped by external pressure from Brussels, rather than sustained domestic demand and enforcement.
Checks and balances
The 2025 report highlights incremental parliamentary and institutional reforms but fails to re-flect the underlying challenges: the law-making process is often driven by government priorities with limited and largely procedural public consultation, and appointments to key oversight bod-ies remain politicized. Civil society faces bureaucratic and funding barriers that limit its effective-ness as a watchdog, conditions recognized but insufficiently critiqued in the official assessment.
Formal compliance, but lack of implementation
While Albania’s formal compliance with EU demands is visible and is indeed fuelling a degree of positive momentum, the 2025 Rule of Law Report paints a picture that is often more favourable than reality justifies. Achievements are fragile and reversible, with systemic weaknesses, and at times political opportunism, undermining the credibility and sustainability of reforms. For EU institutions and partners, the lesson is clear: progress in Albania must be measured not by leg-islative production or procedural milestones, but by long-term, consistent enforcement and de-monstrable improvements in judicial independence, media freedom, and institutional checks.
Bulgaria
Judiciary independence and reform blockade
The report documents repeated legislative and constitutional deadlocks obstructing essential reforms, notably those aimed at the Supreme Judicial Council and the Prosecutor General’s ac-countability. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court’s annulment of sweeping constitutional amend-ments, on grounds that competence for such changes lies with the Grand National Assembly, effectively resets progress, leaving deep-rooted issues unaddressed.
Most of the recommendations and concerns have been open for years: the disproportionate influence of the Prosecutor General and Parliament over the judiciary endures, peer-elected judges remain a minority, and a culture of long-term judicial secondment undermines both im-partiality and stability. Such persistent reversals, and Parliament’s apparent inability to act within constitutional bounds, expose the limits of Bulgaria’s commitment to judicial independence, a core EU value and a Chapter 23 benchmark. Multiple checks on reform have the practical effect of preserving the status quo, raising legitimate doubts about whether legislative activity is gen-uine or merely pro forma to unlock EU funds. For comparative perspective, these obstacles mir-ror patterns seen previously in Romania, self-blocking or formalistic reforms, insufficient to as-sure irreversible progress.
Anti-corruption track record and EU funding conditionality
Despite ongoing institutional reshuffling (division of the Anti-Corruption Commission, legal amendments to asset disclosure, and whistleblower protection), Bulgaria’s record of convictions and high-level prosecutions remains minimal, with numbers that do not diverge substantially from previous years. Overall public and business perceptions of corruption remain bleak.
The 2025 EU Rule of Law Report credits Bulgaria with “further progress” in anti-corruption re-forms, notably restructuring the Anti-Corruption Commission and building operational capacity. However, this outlook is overly optimistic and fails to capture the persistent absence of real re-sults. Data from longstanding civic monitoring, e.g. by the Anti-Corruption Fund Foundation, re-veal a different picture: almost no final convictions in major corruption cases, overwhelming ac-quittals, frequent closure of proceedings by prosecutors, and cases collapsing due to protracted judicial delays. High-level investigations remain rare, reactive, or politically motivated, exempli-fied by a sudden prosecutorial push only after major political shifts and mounting public pres-sure. Crucially, the intense activity of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office stands in contrast with Bulgaria’s own institutions, highlighting systemic reluctance to prosecute entrenched cor-ruption. The Rule of Law report consequently glosses over the gap between institutional archi-tecture and meaningful enforcement, misrepresenting the magnitude and impact of Bulgaria’s anti-corruption failures.
Media pluralism, regulatory independence, and checks & balances
Concerning media freedom (a sine qua non for democratic consolidation) the report outlines persistent vulnerabilities: politicization and underfunding of regulatory bodies, delays in ap-pointing key leadership of public broadcasters, and ineffective enforcement of media ownership transparency. Notably, state advertising remains a vehicle for political influence, with reforms advancing only marginally.
Croatia
The state of the justice system
Confidence in Croatia's justice system is slowly rising but remains low. In 2025, 28% of citizens and businesses found courts "fairly" or "very" independent. This scepticism often stems from perceived political or economic pressure. However, oversight bodies have been active: In 2024, the State Judicial Council handled requests for criminal proceedings against judges and initiated disciplinary cases. Asset declarations were reviewed, with only minor issues found. Courts were reminded to adhere to random case allocation.
Judges' and state attorneys' salaries were adjusted in February 2025 to match other public offi-cials. Digital tools are being adopted, with nearly 1.6 million electronic submissions to courts in 2024. Despite a slight backlog reduction, delays remain substantial: commercial cases averaged 1,147 days, civil cases 797 days.
