Does democracy have a chance in the Arab world? If the answer is yes, what problems would emerge if an attempt were made to make it work? Reform and change have indeed been debated in the region ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, and even a plan was drawn up which aimed to improve governance, empower women, and secure the rule of law. In view of their disastrous level of development, the Arab countries are entirely in agreement on the need for reforms, although their precise meaning is still under dispute. This is why any concrete steps to implement reforms have failed to materialize so far. Instead, most regimes in the Arab region are busy inventing reasons for delaying that process. In addition, purely cosmetic steps are undertaken to alleviate the growing pressure from outside. The arguments produced by local regimes to cover up their delaying tactics are many and varied. The first reason invoked is the Arab-Israeli conflict which, while it certainly does obstruct modernization in the Arab world, was used often enough as an excuse for decreeing emergency laws and suspending civil liberties in the region. Unfortunately, the efforts undertaken by Arab governments to disrupt progress in their own countries coincide with analogous manoeuvres by American groups. Washington should change its attitude towards the conflict, so that the Arab nations no longer feel threatened by initiatives like the Broader Middle East Project. Resolving the conflict would certainly boost the process of reform in the Arab countries. Second, national sovereignty is used as an excuse for rejecting calls for reform from abroad. While domestic opponents are silenced by accusing them of endangering the security of the nation, the self-same regimes hardly ever think about national sovereignty as they offer concessions to foreign powers. The third reason for rejecting democratic reforms that is commonly mentioned is the uniqueness of Arab culture. To be sure, the Arabs’ cultural heritage, with Islam as its backbone, forms an obstacle on the path towards augmenting democracy in more ways than one. At the same time, Islam is susceptible to various interpretations. A much more difficult obstacle on the path towards transformation is the insistence of many Arab governments on conventional forms of rule that largely preclude public participation. Another obstacle is the development initiated by the military coups of the ’50s and ’60s. When the blessings and evils of the oil boom began to manifest themselves in the ’70s, leading to the present uneven distribution of the newly-won wealth in the countries concerned, the problems confronting the forces of modernization in the Arab region grew even more difficult. The fourth argument against change is that reforms lead to chaos, civil division, and greater power for Islamic fundamentalism. While this is certainly true, the argument has been inflated so much that it now forms a bugbear. What is more, the fact that the regimes themselves provoked fundamentalist movements is never mentioned. What would be needed is a policy that deals responsibly and sensitively with national, ethnic, and religious groups within the country. The fifth and last point relates to the political, economic, and social developments within the Arab region which, so the argument runs, cannot be reconciled with democratic reforms. What would be needed in this instance is pressure from the inside coinciding with pressure from the outside. After supporting dictatorial regimes for decades in order to combat communism, as in Afghanistan, for example, the West now would be well advised to show solidarity with the forces of civil society and modernization in the Arab world. There are two approaches to reform which have recently been implemented in the region that may repay a closer look – the reform projects initiated by Washington after the occupation of Iraq and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The first approach: In America, many believe that the events of September 11 imperatively demand that terrorism must be fought at its roots and sources. Thus, terrorism was used in the Arab countries to justify the imposition of severe restrictions on the freedom of opinion, an action that was tacitly tolerated by the USA but did little to help democracy in the region. The occupation of Iraq by the USA, which was done without international legitimation, and the country’s disastrous governance after the overthrow of Saddam did not exactly transform Iraq into a gateway for change in the region. Neither transformation nor democratization were supported in any way; instead, the policies pursued by the US government in Iraq served to strengthen religious and conservative forces as well as the authority of other Arab regimes. Finally, the behaviour of the Americans at Fallujah, Ramadi, and Abu Ghraib recalled the actions of the Israelis at Gaza, Rafah, and Nablus – a fact which certainly did not help to mitigate the Arabs’ image of their enemies. The second approach: Because of their history and their geographical proximity to the Arab world, the Europeans seem to understand it far better than the Americans. For the same reason, Europe recognized the threats building up in the Middle East and North Africa at an early stage – the growth of Islamist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the growing number of illegal immigrants. In response to these new challenges, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was created in the mid-’90s which, among other things, highlights certain values, such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the empowerment of women. It is awkward, however, that some EU member states do not adhere to the standards which they themselves laid down in the Barcelona convention and go on maintaining splendid contacts with corrupt dictatorships. Even so, Europe did not side with the hawks in Washington who wanted to enforce change, instead supporting the forces of moderation in all governments. This is why the South now apparently wishes for more European commitment in the region, not only in solving conflicts but also in providing support for reform movements. There is no uniform pattern of change and reform in the Arab region; rather, the countries there may be broken down into a variety of groups. Thus, there are countries where change will begin as soon as tyranny is overthrown, others where regime change is predicated on policy change, and yet others where the ruling regime is quite capable of coexisting with changes in politics and governance. To which of these groups an Arab country must be assigned depends on its development. It is certain, however, that there is no country which will not have a long way to go on the path towards transformation, reform, and democracy.