1. Introduction
Ali al-Zaidi took the constitutional oath on 14 May 2026 in an unusual moment in the history of Iraqi politics. Parliament had just confirmed 14 ministers of a cabinet designed to number 23.[i] The war between the United States/Israel and Iran had led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz – the route through which Iraq sells the bulk of its oil, cutting state revenues to a fraction of their usual level. And the man taking the oath, a 40-year-old banker and businessman, had been in politics for 17 days.
On his way into office, al-Zaidi’s lack of a political base appears to have worked in his favour. After more than five months of deadlock following the November 2025 elections, and after Washington had made it unmistakably clear that it would not accept the return of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Shi’a Coordination Framework (SCF) settled on the candidate least likely to provoke opposition, both domestically and from key external actors – the US and Iran. Whether the quality that made him electable also makes him capable of governing is a different question and, three months in, seems to depend on the policy area.
The report therefore tests the argument domain by domain, looking at the key domestic files of militia disarmament and anti-corruption, the foreign policy balancing act between Washington, Tehran and Iraq’s neighbours, as well as the economy, where the war has produced the most acute emergency of the young premiership. Any assessment this early in a term is necessarily provisional; what can already be discerned, however, is a pattern taking shape.
2. A Fraught Government Formation
The results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections of 11 November 2025 might have promised continuity rather than change. Then Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Alliance emerged as the strongest single list, and the largest bloc – with the constitutional right to nominate the prime minister – was once again assembled under the umbrella of the SCF. More than five months then passed during which the Framework proved unable to agree on a candidate, while al-Sudani stayed on in a caretaker capacity.[ii] The constitutional sequence of government formation dragged on accordingly, with parliament electing a speaker only at the end of December and the presidency being decided in mid-April – the precondition for naming a prime minister-designate at all.[iii] Two external developments eventually changed the negotiations’ arithmetic, namely the outbreak of the war at the end of February, which turned the vacancy at the top of the state from an inconvenience into a liability, and the increasingly undisguised US involvement.
For much of the deadlock, the contest had a name. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister from 2006 to 2014, had emerged as the SCF’s candidate, before Washington made his exclusion a strict condition given his proximity to Iran, openly blocking Iraq’s choice for prime minister. The SCF had no real choice but to accept it; a clear sign of how much Washington still shapes Baghdad’s politics, and how much pressure the Framework was under to form a government at last.
The name the SCF eventually produced on 27 April was one few had expected. Ali Falih Kadhim al-Zaidi was tasked by President Nizar Amidi with forming a government within the constitutional 30-day window, making him the youngest Prime Minister of Iraq.[iv] On 14 May, parliament confirmed 14 of the 19 ministers he put forward, against a cabinet planned for 23; the rejections cut across Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish blocs alike, and the sensitive interior and defence portfolios were left unfilled.[v] Reporting on the negotiations points to an informal, cross-sectarian alignment between two Shi’a factions, one Sunni party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) as the main supporters of the ministers who did get through to cabinet. Those who lost out were two established power centres – Nouri al-Maliki’s faction and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) – whose nominees failed or withdrew under pressure.[vi] The compromise that produced al-Zaidi as prime minister, in other words, did not extend to the government he was tasked with building.
3. Domestic Policy Ambitions vs.
Power Arrangements
Prime Minister al-Zaidi thus finds himself with a somewhat shaky political foundation. Having been nominated and supported by the SCF, while at the same time facing opposition from SCF heavyweights such as al-Maliki and his supporters, al-Zaidi is facing a delicate balancing act in trying to fill the remaining slots in his cabinet, without crossing limits set out by the US administration in terms of Iran-affiliated members of government. As such, the challenges are indicative of the political complexities the new prime minister is faced with and that will shape his work across his stated policy priorities.
