Why Australia’s New Foreign Policy Role Creates Opportunities for Germany

Australia’s international environment has also become markedly more challenging. Despite sustained efforts by regional powers to preserve the Indo-Pacific’s cooperative order, economic competitors are increasingly becoming strategic rivals and may ultimately emerge as military adversaries. This deteriorating geopolitical environment is compelling Canberra to redefine its role within the region – both in relation to China and the United States as the two major powers as well as towards Europe, with which Australia already enjoys extensive cooperation in the policy areas of foreign affairs, development, security, and defence.

This far-reaching reorientation of Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy – which appears to enjoy broad bipartisan support at home – should be constructively supported by Germany and Europe. Indeed, parts of Canberra’s strategic community are actively calling for closer engagement. While Berlin should not overestimate either its own importance or its military capabilities, the conditions for such a new partnership are certainly favourable. The Indo-Pacific is a region of immense strategic importance both economically and in terms of security. Balancing German and European interests across this vast and complex region with the defence requirements arising in Eastern Europe is likely to become the greatest challenge facing German foreign, development, and security policy. Recently concluded agreements – including the EU–Australia Free Trade Agreement and the EU–Australia Security and Defence Partnership – have created fresh momentum in this regard.^I

Foundations of Australia’s traditional “grand strategy”

For many years, Australia benefited from what might be described as a geographical dividend. Sydney lies almost 8,000 kilometres from Shanghai, Perth around 4,000 kilometres from Singapore, and Darwin more than 5,000 kilometres from Tokyo. This sparsely populated country therefore only needed to concentrate its territorial defence on fortifying its northern territories while otherwise pursuing a strategy of maritime defence well beyond its coastline. Australia consequently played an important role in logistics, in defence-industrial production, and as a secure base for allied naval task groups and strategic submarines.¹ By contrast, the country was of much less importance than Guam or Okinawa, for example, when it came to the rapid deployment of large military formations in terms of traditional power projection simply because the principal flashpoints – particularly in Southeast Asia – lay much farther away.

Even during the Cold War, Australian strategic thinking was dominated by the assumption that any direct threat to the country’s territory – as in the two World Wars – would come from the north, far removed from the major population centres in the south-east and south-west. It was further assumed that Canberra would have several weeks’ warning before such threats would materialise due to the vast distances involved.² Both assumptions greatly simplified Australian defence planning and fostered a widespread sense of security among policymakers and the public alike, as reflected, for example, in armed forces that were well equipped but comparatively small.^II

This unique strategic environment enabled Australia – as the region’s leading middle power – to focus primarily on stabilising its immediate neighbourhood, particularly the South Pacific.³ Australian foreign policy projected power almost exclusively into the South Pacific while maintaining constructive political and economic ties with Southeast Asia and largely apolitical commercial relations with China. Stabilisation has always combined military and development instruments, including peace-support operations such as those in Timor-Leste between 1999 and 2000 and again from 2006 to 2012 as well as natural disaster relief operations in Vanuatu in 2017 and in Tonga in 2022. Apart from its substantial diplomatic presence in Indonesia – a country with which Australia has shared a complex relationship throughout the 20th century^III– Canberra played only a relatively limited role in Southeast Asia and exercised little influence in East Asia prior to the Regional Strategy 2025. Australia thus appeared as a relatively detached power within its wider region.⁴ This situation stood in stark contrast to the country’s exceptionally close security and defence relationships with its traditional allies, namely London and Washington.

Initially, China’s economic rise did little to alter this situation. On the contrary: Canberra benefited enormously from China’s economic boom, particularly in mining and agriculture, but also in sectors such as higher education, where the increasingly affluent Chinese middle class became the principal source of income during the 2000s. This productive bilateral relationship formed part of the wider process of economic integration between China on the one hand and Southeast and East Asia on the other hand. For many years, growing interdependence helped underpin the regional order, accommodated China’s peaceful rise, and reduced the likelihood of interstate conflict.⁵

At the same time, Australia’s commitment to a rules-based international order is no longer confined to diplomatic initiatives. The strategic turning point in Canberra has also given it a distinct security dimension. Amid intensifying systemic rivalry, Australia is determined not to relinquish the achievements of the free world without resistance or to simply accept China’s growing influence, particularly in its South Pacific neighbourhood. In so doing, Canberra is able to draw on its extensive regional partnerships, above all on its rapidly deepening ties with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and – to a lesser extent – also Vietnam and the Philippines. Australia has begun actively supporting the formation of a regional counterweight to an increasingly assertive China.

