Mexico and the Changing Dynamics of Migration

Mexico today occupies a central and highly complex position in terms of global migration patterns. For a long time, it was perceived primarily as a country of origin for migration – the point of departure for millions of people seeking work and better living conditions in the United States. However, this image is becoming increasingly inadequate. Over recent decades, Mexico has undergone profound change: Migration today no longer consists solely of people leaving the country, but also of people moving through it, settling in it from elsewhere, and returning to it.

This development is no coincidence, but rather the result of structural shifts across the American continent as a whole. More rigorous border regimes, new refugee movements within Latin America, and the growing shift of US migration enforcement to third countries have turned Mexico into a central hub where different migration dynamics converge. People from Central and South America, the Caribbean, and – in some cases – other regions of the world pass through the country, many of them now remaining for longer than originally planned or settling permanently.

As a result, the political significance of migration in Mexico has fundamentally changed. Migration is no longer an isolated policy field, instead touching on key questions of state capacity. It affects economic development just as it does internal security, social integration, and foreign relations. The relationship with the United States is of particular importance in this regard.

As such, Mexico exemplifies a new reality of global migration in which traditional categories such as country of origin, transit country, and destination country are no longer sufficient on their own to capture the actual dynamics on the ground. Instead, different functions overlap to create a complex migration system.

Mexico as a country of origin

For much of the 20th and early 21st centuries, Mexico was one thing above all: a classic country of emigration. Migration to the United States shaped the country over generations to such an extent that it became a permanent part of Mexico’s social, economic, and cultural reality. Hardly any other country in the world has been influenced in a comparable way by the sustained emigration of a significant share of its population. Mexicans and people of Mexican descent form one of the world’s largest diaspora communities. According to estimates, around 40 million people of Mexican origin currently live outside Mexico, approximately 97 per cent of them in the United States.¹

Mexicans began migrating to the United States in larger numbers as early as in the late 19th century, initially in connection with railway expansion and later increasingly as workers in agriculture, construction, and industry. During the 20th century, this development became further entrenched, particularly due to the high level of demand for cheap labour on the US market. Migration thus became a central component of an asymmetric yet highly integrated North American economic area.²

The causes of this migration lay primarily in the considerable economic disparities between the two countries. In rural and structurally weak regions of Mexico in particular, migration became a rational strategy for social security. Those with no realistic prospect of well-paid work in their place of origin sought such opportunities across the border. In this way, migration became not just an individual decision, but a pattern spanning generations. Families, communities, and entire regions developed transnational ways of life in which the departure of one or more family members was firmly anticipated. However, this development was by no means evenly distributed across Mexico. In 2022, around 54.7 per cent of all Mexican consular registrations issued in the United States were attributable to migrants from seven of Mexico’s 32 federal states.³

One key reason that these migration movements were able to stabilise over such long periods was the formation of dense social networks. Once a larger group of migrants from a particular region had settled in a US state, this constellation considerably facilitated the migration of further relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

However, the structure of this migration changed over time: Whereas migration was previously more circular in nature, tendencies towards permanent settlement increased from the 1980s onwards. Paradoxically, one reason for this was the tightening of border controls. The riskier, more expensive, and more uncertain that border crossings became, the less attractive it was for migrants to move back and forth between the two countries. Instead, many chose to remain permanently in the United States and arrange for their families to join them.⁴ This development also affected the demographic profile of Mexican emigrants. Up until the 1980s, emigrants were predominantly young men of working age. Since then, this profile has diversified considerably as a result of family reunification and permanent settlement. Today, there is only a slight male majority, while the average age is around 45.

While migration generally pays off economically for Mexican migrants and subsequent generations continue to improve their economic position, Mexico itself also benefits considerably from this development, particularly through remittances sent by emigrants. Between 2013 and 2024, remittances rose from around 23 billion to 64.7 billion US dollars, reaching an economically outstanding level for Mexico. In 2024, they amounted to around 3.5 per cent of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP). Approximately 97 per cent of these transfers originated in the United States, with most of the remainder coming from Mexicans living in Canada.⁵

For many households, particularly in rural regions, these money transfers are far more than just supplementary income. On average, recipient households receive more than 30 per cent of their current income from remesas, as remittances are referred to in Spanish. A total of around 20 per cent of Mexican households receive such transfers, with almost half of all households benefiting from them in certain particularly affected regions, where they account for more than ten per cent of a federal state’s GDP. In some areas, these remesas effectively replace what is lacking in terms of local development, formal employment, or state support.⁶ Emigration is therefore not merely a demographic process, but also a central economic stabiliser.

