Issue: 2/2026
Brazil is heading into elections that are marked by different political camps: the left around President Lula, the right-wing Bolsonaro camp, and the Centrão – a loose alliance of parties and MPs with no fixed ideological orientation. The debate is dominated above all by the economic situation, with high inflation and rising living costs. While Lula stands for social policy measures, the right attracts support on domestic security issues. The political centre remains fragmented, thus far failing to offer a convincing alternative – though that is precisely what many voters are looking for. The election is important for Europe because Brazil remains a key partner on trade, climate, and geopolitical issues.
International Reports (IR): Presidential and parliamentary elections are due to be held in Brazil in October. To begin with, could you give us an overview? Who are the main parties and figures?
Maximilian Hedrich: Indeed: A whole series of elections is set to take place in October. Voters will elect a new president and a new national parliament – the entire Chamber of Deputies and part of the Senate. What is more, new governors and state parliaments will be elected in all 26 federal states. The political landscape is rather confusing, especially from the perspective of non-Brazilians. If we focus just on the federal level, the political landscape can broadly be divided into a left-wing camp around President Lula, a right-wing camp aligned with former president Jair Bolsonaro, and various parties positioning themselves somewhere in between. In Brazil, the latter are often referred to as the Centrão. That sounds like the centre, but it is not necessarily comparable with how the term is understood in Germany, for example.
IR: That’s one aspect we’ll certainly come back to shortly …
Hedrich: On the left, the dominant figure is clearly the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The prospects of his party – the Workers’ Party PT – winning the presidency depend heavily on him personally. Now 80 years old, if Lula were for some reason unable to run after all, it would probably be very difficult for the left. Lula is expected to run once again alongside his current vice president, Geraldo Alckmin – a highly respected and rather technocratic politician.
On the right, the dominant force is the somewhat misleadingly named Partido Liberal, or PL – the political platform of former president Jair Bolsonaro. Following the violent storming of institutions in Brasília in January 2023, however, Bolsonaro remains imprisoned until 2053: He is barred from running for political office and is technically not even allowed to make political statements. De facto, he has nevertheless succeeded in establishing his son Flávio as the provisional presidential candidate – or precandidato, as it is called in Brazil – though political family dynasties have not traditionally been common in the country. Flávio lacks both the charisma and – thus far – the approval ratings of his father.
IR: What distinguishes father and son in terms of political substance?
Hedrich: Flávio Bolsonaro is often equated with his father, but he differs in his political style. While Jair Bolsonaro was known for confrontational rhetoric and marked polarisation, Flávio is more moderate and strategic in his approach. He remains loyal to the family’s conservative course in terms of political substance, but he seeks to appear more institutional and to develop a distinctive profile of his own. Whether Flávio Bolsonaro would in fact govern more moderately if elected remains an open question.
IR: Which issues have been shaping the political debate in this election year thus far?
Hedrich: The economy is clearly the dominant issue. Inflation remains relatively high, and people in Brazil are feeling rising prices in all areas of life, be it at the supermarket or on public transport. And the problem no longer affects only the lower classes: The middle class, too, is struggling with the rising cost of living. More complex economic issues also feature to some extent, such as public finances, debt, and the tax system. But the question that ultimately resonates with most voters is: How much do I have left to spend at the end of the month?
IR: And whom do people trust to deliver better solutions?
Hedrich: For many people, Lula still stands above all for the fight against social inequality and poverty and – more generally – for an active state. People remember the social programmes introduced during Lula’s first two terms in office from 2003 to 2011. The major question is whether that model was sustainable at the time and – even more so – whether this type of policy remains viable today given higher public debt and slower economic growth.
The second major issue, in which the Bolsonaro camp enjoys greater public trust, is domestic security – that is, the fight against organised crime and everyday violence, especially in the major cities. Many people trust the right more on this issue and point to the successes achieved during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency from 2019 to 2023, although that period was dominated by the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.
A third issue that has come to be more of a factor in a Brazilian election campaign for the first time – as far as I can judge – is foreign policy. Brazil is a large country that tends to focus primarily on itself, even during elections. This time, the situation is different, at least to some extent. And here, the advantage again lies more with the left. It might be going too far to describe him as a “foreign-policy president”, but Lula has spent a great deal of time abroad since 2023 and – even in the eyes of some people who are not among his supporters – he has represented Brazilian interests effectively overall. Together with his vice president, he succeeded in getting high US tariffs reduced again, which Brazilians greatly appreciate. He continues to defend Brazil’s role within the BRICS alliance – now BRICS+ – though less vocally than in the past. At last year’s COP summit in Belém, he was able to present himself as a pioneer of climate diplomacy, and the EU–Mercosur agreement might well have failed without him.
IR: Are environmental and climate issues really relevant in the election campaign overall?
