The withdrawal of Western troops from Niger, Mali and other Sahel states by the end of 2024 has significantly changed the security architecture of West Africa. Without the support of Western forces, the capabilities of the local armies are deteriorating, particularly in the border areas infested by jihadists. Islamist groups such as the "Islamic State in the Greater Sahara Region" (ISGS) or Al-Qaeda offshoots such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) are taking advantage of the lack of Western reconnaissance and air support to increase their operational freedom. US analysts point out that the lack of real-time intelligence makes it difficult to track and contain these terrorist groups –Boko Haram and the offshoots of IS and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Burkina Faso or Benin have been able to exploit the gap and launch more frequent, deadlier attacks. The national armed forces are now largely on their own in the fight against terror at a time when the jihadists are trying to spread to the countries on the Gulf of Guinea.
Parallel to the withdrawal of Western support, a new alliance has emerged. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – all governed by the military – formed the "Alliance des États du Sahel" (AES) in 2023 with the help of Russia, which provides for mutual assistance in the event of external threats. This alliance is expressly intended as a regional alternative to Western partnerships. In practice, this means greater openness towards Russia: the Africa Corps (successor to the hybrid Wagner Group), which is part of the Ministry of Defense, is present in the three countries. The security architecture of West Africa must therefore reinvent itself: Local cooperation is gaining in importance, but without external support, the fight against terror cannot be won.
Realignment of the USA
The USA is realigning its military and security policy role in West Africa. Following the collapse of its previous partners in the Sahel, Washington is focusing on alliances with states in the coastal region of the Gulf of Guinea, particularly Benin. The country has an elected government and is stable but is massively threatened by jihadist violence from the Sahel. In northern Benin, groups linked to Al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISWAP) have carried out an increasing number of attacks and assaults. Most recently, on April 17, 2025, 54 Beninese soldiers were killed in a JNIM attack on their positions in the north of the country on the border with Burkina Faso.
Meanwhile, the USA is planning to use Benin as a new base for reconnaissance missions. Work has begun on upgrading an airbase in Benin in order to presumably deploy reconnaissance drones over the West African region from there. The US Africa Command AFRICOM confirmed that the modernization of an airfield in Benin has begun, in some cases even "before the coup in Niger" (July/August 2023). In addition, US special forces are apparently active as advisors in Benin, training and supporting the Beninese army in the fight against terrorist groups. Over 700 Beninese soldiers have recently received US training in border security tactics. Since the beginning of 2025, there have been several visits by high-ranking US delegations to Benin, during which cooperation agreements were also signed. However, the details are unclear.
Strategically placed at the crossroads between the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea, Benin could become what Niger once was: an outpost for Western counter-terrorism operations. However, care is being taken to respect Benin's sovereignty – US troops are embedded in Beninese bases so as not to provoke domestic resistance.
Washington's strategic goals
In view of these developments in Benin, Washington's objectives can be summarized as follows:
1. shift in focus and risk assessment
After two decades of intensive anti-terror missions in Africa, Washington has become somewhat disillusioned. Despite the massive deployment of French troops and UN blue helmets, regions such as the Sahel have not been stabilized; instead, partners have been thrown out of control by coups. The USA is drawing the conclusion from this that it should deploy its military presence in a more targeted manner. Instead of stationing large contingents in politically volatile countries – with the risk of suddenly being in an enemy position in the event of a regime change – it is relying on a "light footprint": small, mobile teams operating from safe neighboring countries. Washington wants to avoid being drawn into a direct conflict with the new rulers (some of whom openly sympathize with Russia). At the same time, a smaller footprint saves resources that are needed elsewhere – the global focus of the USA is shifting towards competition with China in the Indo-Pacific.
2. partner first - "partner-led operations"
One of the USA's declared aims is to bring local partners to the fore. For some years now, Washington has been propagating the idea that African states should take the lead in security matters themselves, while the USA provides advice. Instead of their own combat troops, training missions, intelligence support and equipment assistance should form the core of the advisory services. The USA therefore provides know-how, technology (drones, reconnaissance) and special forces as trainers, while armies such as those in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire or Nigeria carry out the actual ground operations. By strengthening local forces, it is hoped that less direct US intervention will be required in the long term. Washington is also pursuing the strategic goal of promoting regional alliances such as the Accra Initiative.
3. selection of reliable partners and containment of Russian influence
With its involvement, the USA wants to strengthen the elected governments in order to form a counterbalance to authoritarian and pro-Russian tendencies. One of Washington's aims is therefore to form a chain of stable states south of the Sahel that also cooperate with the West – from Senegal to Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition to combating the spread of terrorism to the coastal states, the strategic aim is also to curb Russia's influence with its military cooperation and disinformation in the social media in Africa.
