Why now?
Increased European responsibility has been a long-standing demand of the US, introduced as a pivot to the Indo-Pacific under President Barack Obama. The US National Security Strategy from 2025, using an assertive tone, expressed a change in priorities away from Europe and towards China and the Western Hemisphere.[1]
However, since the Greenland crisis in January 2026, when the US-Administration expressed its intention to acquire the sovereign territory of Greenland, associated with the Kingdom of Denmark, while not ruling out the use of force, the debate over the Europeanisation of NATO accelerated. European allies were increasingly questioning whether a more European NATO should prepare for a scenario in which the alliance must survive without active US engagement – for instance a strong, self-sustaining European pillar of NATO as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested at the Munich Security Conference[2].
While there has been much debate on whether to call it the European Pillar within NATO or the Europeanisation of NATO, the essence and goal is clear: European allies need to ramp up their capabilities in a fast and efficient transition. This is to avoid a scenario of Russia testing Article 5 at a moment of less US engagement while the European pillar is not yet self-sustaining.[3]
What’s in a Name?
The notion of a European pillar originates in the 1960s, when Britain initiated a "Eurogroup" of eleven European member states, France excluded, to better coordinate among the European allies. Despite scepticism from Washington, the Eurogroup operated until 1994, when its tasks moved to the Western European Union. The WEU, dissolved in 2010 and developed as part of the defence component of the EU, constitutes the most substantial version of a European pillar to date.[4] Note that the terms European pillar within NATO and Europeanisation of NATO tend to be used interchangeably due to a lack of a shared distinction. Conceptually, the European pillar constitutes a European defence structure that is cohesive enough to act as a bloc within the Alliance and, if necessary, without US support (“self-sustaining pillar”). The term Europeanisation describes the process implementing such a pillar: a gradual burden-shifting of capabilities and command roles from the US to European NATO allies.[5] In contrast, the notion of strategic autonomy has faced criticism as defined against NATO and the US.
In brief, the pillar describes the gradual, pragmatic ambition to strengthen Europe’s capacity to act, sustain a military effort, and ultimately absorb the first shock of a possible Russian military incursion.[6] It also acknowledges that NATO remains the sole institution capable of executing complex military operations and ensuring interoperability. At the same time, the pillar obliquely contributes to preparing for the worst-case scenario of a US withdrawal from the alliance.[7]
What is changing within NATO?
Notably, NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept is the only official policy document of the Alliance to mention the European pillar within NATO.[8]
Remarkably, US and European rhetoric on the need for NATO to become more European has converged - for different reasons. The US clearly articulates a NATO 3.0, introduced at the February 2026 NATO Defence Ministerial by Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of War for Policy. The idea is an alliance "based on partnership rather than dependency," in which European allies take primary responsibility for the continent's conventional defence while the US concentrates on its homeland and on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. According to Colby, this is not withdrawing but refocusing on NATO's core Cold War purpose: deterrence and defence, with the US still providing its nuclear umbrella.[9]
This term has been adopted by Secretary General Mark Rutte and leading NATO officials. At NATO’s defence ministers’ meeting on 18 June 2026, Rutte said that “NATO 3.0 is really happening”, as the alliance moves to burden-shifting. However, he said, Europe would not be able defend to itself without the US in the near term; greater independence would require far higher spending and could ultimately mean the loss of the American nuclear umbrella.[10]
On 3 June 2026, US officials formally told Allies they would "rightsize" their contribution, in line with the "NATO 3.0" vision. The Force Model constitutes the framework through which the Alliance organises, readies and commands national forces. Historically, the US has supplied the critical enablers, such as surveillance, refuelling, long-range strike capabilities and naval power - those that Europe cannot easily replace. Thus, the announcement lays bare Europe’s strategic vulnerability. It was framed as a step towards more realistic defence plans, less over-reliance on US forces, and a recognition that European allies can increasingly fill in for US capabilities.[11] NATO officials echoed this positive framing.[12] While the official release contained no numbers, reporting by the New York Times indicated the scale at roughly a third of US fighters withdrawn, as well as submarines capable of launching cruise missiles - capabilities needed for deterring Russia.[13] However, Rutte stressed that some of these capabilities were already filled by Canada and European allies.
The most concrete institutional step towards a more European NATO is the unprecedented shift of operational-level commands announced in February 2026: Italy took over JFC Naples, the UK took JFC Norfolk, and Poland and Germany will be alternating at JFC Brunssum. The US retains the overall command chain and the theatre-component commands — and, notably, the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who carries US military power and nuclear responsibilities. Keeping this tradition in US hands signals that the US is still invested in European security, despite the overall change in priorities. In brief, handing Europeans direct command of key operational headquarters adds credibility to a stronger European pillar.