This situation provides a strong foundation for a strategic partnership that can and should be deepened across all areas of cooperation. Particular attention should be paid to development cooperation and security policy, both of which need to be viewed more consistently through a geopolitical lens.

The geopoliticisation of security policy

Foreign and security policy debates in Canberra are now shaped by the widespread perception that Australia’s strategic environment has fundamentally changed.⁶ This is because China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific extend well beyond the nine-dash line in the South China Sea and encompass security partnerships in the South Pacific; the development of a blue-water navy soon to be capable of projecting power on a global scale; anti-access / area-denial capabilities aimed at powers outside the region, such as the United States; and the ever-present prospect of a crisis over Taiwan.⁷ Although relations between China and India – Australia’s partner in the QUAD grouping – remain cool, they are not openly antagonistic, thereby allowing Beijing to focus its strategic attention on the South China Sea and the First Island Chain. Taken together, these developments have compelled Canberra to rethink its strategic posture.

At the same time, doubts are growing about the long-term reliability of the United States as an ally.⁸ While the US remains Australia’s principal security guarantor, as reflected in the ANZUS Treaty, in close intelligence cooperation within the Five Eyes partnership, and in the joint AUKUS programme to develop strategic submarines, concerns that Australia could be forced to rely more heavily on its own military capabilities in a future crisis have been fuelled by political polarisation in Washington, by an increasingly unpredictable style of leadership, and by the prospect of shifting strategic priorities.⁹ Those concerns were reinforced by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s appearance at the most recent Shangri-La Dialogue, where he called on regional partners to assume a greater share of the security burden.¹⁰

Concluded in 2021 under Prime Minister Scott Morrison with the United States and the United Kingdom, the AUKUS security partnership is unparalleled in its military-technological ambition. At the same time, it stands as a symbol of Canberra’s determined and bipartisan commitment to deepening its security partnerships. Under Pillar I, the three partners will jointly develop a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, thereby significantly extending the operational range of Australia’s submarine fleet and enabling it to operate undetected over much greater distances and for longer periods. In addition, the AUKUS partners are pursuing a series of collaborative technology projects under Pillar II in areas including undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, cybertechnology, hypersonics, and electronic warfare. The first of these projects will focus on unmanned underwater vehicles designed to improve maritime domain awareness.¹¹ Kevin Rudd – former Prime Minister and Australia’s ambassador to Washington until March 2026 – also defended this course successfully in discussions with the sceptical Trump administration.¹²

However, AUKUS is only one element of Australia’s long-term strategic response to an increasingly ambitious China. Canberra’s growing regional presence is also reflected in closer security cooperation with the Pacific island states, which in some cases has acquired quasi-integrative characteristics. This is complemented by initiatives on police cooperation, such as Pacific Policing with Micronesia; by enhanced diplomatic and security engagement with Southeast Asia, including ASEAN; by deeper strategic partnerships in East Asia, particularly with South Korea and Japan; and by efforts to strengthen regional balancing through joint exercises in the South China Sea alongside partners such as the Philippines while simultaneously reinforcing alliances with partners outside the region (AUKUS, QUAD).¹³

Since 2025, Canberra has placed a stronger strategic emphasis on the Indo-Pacific’s regional powers. In February 2026, Australia and Indonesia concluded a security pact allowing both countries to undertake joint military action where necessary.¹⁴ Long-term defence procurement – including the acquisition of eleven Mogami-class frigates – will strengthen interoperability with Japan while facilitating technology transfer.¹⁵ By contrast, Australia has yet to develop a relationship with India that extends meaningfully beyond cooperation within the QUAD security dialogue. Canberra’s deepest level of military integration has most recently been achieved with Papua New Guinea. Under the mutual assistance agreement signed in October 2025, Papua New Guinea may contribute up to 10,000 personnel to the Australian armed forces, while Australia has been granted access to Papua New Guinean military infrastructure.¹⁶

These developments demonstrate that Canberra now places far greater emphasis than in the past on forward defence – that is, on a strategy of projecting military power early and decisively into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in order to deter and – if necessary – counter Chinese ambitions long before they reach Australia’s shores. Maritime security occupies a central place in Australian strategy above all because it reflects the strategic logic of an island trading nation. Securing the freedom of navigation, maintaining open sea lines of communication across the Indo-Pacific, and protecting the maritime infrastructure through which most of Australia’s foreign trade passes are therefore core national priorities, be they pursued independently or together with regional partners. Only against the backdrop of this strategic reorientation does the scale of the AUKUS programme become fully¹⁷ understandable. Although it places considerable pressure on the defence budget, it continues to enjoy broad bipartisan support. Pillar II also creates opportunities for defence-technological cooperation with additional partners, including Japan and Germany.^IV

What could a security partnership with Australia look like in practice?

