Central Asia between Russia, China, and the West

A glance at the map illustrates Central Asia’s geopolitical significance: The region lies at the intersection of major spheres of influence, bordering Russia to the north, China to the east, Afghanistan and Iran to the south, and the Caspian Sea to the west. For many years, the countries of Central Asia attracted little attention in Germany and across the European Union. In recent years, however, the region has acquired growing strategic importance. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has suddenly brought home to the West how important it is to pay greater attention to the foreign and security policy of Russia’s immediate neighbours.

Central Asia is no longer merely a geographical buffer zone between the major powers. Indeed, the region is now increasingly emerging as an independent geopolitical actor with growing confidence in its foreign policy. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in particular are pursuing a so-called multi-vector foreign policy aimed at balancing relations with Russia, China, the West, Turkey, and other regional actors. The aim of this policy is to avoid one-sided dependencies and expand the two countries’ foreign policy room for manoeuvre.

Held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in April 2025, the first EU–Central Asia Summit marked the beginning of deeper strategic cooperation between the Central Asian states and the European Union. The EU Strategy for Central Asia – adopted in 2007 and updated in 2019 – provides the political and strategic framework for this cooperation. Germany also established the C5+1 meetings in 2023 as an instrument for systematically intensifying cooperation with the countries of Central Asia.

In order to better understand Central Asia’s growing strategic importance for Europe and Germany, it is worth taking a closer look at the historical developments and regional dynamics since the collapse of the Soviet Union: After the collapse in 1991, the five independent Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan emerged. The withdrawal of Soviet authority led to a series of border disputes and ethnic conflicts rooted in the contentious borders drawn in the 1920s, which continued to destabilise the region for many years after independence. The last major border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was not resolved until 2025 – through Uzbekistan’s mediation. At the same time, the political and social development of the individual states has followed very different trajectories: In Tajikistan, for example, civil war broke out in the 1990s, the consequences of which are still felt today. By contrast, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have seen strong economic development in recent years. Turkmenistan has pursued a policy of complete isolation, while Kyrgyzstan’s development has been marked by repeated changes of government and political upheaval.

Economic interest in Central Asia

While the Central Asian states developed along different political trajectories, the region simultaneously gained increasing importance as an economic area. Central Asia’s extensive natural resources are of particular interest. Kazakhstan possesses substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium, and rare earth elements, while Turkmenistan is one of the world’s leading exporters of natural gas and possesses some of the largest gas reserves in the world. Kyrgyzstan has extensive gold deposits as well as mineral resources that are important for modern technologies and the energy transition. Tajikistan possesses significant deposits of silver, gold, and other minerals as well as considerable hydropower potential. Uzbekistan is also one of the region’s resource-rich countries and is home to some of the world’s largest deposits of gold, uranium, and copper. Furthermore, the country possesses substantial reserves of silver, tungsten, potash salts, and other strategically important minerals. However, Uzbekistan’s geological resources have thus far been explored only in part and indicate considerable additional mineral potential.

Against this backdrop, Central Asia is becoming increasingly strategically important for Germany, particularly in the context of so-called critical raw materials. Rare earth elements, lithium, and uranium are essential raw materials for batteries, semiconductors, wind turbines, and other future technologies. Given Europe’s heavy dependence on Chinese supply chains, Central Asia is increasingly attracting attention as a potential alternative source of critical raw materials. Germany is therefore stepping up its efforts – both bilaterally and through the European Union – to establish strategic raw materials partnerships with the countries of the region, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, experience to date – particularly with Kazakhstan – has shown that political declarations of intent alone are not enough. Despite strategic partnerships, it can be said that expectations of concrete investment, industrial cooperation, and long-term supply chains have often fallen short. Analyses of Germany’s raw materials partnerships indicate that Germany has thus far often acted overly cautiously in Central Asia, while China has expanded its economic influence much more rapidly and comprehensively.¹ This cautious approach has been driven above all by the risk-averse mindset of German industry: There is often an expectation of – or even a demand for – absolute legal certainty. While China steers its major projects politically through state-owned enterprises, German engagement is held back by lengthy approval procedures and stringent sustainability requirements. If Germany wants to offer a genuine alternative in future, this must change. What is needed are more flexible forms of state-backed risk protection, such as modernised German export credit guarantees (Hermes Cover). The aim must be to mitigate political risks such as the effects of sanctions and transit blockades, thereby making market entry into Central Asia financially viable for Germany’s SME sector. What is more, Germany should not only import raw materials, but also invest strategically in local processing, which helps to build trust. In this way, Germany could offer an alternative development model to China’s economic activities in the region, thereby placing greater emphasis on local value creation, skills development, and technology transfer.