However, this situation also creates a structural vulnerability, with the strong dependence on remittances leaving parts of Mexico exposed to economic developments in the United States. This became evident most recently in 2025, when the long-standing upward trend in remesas was interrupted for the first time and they fell to around 61.8 billion US dollars. Among the reasons were weaker employment dynamics in the United States and a declining number of Mexicans living there. Despite this development, Mexico remains the largest recipient of remittances in Latin America and the world’s second-largest recipient after India.⁷

Mexico as a transit country

Alongside its role as a country of origin, Mexico has increasingly developed into a central transit country for migration across the American continent since the 1990s. This function arises first and foremost from the country’s geographical location. From the 1990s onwards, transit migration through Mexico was comparatively clearly structured and was based on the Meso–North American migration system. This system was primarily the result of migrants from the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America – that is, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador – but also involved migrants from the Caribbean, especially Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. These people used Mexico as a transit corridor on their way to the United States.⁸

Since the mid-2010s, however, this system has changed fundamentally, with the composition of migrants travelling through Mexico to the United States having become far more heterogeneous. Today, most migrants crossing Mexico on their way to the United States come from Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti.⁹ Mexico has thus evolved since the late 20th century from a country shaped almost exclusively by emigration into a key transit state. This growing heterogeneity is additionally reflected in the demographic composition of the migrants. Whereas young men once predominated, the profile today is far more diverse. Alongside men travelling alone, increasing numbers of women, families, and minors are also making the journey, particularly from Venezuela, Haiti, and Cuba.

Migrants travelling through Mexico are frequently exposed to extremely adverse conditions. In order to evade state controls, they often resort to informal and dangerous routes. One long-standing example involves the use of freight trains known as “La Bestia”. Travelling on the roofs of carriages or between wagons, migrants covered large sections of their journey through Mexico in ways that involved considerable risks. Serious accidents have repeatedly occurred, resulting in injuries, amputations, and even deaths.¹⁰ Although these trains are now used less frequently due to stricter state controls, alternative forms of transport such as buses and migrant caravans are by no means less dangerous. Along these transport routes, migrants travelling through Mexico frequently fall victim to extortion, kidnapping, and violence, and there are repeated cases of people disappearing without a trace. Estimates suggest that several tens of thousands of people have fallen victim to such disappearances.¹¹

Mexico as a destination and immigration country

At the same time, Mexico’s function within the migration system is also changing. Whereas the country long served primarily as a transit corridor, the increasing fortification of the US border means that many migrants are unable to continue their journey. For many of them, Mexico is therefore changing from a transit corridor into the de facto endpoint of their journey.

The United States began tightening border controls with Mexico from the late 2000s onwards – initially under the administration of US President George W. Bush, but above all under Barack Obama. At the same time, an increasing externalisation of US migration control began, with enforcement progressively shifting to third countries. A key starting point was the Mérida Initiative of 2008. Under this initiative, substantial US funding was channelled into expanding migration control in Mexico, including information-sharing, the training of migration officials, and the deployment of surveillance technologies. The result was a declining success rate for irregular border crossings from Mexico into the United States.¹²

By 2019 at the latest, during the first administration of US President Donald Trump, this development intensified further. Measures such as “Title 42” and the “Migrant Protection Protocols” – particularly the “Remain in Mexico” programme – effectively shifted the US border southwards. These programmes were designed to require asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their cases were processed and to permit entry into the United States only if their applications were successful. The success rate was around two per cent, thereby resulting in a significant bottleneck effect. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from Central and South America as well as the Caribbean remained on Mexican territory – often for long periods and without any clear prospects. A total of between 2.5 and 3 million international migrants who originally travelled there with the intention of entering the United States are currently living in Mexico.¹³ This population group is heterogeneous in terms of its demographic structure, with the share of families – and therefore of women and children – being comparatively high. Although there are still young men travelling alone, they no longer constitute the dominant group.