Berlin should adopt a more partnership-oriented approach to its security and defence policy instruments. This would entail expanding defence exports, relocating parts of defence production to Australia where appropriate, and investing more heavily in joint research and development. As a high-technology nation, Australia possesses excellent research and development capabilities, including in the defence sector, thereby offering considerable scope for cooperation. From the perspective of German industry, the opportunities for collaboration in Australia outweigh any competitive pressures in the armaments sector. This situation contrasts with that of Japan and South Korea, where domestic defence companies are increasingly emerging as direct competitors on global arms markets.^V

Germany is able to make an important contribution to strengthening Australia’s defence capabilities through targeted defence-industrial cooperation. Priority should be given to joint projects in naval systems, air defence, and drone technologies alongside efforts to improve interoperability with European defence systems. German expertise in sensors, radar technology, submarine components, stand-off weapons such as Taurus, and air defence systems such as IRIS-T could complement Australia’s capabilities without compromising interoperability with the United States. There is also significant scope for cooperation in ammunition production, maintenance, and resilient supply chains, all of which would enhance long-term operational readiness. Furthermore, opportunities also exist in both the field of critical raw materials and the development of processing capacity, which remains comparatively limited in Australia but is becoming increasingly important for the defence sector.

German drone start-ups could benefit from the experience of Australian companies if Canberra and Berlin were to actively support the creation of joint ventures, for example, through a joint development fund to which such partnerships could apply. Cooperation already exists in the case of Rheinmetall’s Boxer armoured fighting vehicle, with Rheinmetall Defence Australia manufacturing the platform in Queensland for the Australian armed forces.

Germany could also expand training programmes for Australian armed forces personnel – and vice versa – while increasing support for joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific. This is reflected in the regular participation of Bundeswehr personnel in exercises such as Talisman Sabre (army) and Pitch Black (air force).^VI There is likewise considerable potential for cooperation in research and development relating to artificial intelligence and cyber defence. The experience of autonomous drone warfare and information warfare in Ukraine illustrates the strategic value of such collaboration.

Industrial partnerships of this kind would be conceived as long-term ventures and could ultimately enable German industry to participate in selected technology projects under AUKUS Pillar II. They would strengthen the strategic autonomy of both partners in the Indo-Pacific, build mutual trust, and complement Germany’s existing strategic solidarity with Australia through a more substantial security presence in the region. However, such initiatives would require sustained political support from both the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in addition to the newly established Government-to-Government (G2G) Office within the Bundeswehr Procurement Office in Berlin. To date, however, this aspect of cooperation has received relatively little attention, including within the AUKUS partnership itself.

Securitising development cooperation

China is seeking to expand its political influence over smaller states – particularly the island nations of the South Pacific – through economic dependencies, infrastructure projects, and security cooperation. Germany’s development policy must respond more effectively to this growing securitisation of development cooperation in order to both support vulnerable states in addressing climate change and counter China’s expanding strategic influence.

Despite the opening of Germany’s first embassy in Suva in July 2023 and Foreign Minister Wadephul’s visit in February 2026, the South Pacific island states have thus far received relatively little attention in Germany’s strategic debate. However, these island states are of considerable geopolitical importance as potential bases for projecting power across the Pacific and into Antarctica, where China is likely to pursue increasingly ambitious resource claims in the future.¹⁸ At the same time, the Pacific island countries are among those most severely affected by climate change and possess extensive expertise as well as considerable moral authority in the field of climate resilience. They should therefore assume a more prominent place within German development policy, particularly in the provision of global public goods.

What should a development partnership with Australia look like?