What is happening at EU level?
The EU institutions have a key role to play in defining the Europeanisation of NATO by supporting member states that are also NATO allies through concrete policy initiatives – particularly budgetary and coordinative.
At the political level, EU Member States have set the agenda for this process emphasising that the European defence built-up must complement and not duplicate NATO structures.[14] The European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, has been a prominent voice guiding the Europeanisation of NATO. As such, he has advocated for a self-sustaining European Pillar in NATO.[15] Notably, no official EU documents or communication mention a European Pillar or Europeanisation of NATO, it is merely Commissioner Kubilius who is a thought leader in this regard.
However, a concrete idea of supporting the Europeanisation of NATO has been gaining traction: a European Security Council (ESC).[16] It could make binding European defence decisions by majority principle among those member states subscribing to it. By including the NATO Secretary-General and most EU members states that are also NATO allies, this ESC could serve as a bridge towards a more European NATO. Additionally, such an ESC could also allow for participation of Ukraine as Europe’s strongest and most combat-experienced army. Yet, it is only a theoretical concept at this moment in time.
Besides the ESC, the increasingly popular Coalitions of the Willing (CoW) are practical formats to bridge between the EU and NATO. They allow for greater engagement and responsibility of European allies, notably with inclusion of the United Kingdom (UK). The coalition of the willing on Ukraine, pitched by France and the UK in 2025, foreshadows a European pillar in largely de-institutionalised form, and the E5 format (including France, the UK, Germany, Poland and Italy) adds to its operationalisation.[17] Equally, the Joint Expeditionary Force is an initiative of willing European NATO allies.[18] These are examples of so-called minilateralism: coalitions built outside existing institutions - without veto mechanisms that could paralyse them.
Speaking of possible constellations of disagreement, in parallel to NATO Article 5, the operationalisation of the EU mutual defence clause 42 VII TEU is currently being discussed to strengthen deterrence among EU member states. An established instrument is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO is a treaty-based framework within the European Common Defence and Security Policy, decided by EU member states, in which 26 of them participate[19]. Although it is legally binding, due to its project-based nature, it does not have a default command and control structure like NATO. Yet, if developed further it could serve as a support mechanism driving European NATO allies into more engagement.
By introducing several financing instruments, the EU enables European NATO allies to meet their 5 % of GDP spending targets. The umbrella for this is the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, which is a plan to achieve full readiness to self-defence by 2030. This includes (1) SAFE, (2) EDIP, (3) EDF (4) EDIRPA[20]. All these programs support European Member states to finance armament, to facilitate common defence research and development, and capabilities to scale arms production and supply chains.
The EU has a core coordinating function to contribute to the Europeanisation of NATO. For instance, the European Defence Agency identifies critical capability gaps and formulates long-term strategies for capability development, e.g. through programs like EDTIB[21]. Most importantly, EDA coordinates joint procurement for a more efficient defence built up – which after all serves NATO.
All these EU initiatives boil down to supporting the defence industry[22] – on the one hand, an area where the EU can be of decisive help for NATO due to its budgetary and coordinative power, yet, on the other hand, this is also a point of friction in the process of Europeanising NATO: These European initiatives follow a “Buy European” logic, which has drawn US criticism to maintain purchases from US suppliers.[23]
What could a European pillar look like?
A recent CEPS Task Force report[24], supported by KAS Europe, outlines three pathways for more European defence. It prioritises the Europeanisation of NATO, arguing there is no real substitute and that Europe will depend on US arms, software and strategic enablers until at least decade’s end. Consequently, the report recommends reviving the Eurogroup as a forum for European allies to coordinate on joint capability development and defence posture in regional clusters (Germany and Poland on the Eastern flank, the Nordics in the Arctic, Southern allies in the Mediterranean). The report also recommends a geographical redistribution of command, to align headquarters more closely with their regional theatres: expanding land command in Finland, moving the responsibility for the Eastern flank from JFC Brunssum to a new land command in Poland, and turning Brunssum into a European NATO headquarters.
What does this mean for Europe?
The Europeanisation of NATO has become a prominent slogan but lacks a clear strategic definition. It is often being used interchangeably with notions like burden-shifting, strategic autonomy, or a stronger European pillar. This ambiguity is further reflected in its absence from official NATO and EU communication; it rather established at expert discussion level. For the debate to move to implementation, European actors need to break down the broad idea and not only prioritize what Europeanisation should achieve but also clarifying who "Europe" is: the EU, European NATO allies, or a broader coalition of willing states. A more coherent narrative among Europeans and among NATO and EU is essential for Europe to translate greater responsibility into influence. At EU level, the initiatives of Defence Commissioner Kubilius represent an important step. The Greenland crisis provided a window of opportunity towards a European pillar, proving a sense of urgency to the Nordic, Baltic and Eastern European allies who are more cautious about advancing a European NATO component out of fear this could jeopardise US security guarantees amid the Russian threat.[25] The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara will be an important milestone. Allies will assess to take stock of the burden-shifting, how the US announcement to withdraw capabilities from Europe may materialize, and what role Ukraine plays for a more European NATO.