The close interconnection between Mexican and US migration policy means that important policy decisions in Mexico are generally taken in response to political priorities in Washington; therefore, Mexican migration policy is aligned with US objectives in key respects. Independent domestic policy initiatives such as regularisation programmes, integration initiatives, and the integration of migrants into the labour market remain limited and are often subject to foreign policy considerations. By contrast, Mexico is considerably more active in engaging with its diaspora in the United States. Given the diaspora’s political significance, the Mexican government takes an assertive stance in protecting its citizens in the United States, drawing on a dense consular network that comprises some 50 representative offices across roughly 25 US states in order to maintain contact and indirectly influence political debate in the United States.

Mexico as a country of return

Alongside its role as a country of origin, as a transit country, and increasingly also as a country of immigration, Mexico has in recent years additionally taken on the function of a country of return migration. Hundreds of thousands of people now return to Mexico every year, in some cases voluntarily yet also particularly as a result of deportations and of the increasingly harsh rhetoric directed at Mexicans in the United States, though they primarily do so through forced deportation.

The available data specifically indicate that migration dynamics between Mexico and the United States changed fundamentally around 2010. In the years following the financial crisis, particularly between 2009 and 2014, there were for the first time more Mexicans returning from the United States to Mexico than new migrants emigrating from Mexico to the United States. As a result, Mexico recorded negative net emigration during this period. In subsequent years, the migration balance remained broadly even or only slightly positive. Since the 2020s, however, there has once again been a trend towards negative net emigration: For almost five years, more Mexicans have been returning from the United States to Mexico than have been emigrating from Mexico to the United States.¹⁴

In total, almost four million Mexicans have returned from the United States to Mexico over the past 15 years, the majority of them as a result of deportations. 15 years ago, around six million Mexicans were living irregularly in the United States. Today, this figure is estimated at around five million, with nearly three million undocumented Mexicans having left the country over the past 15 years and around two million Mexicans having migrated to the United States during the same period and now living there without regular residence status.¹⁵

Most Mexicans who have been deported from the United States belong to the first generation of emigrants. In other words, they are people born in Mexico who emigrated to the United States and usually lived there for decades, often having become well integrated. In general, returning Mexicans are initially looked after at reception centres along the border after arriving in Mexico. There, they receive short-term support focused primarily on acute needs rather than long-term assistance. This return migration therefore largely involves adults – often men from the first generation of migrants who generally return together with their families. As a result, a significant proportion of the individuals concerned are children and adolescents who were born in the United States and are now returning to Mexico with their parents.

The real challenge begins after the initial reception phase and involves social and economic reintegration into Mexican society.¹⁶ In many cases, this proves difficult. One essential problem is the economic situation of returnees since returning is often associated with a substantial loss of income. At the same time, many of those affected are returning to regions that are themselves marked by economic weakness and a lack of employment opportunities. Their return additionally means an end to the financial support previously provided to family members who have remained behind, thereby further exacerbating existing economic problems and potentially contributing to widening regional inequalities.

Alongside economic challenges, social and cultural factors are also important. For example, returning migrants also lose their social networks. This trend is particularly evident among children and adolescents who were born and raised in the United States and hold US citizenship but whose parents are deported and return to their country of origin accompanied by their children. These children often have only limited proficiency in Spanish and face difficulties integrating into the Mexican education system, potentially resulting in academic problems, social exclusion, and long-term disadvantages.

In addition, return migration often does not occur in isolation and is instead closely linked to other forms of migration. Many returnees arrive in regions simultaneously affected by internal migration and forced displacement. This overlap of different forms of migration confronts the Mexican state with significant challenges. Existing institutions often lack the capacity to simultaneously integrate returning migrants, internally displaced individuals, and international migrants. Reintegration programmes remain fragmented and frequently focus on short-term measures, with long-term strategies currently lacking.

