Historical Narratives as Part of the Digital Strategies of Authoritarian States

Authoritarian states and allied actors increasingly use the digital sphere to associate Western global engagement with colonial history. The aim is to place such engagement at the centre of media and societal criticism, thereby discrediting values-driven foreign policy. This is evident in disputes within UN organisations, where countries such as China and Russia – often with the support of younger member states still grappling with their own colonial legacies – attempt to block resolutions and reports that cast their own actions in a negative light.

This situation is also reflected in orchestrated campaigns against NATO or against individual countries that support Ukraine or Israel. Governments and politicians who call for close coordination among NATO members, stronger military support for Ukraine or solidarity with Ukraine or Israel are then accused of “old colonial patterns of behaviour” or of acting from an “Old World” perspective that ignores the interests of emerging states and actors.

By emphasising or reinterpreting colonial histories, authoritarian actors connect with global narratives of inequality and historical guilt that particularly resonate with the countries of the so-called Global South. Through social media – which is the main source of information in many societies – they deliberately disseminate content that links colonial experiences to current geopolitical interests. In this way, the digital space becomes a stage for politically charged historical narratives.

Postcolonial narratives are also gaining importance in Western societies – especially in debates about inequality, racism and remembrance culture. The trend towards digital information consumption further intensifies the spread and entrenchment of selected narratives. It becomes particularly problematic when algorithmically promoted content or AI-based language models uncritically reproduce biased interpretations, which then achieve wide reach via social media, opinion pieces and videos. In this way, certain viewpoints can quickly take hold and profoundly shape public debate.

While postcolonial perspectives in Western societies mainly form part of broader societal discourse, in other contexts, these perspectives are deliberately used as tools of state information policy. There, they serve to influence historical and geopolitical interpretations, to expand influence in the Global South and to establish alternative narratives to those of the West.

Great Power Mentality and the Emergence of Grand Narratives

With Xi Jinping’s ascent as Communist Party leader in 2012 and as President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013 came the rhetorical accompaniment of a promise of Chinese resurgence. The “Chinese Dream” and the pledge to “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” introduced a multi-faceted justification of the “new era”, with the proclaimed goal being to return China to the centre stage of the world. The “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” not only highlights China’s economic rise but also asserts the ambition to restore its historical role as a “leading civilisational power” interrupted in the past by foreign domination. This line of thinking permeates both the foreign and domestic rhetoric of the Communist Party – and it increasingly shapes China’s presence on the international stage.

A similar rhetoric underpins Russian propaganda in support of Vladimir Putin’s goal of controlling territories that once belonged to the former Russian Tsarist Empire, including parts of today’s Ukraine and that – as the argument goes – are indispensable to the Russian realm and its cultural foundations. The aims of these grand narratives that look towards a better, greater future for their nations are to generate nationalist sentiment, to evoke national unity and especially to justify the legitimacy of the path chosen to achieve these goals – beyond political participation, and notably without criticism or the questioning of the official narrative.

These “grand narratives” take hold in democratic societies through subsidiary narratives that partly blame their own political and economic elites for the supposed breakdown of the political order. These include the perceived financial burdens of EU membership and the loss of regulatory competence in EU member states, “excessive migration” as an alleged cause of the imbalance in many Western economies or the recent rise in crime and attacks that have had an unsettling effect on the societies in question.

Postcolonialism, the Great Firewall and the Great Patriotic War

China and Russia are two examples in which state actors deliberately use digital platforms and AI to propagate their interpretations of history. Alternative explanations and perspectives are largely pushed aside and – if present at all – appear only on Western-accessible versions of the respective social media platforms (TikTok, for example, is a subsidiary of the Chinese company ByteDance), albeit without significant reach.

Control over historical narratives and the development of digital technologies play a central role here: Historical images are deliberately deployed in order to reinforce national unity internally and to establish one’s own perspective as the foundation for international cooperation externally. In China, this is reflected in the emphasis on a newly awakened national pride born out of the technological advances of leading Chinese companies – especially when these accomplishments are linked to the message that China has finally overcome centuries of Western dominance. For example, the success of the Chinese open-source language model DeepSeek in January 2025 is frequently described as an epoch-making event – a “breakthrough of national destiny”.

