Latin America’s Party Landscape Shifts to the Right

On 3 January 2026, the US government ended the rule of dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela with a military strike. This marked the symbolic beginning of the end of the decades-long “socialism of the 21st century”, which had been supported by parts of the international left, though the dictatorship itself – now without Maduro – continues to exist. However, the end of the dominance of left-leaning governments in Latin America has been emerging for some time and is now gaining additional momentum as a result of the Trump administration’s new Latin America policy. In numerous countries, right-wing populist, libertarian, conservative, or centre-right candidates have replaced previously governing left-wing presidents or secured re-election. This development follows the so-called “pink tide” of the 2000s and 2010s, during which moderate left and left-populist governments and left-wing dictatorships set the tone, leaving a lasting mark on the continent. Their networks still exist and continue to hold power in Mexico and Brazil, which are by far the most important countries in Latin America. However, new political leaders from a variety of ideological backgrounds are increasingly stepping onto the stage and are not only resonating with many voters – especially younger ones – but also making traditional political elites look outdated. Consequently, the defeat of left-wing governments does not necessarily benefit moderate parties on the centre-right. Indeed, these parties are struggling with how to position themselves between long-established socialist rivals and new political competitors on the right without diluting their own political identities.

Fig. 1: Elections (since 2022) in Latin America and the Caribbean (population > 1 million)

Election results since 2022: The right is en vogue

Of the 15 Latin American democracies under consideration here, nine countries have changed political direction since 2022 – in six cases, from left to right (i.e. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama), and in three cases, from right to left (i.e. Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay). Elections in these latter three countries were closely contested, however. In the case of Brazil and Colombia, a structural voter majority to the right of centre can even be assumed. The remaining countries recorded no shift in direction: Mexico and the Dominican Republic maintained a left-wing and a moderately right-wing government, respectively. In Paraguay, the long-standing dominance of the conservative Colorado Party continued. In Ecuador, business-friendly Daniel Noboa received a clear mandate for another term, while El Salvador confirmed its authoritarian incumbent, Nayib Bukele. Overall, conservative and right-wing forces have numerically dominated Latin America’s political leadership since 2025 for the first time in many years.

According to the Chilean pollsters at Latinobarómetro, the proportion of Latin Americans who identify as belonging to the (centre-)right has been higher since 2024 than at any point in more than two decades. Political scientists speak of a possible “conservative turn” of historic proportions that could shape a new generation – comparable with earlier regional shifts such as the military dictatorships of the 1970s, the wave of democratisation in the 1980s, the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s, and the left-leaning “pink tide” that began just over 20 years ago.¹ Conservative and right-wing populist candidates are considered strong contenders in the 2026 elections in Peru, Colombia, and Brazil, while in Costa Rica, a candidate of this type has already prevailed. If current patterns continue, a majority of right-leaning governments could emerge in the coming years.

However, Latin America remains a “pendulum continent”. Voters frequently punish incumbent governments if they are perceived to have failed, regardless as to their ideological orientation. In a sense, the protest voter is the strongest political force in the region. As Chilean analyst Jorge Sahd puts it, “The desire for change remains Latin America’s largest party”.² Many of the shifts in power cited above are the result not necessarily only of proactive support for the right, but also of protest votes against disappointing left-wing incumbents.

The spectrum of the new right: From moderate conservatives to radical populists

In Latin America, politics is heavily focused on individual leaders; thus, the choice of an individual candidate is particularly important. Current presidents to the right of centre represent a broad range of ideologies and styles, from moderate to radical.

One of the best-known figures among the new generation of Latin American leaders is Javier Milei, a libertarian economist without a traditional party base. With striking slogans and eccentric appearances – wielding a chainsaw, for example – he has channelled the anger of many Argentines. Milei stabilised an economy weakened by years of left-wing rule and subsequently also won parliamentary elections. Despite his unconventional and sometimes-abrasive style, he avoids nationalist and anti-migration rhetoric and instead calls for a radical reduction in state intervention, which impedes his categorisation as a classical right-wing populist.

By contrast, Nayib Bukele – El Salvador’s self-styled “coolest dictator in the world”³ – seeks to consolidate as much power as possible in his own hands. He is widely known across the region for his hard stance against criminal gangs and is extremely popular among many Latin Americans, skilfully cultivating the image of a self-made popular hero – primarily through social media, where his following is larger than El Salvador’s population. Evidence of Bukele’s own contacts with criminal gangs and his disregard for human rights has not diminished his support. Indeed, for many followers, results matter above all – specifically improved public security, even at the expense of democratic freedoms.