3.1 Militia Disarmament
Disarmament of the powerful militias in Iraq has crystallised as one of al-Zaidi’s priorities. While previous prime ministers have tried and failed to rein in Iran-affiliated militias, the pressure on al-Zaidi to do so both domestically and from external partners has reached an unprecedented level in the context of the US/Israeli war against Iran. Iran-affiliated Iraqi militias have repeatedly joined the conflict at the behest of Iran, attacking US military installations in Iraq, the Gulf States, and Jordan, but also targeting Iraqi security forces and civilian infrastructure inside the country. While the Iraqi government under then Prime Minister al-Sudani strongly condemned the attacks, it had little leverage to force the militias to stand down – a clear sovereignty issue. Having amassed substantial amounts of military, political, and economic power in the post-2003 Iraqi system, militias continue to heavily shape security and political outcomes in Iraq. They are, paradoxically, armed actors outside of state control while at the same time being deeply embedded in the system through security structures, political representation, and economic endeavours.
Al-Zaidi’s renewed efforts to disarm militias thus signal an attempt to reassert state control – even if partly driven by external pressures. The stated timeline for disarmament is 30 September 2026, coinciding with the withdrawal of the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve military presence from Iraq. Discussion around disarmament started in al-Zaidi’s early days as Prime Minister, after popular Shi’a leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced the dissolution of his militia Saraya al-Salam, followed shortly after by the leaders of “resistance” militias Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Imam Ali – both designated by the US as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs). The latter seem to seek acceptance as legitimate political actors and an end to their international isolation, even if this requires compromising their longstanding “resistance” identity. Some of the most hardline factions, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have firmly rejected any calls for disarmament, however.
And even the first steps towards disarmament of the groups that had signalled their willingness have been fraught with challenges and setbacks, underscoring both the limited capacity of state institutions to enforce disarmament and the inability of political leaders within these movements to secure the full cooperation of their armed wings. Experts point to another issue: integration into state institutions does not automatically translate into allegiance to the state. Formal incorporation may change organisational structures, but it does not necessarily alter underlying loyalties or command relationships.[vii] Moreover, with the advancing disarmament process, political actors with armed groups are likely to increase pressure if their influence or economic advantages are at risk, which could substantively threaten al-Zaidi’s shaky political base.
Further adding complexity is the renewed escalation between the US and Iran, with militias having restarted attacks on Gulf neighbours – and US-Saudi strikes on militia positions in retaliation. Militias have used the latter to bolster their case against disarmament and threaten retaliation – showing defiance towards any such plans. Statements from political actors, however, signal support for al-Zaidi’s agenda, hoping to avoid further escalation and protect Iraqi sovereignty.
Given the plethora of challenges and setbacks in advancing militia disarmament and state integration against the tight 30 September deadline, many questions remain. Can al-Zaidi stay the course despite mounting pressures? What happens once the deadline passes, on the Iraqi government’s side and on the US side? And fundamentally, is militia disarmament and state integration even possible without a fundamental restructuring of Iraq’s political order? All the while, the disarmament file presents an important credibility test for the new prime minister.
3.2 Anti-Corruption
The second priority issue, which has proven at least as difficult to combat, is tackling the endemic corruption woven into Iraq’s political, economic and administrative system. With the backing of Faiq Zaidan, the powerful President of the Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq, al-Zaidi early in his premiership launched an ambitious anti-corruption campaign. The campaign received widespread attention with “Operation Dawn” in late June, during which the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) descended on Baghdad’s Green Zone and several provinces and arrested more than 20 government officials and legislators, including two deputy oil ministers and several members of parliament, while seizing more than USD 100 million in cash and assets. Although the operation earned al-Zaidi praise in Western capitals and from the Iraqi public, it also drew criticism from domestic political actors. The arrests targeted a network of politicians and vested interests, particularly in the energy sector, with prominent detainees from the Sunni party Azm Alliance and former Prime Minister al-Sudani’s networks.
