Fifteen years after the 2011 Arab Spring, conditions across the region have changed drastically. The promises of positive change for ordinary citizens in the early 2010s have largely receded into systems that, for the most part, resemble the political systems that existed before the uprisings. Yet, much has also changed: the horrific attacks by the terrorist organization Hamas against Israel on October 7, 2023 and the Israeli military campaign that followed have had vast spillover effects. Israel has carried out military strikes on a half dozen countries across the region over the last three years. This military campaign culminated in the joint U.S. and Israeli war on Iran that began on February 28, 2026 and has since directly affected nearly all countries in the Middle East.
Amidst the Iran war, Arab Research and Analytics Associates carried out nationally representative public opinion surveys across seven societies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Tunisia. This survey, carried out for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), represents a follow-up on a survey conducted in 2020 around the 10th anniversary of the Arab Spring. The survey included 8,475 respondents with approximately 1,200 interviewed in each country. It was fielded by phone (CATI) from May 8 to July 3, 2026. The new results offer the first systematic insight into how events have changed as a result of the Iran war and also how views have changed since 2020, when the region and the world were dealing with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The new results reveal that public opinion across MENA remains defined by a combination of frustration, pragmatism, and selective optimism. This outcome may be surprising, particularly given the challenges brought about by the Iran war. The survey findings imply that this conflict has cast a long shadow over both domestic and international responses, reinforcing attention to security, national resilience, regional alignments, and the risks associated with appearing out of step with national interests during a moment of crisis.
The findings should therefore be understood as attitudes expressed under conditions of acute regional uncertainty. Such results during times of crisis remain essential for understanding public opinion and can provide a guide for how the region may be changed when this conflict has subsided. At the same time, the crisis context may have affected how some respondents framed answers on sensitive political, economic, and security questions, especially in countries where official relations with Israel make foreign-policy debates particularly delicate.
The survey shows that evaluations of political conditions are strongly shaped by national experience. Majorities in Egypt, Syria, and Morocco say conditions are better today than before the Arab Spring, while the opposite is true in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Tunisia. Morocco stands out as one of the most positive cases on this measure, with 81 percent saying conditions have improved compared to the period before the Arab Spring. Yet this does not mean that political satisfaction is uniform. Even in countries where overall trust in political institutions is relatively high, confidence across institutions is not uniform. Security institutions and local religious institutions generally command relatively high levels of confidence, which may be linked with a rally-around-the-flag effect during the Iran conflict, while political parties remain one of the least trusted actors, if not the least trusted, across nearly every country surveyed.
Trust in government varies widely across countries. Ninety-four percent of Egyptians say they trust the national government fully, a lot, or somewhat, as do 85 percent of Syrians, 82 percent of Jordanians, 81 percent of Moroccans, and 72 percent of Palestinians. Lebanon is the major exception among countries where the question was asked, with 53 percent expressing trust in the national government. At the same time, trust in political parties is far lower, ranging from 23 percent in Lebanon and 27 percent in the Palestinian territories to 59 percent in Egypt and 56 percent in Morocco. The gap between confidence in the state and confidence in partisan representation remains one of the central political findings of the survey.
The trend results help place these findings in context. Compared with the 2020 KAS survey, trust in national government is higher in all overlapping countries where the item can be compared: Morocco rises from 76 percent in 2020 to 81 percent in 2026, Jordan from 71 percent to 82 percent, but Lebanon exhibits the largest increase from 26 percent to 53 percent. This shift in Lebanon reflects the significant political changes that have taken place, including the selection of a new president and the weakening of Hezbollah as a political force.
Part of what may have made political reform so difficult in MENA is the lack of a common vision for how their countries should be governed. Publics are far from unified about the type of political and economic systems that are most suitable for their country. The most favored form of government is a parliamentary system in which all parties compete, a model deemed suitable by majorities in most countries. But support for alternative models remains significant and, at times, appears contradictory. A strong authority system is considered suitable by 57 percent in Egypt, 39 percent in Morocco, and by roughly a third in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Religious law without elections or parties is especially divisive: it is supported by majorities in Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco, but by only 12 percent in Lebanon. Taken together, these results suggest that support for representative institutions remains strong, but citizens seek a system that can also deliver meaningful results. And, in most countries, a substantial percentage favor a system that gives religion some role in the political system.
Economic conditions remain the core challenge in much of the region. In Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, almost no one says the economy is doing well. Only two percent of Lebanese and six percent of Palestinians describe the economy as very good or good, compared with 16 percent in Tunisia, 24 percent in Syria, and 32 percent in Jordan. Egypt and Morocco are the clear outliers in a positive direction: 70 percent of Egyptians and 60 percent of Moroccans rate current economic conditions positively. Likely, this response is an extension of the views of government institutions, which suggests a significant rally-around-the-flag effect amidst the regional crisis.
