Why can Israel not accept the UN Resolution 1860 (2009) ceasefire proposed by Egypt?
From the Israelis point of view the UN Security Council Resolution 1860 on the Gaza conflict fails to refer to the real background of the current conflict namely that Israel has been under constant rocket attacks since many years. While only general references were made, condemning "violence and hostilities directed against civilians”, Israel may well be left empty handed after accepting an immediate ceasefire without conditions.
At the same time Israel is asked "to ensure the sustained reopening of crossing points" between Israel and Gaza as though the cessation of rocket fire and the opening of the crossing points are symmetric demands.
Israel does not accept to be “paying” anything to get Hamas to stop firing rockets, which is an obvious act of aggression against the Jewish State. Besides Israel is not required under international law to trade with a neighbour if it prefers not to.
Israel, with the backing of the Western powers, decided to embargo the Hamas regime in Gaza, because of its constant violations of any truth-arrangements. Trade embargos are any states legitimate right, particularly if the government of such a state calls for Israel's destruction, engages in suicide terrorism against Israeli citizens, and brainwashes Palestinian children with anti-Semitic hatred.
To compell Israel to open the Gaza crossing points is to deny Israel a valid economic instrument to exercise its right to self-defense against a regime that seeks its eradication. Resolution 1860 makes specific reference to the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). After Hamas successfully launched a military coup against the PA in Gaza in June 2007, it started to provide sanctuary to more terror organizations which identified themselves as al-Qaeda affiliates.
At the same time, it is frequently overlooked, that Egypt also closed its border with the Gazastrip and even under the current circumstances does not seriously consider to open this border and provide the desired medical and economic assistance. It is obvious that Egypt does not want to allow Gaza citizens to “escape” into Egypt in big numbers and possibly stay there until further notice or even for good as refugees. It is also afraid that the Hamas leadership could establish a base in Egypt and start supporting its mother organization, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
The Egyptian Government suspects, that Israel is trying to push at least the radical parts of the population, supporting Hamas over the border into Egypt to leave the Gazastrip with a more friendly, pro-Fatah majority.
Why can Hamas neither?
Already the Sarkozy-Mubarak ceasefire plan was considered by Hamas as an attempt to deny the Libyan ceasefire plan the chance to garner the necessary support. Hamas continues to demand an end of Israeli-Gaza occupation, the withdrawal of foreign troops, a recognition of its right of resistance, the full control of Gaza through its political leadership and the opening of all border crossings including Rafah.
Hamas does not accept a plan that proposes an unconditional ceasefire with an indefinite time frame for Israeli troop withdrawal. Hamas also denies President Abbas the right to officially support the plan because it is held, that his presidential term has ended on the 9th January. It instead demands that Jordan, Mauritania and Egypt, the only Muslim states having direct diplomatic relations with Israel, withdraw their envoys as gesture of solidarity.
Therefore Hamas also condemns the UN Security Council Resolution 1860, passed on January 8 because it fails to fails to live up to all these demands. Instead the Hamas leadership in Syrian exile continues to condemn the Israeli aggression and crimes against its people and instead demands an end to the siege and the immediate and permanent opening of all crossings, including the Rafah crossing.
The Hamas leadership living in comfortable exile in Damascus prefers to continue the fight to the end…. They bargain on a (unilateral) withdrawal of Israeli troops before the inauguration in the United States. They seem to believe that they could sell this as a victory of Hams resistance to the world. They are obviously ready to sacrifice more Palestinian lives for such a political objective, while bargaining on some international pressure to reach a ceasefire arrangement at any cost. Even the unconditional acceptance of Israel of such an ceasefire arrangement, far away from being anything close to a withdrawal, could possible be sold as a (partial) victory for Hamas.
How does the battle in Gaza affect Israel’s elections in February?
All Israeli political parties and its representatives currently act on the basis of the date of the parliamentary elections in Israel on the 10th February 2009. Their behaviour concerning the Gaza intervention has also to serve the electoral campaigns of the Israeli political parties and their respective candidates. Since the public support for the Gaza operation continues to be very high, all political parties find themselves almost obliged to continue the operation until at least most of the stated objectives are achieved and felt by the population (voters); otherwise they expect so suffer in the forthcoming polls. So far the resolute acting of defense minister Ehud Barak has already gained him growing support in the polls and the governing coalition including Kadima has all the good reasons not to allow Netanyahu’s Likud to gain from timid action by the current government in this crisis.
Among the political leaders the Kadima leadership is in the comfortable position to command an acting Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, who is not running in the election again (this time) and can put all his political power into an intervention, that might cause international criticism, but at the same time might not burden future political relations with western countries, due to his expected disappearance from the political scene. Olmert also sees a good chance with his behaviour in this crisis to rectify his shortcomings in the South Lebanon intervention, while giving the Israeli army generals a chance to re-establish some of its lost image of an efficient war machine. It will at the same time help to rebuild Israeli deterrence vis a vis terrorist groups.