1. China: Control over Digital Memory

China is a prime example of the use of digital technologies and AI to steer and control historical narratives. Not only is the Internet in China strictly monitored, but the digital information space is a core element of state and Communist Party public relations. Here it is decided whether and how coherently a message can be conveyed both domestically and internationally. In recent years in particular, the history of the Chinese Empire and the distinct path of Chinese civilisation that this history represents have become cornerstones of propaganda work alongside the founding and achievements of the Communist Party since the 1920s. The use of historical data, achievements and elements that have been retrospectively interpreted as parts of China’s success story – which also showcases China’s goodwill and interaction with the global community (e.g. through the ancient Silk Road) – is cleverly linked to the political agenda of government bodies (e.g. the Belt and Road Initiative). The “Spirit of Bandung” is repeatedly invoked in order to emphasise China’s shared victimhood alongside other states under Western imperialism. In April 1955, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China – Zhou Enlai – was warmly received by African and Asian heads of state with his rhetoric of a “partnership for postcolonial dignity” at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Whether at BRICS summits or the annual China–Africa Forum, Chinese representatives still frequently address participants in the spirit of this “common destiny”.

The “Great Firewall” that hermetically separates China’s Internet from the global network is regarded by Chinese regulators as a key tool of digital censorship. It blocks access to information that does not align with the Communist Party’s interpretations. AI-driven algorithms and machine learning are used to monitor, filter and remove content in real time. These technologies specifically detect and delete “undesirable” historical narratives. One example is the censorship of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. In China, the term “Tiananmen” in connection with the 1989 events is heavily restricted, and much content related to the protests is promptly removed from the Internet. Algorithms identify and delete posts in order to prevent public discussion and remembrance of the massacre. AI-powered tools play a crucial role here in that they identify images, texts and even videos that address the topic on digital media and remove them.

However, in the hands of state propaganda, the toolkit goes far beyond censorship mechanisms. In 2017, the State Council unveiled a “New Generation AI Development Plan”, which set the foundations for China’s AI leadership while also emphasising the need for a normative framework establishing ethical guidelines and legal rules, which was accompanied by a range of very specific legal requirements. As generative AI advanced, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued national standards for it that covered technical, industry-specific and security requirements. In this regard, Chinese AI applications must guarantee compliance with “socialist core values”. This also includes “important historical matters”. One example is the aforementioned narrative of the “Great Chinese Renewal”, which describes China’s rise as a global superpower following centuries of humiliation by the West. Digital platforms and official media disseminate this narrative, highlighting the successes of the Communist Party of China and emphasising the state’s role in economic and social development. In response to the punitive tariffs announced by the US administration on “Liberation Day” against trading partners worldwide – which hit China particularly hard – China’s foreign ministry released an AI-generated propaganda video in April 2025 designed to showcase the country’s superiority.

2. Russia: The Revival of the “Great Patriotic War”

In Russia, as well, the digital space is a tightly controlled tool used for the purpose of shaping and spreading historical narratives. Under Vladimir Putin, particular emphasis has been placed on historical building blocks in order to bolster nationalism at home and to serve Russia’s geopolitical goals. The narrative of the “Great Patriotic War” (i.e. the Second World War) is key to Russian identity politics.

In Russia, the topic of the Second World War is systematically instrumentalised in order to boost patriotism and highlight the Soviet Union’s (and Russia’s) role as victor and saviour of the world. The war is often presented as a heroic tale of sacrifice and triumph, with the Soviet leadership – in particular Joseph Stalin – glorified as a key figure. AI and machine learning are used on digital platforms to generate content that reinforces this official narrative. One concrete example is the annual celebration of “Victory Day” on 9 May, when Russia commemorates the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War. Social media and state-backed online media distribute images, videos and posts that underline the heroic depiction of Soviet soldiers and Stalin’s rule. Artificial intelligence is employed in order to produce nostalgic images of victories and war heroes that emotionally charge memories of the war and emphasise resistance to the “fascist enemy”.

In addition to its use in celebrating Soviet hero­ism, AI is also used to suppress narratives that portray Russia and the Soviet Union in a negative light. Historical facts concerning Stalin’s dictatorship and associated crimes against his own people (e.g. the Great Terror and the famines) are increasingly excluded from public discourse. AI algorithms on social media and news platforms such as VK (VKontakte), Yandex News and Odnoklassniki detect critical content and either reduce its visibility or delete it entirely. Moreover, Russia attempts to rewrite the history of the Cold War and 20th-century geopolitical conflicts in order to justify its current foreign policy from a Russian perspective. Artificial intelligence is used to generate content that portrays Western influence as a threat and Russian “resistance” as legitimate. Efforts are also made to shape the narrative so that Russia appears as a defender of its interests rather than as an aggressor, especially in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Regulatory and Response Options in the Digital Sphere

The use of AI and digital platforms to shape historical narratives in China and Russia reveals how two resources that can be used to exercise power – that is, discursive dominance and technological primacy – are combined to form an influential tool of political control. The increased interlinking of artificial intelligence and historical narrative formation raises complex questions about political influence, technical governance and international regulation – especially regarding the risks of selective memory and the digitally controlled interpretation of history.

