How Spain and Portugal Are Positioning Themselves as Bridges between Europe and Latin America

On 4 and 5 November 2026, the 30th Ibero–American Summit will take place in Madrid under the title “Iberoamérica: Juntos construimos nuestra Comunidad” (“Ibero–America: Together, we are building our community”). For Spain and Portugal, this is another opportunity to articulate their claim to being a “bridge” and “driving force” behind closer relations between Europe and Latin America.

However, geostrategic shifts in the international trade and security architecture also require closer cooperation between Latin America and Europe as a whole. Despite all their differences, the two regions are linked by a shared history, common “Western” values, and – above all – shared potential.

Regional cooperation mechanisms

Founded in 1991, the Ibero–American Summit comprises 19 Hispanophone and Lusophone countries in the Americas along with Spain, Portugal, and Andorra in Europe. The Community has maintained a General Secretariat (SEGIB) in Madrid since 2005.¹ This year’s summit agenda seeks to achieve a strategic realignment, with topics including measurable outcomes, sustainable growth, digitalisation, energy security, and cooperation in culture and education.² Spain is also looking to establish an Ibero–American disaster fund. Ibero–America has a total population of some 700 million people (including Spain, Portugal, and Andorra) – around 56 per cent more people than the EU (450 million).

The EU–CELAC summits (formerly EU–LAC summits) have also taken place since 2013. CELAC is the community of all 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2023, during Spain’s EU Council Presidency, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez succeeded in reviving this summit format after eight years of stagnation. Despite disagreements over the invasion of Ukraine and colonial history, the summit adopted a joint declaration – against Nicaragua’s vote – on deepening this strategic, values-based partnership, and the EU committed to investing 45 billion euros in green energy, digital transformation, and healthcare in the CELAC region by 2027 through the Global Gateway Investment Agenda.³ The follow-up summit in Colombia in 2025 established an EU–CELAC alliance in order to combat transnational crime as well as an EIB investment initiative worth more than 1 billion euros for Latin American energy infrastructure. At the same time, cooperation was reaffirmed on renewable energy and AI, as was a shared commitment to multilateralism and democracy.⁴ Spain and Portugal advanced the alliance thanks to the presence of Pedro Sánchez, Portuguese Prime Minister Luis Montenegro, and European Council President Antonio Costa.⁵

Political cooperation

Perceptions of Spain and its head of state

King Felipe VI is Spain’s head of state and represents the country under international law. In practice, however, his role is limited to ceremonial and largely symbolic functions: The king has to coordinate his speeches and international appearances with the Spanish government. Felipe VI has travelled to Latin America more than 30 times since 2014, and in most countries, he is primarily perceived as a symbol of cultural ties. The monarch met Venezuelan opposition politician María Corina Machado in Chile in March 2026. However, he has thus far been denied an official state visit to Venezuela.

In the latest special barometer on Spain’s reputation in Latin America,⁶ carried out in 2023, Spain consistently received ratings ranging from satisfactory (in Chile, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil) to good (in Ecuador, Mexico, and Guatemala), while the EU received the highest approval ratings compared with other alliances, such as the UN and NATO.⁷ This reveals that the reputation enjoyed by Spain and Europe in Latin America is better than is often portrayed in the course of attempts by left-wing intellectual and left-wing populist circles on both sides of the Atlantic to reinterpret European history.⁸

Spain’s bilateral cooperation

Since Pedro Sánchez of the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) came to power in 2018, the Spanish government has maintained close ties with Latin America. Strategic authority rests with Sánchez and the foreign minister. The coalition partners that are positioned on the far left of the political spectrum (Unidas Podemos from January 2020 to November 2023 and Sumar since November 2023) have no formal influence over Spanish foreign policy, but they are able to assert ideological influence in practice due to the government’s weak minority position. This can be seen in the Sánchez government’s growing orientation towards explicitly left-wing populist to left-wing authoritarian governments and regimes in Latin America.