Despite early scepticism, the campaign has kept its momentum – albeit in a less dramatic fashion – and has expanded to include further political actors. This includes figures from within the SCF as well as figures related to Iran-affiliated groups, in a clear effort to counter criticism of the campaign sparing certain factions. While no faction is openly opposing the campaign out of fear of the associated political costs, actors are trying to limit the impacts on their networks. Notable support for the campaign was voiced by influential Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. This has been noted with concern by SCF leaders, who fear that their influence over al-Zaidi might be weakened in case of a political alignment with al-Sadr – adding to concerns over the prime minister’s close association with the judiciary.
Seeking to sustain public support and to enhance legitimacy for al-Zaidi beyond traditional political camps, the campaign is presented as a broader institutional effort, with the recovery of public funds highlighted as an important component. A key question in this regard will be how the government and judiciary will apply the General Amnesty Law to individuals who agree to return public funds. If seen as creating a loophole for influential actors to buy their way out, the credibility and public support for the campaign might quickly wane.
Beyond the next steps and implementation challenges, it will be important to watch the campaign’s implications for the current government set-up as well as for the broader political landscape. With parliamentary seats and senior ministerial posts having to be re-allocated, and with several factions having been weakened through arrests, the political representation in Iraq’s complex power arrangement system might see a broader shift – and could provide an opportunity for al-Zaidi to bolster his political base. At the same time, the credibility and chances of success for this renewed anti-corruption effort depend on it not turning into a politically motivated targeting of individuals but a broad reform challenging institutionalised corruption – a tall order.
Taken together, militia disarmament and anti-corruption are the two most consequential domestic political tests facing al-Zaidi’s government. Both challenges are deeply embedded in Iraq’s political order and intertwined with the very institutions and power networks they seek to reform. Beyond their domestic significance, the two portfolios are closely tied to Iraq’s foreign relations, as progress on disarmament will be watched by the US and Arab neighbours, while anti-corruption efforts are key to strengthening state institutions and attracting external investment.
4. Balancing Foreign Relations between Competing Poles
Iraq’s foreign relations since 2003 have been characterised by a delicate balance between its two main partners – the US and Iran – as well as fluctuating, often strained, relations with its Arab neighbours. This balancing act has reached a new level of complexity against the backdrop of heightened US pressure on Iraq to distance itself from Iran as well as added strain with its neighbours in the context of the regional escalation.
4.1 Iraq-US Relations: Between Promise and Pressure
Having played a key role in the emergence of al-Zaidi as compromise candidate, the US from the outset had high expectations for his premiership. Within days of his nomination, al-Zaidi received an invitation to Washington. Al-Zaidi’s trip to Washington in mid-July then marked his first foreign visit – breaking with the tradition of visiting regional partners first and signalling the importance placed in US-Iraq relations.
US foreign policy towards Iraq is squarely placed within the context of its broader Iran policy, with the objective of limiting Iran’s regional influence. This is evident in both the disarmament file and efforts to bolster economic ties with Iraq. Beyond business opportunities for American companies, the focus on the energy sector aims to reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian gas exports.
For Iraq, the goal appears to be finally shifting the partnership from security to economic cooperation, particularly after the departure of the remaining US troops. During al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington, accompanied by a delegation of ministers and business leaders, 48 agreements and memoranda of understanding worth more than USD 60 billion were reportedly signed. Many are energy-related but also cover fields such as satellite internet and pharmaceuticals.[viii] The crux of the matter, however, will be whether al-Zaidi can ensure implementation this time around.
Undercutting al-Zaidi’s efforts to paint a picture of Iraq as a safe investment destination were the militia attacks on the Kurdistan Region during his visit, clearly illustrating persistent challenges related to militia disarmament and operational safety for US companies in Iraq. The attacks and related critical rhetoric during al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington also showcase mixed reactions by Iraqi actors to seeking closer ties, with “resistance” actors warning of “trading military occupation for economic occupation”.[ix] The SCF, on the other hand, endorsed the visit’s outcomes.
