Nr. 1 | September 2026 - The Promise and Premise of Disarming Iraq's Armed Groups
Mohanad Adnan
Iraq's disarmament initiative was meant to culminate on 30 September 2026. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi chose that date to coincide with the formal conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, depriving armed groups of their longstanding claim that they were resisting a foreign military presence. Yet, days before the deadline, the government began reframing it as the start of a negotiation process and extended the timeline for completing the disarmament file to June 2027.
This is the first paper in a series following up on the conference 'Changing Regional Security in the Middle East'. In it, Mohanad Adnan traces the roots of the disarmament challenge to a blurring of lines between the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) and Iran-aligned militia groups since the PMC’s establishment in 2014. While these groups wear PMC uniforms and draw state salaries, they continue to pursue their own political and security agendas. Whenever the state tries to hold them accountable, they invoke the PMC's legal standing. Under growing U.S. pressure and with backing from the Supreme Judicial Council, the government moved to address the issue, prompting diverging responses among the factions. Saraya al-Salam, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali have moved towards compliance, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada remains undecided. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, by contrast, have refused outright and continue to strike neighboring states.
Adnan also points to weaknesses in the disarmament process. No public list of participating groups has been released, and surrendered weapons were reportedly transferred to the PMC itself. In August, an arrested Harakat al-Nujaba officer was cleared by the PMC within 48 hours, underscoring the state's continued vulnerability to militia pressure. These shortcomings have important implications for Iraq's relations with its neighbours and its credibility as a regional partner. The paper concludes by outlining three scenarios for what comes next. At the same time, it identifies a notable shift in the status quo, wherein public criticism of the militias is no longer is taboo.