Germany’s development cooperation – together with its science and technology policy – should be aligned more closely with the interests and priorities of regional partners. Doing so would enhance Germany’s attractiveness, legitimacy, and capacity to build lasting partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. Both Australia and – equally – New Zealand are particularly well placed as partners in the South Pacific because they can legitimately claim a regional leadership role, even if this role is not universally accepted.¹⁹

The Pacific island states themselves continue to pursue an independent course between the major powers that is encapsulated in the principle of “friends to all, enemy to none”, and more intensive development engagement by external partners is unlikely to alter this fundamental strategic orientation. Against this backdrop, closer coordination between Germany, Australia, and New Zealand appears both sensible and desirable. Australia already coordinates its development cooperation through regional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and has explicitly designed its programmes to facilitate cooperation with other partners. At the same time, a comprehensive division of labour based on clearly defined roles remains difficult to achieve because differing strategic priorities among donor countries continue to limit more structured coordination. The overarching objective should therefore be to strengthen existing regional cooperation mechanisms – particularly the Pacific Islands Forum – and thereby also to reinforce the agency of the island states themselves.²⁰ In this way, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand could make a joint contribution to stability, resilience, and sustainable development across the South Pacific.

One particularly important area for potential cooperation is climate adaptation and resilience-building. For many Pacific island states, rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and the salinisation of agricultural land represent their most pressing security and development challenges. Germany could contribute its expertise in climate finance, renewable energy, and sustainable infrastructure, while Australia and New Zealand could bring extensive regional networks and implementation capacities derived from their geographical proximity.²¹ Although examples of joint initiatives already exist within multilateral frameworks, cooperation has thus far lacked any clear strategic coordination. Against this backdrop, climate adaptation in particular offers considerable potential for closer coordination between Germany, Australia, and their European partners provided that the participating countries make this a political priority.

A second potential area for cooperation is maritime development policy. The Pacific island states exercise jurisdiction over vast exclusive economic zones but often possess only limited capacities to monitor and sustainably manage their marine resources. Germany could support programmes on fisheries management, marine research, and the protection of marine biodiversity, while Australia and New Zealand could contribute their extensive experience in coastal and resource management.²² At the same time, the exploitation of marine resources is becoming increasingly important for some island states. Alongside the controversial issue of deep-sea mining, which is actively supported by countries such as Nauru, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, and Tonga but is opposed by others, including Fiji, Vanuatu, and Palau, this also includes resource extraction within exclusive economic zones. Against this background, there is considerable demand for international support in order to ensure that these resources are developed sustainably and in accordance with robust environmental and social standards.

Education and skills development likewise offer significant opportunities for cooperation. Joint scholarship schemes, vocational training partnerships, and university collaborations could help build local expertise in fields such as public administration, climate policy, healthcare, and engineering. One possibility is even the establishment of a joint German–Australian university specialising in these areas.²³ Germany could contribute its scientific excellence, while Australian and New Zealand universities could provide attractive locations for higher education owing to their proximity to the region. In addition, the three countries could work together within the framework of Global Gateway to improve digital connectivity across the Pacific island states. Investments in digital infrastructure for government and society – together with enhanced cyber security – could promote economic development while strengthening state capacity.

All of these areas offer considerable potential for triangular cooperation, combining German funding with Australian technical expertise – or vice versa – in order to address concrete development needs. Such an approach would bring together the comparative strengths of all three partners: Germany’s financial resources and technological capabilities, Australia’s logistical capacity and security expertise, and New Zealand’s experience of working with small island states and indigenous communities.²⁴

In the longer term, this could evolve into a structured Germany–Australia–New Zealand dialogue on development cooperation in the Pacific. Such a framework could help avoid duplication while making more effective use of both European and regional resources. For Germany, this would also offer the advantage of linking development policy, climate diplomacy, and its Indo-Pacific strategy more closely together. Such cooperation would not only contribute to the sustainable development of the Pacific island states but also deepen Germany’s diplomatic engagement across the southern Indo-Pacific.

A trilateral development partnership with Australia and New Zealand would furthermore enable Germany to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific without repeating the mistakes of an approach driven solely by geopolitical considerations. Pacific island states consistently stress that they do not wish to become objects of major-power competition and instead seek partners that support their own development priorities.²⁵ Accordingly, the primary objective of any such partnership should be to strengthen the capacities and agency of the island states themselves. At the same time, Australia’s Pacific policy demonstrates that development cooperation is frequently linked to broader security and geopolitical objectives, particularly the aim of limiting China’s influence in the region. Any trilateral partnership will therefore succeed only if it combines an awareness of these geopolitical realities with a credible commitment to development objectives and is not perceived primarily as an instrument of strategic competition.