4.2 Iraq-Iran Relations: Holding onto Influence
As Iraq’s second key partner, Iran’s reaction to al-Zaidi’s US visit took a strong tone: An adviser to Iran’s leadership criticised the visit as ill-timed, harmful to Iraq and a “disgrace”, while also calling the prime minister “inexperienced”.[x] Although the Iranian Foreign Minister later distanced the government from these remarks, it nevertheless shows how delicate the balancing act between the two main external poles of influence has become. Iran, which sees Iraq as its premier theatre of regional influence, watches with concern as al-Zaidi moves towards a closer relationship with the US and is clearly set on maintaining its political, economic and military influence in Iraq.
Contributing to Iranian frustration is the fact that al-Zaidi visited Tehran only after his trip to the US. One of the main objectives of the visit was therefore likely to reassure Iran of the continuing close relationship despite efforts to align more closely with Washington. The agenda of the visit on 23 July included bilateral cooperation on trade, energy, and transportation as well as regional developments, and resulted in the signing of several economic agreements. Discussions reportedly also covered two contentious issues: Iraq’s demand that Iran guarantee safe passage for Iraqi oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s demand for payment of USD 11 billion in outstanding gas-export debts.[xi] Neither of these points seems to have been resolved, however: Iran reportedly rejected a formal agreement exempting Iraqi oil tankers from restrictions, while al-Zaidi’s offer to cover part of the debt through an indirect payment via Saudi Arabia was likewise turned down.
4.3 Shaky Steps to Rebuild Trust and Cooperation with Arab Neighbours
Another key foreign relations portfolio for al-Zaidi is repairing relations with Iraq’s neighbours, particularly the Gulf States and Jordan, which have come under attack from Iran-affiliated militias from Iraq. The fragility of this effort was demonstrated on 27 July, just a few days before the Iraqi prime minister’s planned visit to Riyadh. In response to earlier militia attacks on Saudi oil facilities, joint Saudi-US airstrikes hit targets across Iraq, causing at least 20 casualties. Not surprisingly, the visit was cancelled – without a new date in sight.[xii] This puts al-Zaidi in a difficult position, as it highlights Iraq’s continued use as a launchpad for attacks against its neighbours by actors outside state control. At the same time, the Saudi-US strikes threaten to derail his disarmament efforts by fuelling criticism of his inability to protect Iraq from external attacks, a challenge compounded by Trump’s public claim that the strikes had been coordinated with al-Zaidi.[xiii]
Before this latest escalation, cautious first signs of rebuilding ties were visible; from the Gulf States’ and Jordan’s positive reaction following al-Zaidi’s disarmament announcement, to diplomatic visits and exchanges on economic cooperation. Given Iraq’s financial and economic woes, such a rapprochement and the investment it promises are badly needed. The US is also pushing Iraq in this direction as part of efforts to develop energy infrastructure that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. To make this happen, however, al-Zaidi will have to show clear progress in reining in the militias threatening Iraq’s neighbours.
With Iraqi-Gulf relations strained, Syria has increasingly emerged as an important foreign policy option. Iraqi-Syrian relations have recently gained momentum across a range of policy fields, strongly encouraged by the US, which seeks to strengthen alignment among partners countering Iranian influence.[1] It is therefore no surprise that an agreement on a pipeline connecting Iraqi oil fields to the Syrian port of Baniyas was announced during al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington.
Taken together, the three months since al-Zaidi took office suggest that foreign policy is where his unusual profile might serve him best. A prime minister without a faction is also a prime minister without a faction’s foreign patrons to answer to, and he has used this leeway in an attempt to rebalance Iraq’s foreign relationships between its main external poles and regional partners. He is, nevertheless, not insulated from the pressure by the US and Iran, or from established mechanisms of influence in Iraq, which could drag him into the same quagmires his predecessors faced.