Costa Rica’s outgoing president, Rodrigo Chaves, belongs to the same group of new populists, and his like-minded successor, Laura Fernández, is expected to continue Chaves’s political legacy following a landslide victory. A highly educated former World Bank manager, Chaves disrupted the country’s party landscape in 2022 by injecting populist rhetoric into an otherwise-restrained campaign and winning as an outsider. His economic policy is conservative, while rhetorically, he seeks proximity to “ordinary people”, for example, by deliberately adopting a provincial accent. At the same time, he has repeatedly attacked democratic institutions during his presidency despite their solid reputation. With his political protégé Fernández soon to take office, right-wing populist Chaves is likely to retain significant influence over Costa Rican government policy.

Chile’s recently elected President José Antonio Kast is not a political newcomer, but as a hardliner on internal security and migration, he was able to overtake traditional right-wing parties with the new Republican Party. Unlike moderate centre-right parties, he did not distance himself from the Chilean dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet; on the contrary, he provocatively expressed sympathy with it, dominating the headlines with this taboo-breaking stance.

What these figures share is a people-focused rhetoric, sharp attacks on established parties, and media-savvy provocations – preferably via social media. While their substantive positions vary, they are commonly described as populists. Their success indicates that a significant share of the electorate are not afraid of radical alternatives and that these politicians have found ways of mobilising this potential.

Alongside them, moderate conservatives have also achieved electoral success, emphasising continuity and professionalism, with the Dominican Republic’s President Luis Abinader being a prime example. The businessman and moderate reformer replaced a corruption-plagued left-wing government in 2020 and was confirmed in office in 2024 based on an economically liberal yet socially balanced record. Similarly, Ecuador’s economically liberal President Daniel Noboa was confirmed in office in 2025 after having previously served as interim president. Seen as pragmatic rather than ideological, he has pursued a technocratic course in addressing the security crisis. After losing a referendum in autumn 2025, he moved away from his populist refusal to cooperate with traditional elites and has since worked more closely with other centre-right forces. Paraguay’s President Santiago Peña also belongs to the group of conservative politicians associated with market economics, stability, and continuity, thereby continuing the longstanding policies of the dominant Colorado Party. However, Peña has faced criticism beyond Paraguay due to weak anti-corruption efforts and his political dependence on his controversial predecessor Horacio Cartes. Bolivia’s newly elected President Rodrigo Paz likewise fits the pattern of moderate conservative leadership: Although he ran on the ticket of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in 2025, Paz is not a traditional party insider and primarily benefited from public desire for historic change after nearly twenty years of socialist MAS governments.

Moderate in both substance and style, these conservatives differ clearly from the more strident populists by emphasising institutional solutions, seeking broad social consensus, and standing for economic expertise with a free-market approach. Their success reveals that the shift to the right is not solely an expression of anger and protest; rather, it is also driven by a desire for pragmatic leadership and predictability.

Shared features of right-leaning presidents: Security, economic growth, and a rejection of socialism

Despite their differences, whether moderate or radical, conservative and right-wing populist presidents are perceived by voters as being highly competent in similar policy areas. First and foremost, they stand for law and order. Tough measures against crime, corruption, and chaos have been promised by the winning candidates in almost every campaign. These presidents are also united by a market-oriented outlook that undoubtedly resonates particularly with the private sector but that can additionally offer hope of a better life through economic prosperity to voters who are not themselves entrepreneurs. Finally, the new right present themselves as defenders of conservative social values (family, religion, and national identity) against progressive cultural agendas of which many voters are tired. Kast, for example, waged a culture war against abortion and “gender ideology”, while even an unideological pragmatist such as Bukele positions himself as an anti-woke role model in the regional debate.

Beyond these policy areas, another shared characteristic is evident: Pragmatism outweighs dogmatism. After decades in which right-wing politics was often equated with a neoliberal, elite-driven agenda and with cuts to social provision, many representatives of the new right now present themselves as being deliberately people-oriented and flexible, thereby showing that they have learned from mistakes made by conservatives in the past. One example is that these representatives seek to avoid being perceived as being cold-hearted towards the poor. “The right used to be seen as heartless – that’s no longer the case”, comments Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. “The left may still enjoy a credibility advantage on social justice, but it is not what it once was”.⁴

Right-wing parties have found their lowest common denominator in their uncompromising stance towards the traditional left. In their respective countries, they agree on the goal of breaking the dominance of the parties of the “Pink Galaxy”⁵ – that is, networks of parties on the subcontinent ranging from social democratic to left-authoritarian that were organised and coordinated through the Foro de São Paulo and the Grupo de Puebla. In addition to the left-wing dictatorships in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, the only prominent representative of the moderate left still in office is Brazil’s 80-year-old Lula da Silva. Other current left-wing presidents who might be associated with this network – such as Yamandú Orsi in Uruguay and Gustavo Petro in Colombia – are nowhere near as politically influential. As such, the real political and social momentum for change in Latin America no longer comes from the left as it once did, but from the right.