4. focus on reconnaissance and counter-terrorism capabilities despite withdrawal
Another goal is to maintain the reconnaissance capability in West Africa, even if ground troops are withdrawn. The USA is investing in drone technology and mobile surveillance. The idea behind this: Even with a small presence on the ground, the US can monitor terrorist activities via high-tech and, if necessary, carry out targeted strikes (e.g. by drone) as in Somalia. The upgrade of the drone base in Benin or the planned stationing of surveillance aircraft in Côte d'Ivoire serves this purpose. In the long term, the US military is working on drones with a very long range and endurance (partly solar powered) in order to be able to cover the airspace over the Sahel and North Africa, particularly Libya, even without local bases. Washington's strategic goal is therefore to keep its "eyes and ears" in the region despite its withdrawal and to support friendly states in their reconnaissance efforts against terrorist groups.
Reaction of other players
France: The end of Franceafrique and the search for a new approach
For France, the US withdrawal from Niger means an intensification of an already negative development for Paris, which reached its peak at the beginning of 2025: The extensive military withdrawal from West Africa – a dramatic turning point in French Africa policy. After Paris had already ended its military operations in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it now also withdrew from Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Chad. This development underlines a decline in French military influence, particularly in view of the growing presence of Russia, China and Turkey.
France's withdrawal from these countries took place in an environment of increasing domestic political pressure and anti-French protests. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger had already forced Paris to end its deployments, and this was followed by decisions in Dakar, Abidjan and N'Djamena, which also no longer wanted a French troop presence. The loss of the base in Chad is particularly serious for Paris, as N'Djamena has long served as a central base for operations in the region.
Paris is now increasingly relying on the support of the Accra Initiative, an alliance of coastal states that receives financial and logistical support from the EU. At the request of the respective governments, military advisory teams are also to contribute to the fight against terrorism in some more stable countries, such as Benin and Ghana. President Macron is now increasingly emphasizing a commitment that is based less on military presence and more on economic cooperation, development aid and diplomatic partnerships.
Russia: Expansion in the shadow of the power vacuum
Russia's reaction is opportunistic – it senses an opportunity to expand its influence. Even before the Niger coup, Russia had a military presence in Mali - first through the Wagner Group and now through the Afrika Korps – and supported the military government there. With the withdrawal of the French, Russia's role there increased enormously: Malian armed forces operated side by side with Russian forces, similar to the situation in the Central African Republic. Russian instructors also appeared in Burkina Faso. After the coup in Niger, Russia indirectly welcomed the takeover by calling for a "peaceful solution without Western interference", while pro-Russian demonstrations with flags took place in Niamey.
Russia quickly signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which provided for the deployment of Africa Corps trainers. In a symbolic move, Russian military personnel entered an airbase shortly after the coup while US personnel were still present. This action underlined Russia's claim to now also have a presence there. At the same time, Russia offers political backing to the Sahel military governments: in the UN and on the international stage, it blocks or waters down resolutions directed against the military governments and presents itself as the defender of the "sovereignty of African states" – in contrast to the "neo-colonial" West, according to the Russian narrative.
However, Moscow faces a challenge in 2025: with the possible loss of its military bases in Syria due to geopolitical upheaval, the supply of Russian troops in West Africa will come under pressure. The Syrian bases, in particular Tartus and Hmeimim, have long served Russia as logistical hubs for its military presence in the Sahel. Without this infrastructure, the supply of Russian military advisors, weapons deliveries and supplies to the region becomes considerably more complicated. The Russian navy must now look for alternative routes and bases in Libya or Sudan.
Russia's countermeasures to the US strategy consist primarily of propaganda and diplomatic influence. Russian media and social media channels are reinforcing the impression in West Africa that the USA is abandoning Africa and has "lost". Actors close to the Kremlin are praising Russia as a reliable partner that does not point a moral finger. Moscow is also expanding its military advice in the region. In concrete terms, this presumably means an increase in Russian arms deliveries (such as combat helicopters to Mali, radar and ammunition to Burkina Faso) and the offer of training programs for officers in Russia. The Africa Corps remains a key tool for Russia: its presence in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger shows that Moscow is prepared to offer security services as an export commodity.
However, it remains to be seen whether Russia will continue to be in demand as a partner, as the Wagner mission in Mali has made the security situation even worse. In addition, Russia wants to offer more training with the Afrika Korps in future and fewer traditional combat missions. This is due to the fact that Russia's Ministry of Defense is currently winding up the last remnants of the hybrid Wagner Group. In Mali, the corps has just replaced Wagner, and Russia also wants to officially take over the last remaining Wagner operation on the continent in the Central African Republic. The Africa Corps focuses on training and security. The Africa Corps' involvement in Burkina Faso and Niger is therefore much smaller than the Wagner operation in Mali. With training, Russia faces a lot of competition like Turkey and will therefore be less attractive for the Sahel states. Russia will continue to claim to be successful with disinformation, but it remains to be seen whether this strategy will work with a smaller involvement of the Africa Corps.