As early as in 2018, Sánchez made the first official and symbolically significant visit to Cuba since 1986 in order to begin political consultations with the Cuban dictatorship, with Sánchez promising President Díaz-Canel that Cuba would occupy a “privileged place in Spanish foreign policy”.⁹ Economic ties are negligible between the two countries due to Cuba’s stagnant economy, but the Cuban dictatorship supports the illegitimate regime in Venezuela through its military apparatus and intelligence services, which means that Cuba remains geopolitically relevant.¹⁰

In 2021, Sánchez signed a strategic action plan with Argentina’s president – left-wing Peronist Alberto Fernández – to protect Spanish investments in the energy and technology sectors.¹¹ Fernández and Sánchez met four times over the course of two years. Strong cultural and migratory ties exist between the two countries, but since libertarian President Milei came to power, relations have been in a diplomatic deep freeze, and the tone of the disputes has deteriorated dramatically: In March 2024, Spanish Transport Minister Puente accused President Milei of “taking drugs”, while Milei made disparaging remarks about Sánchez’s wife, who is under judicial investigation for corruption.¹² Spain subsequently withdrew its ambassador from Argentina from May to October 2024.

Following Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s inauguration as President of Brazil in January 2023, Sánchez established close relations with him. Previously, relations had been severely strained under the right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro. Until Lula’s election victory, Sánchez largely used Brazil as a stage for domestic political messaging to portray the opposition parties – specifically, the moderate centre-right People’s Party (PP) and the national conservative to right-wing populist Vox – as misogynistic, homophobic, and racist parties that “are like Bolsonaro”.¹³ Under Lula, Spain and Brazil signed a renewed strategic partnership agreement in 2023, which was extended in 2025 to establish the first permanent bilateral commission at the head-of-state and government level.¹⁴

Chile also maintained particularly close ties with Spain during the presidency of the progressive Gabriel Boric (2022–2026), with the two countries concluding several agreements on women’s rights, sustainability, energy, and investment during this period. In 2025, Sánchez was invited as the only European head of government to the Democracia Siempre government summit in Santiago, which aimed to create “a front against the global rise of the far right”. This initiative sparked controversy because it simultaneously implied that only a small number of heads of government – some of them explicitly left-wing – were capable of speaking on behalf of democracy, including Yamandú Orsi of Uruguay, Gustavo Petro of Colombia, and Lula da Silva.¹⁵

In Colombia, the Sánchez government signed a reciprocal investment protection and promotion agreement with President Iván Duque in September 2021 that aimed to provide particular protection for Spanish companies in Colombia and that further deepened economic ties. Following the change of government to Gustavo Petro in 2022, Sánchez further deepened relations with Colombia and actively supported the Colombian peace process, as reflected in several bilateral meetings and close coordination on security and migration issues. However, Petro’s ambitious agrarian reform, substantial tax increases, and attempts at judicial reform also had the potential to make the investment climate more difficult for Spanish companies,¹⁶ but for the time being, Colombia continues to represent an important destination for Spanish direct investment.

Although Mexico is governed by the left-wing populist and left-wing nationalist MORENA movement (Andrés Manuel López Obrador / Claudia Sheinbaum), ties with the Spanish left remain weak. The reasons for this situation lie in MORENA’s nationalist-Indigenist ideological stance. Since Prime Minister Sánchez declared the normalisation of Spanish–Mexican relations a priority, Foreign Minister Albares began in winter 2025 to acknowledge the “pain and injustice” inflicted on Mexico’s Indigenous peoples. King Felipe VI offered a more nuanced acknowledgement in March 2026, calling for a historically honest and precise interpretation. He argued that Spain’s overseas territories had been parts of the kingdom rather than colonies – a vision that had culminated in the Constitution of Cádiz (1812), which granted parliamentary representation in the Spanish Cortes to territories in both hemispheres.¹⁷ In order to support the rapprochement with the Sheinbaum government in Mexico as promoted by Sánchez, Felipe VI acknowledged in March 2026 that during the more-than-330-year integration of the Americas into the Spanish monarchy, there had been “much abuse”, of which “no one could be proud”. At the same time, however, he stressed that the Spanish Crown had treated the overseas territories not as colonies, but as fully fledged viceroyalties and had protected the fundamental rights of Indigenous peoples as early as in the 16th century through the Leyes de Indias (“Laws of the Indies”).¹⁸