The dilemma facing centrist parties: Distance or rapprochement?

The stark polarisation between left and right in recent years has pushed above all the moderate, traditional parties of the centre and centre-right onto the defensive. Many of these parties – such as long-established Christian democratic and conservative parties that were once able to appeal to large segments of society  – have lost visibility in election campaigns and performed poorly as a result because they have been unable to offer either radical change or an appealing vision capable of matching that of the noisier populists. These moderate forces face the challenge of how to deal with populist outsiders without losing their own profile. Latin America’s centre-right parties are pursuing a range of different strategies in order to adapt to the new political realities.

One prominent example is Brazil, where the party landscape has become increasingly polarised into two camps. Caught between a strong left-wing bloc led by President Lula da Silva and a right-nationalist camp centred on Jair Bolsonaro, moderate parties have for years been struggling internally and with one another to find the right course and are constantly testing how best to position themselves between the two poles. The 2026 election year promises to be highly competitive. Despite his advanced age, the left’s figurehead, Lula da Silva, is running again in 2026, while Jair Bolsonaro’s son Flávio has also thrown his hat into the ring. While Flávio does not command the same following as his father, a run-off place as the strongest representative of a divided right remains possible. This means that Brazil could once again face an electoral scenario in which a structural voter majority exists to the right of centre – as local⁶ and regional⁷ results suggest – while the national government is led by the left.

In Argentina and Chile, moderate conservative parties have chosen a path of cooperation with their radical competitors. There are differences in tone and style, but also a substantial policy overlap along with the common goal of bringing the left-wing bloc to an end at the ballot box. Mainstream parties such as Propuesta Republicana (PRO) in Argentina along with Renovación Nacional and Unión Demócrata Independiente in Chile have paid a high price for the success of this cooperation. They have lost votes and a clear-cut profile, while in the case of PRO, more and more leading figures have drifted towards Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza. Tactically, they now find themselves in an awkward position: If the government performs well, they will continue to lose voters to the president’s party, whereas if the president fails, voters will punish them along with the president.

In the 2025 elections in Honduras, Bolivia, and Ecuador, moderate conservatives emerged as winners. In all three cases, voters delivered a clear rejection of left-wing political projects in the mould of “socialism of the 21st century”. Nevertheless, there were differences compared with traditional mainstream parties and election campaigns in other countries. It was not until 2021 that Daniel Noboa founded the Acción Democrática Nacional party in Ecuador: With a massive online campaign that often pushed the boundaries of democratic decency, the ADN responded to the populist attacks of socialist challenger Luisa González. In Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz unexpectedly prevailed in the run-off. He campaigned for a “capitalism for all” with social safeguards, but a deciding factor in his victory was his campaign partner, Edman “Capitán” Lara⁸: A former police captain, Lara promised to tackle crime using tough rhetoric and a well-orchestrated social media campaign.

Mexico does not fit the common pattern, for the left-populist Movimiento de Renovación Nacional (Morena) not only won the 2018 elections with presidential candidate López Obrador, but also further consolidated itself as a strong left-wing force with Claudia Sheinbaum’s victory in 2024. Unlike in the rest of Latin America, the centre-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) entered an electoral alliance in 2024 with its social democratic rival, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). They fielded a businesswoman of indigenous background, Xóchitl Gálvez, in the hope that a female candidate who is closely connected to ordinary citizens would bring fresh momentum to the campaign. It was a resounding failure. Voters’ distrust in the established “old parties” was too great: They viewed the “grand centre” alliance of the former rivals PRI and PAN not as a solution, but rather as an act of desperation. Since the rise of Morena, numerous party defections have followed, with the PRI losing far more than the PAN.

As in Europe, the central problem for mainstream parties lies in the strategic question of rapprochement or distancing – both in forming electoral alliances and in political communication, particularly when adopting populist elements. Rapprochement can secure power in the short term but carries the risk of a loss of one’s own profile and an erosion of one’s identity. Cooperation with radical forces may have brought down the left, as in Argentina and Chile, but it has marginalised the moderate partners. By contrast, distancing preserves credibility but carries the risk of political irrelevance. Alliances with political adversaries – as in Mexico – are not a viable solution, either. Adopting populist styles of mobilisation – such as aggressive rhetoric and social media campaigns – may increase visibility but undermines the normative foundations of moderate parties. The challenge is to develop an attractive, independent vision of reform and stability grounded in democratic principles that is perceived neither as outdated or ineffective nor as a copy of populist extremes. If traditional parties reduce themselves to the role of mere majority-makers for radical forces, they will ultimately make themselves redundant. The same applies if they fail to adapt to the new spirit of the times – particularly in candidate selection and political communication. In this context, it will be worth watching the performance of right-wing populist outsider and self-styled “celebrity lawyer” Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia. In the upcoming campaign, he is positioning himself against both the traditional right and the unsuccessful incumbent left, seeking to draw votes from both camps.