Germany’s own development policy toolbox has likewise become broader and – inevitably – more geopolitical. Complementing the Team Europe approach with triangular partnerships involving liberal regional powers such as Australia is therefore likely to enhance the effectiveness of German development policy across the region.

Outlook: Australia’s regional leadership serves Germany’s interests

Ultimately, what Australia seeks from Europe is strategic solidarity. In foreign and security policy terms, the Federal Government should therefore regard the Indo-Pacific as a theatre intrinsically linked to the Euro-Atlantic region and should continue to strengthen its presence there in coordination with other EU member states. At the same time, it must remain mindful that Europe will never be able to project sufficient military power into the region in order to contain China on its own. Germany’s continued focus on NATO’s eastern flank – and thus its contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing – should likewise be understood as an expression of this strategic solidarity since it enables allied resources to be deployed more effectively in the Indo-Pacific.

The increasing securitisation of both Australian and German foreign policy in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine since 2022 presents significant opportunities for what might be described as a strategic reset, some economic disappointments on both sides notwithstanding. In the decades following the end of the Cold War, Germany’s traditional policy of restraint – together with the foreign and development policy instruments associated with its role as a civilian power – proved well suited to consolidating the country’s international standing.²⁶ Today, however, Germany’s civilian-power approach must become more realistic and therefore more robust if it is to remain effective. In an era of renewed great-power rivalry, soft power requires the support and credibility that only hard power can provide.²⁷

The United Kingdom and France recognised this long ago, offering valuable lessons for Germany’s own Zeitenwende in foreign and security policy. The same applies to emerging Western middle powers such as Canada and Australia, both of which combine a commitment to liberal internationalism with credible military capabilities. Under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese – and in particular Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles – Australia is investing in the instruments of a robust middle-power strategy, much as Mark Carney has advocated in Canada. Like-minded middle powers, they argue, must stand together more closely on security matters, regardless of whether the United States remains fully engaged.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: SIPRI Military Expenditures Database.

Against this backdrop, the Federal Government under Friedrich Merz should pursue a comprehensive redefinition of Germany’s global partnerships, which will require much closer cooperation between government and industry, between business and academia, and between security and development policy. Alongside well-established, values-based partnerships with liberal democracies both within and beyond the G7 and NATO, Germany should additionally develop more pragmatic, interest-based partnerships with like-minded countries around the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, where many of the principal actors underpinning the liberal international order are located. Such an approach would both deepen cooperation within the wider community of liberal democracies and provide a stronger response to China’s growing international influence.

Australia’s increasingly active regional role and expanding presence across the Indo-Pacific therefore also create opportunities for Europe. Berlin and Brussels should actively support Canberra’s greater engagement with its own region in the shared interest of strengthening the political West, which in the future should define itself not only in Euro-Atlantic terms, but increasingly also in Indo-Pacific terms.

– translated from German –

Dr Christian E. Rieck is Associate Professor of War Studies at the Chair of Military History at the University of Potsdam. In 2025, he held a Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Fellowship at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

Sabina Wölkner is Director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Australia and the Pacific based in Canberra. Her main areas of focus include security and foreign policy in Australia and the Pacific.