5. Economy: A Rentier State Cut Off from Its Rent
Nowhere are the limits of his room for manoeuvre more concrete than in the economy, where the war’s impact has been most immediate. Before February 2026, Iraq was exporting around 4.2 million barrels of oil per day, almost all of it through the Strait of Hormuz. By May, exports had fallen to about 1.45 million barrels per day.[xiv] The effect on public finances was immediate. Oil accounts for more than 90% of state revenue – the basis for public sector salaries and government spending – yet monthly oil income in April and May averaged only about one-seventh of its 2025 level.[xv]
5.1 Governing Without a Budget
Iraq entered the war without a budget and will likely end the year without one. The three-year framework covering 2023-2025 expired without a 2026 draft being submitted.[xvi] In early June, the parliamentary finance committee effectively ruled out the passage of a 2026 budget; the government now plans to submit a 2027 draft to parliament in October or November.[xvii] In the meantime, the state operates under the “one-twelfth” rule, which caps monthly spending at a twelfth of the last approved budget, while a proposed stop-gap budget of 20 to 30 trillion dinars intended to keep offices running awaits parliamentary approval.
That the state has nonetheless kept paying its bills – above all a monthly wage and pension bill of around USD 5.3 billion – is largely due to the Central Bank of Iraq. Since the closure of Hormuz, the government has financed itself through indirect borrowing against the bank’s foreign reserves, alongside a marked expansion of currency issuance. Yet the limits of this approach are becoming clear. Iraq recorded a deficit of around USD 5 billion in the first four months of the year, and at the end of July the government publicly conceded that salaries would henceforth depend on available liquidity rather than the calendar.[xviii]
What the emergency squeezes out entirely is investment. Even in normal years, wages and pensions absorb well over half of federal spending, with cuts to development projects serving as the default adjustment whenever oil receipts fall.[xix] Under the one-twelfth regime, new projects cannot be launched, ongoing ones are protected only on paper, and delayed payments are spilling into the private sector. The absence of a budget effectively suspends the previous government’s infrastructure and services agenda while creating a backlog of obligations that the 2027 budget must absorb before funding any of al-Zaidi’s priorities.
5.2 Energy: Exports, Electricity and the American Opening
Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the government has sought alternative export routes for its vital oil sector, such as the recently reopened northern pipeline to Türkiye, now Iraq’s main oil export artery.[xx] Smaller volumes have moved by truck to Syria and Jordan, while longer-term options ranging from a Basra–Aqaba line to a link towards the Gulf of Oman are being studied.[xxi] None of this replaces the Strait of Hormuz, however. Even at target, the northern system would carry just under a fifth of pre-war volumes.
The second energy front is domestic, and the one most acutely felt by Iraqis. The country entered the summer with generation capacity of about 29 gigawatts against projected peak demand of roughly 40, the widest gap in years, after the war compounded existing weaknesses.[xxii] Safety shutdowns cut the gas production that fuels power plants, while Iranian deliveries fell sharply, forcing the government to buy power from Türkiye and the Kurdistan Region.[xxiii]
The economic dimension of al-Zaidi’s Washington visit belongs in this picture as well. The agreements signed – with the oil minister suggesting that the energy component alone could reach USD 200 billion in investments – amount at their core to an expansion of US commercial involvement in the energy sector.[xxiv] Two qualifications are important. First, most of the agreements are non-binding. Memoranda of understanding are not final investment decisions, and their implementation will depend heavily on security conditions, particularly the restraint of armed groups. Second, the dollar channels now being reopened have themselves recently been used as a source of pressure when Washington temporarily withheld currency shipments to Baghdad.[xxv]
The economic file thus offers the report’s sharpest, and most asymmetric, answer to its guiding question. In day-to-day crisis management, the absence of a political base has been largely irrelevant and occasionally liberating: central bank financing, export rerouting, emergency power purchases and memoranda with Washington are all executive tools that al-Zaidi can deploy without servicing a coalition. Yet each merely buys time.
Reserves deplete; memoranda must become contracts, and contracts need laws, land and security guarantees; a 2027 budget must eventually pass a parliament in which the prime minister commands not a single vote of his own, while each passing day with electricity cuts in scorching summer heat increases the risk of popular frustrations turning into protests.
