After almost a year and a half of the Arévalo government, it can be said that the deficit analysis carried out at the beginning of his term of office was not only accurate, but is now even negatively exceeded in important points. While large parts of the judiciary under the Giammattei government (2020-2024) were an instrument of this government, central parts of it have become independent after the change of government and are openly working against it. Since Arévalo did not seek a power struggle, the judiciary continues to be an instrument of political persecution, including against the government and Arévalo's SEMILLA party itself. His government has a massive communication deficit. It has only a limited capacity for conflict to achieve its own goals, preferring to withdraw at the first sign of resistance to its policy proposals. Deep-rooted corruption is another of Guatemala's central challenges.
At first glance, there is a broad consensus on the need for a national dialogue between all relevant and antagonistic actors. Many assume that Arévalo, although professionally coming from the diplomatic-mediation sector, will not take this sceptre in his hands. The Guatemalan Congress, on the other hand, is highly fragmented. This makes a scenario of an institutional stalemate increasingly likely, in which the government's limited executive capacity leads to growing dissatisfaction and disenchantment with politics, a rudimentarily dysfunctional system of government frays further, and the party-political landscape becomes even more fragmented. Over the next two and a half years, not only a sword of Damocles hovers. Three of the central areas should be named.
The power struggle between parts of the judiciary and the Arévalo government continues. Surprises are to be expected every day. With a view to the upcoming new appointments to important institutions in 2026, largely non-public debates and simulation games are underway as to how these staffing processes could be designed. The migratory pressure in Guatemala is still enormously high, and the country offers hardly any development prospects for its population. Even education as a promise of advancement is increasingly reaching frustrating limits in a society that is not very socially permeable. USAID's withdrawal from many programs with short- and long-term consequences does the rest and cannot be compensated for by other donors, some of whom are also withdrawing or reducing. At the same time, Guatemala is economically highly dependent on the remesas, i.e. the foreign remittances of the Guatemalans to their homeland. These amount to over 20 billion US dollars per year and account for a good 20 percent of Guatemala's GDP. This amount will be reduced in the future simply because the USA has decided on a 1 percent tax on these transfers.
Decisive for Guatemala's development, especially with a view to the elections to be held in 2027, are the new appointments to four institutions between March and October 2026, a coincidence in time that will not occur again for another 60 years: the election of new magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE), the Constitutional Court (CC), as well as the appointment of the next attorney general and head of the Public Ministry (MP) and the comptroller general of accounts. The 2027 elections will therefore depend largely on how these four central institutions are occupied, which of the forces prevail in whole or in part, and how the parallelogram of forces between these four is balanced or turns out in favour of one side. The more politically Arévalo enters 2026, the greater his chances of exerting strategic influence on these new appointments are assessed. There is a danger that voters who are permanently dissatisfied and have been disappointed by the achievements of democracy for many years could see a radical populist leader as a realistic option in 2027, regardless of whether he or she has a good reputation or carries accusations and burdens from the past. Bukele from El Salvador and Trump send their regards. The government has little time left to effectively counteract such a development.
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