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2. White, Hugh 2019: How to Defend Australia, La Trobe University Press, 2 Jul 2019.↩︎
3. Hoskins, Ian 2021: Australia and the Pacific: A history, UNSW Press, Oct 2021.↩︎
4. Miriam Prys describes this pattern as one of “detachment”: Prys, Miriam 2010: Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood, International Studies Review 12: 4, pp. 479–504, here: p. 489, in: https://ogy.de/a9h2 [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
5. Kliem, Frederick 2022: Great Power Competition and Order Building in the Indo-Pacific. Towards a New Indo-Pacific Equilibrium, Routledge, 24 Jun 2022.↩︎
6. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2025: AIIA Gala Dinner Keynote Address, Speech, 17 Nov 2025, in: https://ogy.de/axxy [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
7. Kirchberger, Sarah 2015: Naval Power and Its Role in China’s Rise, in: Kirchberger, Sarah 2015: Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications, Springer, Jul 2015, pp. 21–56, here: p. 42, in: https://ogy.de/rzy2 [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
8. Green, Michael J. 2019: By More Than Providence. Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783, Columbia University Press, Jan 2019.↩︎
9. Lowy Institute 2026: In 2026, 73% say Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States was important to its security., in: https://ogy.de/fh54 [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
10. Marston, Hunter 2026: At Shangri-La, Washington and Southeast Asia talked past each other, Lowy Institute, 1 Jun 2026, in: https://ogy.de/zw1a [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
11. Groffman, Nicolas 2026: AUKUS sees the sea – not everyone will, Lowy Institute, 3 Jun 2026, in: https://ogy.de/upvm [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
12. Kelly, Joe 2026: How Morrison, Rudd and Marles forced Pentagon rethink on its AUKUS review, The Australian, in: https://ogy.de/ihgz [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
13. On the concept of the Indo-Pacific as Australia’s “new strategic map” as early as in 2014: Medcalf, Rory 2014: In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s new strategic map, Australian Journal of International Affairs 68: 4, 14 May 2014, pp. 470–483, in: https://ogy.de/vwbz [8 Jun 2026].; on Australia’s Southeast Asia engagement: Rodan, Gary 2025: The new political economy of Australia – Southeast Asia engagement, Australian Journal of International Affairs 79: 6, 31 Oct 2025, pp. 1009–1016, here: pp. 1012 f., in: https://ogy.de/ewh8 [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
14. Wong, Penny / Albanese, Anthony 2026: Australia and Indonesia sign historic security treaty, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 Feb 2026, in: https://ogy.de/xw3e [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
15. Marles, Richard / Conroy, Pat 2026: Australia locks in delivery of our first three general purpose frigates, Australian Government, 18 Apr 2026, in: https://ogy.de/kdt3 [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
16. Lam, Lana / Ng, Kelly 2025: Australia signs key defence deal with Papua New Guinea, BBC, 6 Oct 2025, in: https://ogy.de/jfei [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
17. Lowy Institute 2023: In 2023, 49% said more safe when asked about Australia., in: https://ogy.de/j5s9 [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
18. Press, Anthony J. / Bergin, Anthony 2022: Coming into the Cold: China’s interests in the Antarctic, Australian Journal of International Affairs 76: 2, 30 Mar 2022, pp. 1–19, here: p. 13, in: https://ogy.de/521v [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
19. Australia is the largest provider of development assistance in the South Pacific, allocating AUD 2.15 billion in the 2025–2026 financial year. Papua New Guinea is by far the largest recipient, receiving AUD 681 million. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australia’s Official Development Assistance Budget Summary -2025–26, in: https://ogy.de/cqjj [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
20. This is not always straightforward: Moore, Liam 2024: A dysfunctional family: Australia’s relationship with Pacific Island states and climate change, Australian Journal of International Affairs 78: 3, pp. 286–305, here: pp. 293 f., in: https://ogy.de/1nuo [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
21. Hill, Cameron 2026: Development with depth: (re)building Australia’s aid capability, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 12 Mar 2026, pp. 1–7, here: p. 5, in: https://ogy.de/bjd8 [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
22. Ide, Tobias 2023: Climate change and Australia’s national security, Australian Journal of International Affairs 77: 1, 25 Jan 2023, pp. 26–44, here: pp. 34 f., in: https://ogy.de/occ8 [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
23. German Academic Exchange Service: Binationale Hochschulen, Fakultäten und Institute, in: https://ogy.de/te74 [4 Jun 2026].↩︎
24. For an overview of New Zealand’s regional relations: de Jong, Marco 2024: Losing the Pacific to the Anglosphere: AUKUS and New Zealand’s regional engagement, Australian Journal of International Affairs 78: 5, 25 Sep 2024, pp. 644–651, in: https://ogy.de/asoy [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
25. Köllner, Patrick 2021: Beyond “Indo-Pacific”: Understanding Small Pacific Powers on Their Own Terms, GIGA Focus Asia 5, German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) / Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, in: https://ogy.de/ukv2 [8 Jun 2026].↩︎
26. Rieck, Christian E. 2026: Raumfahrt und Reaktoren: Wissenschaftsdiplomatie als bundesdeutsche Ersatzaußenpolitik nach 1990, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, forthcoming.↩︎
27. Rieck, Christian E. 2026: Anarchy in the international system: A new era of realism?, Diálogo Político 1/2026, 17 Feb 2026, pp. 20–33, in: https://ogy.de/ay4y [4 Jun 2026].↩︎