Due to doubts over the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s re-election to a second term, the Sánchez government recognised Juan Guaidó as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela in February 2019. Spain continued to maintain close diplomatic relations, however, primarily through the so-called “shadow diplomacy” of former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who to this day repeatedly calls on both the Venezuelan opposition and the EU to remain “open to dialogue” with the regime of Maduro or with that of Maduro’s successor, Delcy Rodríguez. The situation developed differently following the presidential elections of 28 July 2024, which saw an overwhelming voter turnout, united participation by the opposition parties, and a very clear result. Opposition candidate Edmundo González – who later fled to Madrid – won 67 per cent of the vote, while the opposition published more than 81 per cent of the polling records online, thereby demonstrating the indisputability of the result.¹⁹ However, the regime declared Maduro the winner and effectively remained in power. Although no EU country formally recognised the actual election result, a non-legislative resolution of the European Parliament acknowledged González’s electoral victory.²⁰ Spain then became the only European country alongside the left-wing governments of Brazil and Colombia to advocate continued dialogue with the authoritarian-dictatorial Maduro regime, while the United States had already withdrawn its recognition of the regime’s legitimacy.

With regard to the near future, the Spanish government’s official “Strategy for External Action 2025-2028”²¹ reaffirms that Latin America and the Caribbean will remain a strategic constant in Spanish foreign policy and that the government intends to further intensify cooperation within the “Ibero–American sphere”. Spain will seek to continue serving as the link between Latin America and Europe. Last year, the state acted as a mediator in the ratification processes for the EU–Mercosur agreement, the EU–Chile agreement, and the EU–Mexico Global Agreement. At the 30th Ibero–American Summit Conference at the end of 2026, economic relations are also to be further deepened (investment, trade, and Global Gateway funding), as are cultural and institutional ties.

All in all, therefore, Prime Minister Sánchez can be credited with several accomplishments in Latin America policy since 2018. However, the broader picture additionally includes the fact that his political room for manoeuvre has become more narrowly focused on left-wing and far-left populist forces in Latin America. In addition, he has deliberately made use of foreign policy conflicts with individual heads of state and government – such as Milei and Nayib Bukele of El Salvador – to fuel polarised domestic debate with the PP.

Portugal’s bilateral cooperation

Portugal pursues a more focused form of bilateral cooperation that is primarily limited to Lusophone Brazil, with the two countries holding Portuguese–Brazilian summits on a regular basis. At the 14th such summit, in 2025, 19 cooperation agreements were signed, including initiatives in the areas of health, science, tourism, and justice.

Portugal also uses the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) as a vehicle for launching collaborative projects in Latin America. Since 2023, for example, a Portugal–Latin America–Africa triangular cooperation fund has been working together with SEGIB.

Furthermore, Portugal strongly advocates the EU–Mercosur agreement and the EU–CELAC format. Despite its focus on Brazil, the Portuguese political and diplomatic elite maintain a clearly defined global foreign policy strategy that is geared towards cross-party consensus-building. As a result, Portugal is often more successful at communicating and integrating its strategic interests at the European and international level than is the more inward-looking Spain. In order to pursue these interests, the Portuguese make use of a highly developed soft power based on their language, their extensive and exceptionally well-integrated diaspora, and trade, thereby enabling them to build robust global networks.