A genuine decoupling is already occurring in the information space, driven in part by coexisting and practically irreconcilable concepts of sovereignty in the digital realm. China promotes its own concept of “digital sovereignty” – that is, the state’s right to autonomously control, regulate and shape the Internet within its borders both technically and politically. This model clearly differs from the Western liberal understanding of an open, global Internet, not least by deliberately restricting access to information in the digital space. In a world in which machines can generate and filter content, it is becoming increasingly difficult for more and more people to distinguish fact from fiction. The crucial question remains as to whether the increasingly widespread large language models of Chinese AI solutions are trained on datasets from around the world or whether – by way of digital separation – they will increasingly diverge from Western applications, thereby reinforcing entrenched opinions and interpretations. An initial (provisional) indication arose from an analysis of the DeepSeek-R1 language model that focused on the use of propagandistic elements and on anti-American resentments in a cross-thematic study and that found that narratives differ across languages (i.e. Simplified Chinese, common in the PRC; Traditional Chinese, used in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and English).

In dealings with decision-makers in Moscow and Beijing – as well as regarding our own scope for action in shaping and regulating AI – the following points are especially important:

1. Although the “grand narratives” that are promoted by states do not necessarily take full hold in target societies, their presence on global digital platforms does intensify social polarisation. In light of this observation, Western states must strengthen their ability to contextualise such attempts at influencing the population and respond appropriately. This can be supported by boosting national capacities – for example, by expanding open-source access, by promoting independent research infrastructures and by improving coordination between administrative bodies and civil society on digital resilience. It is becoming clear that both analogue and digital spaces must be understood not only as arenas of exchange, but also as stages of strategic influence.
2. While there is much to suggest that AI-driven postcolonial narratives do resonate with some people, there remains room for action to limit the long-term impact of these narratives. Such discourses primarily aim to influence foreign decision-makers in the short term. Many of the arguments can often be traced back to misinformation, and they frequently seek to distract from other issues. However, the authoritarian nature of the actors themselves presents vulnerabilities that can be used to call into question the credibility of the very messages they seek to convey. This weakness should be addressed more coherently by governmental and scientific institutions, associations and NGOs across Europe. This process also requires long-term support for projects – including linguists who can track down narratives and who have the expertise to compile them into fact sheets and online databases.
3. China and Russia are highly active in creating alternative narratives, with storytelling having become a key tool for them to spread their messages. Both countries tend to defend their narratives in two ways: first, by adapting the language they use internationally via the employment of terms and concepts that at first glance appear to align with the liberal values shaping the international order, and second, through coercive measures that exert pressure on target countries in order to ensure that reporting that contradicts Russia’s and China’s perspectives is suppressed within their own (linguistic) information spaces. This combination of strategic adaptation and repressive action is not contradictory; rather, it is a deliberate two-pronged approach aimed at achieving international acceptability while at the same time maintaining control over the information space. Liberal democracies need to analyse the coexistence of these mechanisms more comprehensively.
4. On the European side, more efforts are needed to provide high-quality reporting in Chinese, Russian and other languages. Only in this way can contradictions be uncovered, can historical contexts be properly understood and provided, and can weaknesses that are linked to propagandistic agendas be revealed. Similar initiatives should also be undertaken in societies with limited access to independent media coverage, such as in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. We should view these states and societies as partners, even if they are not “like-minded”. Crucially, combating the spread of false narratives depends on societies that find themselves today under authoritarian pressure and lacking independent sources of information.
5. China leverages its economic relations and other states’ financial liabilities, demanding loyalty and managing in recent years to secure a high level of support, especially from countries in Latin America and Africa, but increasingly also in the MENA region, in the Western Balkans and in the Western Pacific. China has made countries’ acceptance of its own interpretation of its “national interests” a central subject of every dialogue. This significantly affects the bilateral and multilateral behaviour of these countries and their political elites. Many are caught between economic dependence and preserving their political manoeuvring space. China expands its influence not only through investment, but also by activating postcolonial narratives. Concepts such as sovereignty, development and a multipolar order are deliberately contrasted with the history of Western dominance. The appeal of these narratives draws on historical experiences of foreign rule, exploitation and patronising development rhetoric, thereby granting China moral legitimacy in many regions that goes beyond mere interest-driven policy. In light of this complex dynamic, German and European actors must clearly be capable of engaging in discourse and must also acquire the relevant skills. Current dialogue initiatives offer valuable opportunities, such as regional studies (in China: “area studies”) and interdisciplinary competence-building concerning countries and regions. These efforts should be more strongly integrated into university curricula and the political sphere.

– translated from German –

David Merkle is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Shanghai Office.

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