Expert Comment:
Juraj Majcin, Policy Analyst for Security & Defence at the European Policy Centre
NATO 3.0 cannot run on nuclear promises alone
Russia’s war against Ukraine has returned NATO to its original purpose of defending allied territory, with Europe taking a greater role in its own defence under the unofficial banner of NATO 3.0. The Alliance’s reorientation is logical and necessary. However, it becomes dangerous if NATO 3.0 is used as shorthand for a reduced U.S. conventional role in Europe, offset by promises to preserve or even expand America’s nuclear guarantees.
The assumption behind this trade-off is risky. Conventional and nuclear deterrence are not separate instruments that can be neatly exchanged. They are connected parts of the same escalation ladder. Washington cannot expect to remain fully credible in Europe by offering mainly nuclear reassurance while limiting its conventional presence.
The recent U.S. decision not to deploy certain long-range capabilities to Europe illustrates the problem. Such systems are not merely conventional assets. Since they can hold targets deep inside Russia at risk, including elements of its tactical and strategic nuclear forces, they also strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture. Withholding them has therefore not merely reduced the Alliance’s firepower. It has also overlooked the role that conventional assets play in making nuclear deterrence credible.
This makes Washington’s position paradoxical. The United States wants Europeans to take on far more of the conventional burden, while remaining cautious about a larger European nuclear role. Nonetheless, if Washington reduces its conventional footprint in Europe and compensates by leaning more heavily on nuclear forces, it leaves itself with fewer credible options in a crisis below the nuclear threshold. That gap is what makes the formula risky. In a confrontation with Moscow, Russia could be tempted to test NATO through limited conventional pressure, while betting that Washington would be reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold.
Against this backdrop, the objective of NATO 3.0 should be a more capable European pillar within NATO, not a rushed reduction of the American role. The guiding principle should be the preservation of deterrence at both the conventional and nuclear levels, not burden shifting for its own sake. Otherwise, a rapid withdrawal of U.S. conventional capabilities could weaken nuclear deterrence as well, leaving the Alliance with fewer means to manage escalation.
[1]https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/the-narrow-but-inescapable-path-of-the-european-pillar-of-nato/
[2] Speech by Federal Chancellor at the Munich Security Conference | Federal Government
[3] The European Pillar of NATO in the Era of US Disengagement | Istituto Affari Internazionali
[4] The 1992 Declaration on the WEU during the Maastricht Summit framed it both as the Union's nascent defence arm and as a vehicle for "strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/the-narrow-but-inescapable-path-of-the-european-pillar-of-nato/
[5] Toward a Europeanised NATO - International Centre for Defence and Security
[6] https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c41/european-pillar-nato-era-us-disengagement
[7]Tardy, T. “The narrow but inescapable path of the European pillar of NATO”, Policy Paper, Jacques Delors Institute, November 2025
[8] “The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole. (§3)” Note_de_consultance_Pilier_europeen_OTAN_Tardy_EN_2.pdf
[9] https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4404801/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-nato-defense/
[10] NATO Chief Mark Rutte warns Europe it can't defend itself without the US
[11] United States European Command
[12] US to pull jets, destroyers and submarines from NATO as part of European drawdown – POLITICO
[13] Not all US capabilities will be backfilled by NATO summit, Rutte says | Euractiv
[14] European Council conclusions, 19 March 2026 - Consilium
[15] Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Forum Europa event “Ideas to Strengthen the Union”
[16] EU-Security-Council-In-Brief.pdf
[17] Coalition of the Willing | German Marshall Fund of the United States
[18] About the JEF – The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)
[19] Malta is the only member state that does not participate.
[20] (1) Security Action for Europe (SAFE | Security Action for Europe - European Commission), (2) European Defence Industry Program (European defence industry programme - Consilium) , (3) European Defence Fund (European Defence Fund (EDF) - Official Webpage of the European Commission. - Defence Industry and Space) (4) EU Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EU Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) - European Commission)
[21] European Defence Technology and Industrial Dependencies (Activities Search
[22] as the European Defence Industry Strategy lies out, defence industry
[23] US rejects ‘Buy European’ in defence procurement
[24] More Europe in defence – three pathways – CEPS
[25] The European Pillar of NATO in the Era of US Disengagement | Istituto Affari Internazionali
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