Lithuanian intelligence has warned that Russia is considering unconventional kinetic operations against critical infrastructure in Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. One scenario involves the use of captured, repaired or replicated Ukrainian drones to create the appearance that Ukraine had attacked NATO territory.
Lithuanian National Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas has confirmed that according to the intelligence sources, Russian planning is being monitored. At the same time, he stressed that there is no evidence that the Kremlin has taken a final decision, selected a specific target or set a date. This is therefore a credible intelligence warning, not an indication that an attack is imminent.[1]
Similar concerns have been expressed by Polish and other Baltic officials. Ukrainian defence technology adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov has also stated that Russia collects Ukrainian drones brought down by electronic warfare or technical failure, repairs or copies them, and may prepare them for future provocations in Europe.[2]
How could such an operation be conducted?
Several scenarios are under discussion by experts as potential.
First, Russian electronic warfare systems could jam or spoof a Ukrainian drone’s navigation and divert it into NATO airspace. Such incidents have already occurred. However, diverting a drone across a border is technically easier than guiding it precisely towards a particular infrastructure target.
A more deliberate operation would involve rebuilding or copying a Ukrainian drone, reprogramming it and launching it from Russia, Belarus, the Kaliningrad region or, potentially, from within NATO territory through Russian intelligence proxies.
The discovery of Ukrainian components or markings would then allow Moscow to deny responsibility and claim that Ukraine had either lost control of the drone or deliberately attacked a NATO country.
What would Russia seek to achieve?
The physical damage would be only one part of the operation. Moscow’s main objectives would be political and psychological.[3]
First, Russia would seek to undermine relations between Ukraine and the Baltic States. Its propaganda would argue that Western support for Ukraine is creating a direct threat to NATO countries.
Second, Moscow would try to weaken military support for Kyiv by encouraging demands to restrict Ukrainian long-range operations or access to Western technologies.
Third, Russia would seek to create an attribution crisis. Technical investigation takes time, while disinformation can be distributed within minutes. Even several hours of uncertainty could allow Moscow to dominate the information space and deepen divisions within Baltic societies.
Fourth, the operation would test NATO’s political cohesion. Russia would closely observe whether the Allies agreed on attribution, activated Article 4 consultations, strengthened their military posture or merely issued statements of concern.
Finally, Moscow could attack an object on its own territory - particularly in Kaliningrad, Pskov or Leningrad regions - and falsely accuse any Baltic States of enabling the strike. This could provide a manufactured justification for “retaliatory” Russian action.
What could be targeted?
Officially, no specific targets have been identified publicly. The most plausible categories include:
- electricity interconnectors, substations and other essential energy infrastructure;
- LNG and gas facilities;
- ports, airports, railway junctions and military logistics routes;
- telecommunications and data infrastructure;
- defence companies and facilities supporting Ukraine.
Lithuania has already strengthened security around several strategic energy and transport sites. This does not necessarily mean that intelligence has identified those facilities as specific targets. It reflects preventive protection of infrastructure whose disruption could have national or regional consequences.
Russia would not need to destroy a large facility completely. A limited strike that interrupted electricity, transport or communications, caused public fear and produced dramatic images could be sufficient.[4]
How realistic is the threat?
Russia clearly possesses the technical capability to capture, reconstruct or imitate Ukrainian drones. It also has experience conducting sabotage, arson, cyberattacks, GPS interference and other deniable operations across Europe.
Political motivation is equally clear. Moscow has an interest in weakening support for Ukraine, intimidating frontline states and testing the boundary between hybrid aggression and NATO’s collective defence commitments.
However, capability and intent do not automatically mean that an operational decision has been taken. Based on publicly available information, the immediate risk of a specific, pre-authorised attack cannot be assessed as high. The broader risk of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against the Baltic region is nevertheless already high.
My assessment is therefore that a false-flag drone operation is plausible and should be treated seriously, but not presented as inevitable or imminent.
Conclusion
The greatest danger would not be the drone alone. It would be the uncertainty following the explosion: Who launched it? Was it deliberate? Should NATO respond? Can Ukraine still be trusted?
That uncertainty would be the central weapon of the operation.
Effective deterrence therefore requires more than air defence. The Baltic States and NATO need:
- better detection and interception of small, low-flying drones;
- stronger local protection of critical infrastructure;
- rapid technical and intelligence attribution;
- coordinated strategic communication;
- an agreed political response to deniable Russian attacks.
Russia’s strategy would rely on surprise, ambiguity and hesitation. The best deterrent is to demonstrate in advance that such an attack would be detected, attributed and met with a united response - and that it would neither divide NATO nor weaken support for Ukraine.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/lithuania-says-russia-could-use-ukrainian-drones-against-baltic-region-2026-08-06/
[2] https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/07/21/russia-may-use-captured-ukrainian-drones-against-poland-and-baltics-warsaw-warns/
[3] Some ideas are developed by Saldziunas, DELFI.lt: https://www.delfi.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/perspejimas-apie-planuojamas-rusijos-operacijas-baltijos-salyse-ko-galime-sulaukti-120286183
[4] See for example: https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/karine-zvalgyba-rusija-svarsto-smugius-baltijos-regione-ukrainos-gamybos-dronais-56-2736860