6. Outlook
After three months, a consistent pattern appears to emerge across policy fields. Al-Zaidi’s lack of a political base has not hindered him in areas where authority lies with the executive, such as crisis finance, foreign relations and the anti-corruption campaign supported by the judiciary, but it has left him exposed wherever political support must be assembled.
The coming months will bring important tests for al-Zaidi’s agenda, foremost among them the 30 September 2026 deadline for confining weapons to the state. Here, the yardstick matters as much as the deadline. Measured against full disarmament, the government may fail to achieve its goals, as the factions are too deeply embedded in the security services, the economy and parliament itself to be dissolved by a date. A narrower measure is more revealing; that is, whether Baghdad can steadily reduce the ability of armed groups to launch attacks, threaten neighbouring states and act outside state control. By that standard, the government will have pushed further institutionally than its predecessors.
Two relationships deserve particular attention in the months ahead. The first is al-Zaidi’s relationship with the judiciary, which is closely linked to his anti-corruption campaign and serves as a substitute for the parliamentary base al-Zaidi lacks. The second is Washington. The external pressure that has enabled much of the domestic agenda is also its greatest liability, and the US administration’s support may matter more for the outcome than any Iraqi actor’s preference.
Whether al-Zaidi can carry the foreign policy agenda while the domestic and economic files consume his attention is ultimately a question of political bandwidth: nearly everything he has secured abroad – investment memoranda, export routes, the Damascus opening – becomes durable only if the domestic files move as well. Iraqi political history counsels caution in this regard. Governments in Baghdad have repeatedly begun with reformist ambition only to see those ambitions absorbed by the very structures they promised to change. Little in the past three months suggests those structures have fundamentally shifted. What has changed, however, is the context: a war economy that has disrupted the ordinary distribution of rents, an American administration willing to wield its leverage openly, and a Shi’a house visibly divided over the future of its armed wings. Whether this combination, and the surprise candidate turned prime minister, produces a genuine turning point or another cycle of unfulfilled reform rhetoric is the question the coming year will answer.
[1] The notable US pressure for closer Iraqi-Turkish ties follows the same logic.
[i] The National: Ali Al Zaidi sworn in as Iraq’s PM after parliament endorses most of his cabinet picks, 14.5.2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/05/14/iraqi-parliament-votes-on-thursday-in-key-step-towards-installing-government/ (last accessed: 11.8.2026).
[ii] FDD’s Long War Journal: Iraq forms new government with only 14 of 23 ministers, 15.5.2026. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/05/iraq-forms-new-government-with-only-14-of-23-ministers.php (last accessed: 30.7.2026).
[iii] ORSAM: What Iraq’s new government under Zaidi reveals, 2026. https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/what-iraqs-new-government-under-zaidi-reveals/ (last accessed: 30.7.2026).
[iv] bne IntelliNews: Iraq’s President tasks Ali Al-Zaidi with forming new government, 28.4.2026. https://www.intellinews.com/iraq-s-president-tasks-ali-al-zaidi-with-forming-new-government-439908/ (last accessed: 11.8.2026).
[v] ORSAM: What Iraq’s new government under Zaidi reveals; EPIC – Enabling Peace in Iraq Center: ISHM 543: May 14–21, 2026. https://enablingpeace.org/ishm543/ (last accessed: 11.8.2026).
[vi] Amwaj.media: Iraq’s new premier navigates emerging fissures between political blocs, 19.5.2026. https://amwaj.media/en/article/iraqs-new-premier-navigates-emerging-fissures-between-political-blocs (last accessed: 2.8.2026); The New Arab: From guns to power: The reinvention of Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, 25.6.2026. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/guns-power-reinvention-iraqs-asaib-ahl-al-haq (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[vii] Chatham House: Can Iraq’s new prime minister finally rein in its armed factions?, 6.2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/can-iraqs-new-prime-minister-finally-rein-its-armed-factions (last accessed: 5.8.2026).
[viii] Roya Development Group 2026. RDG Political Insights, Issue 252, July 19, 2026, p.7.
