Setting the scene: Space as an increasingly securitized environment
The domain Space is no longer only considered as a field for research and civilian use but is increasingly perceived as an additional security and defence domain next to land, air, and sea – and cyberspace. Key security issues in space are cybersecurity, integrity of satellites, space debris, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the inclusion of private actors in the space sphere has changed the security landscape decisively. In many ways, states, which used to be the sole actors, now rely on services private companies offer. As such, Elon Musk’s Space X is executing projects for NASA. Another most prominent example is the fact that Ukraine is relying on Starlink for its defence, a prime example of how space capabilities are decisive for manoeuvring wars. A key factor for these developments is that the space domain is growing at rapid speed. One could say that the current state we are at in space research and industrial development corresponds to the state of the internet in the 1990s[1] – which indicates what is still ahead. And yet already today, increasing geopolitical competition in space is leading to an overcrowded space resulting in congestion and contestation.
Who are the key players and their interests?
While historic rivals such as the United States and Russia continue to dominate the global space landscape, rising actors including China, India, Japan, and South Korea are advancing rapidly. According to the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), so far only the United States, Russia and China qualify as full space powers.[2]
The US remains the pre-eminent space actor, leading across investment, technology, industrial capacity, and operational capabilities. In 2023, US civil-military spending on space exceeded $73 billion, accounting for almost two-thirds of all government space budgets globally.[3] American space power is partly rooted in its partnership with a highly innovative commercial sector. Companies such as SpaceX provide dual-use capabilities that vastly multiply the space assets that the US can mobilize for national security. In contrast to rivals such as Russia and China, the US has historically limited its counterspace activities. Publicly, Washington shows little interest in expanding its counterspace arsenal, e.g. by developing defensive satellites.
Russia retains one of the largest space programs globally, but its space sector has been in marked decline due to funding constraints and international isolation after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Moscow perceives space primarily as a military domain decisive for future armed conflicts. The war against Ukraine is likely to shape Moscow’s space policy, since it shows that modern high-intensity war can be waged even under conditions of space inferiority. This lesson may reinforce Moscow’s preference for offensive counterspace capabilities including anti-satellite weapons to disrupt commercial networks like Starlink and adversaries’ space assets. Recent reports also hint towards the development of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon, which would violate the Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, Russia has conducted extensive electronic warfare on Earth—jamming and spoofing GPS signals across Europe, the Black Sea region, and Ukraine as part of its hybrid threat toolbox.
China possesses the world’s second-largest space program, which is pivotal to Xi Jinping’s space ambitions and the overarching aim of technological and geopolitical leadership. China’s program combines civil and military objectives within a long-term strategy of becoming the leading space power by 2045.[4] These efforts align with China’s strategy of expanding its global economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. Since 2015, Beijing officially considers space as a new domain of warfare.[5] Over the past decade, China’s space program has delivered consistent progress, narrowing the technological gap with the United States to just a few years in most fields, and even leading in areas such as space-based quantum communications. Therefore, Beijing’s trajectory represents both a technological challenge and a security concern for the West.
How is Europe involved in space?
European space capabilities provide navigation, earth observation, and communications services to EU authorities and industries through EU-level initiatives and member’s national or multilateral projects. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have long-standing space programmes and were central in establishing the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975. Many national assets are jointly managed, such as Athena-Fidus, the French Italian dual-use telecommunications satellite or joint ventures like Airbus (shared involvement by France, Germany, Spain).
The EU Space Programme integrates EU space assets under Commission oversight, with the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) managing operations and the ESA providing technical expertise. Note that ESA is not an EU body, but an international organisation, operating the EU’s satellite systems Galileo and Copernicus. In the last years, ESA is taking a more active role in security, with dual-use programs like the European Resilience from Space (ERS) for Earth observation. The 2021-2027 Space Programme operates under a €14.88 billion budget. In the new MFF, the Commission proposes to include Space Policy under the new Competitiveness Fund, alongside Defence and Resilience. Key EU Space assets include GOVSATCOM for satellite communication, the satellite system Copernicus for earth observation and satellite navigation system Galileo, whose signals are augmented by EGNOS. Space situational awareness is addressed through the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) consortium.