At the same time, the region’s growing markets are becoming increasingly attractive for businesses. German industry’s interest in Central Asia is also growing noticeably, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. German investment is present in more than 200 companies in Uzbekistan, particularly in the building materials industry, agricultural machinery manufacturing, and the production of cables, wires, wire products, and optical fibres.² Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has pursued a policy of economic openness and liberalisation in order to become more attractive to Western investors. In Kazakhstan, economic reforms were also launched under the Strategy 2050 programme in order to modernise the economy and strengthen its international orientation. The other Central Asian states are also making increased efforts to attract foreign investment. Nevertheless, structural challenges for Western investors remain, including bureaucratic hurdles, shortcomings in transparency and administrative structures, and – in some cases – limited legal certainty. These factors make long-term economic cooperation more difficult and further constrain the already-cautious and bureaucratic engagement of German companies in the region.

China plays a particularly important role, having overtaken Russia in 2023 to become Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, accounting for around 21 per cent of the country’s total foreign trade.³ China’s economic influence is also growing steadily across the other Central Asian states. This development highlights the region’s growing geoeconomic importance and deserves far greater attention in Germany and Europe. Economic cooperation is not merely an economic instrument; it also has a geopolitical dimension, helping to secure influence and build long-term partnerships. In order to avoid placing Germany at an even greater disadvantage, investment decisions will therefore need to be taken much more swiftly in future. Only then will it be possible to seize strategic windows of opportunity that other actors – such as China and Turkey – are already exploiting in order to expand their economic presence and occupy emerging market niches.

Germany and the European Union – alongside the United States – continue to be regarded as important Western partners in the region. Central Asian states also widely view them as a counterweight to the growing dominance of China and Russia. At the same time, however, it is becoming clear that the effectiveness of Germany’s partnerships depends not only on strategic interests or political objectives, but also crucially on their practical implementation and speed as well as on a visible economic presence.

In the Central Asian context, the frequently used umbrella term “the West” does not fully capture these differences. Although Europe and the United States share the objective of offering the countries of the region an alternative to their powerful neighbours of Russia and China, their strategic priorities differ. While the European Union and Germany focus primarily on economic connectivity, on the diversification of trade routes, and on long-term partnerships based on environmental and legal standards, the United States views the region primarily through the prism of global major-power rivalry, placing greater emphasis on security policy.

Central Asia as a transit region between Europe and Asia

Central Asia is acquiring additional strategic importance through its role as a transit region between Europe and Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries have stepped up their efforts to identify alternative trade and transport routes that bypass Russia. In this context, the so-called Middle Corridor has come increasingly into focus – a route that runs from China through Central Asia and across the Caspian Sea, continuing via the South Caucasus and Turkey to Europe.

This development offers considerable economic opportunities for the Central Asian states. Infrastructure projects, rail links, and logistics hubs are becoming increasingly important. The planned China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway in particular could become a key component of Eurasia’s transport infrastructure in the long term.

At the same time, geopolitical competition for influence over trade routes and infrastructure projects is intensifying. While China has been investing heavily for years through its Belt and Road Initiative, the European Union is seeking to establish alternative offers through its Global Gateway initiative. For the Central Asian states, this competition creates additional room for manoeuvre, enabling them to balance different partners against one another and thus to avoid excessive dependence.

Sustainable energy as a bridge between Germany and Central Asia

The current geopolitical situation demonstrates just how urgent the diversification of energy sources has become. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the German government has stepped up its commitment to reducing dependence on Russian energy imports. In this context, Central Asia is gaining increasing importance as a potential partner for renewable energy and green hydrogen.