Party cooperation and transnational political interconnections

Spain

The PSOE is organised within the “Socialists and Democrats” group in the European Parliament. In the Latin American context, however, the PSOE positions itself considerably closer to left-wing populism and authoritarianism than it does in Europe. Since November 2024, Pedro Sánchez has served as President of the Socialist International and – particularly in Latin America – has sought to present himself in this role as a counterweight to President Trump’s US administration. At the Democracia Siempre summit, he argued that the left must “go on the offensive” against the rise of the “extreme right” worldwide.²² For Sánchez, however, all political forces that are not “social and progressive” are right-wing or even far-right – forces that stand beyond a “wall”.²³

Former Deputy Secretary-General of the PSOE Adriana Lastra is the deputy coordinator of the Puebla Group, which has repeatedly expressed public support for the authoritarian regimes in Venezuela (2020, 2021), Cuba (2021), and Nicaragua (2023). The Group’s executive board members also include Evo Morales, who was forced to resign in Bolivia in 2019 due to electoral manipulation, and Rafael Correa, who is currently living in exile in Belgium and repeatedly amended the constitution during his presidency in Ecuador, restricted press freedom, and was sentenced to eight years in prison for corruption in 2020.

Spain’s far-left parties and Sánchez’s coalition partners (Podemos until 2023; now, Sumar) maintain close ties with parties and movements ranging from left-wing populist to left-wing authoritarian parties in Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Colombia. Party leaders Pablo Iglesias (until 2021) and Ione Belarra (since 2021) have cultivated close relations with Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro since the founding of Podemos, while current Labour Minister Yolanda Díaz (Sumar) works primarily with Lula, Petro, and Boric.

These networks had a noticeable influence on Spanish foreign policy between 2020 and 2023: The coalition advocated dialogue with Maduro, criticised US sanctions, and blocked tougher EU positions vis-à-vis Cuba and Nicaragua. The central themes here are “anti-imperialism”, solidarity with left-wing governments, feminism, and climate justice. These parties position themselves as part of a “progressive” transatlantic network that uses the Foro de São Paulo and the Puebla Group to coordinate shared positions.

The right-wing populist party Vox is skilfully exploiting the broad rightward shift in Latin America, which in many places can be attributed to the public's disappointment with previous left-wing populist to left-wing authoritarian governments.²⁴ Its most important partners are President Javier Milei of La Libertad Avanza in Argentina (right-wing libertarian populist), President Nayib Bukele of Nuevas Ideas in El Salvador (right-wing authoritarian populist), and José Antonio Kast of the Partido Republicano in Chile (right-wing national conservative). Since 2020, Vox has organised the Foro Madrid both as an international summit meeting of conservative to right-wing populist parties (while maintaining distance from the German AfD, which is not integrated in the Foro) and through so-called regional forums in Latin America (held in Bogotá in 2022, in Lima in 2023, and in Paraguay in 2025). This demonstrates Vox’s particularly strong track record in organising international political events in Latin America. Ideologically, Vox is also connected to the MAGA movement and the Orbán movement, their common denominator being the culture war against “wokeism” and the extreme left. At the same time, however, Vox rejects Russian and Chinese geopolitical influence in the Western hemisphere, which is one of the main ways in which Vox differs from the AfD. Meanwhile, Vox is also encroaching on the former sphere of influence of the traditional centre-right PP by maintaining formal relations with Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado²⁵ as well as informal contacts with politicians from Mexico’s PAN.²⁶ Within the framework of its “Iberosphere” concept, Vox draws a very clear distinction between its hard-line anti-immigration policy in general and immigration from Latin America in particular, arguing on the basis of cultural, linguistic, and religious proximity.²⁷

The centre-right PP traditionally maintained deep and institutionalised ties with Christian Democratic and liberal-conservative parties in Latin America, which have lost ground in the course of the region’s political transformation. PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo travelled once in 2022 to Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador, where he advocated the EU–Mercosur agreement, political moderation, and strong relations between Europe and Latin America, but no reports of further initiatives by him in the region have appeared since then. Traditional partners such as PAN in Mexico, PSDB in Brazil, PCC in Colombia, CREO in Ecuador, Renovación Nacional in Chile, and PRO in Argentina have tended to lose influence over the past 20 years. As a result, the PP has also moved closer to parties that are not traditional members of the International Democracy Union (IDU) or the Centrist Democrat International (CDI), such as Centro Democrático in Colombia (CDI; only associated with the IDU) and Daniel Noboa’s Acción Democrática Nacional in Ecuador (not a member of either the IDU or the CDI).