[ix] Al-Monitor: Renewed Iraq attacks test Zaidi’s push to disarm Iran-backed militias, 7.2026. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/renewed-iraq-attacks-test-zaidis-push-disarm-iran-backed-militias (last accessed: 5.8.2026).
[x] Asharq Al-Awsat: Iran, Iraqi factions criticize al-Zaidi’s Washington visit, 19.7.2026. https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5297623-iran-iraqi-factions-criticize-al-zaidi’s-washington-visit (last accessed: 5.8.2026).
[xi] Alhurra: Exclusive: Tehran pressed al-Zaidi to pay 11 billion US dollars in gas debt, 2026. https://alhurra.com/en/29347 (last accessed: 5.8.2026).
[xii] Roya Development Group 2026. Snap Analysis ”KSA-US Strikes Complicate Zaidi’s Balancing Act”, Edition 46, July 30, 2026, p.2.
[xiii] Roya Development Group 2026. Snap Analysis ”KSA-US Strikes Complicate Zaidi’s Balancing Act”, Edition 46, July 30, 2026, p.2.
[xiv] The National: Iraq secures energy deals worth 200 billion US dollars during Prime Minister Al Zaidi’s US visit, 22.7.2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/07/22/iraq-secured-energy-deals-worth-200bn-during-prime-minister-al-zaidis-us-visit/ (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xv] Van Heuvelen, Ben / Hussein, Mohammed: Iraq leans on central bank reserves to weather oil export collapse, Iraq Oil Report, 22.6.2026. https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/iraq-leans-on-central-bank-reserves-to-weather-oil-export-collapse-47857/ (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xvi] AGBI: Iraq considers mini-budget to keep country running, 16.6.2026. https://www.agbi.com/economy/2026/06/iraq-considers-mini-budget-to-keep-country-running/ (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xvii] Shafaq News: Delayed 2026 budget pushes Iraq toward 2027 plan, 25.6.2026. https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Delayed-2026-budget-pushes-Iraq-toward-2027-plan (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xviii] AGBI: Expect salary delays with Iraq in “liquidity crisis”, says official, 31.7.2026. https://www.agbi.com/economy/2026/07/expect-salary-delays-with-iraq-in-liquidity-crisis-says-official/ (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xix] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Facing fiscal pressures: Iraq’s struggle for reform ahead of the 2025 election, 18.9.2025. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/facing-fiscal-pressures-iraqs-struggle-reform-ahead-2025-election (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xx] Associated Press: Iraq says it will resume oil exports from the Kurdish region after a halt of more than two years, 26.9.2025. https://www.marketbeat.com/articles/iraq-says-it-will-resume-oil-exports-from-the-kurdish-region-after-a-halt-of-more-than-2-years-2025-09-26 (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xxi] EnergyNow: Alternative routes for Middle East oil and gas due to Hormuz disruption, 23.4.2026. https://energynow.com/2026/04/alternative-routes-for-middle-east-oil-and-gas-due-to-hormuz-disruption/ (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xxii] Shafaq News: Iraq power 2026: War on Iran collapses the grid’s last defenses ahead of peak summer, 7.5.2026. https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-power-2026-war-on-Iran-collapses-the-grid-s-last-defenses-ahead-of-peak-summer (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xxiii] Middle East Forum: Iraq’s delayed Gulf Cooperation Council power link deepens summer electricity risks, 19.5.2026. https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/iraqs-delayed-gulf-cooperation-council-power-link-deepens-summer-electricity-risks (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xxiv] Arab News: How decades of instability, dependence on Iranian gas hollowed out Iraq’s power sector, 8.6.2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2646442 (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
[xxv] Reuters: US blocks Iraq’s dollar shipments to squeeze Iran-backed militias, WSJ reports, 22.4.2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-blocks-iraqs-dollar-shipments-squeeze-iran-backed-militias-wsj-reports-2026-04-22/ (last accessed: 2.8.2026).