Hedrich: Not really. For us Europeans, the Amazon issue is often relatively high on the agenda, and under Lula, deforestation there has indeed declined significantly – unlike in other regions of the country, which receive far less attention. But this is not really an election issue, nor would it fit particularly well with Lula’s broader narrative, in which national economic development clearly takes centre stage.
Migration is another issue that barely features in the election campaign at all, perhaps surprisingly for outside observers, especially in Europe. Brazil does host refugees, for example, from Venezuela, but in a country of this size, they effectively disappear from view.
One issue widely debated among experts but entirely absent from the campaign is the possibility of education reform. In fact, this is one of the key reasons for the country’s extreme social inequality. Public schools are simply of poor quality, and if parents cannot afford expensive private schools, children have virtually no chance of advancing economically. However, it may be that the elites prefer things that way, and there appears to be little real determination to change the situation.
IR: As things currently stand, Brazil could this year once again face a choice between a president from the Lula camp and one from the Bolsonaro camp – for the third election in a row. Centre-right candidates who in the past either won the presidency or at least reached the run-off may once again prove insignificant. Does this reflect growing polarisation in Brazilian society?
Hedrich: Not really. If anything, it feels almost somewhat schizophrenic. My impression from conversations in the country itself is that the level of polarisation is not quite as high as the presidential elections might suggest. Indeed, there are indications that polarisation may even have declined. When Jair Bolsonaro was elected president in 2018, divisions often ran through families and groups of friends. In some cases, people stopped speaking to one another altogether.
What was interesting was the reaction to the attempted coup at the beginning of 2023 and the eventual conviction of Jair Bolsonaro. Following the attempted coup, almost the entire country was shocked: Most people in Brazil had never believed such a thing to be possible. The trial itself was relatively calm, however. It is true that supporters and opponents of Bolsonaro demonstrated in advance according to their respective positions. But after that, everything proceeded in a fairly routine manner. As is common in Brazil, the trial was broadcast live on television. One day, people watched the proceedings and the verdict against Bolsonaro, and the next day, the telenovela was back on their screens. There were certainly fears beforehand. In the end, however, most people in Brazil trusted the Supreme Court to conduct the trial properly – and rightly so, in my view.
Today, I would say that Brazilian society can be roughly divided into three equally large groups: those clearly on the left, those firmly aligned with the Bolsonaro camp, and another third somewhere in between. Many people in Brazil essentially want a political middle ground between the camps on the left and right. Brazilians refer to this as the terceira via – literally, the “third way”. But people are deeply disappointed by the parties occupying this space, which they view as being more interested in lining their own pockets than in pursuing coherent political programmes.
IR: Now is probably the right moment to take a closer look at the parties in Brazil’s political centre. We’ve already heard that this bloc is often referred to as the Centrão. Which parties belong to it, and what do they stand for?
Hedrich: One classic representative of the Centrão is the MDB, which stands for Movimento Democrático Brasileiro. It’s a party that has frequently provided ministers at the national level and that also performs well in regional and local elections, but it has never achieved the major breakthrough of winning a presidential election.
Then, there’s the PSDB, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party – again, a somewhat misleading name because the party is certainly not social democratic in the German sense. Today, it is best described as a liberal-centrist or moderately conservative reform party, and it is currently fighting simply to stay in parliament.
União Brasil is likely positioned on the more conservative side of the Centrão, and the Republicanos party also belongs in this category. Finally, there is the PSD under its chairman, Gilberto Kassab. Its name, too, suggests social democracy, but in reality, it may be centre-left, centrist, or centre-right depending on the geographical region in question. The PSD is currently the leading force within the Centrão. It performed extremely well in the last municipal elections and could once again be the kingmaker in this year’s national elections. Under Kassab, the party has positioned itself very effectively and professionally: During the party-switching window – the phase of political reshuffling in the Brazilian autumn, which is the spring in Europe – it succeeded in attracting numerous politicians and officeholders from other parties.
IR: Party-switching window?
Hedrich: In Brazil, the “party-switching window” is a legally defined period during which elected politicians are allowed to change their party without losing their parliamentary seat. In light of this, it is also easier to understand the broader dynamics within the Centrão. And this brings us to the fundamental question of what these parties actually stand for. In Germany, we’re used to centrist parties representing certain substantive political positions despite their willingness to compromise. Anyone looking at Brazil should abandon that assumption right away. If you google these parties, almost every one of them seems to be described as “catch-all” or “pragmatic” – and “pragmatic” is actually not a bad description. Viewed in a positive light, these parties are extremely willing to compromise. They also do not engage in the culture wars pursued by both the right and the left through clearly defined ideological positions. Instead, they generally try to determine which political winds are most favourable at any given moment.
Viewed in a more negative light, these parties are largely devoid of substantive content. Essentially, they are vehicles for the political ambitions of individuals. If one of these vehicles begins to lose support in the polls, people simply switch allegiance and back a more promising “horse”. Within Brazil’s political system, these parties act as kingmakers.