Regarding human rights, Croatia began 2025 with 30 European Court of Human Rights judg-ments awaiting implementation (32% of all judgements), though average delays have decreased.
The fight against corruption
Public-sector corruption in Croatia is widely seen as a serious problem. In Transparency Interna-tional’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Croatia scored 47/100. A 2025 Eurobarometer found 92% of Croatians believe corruption is widespread. Businesses largely agree, with 60% seeing it as an obstacle.
The government’s August 2024 report indicated 79% of the 2022–2024 anti-corruption Action Plan measures were completed. The 2025–2027 plan promises stronger access-to-information and whistle-blower protections. Cooperation between anti-corruption police (PNUSKOK) and prosecutors (USKOK) was praised, though a jurisdictional conflict arose when a high-profile case was reassigned from EPPO to USKOK. In 2024, the State Attorney’s Office indicted 155 individu-als, and convictions reached a record high. Legal adjustments aim to expedite investigations, focusing USKOK on serious corruption. In 2024, 72% of USKOK convictions resulted from plea bargains, with more cases concluding within six to twelve months. Wiretaps for bribery are now explicitly permitted. However, enforcement gaps persist. Public procurement remains high-risk, with 27% of Croatian firms reporting lost contracts due to corruption.
Strength and Independence of Institutions
Over half of Croatian companies (53%) are confident in legal protection for investments but cite slow court procedures and frequent legislative changes as hurdles. Only 32% trust the independ-ence of the Croatian Competition Agency. The High Administrative Court can ensure judgments are carried out but cannot discipline officials or award damages.
A more critical perspective
Despite reforms, there is no significant reduction in corruption or increase in public trust. The widespread perception of corruption suggests reforms aren't fully addressing root causes, lead-ing to a normalization of corruption and eroding trust. Furthermore, USKOK faces challenges like understaffing and a leadership vacuum since 2023, attributed to political pressure. The public criticism of EPPO investigations by politicians suggests potential undue influence on anti-corrup-tion bodies. While convictions are rising, this may not reflect a comprehensive fight against all forms of corruption, especially high-level political corruption. Reports also indicate corruption undermines local government operations.
Montenegro
The state of the justice system
Public trust in Montenegro's judiciary has plummeted, with only 26% of citizens and 35% of busi-nesses rating courts and judges as "fairly" or "very" independent in 2025. This decline, especially for citizens, is largely blamed on government and political pressure. While recent reforms align laws on the Judicial Council, judges, and the State Prosecution Service closer to European stand-ards, constitutional tweaks are still needed to fully meet Venice Commission recommendations, particularly regarding the Minister of Justice's Judicial Council seat and the Prosecutorial Coun-cil's structure. The Special State Prosecutor's Office law also requires improvements in account-ability and operational clarity.
Montenegro lacks a unified statute for judges' labour rights, causing conflicting rules. Staffing gaps persist, with only 243 of 329 judge posts filled. Performance benchmarks, like the 30% an-nulled decision threshold, risk curbing judicial independence, a Venice Commission concern. Regular appraisals are not systematic, and disciplinary rules need updating. Public comments by high-ranking officials on ongoing cases further erode confidence, while staff shortages and poor conditions hinder recruitment.
Efficiency gains are offset by growing administrative-case backlogs. Clearance rates remained below 100% in 2023, and Administrative Court judges handled an average of 2,513 cases in 2024, impacting business and public trust. The Constitutional Court itself had over 2,000 pending cases in June 2025, indicating systemic delays at the highest level. The lack of capacity and staff remains a major problem, even at the Constitutional Court, where several seats were vacant.
In human rights, Montenegro began 2025 with six "leading" European Court of Human Rights judgments awaiting follow-up.
The fight against corruption
Montenegro's 2024–2028 anti-corruption strategy is underway, but unclear mandates and weak work plans cast doubt on its effectiveness. While enforcement efforts have increased, defence lawyers often delay trials. Anti-corruption bodies remain understaffed. On prevention, whistle-blower protection is improving, and public procurement transparency has increased, reducing complaints. Overall, corruption in Montenegro's public sector remains high, as reflected by its low 2024 Transparency International score (46/100). A 2025 Eurobarometer survey confirms widespread corruption, yet only 21% believe prosecutions are a sufficient deterrent.
Strength and independence of institutions
Montenegro has formal tools for open law-making, but MPs' draft bills often lack required as-sessments. Tensions arose when Parliament attempted to force a Constitutional Court judge's retirement unconstitutionally. While businesses trust courts to protect investments, confidence in other review bodies is lower.