Therefore it is not surprising to learn from the media, that Livni and Barak (who stay in the electoral game) seem to be in favour of ending the campaign sooner than Olmert. He plays hardball for the conservative electorate (of Kadima) while Livni and Barak slowly respond to the international pressure, they both might have to confront after the crisis for some time to come.
All in all Kadima looks to probably gain a lot from its current approach to the crisis or at least limit the chances for Netanyahu’s Likud to gain.
In general all political representatives in reach of the premiership or any other cabinet position shall be carefully watching public opinion develop, to go along with the flow and identify the right time and conditions for a political shift towards accepting a ceasefire. This means the ceasefire plan does not only have to comply with the various stated objectives of the campaign, but to a significant extent has also to comply with the flow of public opinion in Israel.
What happens to Hamas government after this battle? What about people’s support of Hamas?
It’s difficult to preview, what the Gaza operation shall mean for the Hamas administration in Gaza. That depends a lot on the final outcome of the operation and the assessment by the people of Gaza, whether their individual “cause” has been served by Hamas tactics or not. Some Gaza citizens might sympathize with the “steadfastness” of some of Hamas officials; others might come to regard the rocket attacks as too costly in the face of the ongoing military onslaught. One does not know much about the views of the “silent majority” in Gaza. It could well be that only a few are really supporting the “resistance” by rocket attacks but have no means to express that politically. It may be that even the local Hamas leadership in this chaos does not command all the means to prevent mortars from being fired by terrorist splinter groups (Islamic Jihad).
How is the popularity of President Abbas in Palestine now?
It seems his popularity in further waning, if that is still possible. Since he accorded a bit chunk of responsibility for the Israeli Operation to Hamas and its continuous rocket attacks, he is considered by some radical Palestinians as a “traitor“. It could well be, that Abbas shall be further weakened, if the Gaza Operation ends in a ceasefire, either brokered between Israel and Egypt with the silent recognition by some Hamas representatives or implemented unilaterally by Israel. It is difficult to forsee Hamas accepting a ceasefire without being named as a contractual partner in the agreement. If a ceasefire deal needs the Palestinian factions to reunite beforehand, to allow Abbas to sign, it might not come about. Only the fact that Hamas might want to avoid being a contractual partner of an entity, it does not recognize, might bring them to accept a ceasefire agreement signed by “President” Abbas.
At the same time, the current conflict cannot entirely deflect attention from the fact, that the continuation of his presidency is disputed not only by Hamas, but also by some constitutional experts. The fact that presidential elections in all the “Palestinian Territories” are not feasible right now and probably also not in the near future serves Abbas interest to remain President for the time being and possibly some time to come. Still the fact that he might not be able to play a leading role in the ceasefire negotiations might hurt him politically and make him look like a real “lame duck” for some time to come, too unless the new US administration moves in swiftly and accords him a prominent role in a new peace process.
Is the popularity of Hamas also growing in the West Bank now?
There has always been considerable support for Hams in the Westbank too, as the last election results testify and one must expect people to sympathize with those suffering, regardless of the real reasons for their suffering, the more so, when the suffering is inflicted by somebody who is considered an antagonist. There might even develop some “sentimental” tendency with some Westbank Fatah members, and not only with those, who have family in the Gaza Strip, to sympathize with the current suffering there and look for their leadership to do something to end that, despite the brutal onslaught on Fatah members in the Gaza Strip during the successful coup of Hamas. To expect them to be intellectually strong enough to realize, that Abbas cannot do much under the current circumstances and that the real cause for their suffering is the constant shelling of Israeli territory, might end up being a very individual challenge.
At the same time many Fatah members realize that only a weakened Hamas in the Gaza Strip would allow for a successful electoral contest in the future and a leading role for Fatah in future negotiations. The Fatah leadership can be sure of the political support by most Arab governments, since none of those states desire to see Hamas and the likes become more popular or even successful in future electoral processes. It could well be that such desire could make some Arab governments (Saudi Arabia) try to enter the ongoing ceasefire negotiations as a (new) intermediate, provided Hamas decides not to accept Egypt as an intermediate any longer. So far obviously Egypt and eventually the US are not interested to allow for this to happen. Also Turkey was mentioned by some Hamas officials as a more trustworthy intermediate than Egypt.
How do the rocket attacks from Lebanon affect the Gaza conflict?
Since those rocket attacks are -for the moment- considered to be the responsibility of Palestinian splinter groups and not Hizbollah, the risk of an extension of the conflict to the northern border of Israel seems to be limited right now. Hizbollah that obviously did not prevent those attacks from happening found harsh words in his recent speeches for the Israeli Intervention, but shall be cautious to engage militarily. Lebanon is also looking forward to elections and another fight with Israel shall definitely not serve the electoral objectives of neither Hizbollah nor any other Lebanese political group except for some Palestinian resistance groups.
Israel has mobilized some reserve troop contingents to the Lebanese border to be able to react, if the situation at its northern border might change. If the Gaza conflict continues, one might see more of those motar/rocket incidents resulting from frustration of individuals, but not a full fledged Hizbollah military engagement.