Internal migration and displacement

Alongside cross-border migration movements, internal migration within Mexico itself is also a key phenomenon. Internal migration is by no means new, but over the past two decades, it has increased considerably in both intensity and complexity.

Traditionally, the main internal migration flows have followed clear economic patterns: from rural regions to urban centres, and from the structurally weaker south to the more economically dynamic north of the country. This form of migration is driven primarily by economic incentives and reflects deeply rooted regional inequalities within Mexico. Estimates suggest that around five million Mexicans have become internal migrants.¹⁷

In recent years, however, a second and increasingly significant driver has emerged: internal displacement caused by violence and insecurity. In some federal states, large numbers of people are forced to leave their places of origin because organised criminal groups control entire regions through violence. Extortion, kidnappings, forced recruitment, and violent conflicts between cartels mean that many residents no longer have any realistic possibility of remaining in their communities. Over the past ten years alone, around 2.5 to 3 million people are likely to have become internally displaced as a result of violence and insecurity.¹⁸

This trend is also reflected demographically in the profile of internal migrants. Whereas internal migration initially consisted primarily of men and women of working age, increasing numbers of entire families with children are now moving within the country. The reception of these internal migrants poses additional challenges, particularly for urban centres. While urban infrastructures are already overburdened, especially in terms of housing, the labour market, education, and healthcare, they are now under additional pressure: Many internally displaced people find themselves living in precarious conditions, often without adequate social protection.

Any sustainable migration policy must therefore address not only cross-border movements, but also the structural causes and consequences of internal migration. Without improvements in the security situation, a reduction in regional inequality, and an expansion of the state’s capacity to receive and integrate migrants, the dynamics of internal migration will continue to intensify.

Societal impact and the state’s response

The growing complexity of migration is having a clear impact on the social reality of Mexico, though it has not given rise to pronounced political polarisation to date. Unlike in many European states, migration in Mexico is not a dominant source of conflict in public discourse, due largely to the composition of the external migrant population. A large proportion of this group comes from other Latin American countries and shares linguistic, cultural, and religious similarities with the Mexican population. This proximity facilitates integration processes and limits potential lines of conflict.

Public perception is gradually changing, however. As migrants become increasingly present in urban centres and border regions, their visibility in day-to-day life is growing. Migration and its consequences are increasingly perceived as a part of social reality, particularly in urban areas such as Mexico City and along the northern border. Initial forms of rejection and social distancing are emerging, though they remain isolated for the time being. Economically, many migrants work in the informal sector or in low-skilled occupations, meaning that direct competition on the labour market remains limited in the short term. As such, integration largely takes place in precarious conditions: While migrants do find employment, they generally have little social protection or long-term prospects. Direct competition with the local population remains limited, though pressure on the lower end of the labour market is increasing. For many migrants, their situation improves in the short term compared with conditions in their countries of origin, but overall, it remains unstable. Over the longer term, however, these precarious employment conditions reinforce existing social inequalities.¹⁹

For the Mexican state, the central challenge therefore lies less in widespread public rejection than in managing these complex and overlapping migration dynamics. Mexico is simultaneously confronted with international immigration, transit migration, return migration, and internal displacement. Institutionally, responsibility lies with the Instituto Nacional de Migración (National Migration Institute), although in reality, the security forces and the National Guard have a key role to play.

In practice, migration policy has become increasingly “securitised”.²⁰ Across party lines, Mexican politics have traditionally treated migration primarily as a matter of control and regulation, whereas comparatively little emphasis is placed on social and integration policy.²¹ This situation is closely linked to Mexico’s foreign policy position. For decades, the United States has exerted pressure on Mexico to curb migration flows heading northwards. As a result of Mexico’s economic dependence on the United States in particular, Mexican migration policy is in many respects designed to reduce migration to the United States and thereby also to accommodate Washington.²² This policy is reflected, for example, in the Plan Frontera Sur: Introduced in 2014, the plan is a measure taken by the Mexican government to significantly tighten control of its southern border. Since then, migrants have increasingly been intercepted either upon entering from Guatemala or along key transit corridors and have been prevented from continuing their journey. This strategy was further expanded in the years that followed. Since 2019, Mexico has made greater use of the National Guard to control migration movements, thereby strengthening its physical presence along major routes. These measures are supplemented with increased deportations and more restrictive residency regulations aimed at stopping migration as early as possible. Overall, therefore, Mexico is pursuing a policy designed to prevent migrants from reaching the US border in the first place.