A more critical perspective
The overall state of the rule of law in Montenegro is unsatisfactory. Despite legislative progress towards EU accession, deep-seated corruption, a politicized justice system, and fragile institu-tions hinder real advancement. The 2024 GRECO Report highlighted a failure to fully implement anti-corruption recommendations, with limited results in high-level corruption cases. The judici-ary remains susceptible to political influence, and state institutions are marked by instability and polarization, leading to legislative gridlock. This suggests that while legislative alignment may occur, substantive progress in the rule of law will likely remain slow.
North Macedonia
The State of the Justice System
While the 2024–2028 Judicial Reform Strategy is underway, only 42.9% of its 2024 activities were completed due to poor coordination, funding, and staffing gaps. Public trust in judiciary remains low, with only 28% of citizens and 26% of businesses in 2025 rating courts and judges as inde-pendent. Both groups primarily blame pressure from politicians and vested interests.
While procedural reforms, like written and oral feedback for judicial selections, have improved transparency, substantiations of decisions remain patchy. Draft legislation clarifying how Judicial Council members and judges are chosen and disciplined has secured a Venice Commission opin-ion urging clearer dismissal grounds. However, chronic underfunding means judicial and prose-cutorial budgets fall below legal minimums, leading to staffing levels of only 20–50% by late 2024. Despite recruitment drives, higher-court vacancies persisted, including 12 of 26 Supreme Court seats. As a result, case backlogs are growing and delays mounting, particularly in administrative, civil, and commercial appeal cases, with disposition times significantly increasing.
The fight against corruption
Experts, citizens, and businesses widely agree that public-sector corruption remains a serious problem in North Macedonia, evidenced by its low 2024 Transparency International score (40/100) and high Eurobarometer survey results indicating widespread corruption. Despite this, only 34% believe prosecutions are a strong deterrent.
The State Commission for Prevention of Corruption (SCPC) reports that only 18% of planned actions under the 2021–2025 anti-corruption strategy were fully completed in 2024. Although investigations and prosecutions have increased, court delays and resource gaps mean high-level cases drag on or end with light sentences. Amendments to the Criminal Code have led to the termination of several ongoing cases, with some becoming time-barred or losing their legal ba-sis, creating a sense of impunity. The Constitutional Court has flagged concerns over these revi-sions. Oversight of officials’ wealth is hampered by SCPC backlogs and staff shortages, and whis-tle-blower protections remain weak, with reports often not investigated and those who speak up facing risks.
Strength and independence of institutions
Since adopting new Rules of Procedure in November 2023, the parliament’s day-to-day work has improved, though sustained efficiency remains to be seen as not only qualified candidates were appointed, and key posts remained empty. Confidence in public procurement appeals and the national competition authority is as low as in the judiciary. In human rights compliance, North Macedonia began 2025 with 18 "leading" European Court of Human Rights judgments still await-ing action, reducing its ten-year implementation rate.
A more critical perspective
North Macedonia's EU accession path is obstructed by a critical gap between legislative reforms and their practical implementation. Deep-seated influence of various interest groups continues to undermine progress in fighting corruption, ensuring judicial independence, and strengthening state institutions. While an extensive legal framework exists, its enforcement remains weak, par-ticularly concerning high-level officials, due to limited political will. The judiciary consistently fails to demonstrate full independence from political influence.
Romania
Justice System
Romania has made strides in aligning its justice laws with Venice Commission recommendations, including drafting limits for high-level prosecutors' mandates and planning audits for the Judicial Inspection. However, most measures are still in preliminary stages. Transparency remains weak.
A significant concern, unaddressed in the Commission report, is the serious conflict over the courts’ IT infrastructure. The Ministry of Justice’s push to centralize all court servers under its just.ro domain, despite the High Council of Magistracy (SCM) objections, threatens judicial inde-pendence and breaches EU best practices. SCM’s demands to halt this have been ignored, risking executive overreach.
While judge and prosecutor occupancy rates have slightly improved, structural staff shortages and rising workloads continue to undermine the quality and accessibility of justice. Without real follow-through and independent evaluation, formal alignment with EU advice is incomplete.
Anti-Corruption Framework
Romania presents a mixed picture: While the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) se-cured 391 convictions in high-level corruption cases in 2024, corruption perception remains high, and public trust is low. Many cases are unresolved, and staff capacity is strained. Recent Su-preme Court decisions on statutes of limitations led to numerous case collapses.
