During our lifetimes, the major part of the world’s citizens have come to life in democracy. And since the late 1970s, more than 90 countries have made progress in establishing a democratic system. However, and despite this transformation, there still persist notions of an „authoritarian advantage“. Three main tenets can be pointed out. First: Poor countries can expand their economies more rapidly under some form of authoritarian system. Second: Economic growth favorizes democratic transitions. And third: Autocratic governments can better ensure stability in volatile environments. The empirical bases to these tenets are worth to be looked at. Categorizing regime types presents certain challenges. In our context, democracy can be defined as a system that employs mechanisms of shared power, established institutions for the selection of the community’s leaders and protected channels for public participation in the political process. Let’s turn to the three tenets mentioned above.1.)„Authoritarian governments oversee more rapid growth in the developing world.“ Reviewing the economic growth performance of all developing countries since 1960, it appears that democracies have attained rates of per capita GDP growth equivalent to autocratic systems. So, there is no empirical evidence of authoritarian growth advantage. And there will not be any evidence even when looking at the exceptional autocratic growth experiences in Asian countries such as China, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan. Outside of East Asia, developing country democracies have a growth rate that is 51 percent higher than that of autocracies. Countries such as Botswana, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic and Senegal may serve as good examples. Apart from the economic growth rates, anthropometric indicators are worth to be examined. On these human development measures, developing country democracies also excel relative to authoritarian countries. Here, citizens have, for example, life expectancies that are nine years longer, infant mortality rates that are 21 percent lower and secondary school attainment levels that are 40 percent higher than those in autocracies. All these superior outcomes are obtained without massive social spending. Processes internal to democracies are responsible for them.2.)„Economic growth leads to democracy.“ It is assumed that once countries reach a middle-income threshold and the reduction of poverty, expanded middle-class, literacy and urbanization, they will automatically start transitioning to democracy. This notion is repeated so often that it is taken as true. However, the assumption lacks empirical grounding. Research shows that economic decline, rather than growth, is a more powerful impetus for democratic transition. Everywhere, people become more restless for change when their living conditions worsen.3.)„Democratization is destabilizing.“ Of course, democratization is a process far away from being without a risk. But this risk has to be weighed against the relatively greater danger of conflicts associated with governments that resist political reforms, relying on repression to stay in power. A look at these three tenets does not imply that all developing country democracies grow more effectively than autocracies. To make it clear, there are nine authoritarian systems that have sustained economic growth for at least one decade since 1981: Bhutan, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Tunisia, and Vietnam. China is even a poster child for the autocratic growth argument. And in former times, the Soviet Union, Romania and Yugoslavia were held up as models for authoritarian growth.What is the explanation for democracies’ impressive track record of steady and broad-based development? There are a variety of interrelated reasons belonging to three categories – accountability, openness and adaptability. Accountability is what drives democracies developmental superiority. Democratic systems tend to be stronger systems of checks and balances, independent media, and rule of law than other systems. Openness, that means the greater access to information in open societies, fosters more informed policy debate and analysis. Adaptability is essential for any democratic system. Political competition gives leaders incentives to identify new ideas that will address public priorities. Over a wide range of development measures, democracies have performed consistently better than other governance regimes. Democracy is central to development and conflict mitigation. As a result, it should be taken into account when development policy is designed and implemented. Some suggestions shall be made: Developing countries that have „self-selected“ their way towards a more transparent and accountable government should receive more aid. This is not the case at the present time. Even low-middle income democracies do not receive an edge in aid. Bilateral donors should explicitly make democracy a criterion in their funding decisions. Recently, some donors have given special emphasis to „good governance“. However, this term is often interpreted as economic government, rule of law, or corruption. How reliable can „rule of law“ be if it is contingent on the discretion of leaders who stand above the law? This does not mean, that developing country autocracies should not receive international assistance. Allocutions for humanitarian assistance and transnational threats – HIV/AIDS, avian flu, or polio –should be made. However, it should be ensured that these resources are used for the purposes defined and not to promote the regime as such. The international financial institutions (IFIs) –World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks –should amend their charters in favour of the affirmation of democracy. Countries with transparent and participatory political systems should be given priority in funding decisions. Moreover, they should afford more flexibility to democratically elected governments. One regional developing bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, already cites democracy as one of its two principal objectives. Development responds to incentives, too. However, the incentives created by current development financing practices are rather ambiguous. 93 percent of all development assistance goes through national governments. Trouble starts where undemocratic governments are part of the problem the solution of which is urgent. Here, the flow of aid resources only serves to perpetuate their hold on power. The funding should be diversified through a variety of actors with different approaches. Diversification is not destined to undermine the capacity and authority of national governments. Democratic space should be encouraged. Even autocratic governments try to be perceived as meeting international expectations and norms. Clear signals from established democracies that legitimacy is valued will encourage more space for independent voices. Finally, the initial months and years are essential for the success of the opening process of developing and democratizing countries. As a result, international actors are not as influential in ensuring a democracy dividend is realized. Here, the creation of„democracy response accounts“ may be helpful. We live in a historic and hopeful time. The expansion of democracy and its implications for development and security throughout the world are encouraging. If we don’t want to put at a risk what we have reached so far, we should no longer treat democracy as a secondary objective.