Although the countries of the region still rely heavily on fossil fuels, they are planning a significant expansion of renewable energy sources: Kazakhstan aims to generate 35 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2035, while Uzbekistan plans to increase the share of solar and wind power to 40 per cent by 2030.⁴ Germany should actively support this development and establish targeted energy partnerships with the Central Asian states.

Such cooperation not only serves German and European interests but also helps the region reduce economic and energy policy dependencies. A closer look, however, reveals a profound security dilemma as the Central Asian states do not present a united front in their positioning towards Moscow, instead remaining intertwined with Russia to very different degrees depending on the country. The economically weaker countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have very little room for manoeuvre in foreign policy: Russia’s military presence on their territory and their dependence on remittances from migrant workers tie them closely to Russia both politically and economically. By contrast, the regional heavyweights of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have succeeded in striking a balance, and both countries have gained greater room for manoeuvre in recent years. This is evident in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan having refused to give Moscow their open backing in its war against Ukraine and having emphasised Ukraine’s territorial integrity. At the same time, however, geographical and historical realities mean they cannot completely turn away from Russia.

These differences within the region are directly reflected in the energy sector and raise critical questions about the region’s long-term energy sovereignty. For example, Uzbekistan is currently stepping up its energy cooperation with Russia in the fields of natural gas and nuclear energy.⁵ Unlike Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan did not choose Russia as its partner for the construction of a new nuclear power plant, instead awarding the contract to China. This demonstrates that energy partnerships in Central Asia are far from uniform. Against this backdrop, diversification strategies are becoming increasingly important for the region’s energy policy as a whole. Germany in particular could play an important role in both renewable energy and the energy transition by supporting the Central Asian states in developing a sustainable, climate-friendly energy supply while at the same time providing a counterweight to dependence on Russian fossil energy sources.

In addition, climate change is becoming a growing security and economic policy challenge for Central Asia. The region is suffering from water scarcity, rising temperatures, and the retreat of glaciers. Conflicts over the use of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers could intensify further in the future. Water is of crucial importance, particularly for the region’s agriculture and energy supply. Germany and the European Union could therefore significantly expand their cooperation with Central Asia in the fields of water and climate policy.

Skilled workers as a game changer

Demographic trends pose a major challenge to Germany’s economic development, with around 530,000 vacancies remaining unfilled in 2023. By contrast, Central Asia has a young and growing population. Not all young people can be absorbed by the domestic labour markets of the Central Asian states, thereby creating a large pool of potential skilled workers for Germany. Recruiting qualified skilled workers from Central Asia is becoming a key area of bilateral cooperation between Germany and the region. The migration agreement between Germany and Uzbekistan entered into force on 5 March 2025 with the aim of facilitating labour migration. Compared with in 2023, the number of employment visas issued increased by 72 per cent in 2024.⁶ At the same time, the political dimension should not be overlooked because it reduces dependence on Russia as the principal destination for Central Asian migrant workers.

The example of Tajikistan illustrates just how politically sensitive the issue of labour migration is: Tajikistan’s economy is heavily dependent on remittances from Tajik migrant workers in Russia, which account for a significant share of the country’s gross domestic product. Any disruption to these financial flows would seriously jeopardise the country’s economic and social stability. This effectively gives Russia a powerful lever with which to exert influence over the Tajik government. The migration agreements would therefore not only help address Germany’s shortage of skilled workers but also – from a geopolitical perspective – contribute to reducing Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia. However, this will require a significant expansion of language training and skills development programmes.

Promoting the German language strengthens Germany’s influence in Central Asia

Russian remains by far the dominant foreign language in Central Asia. Although some countries in the region have boosted their national languages through a wide range of initiatives in recent years, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Russian continues to dominate science, business, and politics due mostly to the strong influence of the school and higher education system. This is reinforced by the numerous branches of Russian universities in Central Asia and by extensive educational partnerships with Russia.