Visible international initiatives have come from Isabel Díaz Ayuso (PP), who – as regional president of Madrid, Spain’s economic powerhouse – uses foreign visits to combine political outreach with efforts to strengthen economic cooperation²⁸: Since 2021, Ayuso has travelled to the United States six times, and she spoke with the Latin American diaspora in Miami in 2022. Moreover, she has also travelled to Latin America on five occasions (Chile, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina). There, she met figures such as Argentine President Javier Milei, Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, Chilean politician José Antonio Kast, and Bolivian politician Luis Fernando Camacho (during their respective periods as opposition leaders).

Portugal

The Partido Socialista (PS) maintains close personal ties with Brazil’s PT under Lula as well as with socialist and social democratic parties in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay while systematically using the CPLP and the EU–CELAC format for political and economic networking and influence-building. Its Latin America policy is highly organised, stable, and strongly centred on Brazil, combining ideological affinity with pragmatic diplomacy.

The centre-right Partido Social Democrata (PSD) maintains good contacts with liberal, liberal-conservative, and Christian Democratic parties such as the PSDB in Brazil, Renovación Nacional in Chile, Cambio Radical and Centro Democrático in Colombia, and also CREO in Ecuador, placing strong emphasis on economic diplomacy and the promotion of Portuguese investment. Its Latin America policy is pragmatic, relatively non-ideological, and stable, although it appears somewhat more passive than that of the PS. However, the PSD shares with Spain’s PP the problem that many of its traditional partner parties in Latin America have lost influence in recent years.

The right-wing populist Chega is Vox’s closest ally in Europe: It shares the same core convictions and is an active member of Foro Madrid. Since 2022, party leader André Ventura has rapidly built up a network with the new right-wing forces in Latin America, particularly with Javier Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and José Antonio Kast in Chile. Prior to January 2023, he also maintained close contacts with Jair Bolsonaro but has distanced himself from Bolsonaro since the storming of the political institutions in Brasília. Chega’s Latin America policy is ideological and dynamic, but it is comparatively weakly institutionalised and remains more heavily dependent on personal contacts and on the networks of Vox.

Geopolitical perspectives

Spain and Portugal continue to possess unique historical, cultural, and economic bridges linking Europe and Latin America, although both countries use them differently. With an FDI stock of around 245 billion euros, Spain possesses by far the strongest economic foothold of any European state and will be able to strengthen its position further through the 2026 Ibero–American Summit. However, the Sánchez government has partly squandered this strength through its ideological narrowing towards left-wing regimes, thereby losing many political channels of access. Portugal acts more pragmatically and with a stronger focus on Brazil, refraining from asserting a leadership role and successfully relying on soft power and economic diplomacy, although its overall reach remains more limited than Spain’s.

The geopolitical situation in Latin America is shaped by two major external powers. The US National Security Strategy of November 2025 once again claims the Western Hemisphere as an exclusive sphere of influence, a claim that was underlined with military intervention in Venezuela in January 2026. At the same time, China is rapidly expanding its presence: In 2024, its trade volume with the region reached 515 billion US dollars – around ten times that of Spain. Russia and Iran play a less important role, though they continue to retain security-policy relevance for the remaining left-authoritarian regimes.

In this context, the EU–Mercosur agreement is particularly relevant: For Spain, it offers the opportunity to secure the state’s economic foothold in the bloc’s core countries (especially Brazil and Argentina) and to strengthen its bridging role within the EU, while for Portugal, the focus lies almost exclusively on Brazil, where the agreement would provide significant market-access advantages for key companies.