Despite these capabilities, Europe is not yet a full-blown space power, since it lacks the military capabilities and strategic autonomy of the United States, China, or Russia. This is mostly due to low funding levels and a lack of coordination of public investments in the space sector, as outlined by the Draghi report – the guiding report on addressing European competitiveness published in 2024. Consequently, the EU continues to rely on advanced US space capabilities.
EU-NATO Cooperation on Space Security
Traditionally, the EU has approached space from a civilian, market-driven perspective. However, the Union’s recent focus on space security and dual-use technologies aligns more closely with NATO’s stance on space as a defence domain. Unlike the EU, NATO does not own space
assets but instead relies on member states’ capabilities. Cooperation between the two organizations has gained momentum through the 2023 EU-NATO Joint Declaration and the EU Space Strategy, both calling for joint action against space threats. A structured dialogue launched in 2023 explores further cooperation on surveillance, tracking and situational awareness among others. Space also features as one of the priority areas of the EU-NATO partnership in Ursula von der Leyen's second Commission Political Guidelines.[6] Nevertheless, the current recalibration of the transatlantic partnership may complicate deeper collaboration on space going forward.
EU Space Strategy[7]
Over the last years, the EU has acknowledged space as a strategic domain for security and defence and hence developed a space strategy in 2023. In this strategy counterspace activities are identified as threats to satellites and the infrastructure supporting them on the ground. To counter these threats, an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre was installed to share best practices among member states and their space institutions. Furthermore, the European External Action Service plays a crucial role for cooperation with strategic partners, first and foremost with NATO and the US, but also within the United Nations framework and through specific space security dialogues with third countries.
EU Space Act
As part of the space strategy, the EU Commission proposed an EU Space Act in June 2025[8] with the goal to harmonize fragmented national rules. This shall help forming an EU internal market for space which is globally competitive and hence boosts Europe’s strategic autonomy in space. Not the least motivation is rooted in the Draghi report which estimates a 9% growth of the space sector by 2035.[9] It should be noted that military space activities are excluded from the act, which focuses on civilian and dual use capabilities – which has huge implications for security issues. It encompasses three pillars: Security, resilience, and sustainability. Security in this regard focuses on minimizing the disposal of satellites in space and the risk of collisions to reduce space debris. Resilience alludes to cybersecurity, to avoid satellites that are vital for infrastructure and military purposes being harmed through cyberattacks. Sustainability encompasses making space missions economically more efficient and improving their environmental impact.
On the path towards strategic autonomy in space?
While the EU demonstrates a clear will to become more autonomous in space, the road is yet to be paved. Europe is at the crossroads from being a merely civilian actor to applying dual-use instruments and integrate space in its security strategy. The fact that with Commissioner Andrius Kubilius the EU for the first time has a dedicated commissioner for defence and space stands exemplary for it. Equally, the EU Space Act makes the Commission guide the member states as a first step towards this direction. The Space Act thereby meets the nexus of the commission’s two major priorities: Competitiveness and Security. At a moment where space is starting to be recognized as a strategically important yet less urgent domain within European security and defence, Europe must act swiftly and decisively to find its position in space.
[1] Silicon Luxemburg: Space Tech Today Is Like The Internet In The Mid-90s
[2] EPRS: EU capabilities in space: Scenarios for space security by 2050
[3] Council on Geostrategy: The role of space power in geopolitical competition.
[4] Council on Geostrategy: The role of space power in geopolitical competition.
[5] NSSA Space: Space Threat Assessment
[6] Priorities 2024-2029 - European Commission
[7] EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence | EEAS
[8] EU Space Act - Defence Industry and Space - European Commission
[9] The Draghi report on EU competitiveness
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