China: wait and see, economic consolidation and quiet security ambitions
China is behaving quietly but is by no means uninvolved. Beijing is primarily pursuing economic and geopolitical interests in Africa. Chinese state media interpreted the withdrawal of US troops from Niger as a sign of American weakness. Commentators emphasized that the USA had "reluctantly surrendered". Their withdrawal proves that Washington's approach in Africa has failed. China is trying to portray itself as a reliable partner that will not suddenly pull out. However, China is not openly acting as a security actor in West Africa. Instead, Beijing is concentrating on diplomatic and economic responses: China has deplored the coups (in Mali, Niger, etc.) but has never supported sanctions such as those imposed by ECOWAS against Niger.
China offers the military governments economic cooperation without political conditions. In fact, shortly after the expulsion of the French and Americans, Niger emphasized that it wanted to turn to "new friends" such as China. China is already a major buyer of Niger's uranium and oil and is investing in infrastructure. This gives Beijing influence. For example, China could supply security equipment (drones, vehicles) or expand police cooperation in exchange for raw material concessions.
China already has a naval base in East Africa (Djibouti). There is speculation that Beijing could one day also seek to establish a naval base in the Gulf of Guinea or on Africa's west coast in order to secure its trade routes. If the USA were to withdraw more strongly in the long term, this could facilitate such plans – a step that has so far been shied away from in order to avoid provoking the USA.
In the short term, China is responding primarily diplomatically and positioning itself as a potential mediator. At the same time, Beijing argues that the West's anti-terrorism efforts have neglected the root causes (poverty, development) and that China is offering support in precisely these areas with its Belt and Road Initiative. Seen in this light, China's counterproposal to the US strategy is not military, but economic: while the US is restructuring military cooperation, China has announced, for example, that it will invest more in coastal countries such as Benin and Togo, which is intended to promote their stability and naturally consolidate China's influence.
Turkey sells drones
Another winner of the Western withdrawal from the Sahel states is Turkey, which has sold drones to Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. Private Turkish security companies are training the local armies on the new drones and also offer infantry training. At the same time, Turkey is positioning itself as a new trading partner. Turkish construction companies built a new airport terminal in Niamey and the largest private hospital in Bamako. Turkish Airlines flies almost daily to the Sahel capitals and is taking advantage of Air France's flight ban in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Visa facilitations also mean that many middle-class people in the Sahel are now spending their vacations in Turkey instead of France.
Trump intra portas – Will everything be different after all?
Since taking office, US President Donald Trump has caused quite a stir in both domestic and foreign policy. The increased pressure on Ukraine to make (or rather accept) peace with Russia and the abolition of the US development aid agency USAID – with serious consequences for humanitarian aid worldwide – have shown that Trump is now trying to enforce his "America First" mantra with all his might. With regard to (West) Africa, it is not only the discontinuation of the work of USAID and other organizations such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) or the National Democratic Institute (NDI) that has security policy implications for the region. Rumors about the dissolution or restructuring of AFRICOM (Africa Command) are also causing a stir. AFRICOM was founded in 2007 and runs the US missions on the African continent from Stuttgart. The idea now being considered is to place AFRICOM under the European Command in order to reduce bureaucracy. However, it could also make it easier for Trump to withdraw US troops from Africa.
Winding down AFRICOM and reducing the US military presence in Africa would have potentially far-reaching geopolitical consequences. For years, US forces in Africa have been safeguarding US strategic interests, particularly in the fight against terrorism and to contain the influence of rival powers. Western states are increasingly losing their influence in the Sahel. Local regimes feel less tied to Western partners and in some cases are looking for alternatives.
The signal effect of an AFRICOM withdrawal should also not be neglected: many African governments are keeping a close eye on how reliable Washington's commitment is. A withdrawal could raise doubts among partners about the USA's long-term support - and encourage anti-democratic forces. Anti-Western sentiment has already increased in parts of the population, which has become evident in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The loss of prestige of the USA and Europe in the region is palpable. This development illustrates the geopolitical consequences: The West is losing influence and prestige; while competing powers and local players are gaining space.
The coming months and years will show whether the US reorientation towards the coastal states, which took place before Donald Trump took office, will continue and be successful – namely if the coastal states remain stable and the terror from the Sahel does not spread to them completely – or whether the "coup belt" will capture more countries and undermine Western partner strategies. West Africa's security remains an arena of international interests in the struggle for stability, influence and order in this strategically important region.