The significance for Europe, Germany, and German Christian Democracy

Many of the initiatives undertaken by Spain and Portugal benefit the European Union as a whole. Spain contributed to the reactivation of the EU–CELAC format and to the conclusion of the EU–Mercosur agreement, for example. Through the CPLP and the Portugal–Latin America–Africa triangular cooperation fund, established in 2023, Portugal has built up an important global mediating role. Both countries will also “represent” Europe at the 2026 Ibero–American Summit in Madrid.

However, at the same time, the Spanish government has increasingly narrowed its foreign policy ideologically towards left-wing and left-wing authoritarian regimes (Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua) since 2018 while neglecting governments that represent other political currents. Through his often-one-sided positioning, Sánchez has intensified political polarisation in Latin America to some extent. In addition, both Iberian states tend to react to immediate events rather than to pursue a long-term strategy.

As such, the “Iberian bridge” is important, but it can be only one of several foreign policy instruments available to the EU. Moreover, the EU should also continue to develop its own initiatives (Global Gateway, EU–Mercosur, Euroclima+, the anti-drug cooperation programme COPOLAD, etc.) – albeit in a manner that is aligned with Latin American interests. After all, many governments there would prefer that Europe offer pragmatic cooperation between equals focused on investment and growth that is underpinned by rule-of-law and strategic security cooperation rather than an economically burdensome and overregulated green agenda combined with identity and gender standards that is tied to one-sided conditions. Europe itself would additionally benefit directly from closer cooperation against Latin American drug cartels that use the continent as a gateway.

Within this web of cooperation, Germany should also continue to develop its own already highly extensive networks (GIZ, Goethe-Institutes, political foundations, and German Chambers of Commerce Abroad) in a targeted manner and align them with the major geopolitical challenges and issues of the 21st century (systemic competition with China, Russia’s continental security threat, transnational mass migration, etc.), thereby taking its own interests into account. Bilateral cooperation with Spain and Portugal can generate synergies but should focus on projects that are less ideologically constrained and should pursue a Latin America policy that includes all relevant democratic forces in the region.

At both the institutional and the working level (through its Office for International Relations, the political foundations, the EPP, the IDU, the CDI, etc.), the CDU/CSU has maintained contacts in Latin America for decades. In a political environment characterised by hyper-personalisation and digital ad hoc communication, however, it is questionable whether these structures alone will be sufficient for political and ideological engagement on the continent in the future. What is required instead is a dynamic, continuous, and strategic network of political relationships involving party leaders as well as representatives of the legislative and executive branches.

On the one hand, the CDU/CSU could deepen these ties together with Spain’s PP and the Portuguese sister parties PSD and CDS-PP in a symbiotic manner: The CDU/CSU could contribute its existing institutional resources, while the Iberian partners reactivate and build on their historically established networks in Latin America through joint strategic initiatives and coordinated positions within the EPP and IDU. This could help the CDU/CSU better interpret current political trends in Latin America and establish long-term relationships with future political leaders. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU could simultaneously continue developing independent political initiatives in addition to directly identifying and engaging emerging moderate forces in Latin America through its own networks, for example, by expanding bilateral dialogue formats at the political leadership level, by increasing its political presence in strategically important countries, and by strengthening economic forums.