Yet, again the trend data show progress since 2020. Positive evaluations of the national economy have increased in each country where a comparison is available. In part, this may be due to the fact that the prior survey occurred during the dislocation caused by the pandemic and associated restrictions on certain economic activity while other factors likely represent the rally-around-the-flag effect. Morocco rises from 39 percent saying the economy is good or very good in 2020 to 60 percent in 2026, Jordan from 23 percent to 32 percent, Tunisia from three percent to 16 percent, and Lebanon is effectively unchanged.
At the individual level, however, the picture is less positive, which better reflects the challenges that citizens in the region are facing. The share saying household income covers expenses falls in Morocco from 65 percent in 2020 to 44 percent in 2026 and remains essentially flat or slightly lower in Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon. This divergence reinforces the need to distinguish between assessments provided at the national level, which tend to be more subjective in response patterns, and the personal reality facing citizens across the region.
Jobs remain a major challenge in most countries surveyed. Similar to views of the economy overall, job opportunities are rated positively by 73 percent in Egypt and 66 percent in Morocco. Elsewhere, just 10 percent in Lebanon, seven percent in the Palestinian territories, 20 percent in Jordan, 31 percent in Tunisia, and 36 percent in Syria say the same. These findings underline that economic growth alone is unlikely to be politically sufficient to resolve economic challenges. Instead, policymakers must focus on creating employment for citizens.
Notably, despite challenging economic circumstances in most countries, the broader regional picture is not one of resignation. Majorities in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco expect economic conditions to improve in the coming years, along with nearly half of Palestinians.
The international findings show a region that is open to outside engagement but highly selective in how it evaluates external actors. China is viewed favorably by majorities in all countries surveyed, ranging from 56 percent in Syria to 86 percent in Jordan. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Germany, France, the European Union, and the United Arab Emirates also receive broadly positive ratings in many countries. The United States proves divisive, with favorable views ranging from 22 percent in the Palestinian territories and 27 percent in Tunisia to 60 percent in Syria and 64 percent in Morocco. Morocco is the most pro-U.S. country in the survey on this measure, with nearly two-thirds holding a favorable view of the United States. Perhaps surprisingly, younger citizens often hold more favorable attitudes toward the U.S. than older citizens, suggesting that views of the U.S. after the Iran war are nuanced.
Regional support is lower for both Iran and Israel, but the latter is seen as the bigger problem in the eyes of MENA publics. Israel is the most commonly named security threat in every country surveyed, though Morocco requires special consideration. In Morocco, 24 percent name Israel as the biggest threat, while 53 percent do not identify a specific threat. This high non-response should be interpreted carefully. It may reflect the North African country’s geographic distance from the Middle East, genuine uncertainty, reluctance to answer a sensitive question, or a combination of these considerations, particularly in light of official relations with Israel and close ties to the United States. Still, by other metrics, concern about Israel is clear: fewer than a quarter agree or completely agree that Israel and the U.S. were justified in attacking Iran in all countries surveyed except Syria (38 percent), including just 18 percent in Morocco. Similarly, with the exception of Lebanon (41 percent), there is minimal support for the Abraham Accords, with at most 22 percent indicating support in any other country surveyed.
Given the number of regional events that have taken place since 2020, it is difficult to know the effect of any single one. However, it is possible to see the cumulative change during this period. What is clear is that China’s favorability has increased since 2020 in Jordan, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco, while the United States’ image has improved in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco but declined in Tunisia. Regional powers have also gained ground in many places, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran has also increased moderately, although in no country surveyed is it viewed favorably by more than half of citizens.
Taken together, the survey points to several implications for policymakers. First, domestic legitimacy remains linked to performance, especially on jobs, the economy, and security. Second, citizens distinguish between institutions and are more likely to trust security, religious, local, and civil society actors than political parties. Third, regional conflicts have taken a toll, but the ways in which they have shaped attitudes toward foreign powers are complex. Given the shifts seen after the start of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, these findings are surprising and suggest that the Iran war may be leading to a complex realignment of attitudes toward foreign countries. Ultimately, MENA publics cannot be reduced to being just anti-Western or pro-authoritarian. Their views are nuanced and conditional: citizens want governments that serve the region, foreign partners that support their interests, and political systems that can produce order and economic benefits, ideally in a more democratic and representative form.
Read the entire country report here as a PDF.