The prevailing mood is shifting rightwards – Politically volatile and unburdened by taboos

One striking feature of the recent political shift is the role of first-time and younger voters. In many Latin American countries, the younger generation has shown no hesitation in supporting right-wing or anti-establishment candidates. On the contrary: In some cases, young voters even form the largest support base for these politicians. This situation points to a shift in the political mood: The progressive-left ideal of renewal that prevailed ten or 15 years ago has lost its appeal to many young people; instead, they are now more open to previously untested, sometimes-taboo-breaking solutions. This trend was confirmed by a survey conducted in November 2025 by AtlasIntel and Bloomberg in Brazil, Latin America’s most populous country. According to the survey, more than half of those under 40 place themselves politically on the right or centre-right, while older cohorts lean slightly to the left.⁹ Many do not define themselves primarily by ideology but want tangible improvements in everyday issues such as employment, security, and the cost of living. A key background factor here is that young Latin Americans have no direct memory of right-wing military dictatorships, including the emotionally charged democratic transition of the 1980s. Instead, they have witnessed numerous corruption scandals, economic collapse, and often also social stagnation, all of which have largely occurred under established, mostly left-wing governing parties. This situation has led to a different political socialisation of the younger generation. Trust in traditional institutions and parties has been deeply shaken, thereby making anti-establishment rhetoric by political outsiders more persuasive. Social media plays a key role in mobilising volatile voter groups, especially young people. Traditional campaign methods are receding, while political success now increasingly depends on mastering digital platforms: namely emotionally charged, easily digestible messages that capture the quickly evolving zeitgeist and that are amplified by algorithms. Regardless of their political orientation, the winners of recent elections have all understood and applied this dynamic better than their more sluggish opponents.

The right-leaning mood is also being reinforced by a new US policy towards Latin America. All Latin American governments to the right of centre share a desire for a positive relationship with the current US administration. This is hardly surprising given that Washington recently announced its intent to actively support like-minded political forces in the Western Hemisphere, to expand trade relations, and to stabilise Latin American countries in line with its own interests. This intent has already become clear in two cases: During recent parliamentary elections in Argentina and the presidential elections in Honduras, Donald Trump publicly expressed a preferred outcome and threatened consequences if voters failed to follow his call. Despite concerns about the confrontational style of the US president, the new right-leaning governments are reacting pragmatically: They have determined that proximity offers more opportunities than risks. Fears of a possible end to the multilateral order are giving way both to a results-oriented approach and to shared market-oriented goals. This situation is also reflected in surveys: According to the Mexican polling institute Áltica, a majority of people in the nine surveyed Latin American countries support the US military strike in Venezuela and the arrest of dictator Maduro.¹⁰ This is not without reason: Indeed, millions of Venezuelans who have been forced to flee hunger, repression, and a lack of prospects have recounted in host countries across the region the disastrous consequences of socialist experiments. Their dramatic fate has repeatedly been cited by right-of-centre politicians as clear evidence warning against left-wing policies. At the same time, even moderate figures on the left have hesitated to condemn the regime in Caracas, thereby undermining their own credibility when speaking about democracy, human rights, and the achievements of left-wing policies.

Latin America has recently experienced a noticeable shift to the right. In any case, the political discourse has shifted: Conservative buzzwords such as freedom, security, and order are once again dominant, whereas progressive terms such as justice, inclusion, and participation previously prevailed. Fuelled by disappointment with the left, whose policies have often contributed to crises themselves, space is opening up for new actors – from radical libertarians and conservatives focused on traditional values to moderate technocrats. They now have the opportunity to bring about a lasting political shift in Latin America and to overcome the dominance of an ideologically exhausted left. Whether this rightward shift will bring lasting improvements in governance or remain just another episode in the subcontinent’s historical pendulum will depend on how effectively the new governments deliver – and on how strongly they uphold democratic principles. Against this backdrop, traditional centre-right parties should proactively defend the democratic constitutional order not only out of conviction, but also in order to remain politically relevant.

– translated from German –

Henning Suhr is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Party Dialogue and Democracy in Latin America, based in Montevideo.

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