Although there are examples of a pragmatic approach, such as temporary regularisation programmes, local integration initiatives, and cooperation with international organisations, these measures remain fragmented and have thus far proven insufficient to comprehensively address structural challenges.

As such, it is evident overall that Mexico is no longer a classic country of origin, a transit country, or a destination country, but rather a space in which different forms of migration overlap and reinforce one another. The key challenge lies not only in controlling these complex dynamics, but also in managing them institutionally and integrating them into society.

The authors would like to thank Niklas Flüeck – an intern at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s office in Mexico – for his support in preparing this article.

– translated from German –

Johannes Hügel is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s office in Mexico.

Nikolaus Rischbieter is Trainee at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s office in Mexico.

1. Moslimani, Mohamad et al. 2023: Facts on Hispanics of Mexican origin in the United States, 2021, Pew Research Center, 16 Aug 2023, in: https://ogy.de/sy3k [5 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
2. Hernández, Juan et al. 2023: México: La Gran Nación Transnacional, pp. 21–26, in: https://ogy.de/lsak [8 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
3. Serrano Herrera, Carlos / López Vega, Rafael (eds.) 2025: Anuario de migración y remesas México, BBVA Foundation Mexico, 6 Aug 2025, in: https://ogy.de/k5d4 [20 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
4. Hernández et al. 2023, n. 2, pp. 33–38. ↩︎
5. Serrano Herrera / López Vega (eds.) 2025, n. 3. ↩︎
6. Ibid. ↩︎
7. Morales, Yolanda 2026: Habrían llegado remesas por 62,000 millones de dólares: S&P Global Market Intelligence, El Economista, 22 Jan 2026, in: https://ogy.de/jda7 [11 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
8. Schiavon, Jorge 2022: Introducción. Migración en el sistema mesonorteamericano, Norteamérica 17: 2, 6 Jun 2022, in: https://ogy.de/gdx7 [17 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
9. Serrano Herrera / López Vega (eds.) 2025, n. 3. ↩︎
10. Castillo, Oscar B. 2023: ‘Tú puedes hacerlo, mi amor’: un trayecto peligroso en busca de una vida mejor, The New York Times, 6 Mar 2023, in: https://ogy.de/d3g0 [14 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
11. Cornelius, Wayne 2018: Mexico: From Country of Mass Emigration to Transit State, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov 2018, in: https://ogy.de/w2zw [28 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
12. Roy, Diana / Lee, Brianna 2025: U.S.-Mexico Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 Jan 2025, in: https://ogy.de/wea6 [10 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
13. Serrano Herrera / López Vega (eds.) 2025, n. 3. ↩︎
14. Hernández et al. 2023, n. 2, pp. 61–73. ↩︎
15. Ibid. ↩︎
16. Ibid. ↩︎
17. Fischer, Pedro et al. 2024: Mérida Ciudad Refugio, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Mar 2024, in: https://ogy.de/d9qv [20 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
18. Juárez Díaz, Diego / García Amador, Cecilia 2025: Evolución y causas de la migración interna en México: un análisis de los periodos 1995-2000 y 2015-2020, Revista Pueblos y fronteras digital 20, 12 Aug 2025, in: https://ogy.de/ezzs [17 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
19. Danish Refugee Council 2023: Protection Needs Overview. Mexico, 31 Dec 2023, in: https://ogy.de/1m11 [17 Mar 2026]. ↩︎
20. “Securitisation” refers to the process by which political actors frame an issue as a security threat and come to view it almost exclusively through that lens, thereby causing alternative perspectives – in the case of migration, e.g. the social and integration-related dimensions – to recede into the background. ↩︎
21. Hernández et al. 2023, n. 2, pp. 77–96. ↩︎
22. Roy / Lee 2025, n. 12. ↩︎