The National Integrity Agency (ANI), the integrity watchdog, is underfunded and understaffed. Recent Constitutional Court rulings have weakened asset declarations and public scrutiny. Work on "revolving door" rules and lobbying transparency is delayed, with no final law. Meanwhile, party financing remains murky, highlighted by issues in the annulled 2024 presidential election.
Public procurement remains fertile ground for fraud, with common cartel-like practices and sin-gle-bid tenders. Digital tools could help but require real oversight.
Media Pluralism and Freedom
Political money continues to distort Romania’s media landscape. State and party-funded adver-tising blurs the lines between journalism and paid content. The National Audiovisual Council is underfunded and slow to modernize. A draft Audiovisual Law risks over-regulating online con-tent without genuine gains for editorial freedom. Meanwhile, true self-regulation is absent. Transparency of media ownership remains patchy, especially online.
Threats and intimidation against journalists persist. SLAPPs drain resources and chill reporting, and the anti-SLAPP directive is not fully transposed. The environment for free media is fragile.
Checks and Balances
Romania’s broader checks and balances remain inconsistent. Public consultations are largely superficial, with frequent circumvention through "emergency" exceptions. The use of Govern-ment Emergency Ordinances has significantly increased, covering key policy and electoral changes without parliamentary oversight.
The European Court for Human Rights backlog remains stubbornly high. The Constitutional Court’s conduct in 2024 was unprecedented, with three controversial decisions lacking clear legal reasoning and consistency, raising concerns about its tendency to stretch its powers.
National Human Rights Institutions are stalled due to funding and staffing cuts or political block-ages. Civil society still faces high administrative barriers, intimidation, and SLAPPs.
Serbia
The state of the justice system
Public confidence in judiciary remains low: in 2025, only 30% of citizens and 36% of companies rated courts and judges as “fairly” or “very” independent. This lack of trust is fuelled by persistent political interference; office and mandate holders frequently comment on ongoing cases, criti-cizing rulings, while judicial and prosecutorial councils largely remain silent. In February 2025, a high-profile anti-corruption operation against NGOs, immediately following official signals, raised doubts about prosecutorial autonomy. Staffing shortfalls persist, with many prosecutors posts unfilled and elections delayed. Technological upgrades are uneven; courts lack a unified digital platform. Case-flow data is mixed: administrative justice significantly lags, with first-in-stance clearance falling to 35% in 2023, disposition times rising to 2,095 days, and pending work-loads increasing by 45.8%, creating a systemic bottleneck.
The Constitutional Court faces a manpower crisis; four of 15 judge slots are empty due to lack of nominees, slowing its work. With seven of eleven sitting judges retiring by year-end, the Court risks losing its quorum.
At the European level, as of January 1, 2025, Serbia had 20 "leading" European Court of Human Rights judgments awaiting implementation, with only 62% from the past decade executed. The oldest pending rulings, some unresolved for 17 years, concern fair trial violations due to exces-sively long civil, family, and commercial proceedings.
The Fight Against Corruption
Experts, citizens, and business leaders agree that public-sector corruption is high. Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index scores Serbia at just 35/100. A 2025 Euroba-rometer finds 85% of people see corruption as widespread, and 53% of companies say it ham-pers operations. Only 26% of respondents believe prosecutions deter corrupt practices.
The law fails to clearly define the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime's coordinating role, leading to inconsistent direction among specialized bodies. Transparency and oversight of dropped cases remain weak. Serbia struggles with thorough investigations and convictions in high-level cases, specifically with regards to politically or economically influential suspects. Public procurement is widely sidestepped. At the beginning of 2025, over 100 people were arrested in raids for corruption, but since then there has been no information about the investigations.
Strength and independence of institutions
Serbia’s Parliament struggles with oversight; sessions are infrequent, often called with short no-tice, limiting MP input and amendments. The President's informal expansion of powers beyond constitutional bounds raises concerns as public debate often follows his lead. On the business front, 57% of companies trust legal protection for investments, but only 32% are confident in the independence of the public procurement review body.
An Even More Critical Perspective
According to Freedom House and GRECO observations, Serbia’s governance framework shows a continued erosion of democratic institutions and deepening state capture. Despite EU acces-sion progress, high-level corruption, pervasive political influence over the judiciary, and execu-tive power concentration circumventing the parliament remain critical obstacles. The judiciary remains under significant pressure, and constitutional amendments have failed to break estab-lished patterns of political influence. The media freedom has collapsed. Civil society faces an "obstructed" operating environment, with CSOs under verbal attack and smear campaigns.