IR: Where does this power come from?
Hedrich: Brazil has a presidential system, while the parliamentary chambers are elected through proportional representation with open lists. This gives rise to a focus on personalities, but it also tends to produce fragmentation. The president’s party almost never has the outright majority needed to pass legislation, and that’s the leverage enjoyed by the Centrão parties. In exchange for political support, these parties receive ministerial positions and other offices or funding for their constituencies, the use of which is then subject to little scrutiny. Some people say this amounts to a system of perfected – or even “legalised” – corruption.
In recent years, Lula’s government relied on virtually all Centrão parties, including União Brasil – that is, almost right up to the edge of the Bolsonaro camp, though União Brasil has since left the government. And according to forecasts, the next parliament is likely to be even more conservative than the current one. Thus, even if Lula himself is not particularly moderate on the left, his government very much is – out of sheer necessity.
Another factor distinguishing the Centrão parties from both the Workers’ Party and the PL is their geographical base: They generally have specific regional strongholds and focus primarily on delivering benefits there. By contrast, both the Lula and Bolsonaro camps have nationwide support bases.
What almost all parties still have in common, however, is the low proportion of women. There are certainly female officeholders, but many of them face such a torrent of sexist abuse that – unfortunately – after a single term, many say, “Thank you, I’ve had enough!”
IR: That doesn’t sound very encouraging. Is there really no political voice at present capable of credibly representing a programme that reflects the people’s desire for a “third way”, which you yourself clearly perceive?
Hedrich: The loudest voice in that sense is probably the PSD already mentioned, together with its chairman, Kassab; prominent liberal-democratic figures, such as Eduardo Leite; or the more conservative Ronaldo Caiado, whom Kassab has established as the party’s precandidato for the presidential election. But overall, one doesn’t get the impression that the party genuinely believes it can win the presidency. More likely, it simply wants to drive up the political price demanded from whichever candidate from the left or right it eventually decides to support.
To be honest, the opinion polls currently suggest little else. Over the past four years, the parties between the left and right camps have effectively wasted their opportunity. Partly because nobody wanted to step aside, they failed to agree early enough on a single figure who could systematically have been built into a serious presidential contender. As in so many countries across the region, the political centre has unfortunately lost momentum and no longer offers clear substantive alternatives. In the Latin American context, personalities play a particularly important role in elections, so if there is no genuine political heavyweight capable of challenging someone like Lula – an ageing politician – things naturally get difficult.
IR: To conclude, let’s turn to Europe. What would ultimately be better for us: a fourth Lula presidency or a president from the Bolsonaro camp?
Hedrich: Lula is certainly a difficult and – at times – uncomfortable figure for us. But it is also true that on raw materials, climate policy, and also economic policy, he’s been a relatively reliable partner to both the previous and the current German government. I have already mentioned his role in the EU–Mercosur agreement. That’s an extremely important issue for us because Brazil is a major partner. It’s not for nothing that the world’s largest German Chamber of Commerce was in São Paulo for many years. Recent developments have once again shown how important Brazil is for us, too: This year, it was the partner country at the Hannover Messe, which was opened jointly by Lula and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Lula arrived with a delegation of no fewer than 15 ministers, who also took part in the German–Brazilian intergovernmental consultations. All this once again underlines the strategic partnership between our countries.
At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves: Lula will not change his position on BRICS or his broader foreign-policy narrative, which is at times highly critical of the West. Particularly regarding the Middle East conflict and the role of Israel, he continues to use rhetoric that we rightly view very critically. However, his foreign-policy team and ministries are highly professional, and a pragmatic working relationship is maintained on other issues that matter to us.
If Flávio Bolsonaro or a similarly aligned politician were ultimately to prevail, there probably wouldn’t be any major changes in the areas of business and trade. Bolsonaro Senior also supported the signing of the EU–Mercosur agreement in 2018/2019. But we would have to assume that under such a president – at least as long as Donald Trump remains in office in Washington – Brazil would seek closer alignment with the United States, possibly at the expense of Europe and Asia.
In addition, tensions with Europeans could once again arise over environmental and human-rights issues. Under no circumstances should we repeat the mistake made during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency: Despite all political differences, we should have kept channels of communication much more open at that time simply because Bolsonaro was the representative of Brazil – an important partner and key country for us. It is foreseeable that in such a scenario, some NGOs in particular would again push strongly for maximum distancing. And criticism should be voiced where appropriate and in a suitable context, of course. But as I said: We must not close the channels of communication again. Last time, it was possible to reopen them after the Bolsonaro freeze. Next time, I believe things may be different.
This interview was conducted by Magdalena Falkner and Sören Soika.
– translated from German –
Maximilian Hedrich is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Brazil Office in Rio de Janeiro.