While Prime Minister Sánchez has high hopes for the 30th Ibero–American Summit as a means of consolidating his influence in Latin America, the judicial investigation into his predecessor and mentor, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, in the “Plus Ultra case” marks a historic turning point. Since his time as prime minister (2004–2011) and to this day, Zapatero – as an ideological figurehead of the Spanish left – has systematically promoted left-wing populist and left-wing authoritarian governments in Latin America. Through massive economic aid to Venezuela, close partnerships with Evo Morales and former Argentine President Cristina Kirchner, and the co-founding and promotion of the Grupo de Puebla, he helped build a transatlantic far-left network.²⁹

Now, in the 4,000-page indictment, he is accused not only of improper influence, money laundering, and document forgery, but also of forming a (transnational) criminal organisation. Despite the embargo, raw materials such as gold, nickel, and oil are alleged to have been funneled from Venezuela to China through him. At the same time, he is alleged to have potentially provided China (e.g., Huawei) with improper access to the Spanish government.³⁰

These revelations could not only further undermine the credibility of progressive narratives in Latin America, exacerbate polarisation, and strain Spain’s role as a bridge to the region, but also lead to disillusionment with Europe. It is therefore essential that Europe and Germany work more actively to build the aforementioned sustained, non-partisan, and issue-oriented relationships with the new Latin American leaders.

– translated from German –

Martin Friedek is Project Coordinator at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Spain and Portugal Office in Madrid.

Dr Ludger Gruber was Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Spain and Portugal Office until May 2026.

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2. The Diplomat 2025: The next Ibero-American Summit will be held in Madrid on November 4 and 5, 2026, 26 Sep 2025, in: https://ogy.de/xlzh [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
3. Escoffier, Natalia 2025: The CELAC-EU Summit advances its shared agenda with the declaration of a Bi-regional Pact on Care, EU–LAC, 15 Dec 2025, in: https://ogy.de/tpbc [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
4. European Council 2025: EU-CELAC summit, 9 Nov 2025, in: https://ogy.de/usi3 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
5. República Portuguesa 2025: Portugal views the EU–CELAC partnership as a strategic alliance, 8 Nov 2025, in: https://ogy.de/qhag [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
6. The aim of the “Barómetro de la Imagen de España en América Latina 2023” – conducted by the Real Instituto Elcano – is to measure, analyse, and evaluate Spain’s image, appeal, credibility, and reputation in eight Latin American countries by focusing on the role of the country’s economy, culture, and politics. ↩︎
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10. Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled to Cuba in 2015 as German foreign minister, but this was not a German state visit that would have elevated Cuba to the same extent. ↩︎
11. La Moncloa 2021: Sánchez muestra su respaldo y solidaridad a Argentina para superar los retos sanitarios y económicos derivados de la pandemia, 9 Jun 2021, in: https://ogy.de/wc28 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
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15. Montero, Andrés 2025: Cumbre progresista en Chile: fracaso estrepitoso, El Debate, 26 Jul 2025, in: https://ogy.de/00kh [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
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17. The Hispanic Council 2022: La Constitución de 1812 y sus implicaciones en los territorios españoles de ultramar, 8 Mar 2022, in: https://ogy.de/c8gh [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
18. Europa Press 2026: El rey Felipe VI admite que hubo “mucho abuso” durante la conquista de América, El Confidencial, 16 Mar 2026, in: https://ogy.de/xxp3 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
19. BCC News Mundo 2024: Cuáles son los resultados de las elecciones en Venezuela según las actas publicadas por la oposición, 6 Aug 2024, in: https://ogy.de/j6n0 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
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22. Caraballo, Cristian 2025: Sánchez llama ante los líderes latinoamericanos a pasar a la “ofensiva” contra la ultraderecha, Euronews, 21 Jul 2025, in: https://ogy.de/6lv4 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
23. García de la Granja, Pilar 2026: Sánchez, de promotor del muro a supuesto líder contra el odio, Cope, 12 Mar 2026, in: https://ogy.de/c4pt [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
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25. http://Swissinfo.ch 2026: Corina Machado se verá en España con líderes del conservador PP y el ultraderechista Vox, 9 Apr 2026, in: https://ogy.de/egi1 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
26. http://Swissinfo.ch 2021: El PAN afirma que la reunión con Vox en México fue “a título personal”, 3 Sep 2021, in: https://ogy.de/y675 [29 Apr 2026]. ↩︎
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