Germany and the European Union have long underestimated this element of soft power and overlooked its considerable potential: In Uzbekistan alone, around 400,000 students are learning German. Expanding German language teaching across the region is crucial to the long-term success of the skilled worker agreement. The establishment of a regional office of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in Bishkek in 2025 laid important foundations. Nevertheless, the small number of permanent DAAD lectureships in Central Asia and the Goethe-Institut in Tashkent are not sufficient to meet the growing demand for German language teaching and create a counterweight to the dominant position of Russian. The German government must therefore recognise that additional investment in language education, academic cooperation, and cultural projects is essential if Germany’s influence in the region is to be strengthened on a sustainable basis.

In addition, it is important to assess whether establishing a branch campus of a German university in the region would be worthwhile. Successful English-language institutions such as Westminster International University Tashkent and Webster University Tashkent could serve as models.

Security policy interests

The region’s importance as a geostrategic hub between Russia, China, Afghanistan, and Iran was evident as early as between 2002 and 2015: During this period, the Bundeswehr operated an air transport hub in Termez, Uzbekistan, which ensured logistical support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Termez was briefly used as an evacuation hub, once again underlining the region’s strategic importance.

Taliban rule presents Germany with considerable diplomatic challenges because direct official contacts are politically undesirable. By contrast, the Central Asian states pursue a pragmatic approach towards Kabul and act as important intermediaries. Germany shares these states’ interest in containing instability in Afghanistan and regional conflicts while limiting irregular migration to Europe.

Of particular importance are the diplomatic channels through which the deportation of Afghan criminals is carried out via so-called third countries. In this context, Uzbekistan has repeatedly signalled its willingness to provide support. An interest-driven foreign policy offers itself as the appropriate approach: The use of these channels – together with support for the deportation of convicted criminals – should be reciprocated through increased development cooperation, for example, via GIZ.

Germany is also pursuing the objective of containing radicalisation and religious extremism. The terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk, Russia, on 22 March 2024 by Islamist extremists from Tajikistan illustrates the continuing threat. Germany is already involved in projects aimed at preventing extremism, particularly those that support vulnerable groups. In the longer term, this approach should be complemented by closer cooperation between the German and Central Asian security authorities.

The region’s geography further complicates the security situation. While the 140-kilometre border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan is relatively short and closely monitored, Tajikistan shares a 1,340-kilometre border with Afghanistan that is difficult to secure and repeatedly becomes the scene of incidents. At the end of December 2025, three terrorists and two Tajik border guards were killed in an armed clash.⁷ Germany and the European Union can support Tajikistan in strengthening its border security through modern technology that targets training and logistical assistance.

Central Asia is also a key region in the fight against drug trafficking. Around 80 per cent of the world’s illegally produced opium originated in Afghanistan in 2022. Although the Taliban’s ban has reduced production, trafficking has not ceased, meaning that Central Asia continues to serve as a key transit route.⁸ Close cooperation is therefore essential in order to safeguard both regional stability and Germany’s internal security.

Central Asia between Russia and China

The Central Asian states are generally regarded as lying within Russia’s sphere of influence. This assessment is understandable given the enduring Soviet legacy reflected in the close political, economic, and cultural ties of these states. Russia maintains military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and has extended its military cooperation with Uzbekistan until 2030.⁹ Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are also members of the Eurasian Economic Union.

At the same time, however, a shift is becoming apparent – one that has been further reinforced since 2022 as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: While the Central Asian states continue to maintain good relations with Russia, they are increasingly pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy in order to reduce one-sided dependencies.

China in particular continues to expand its influence in the region, increasingly shifting the geopolitical balance. Central Asia is of major geopolitical importance to China due to its natural resources and its role as a transit corridor between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.¹⁰ Through the Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, China is investing in large-scale infrastructure projects and providing extensive loans. The best-known example is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. The first China–Central Asia Summit – held in 2023 – also established a platform for intensifying cooperation. Whereas China had previously sought to include Russia, for example, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), it is now pursuing its own course with the China–Central Asia Summit.¹¹ Weakened politically, economically, and diplomatically by the war against Ukraine, Russia is facing growing competitive pressure from other external actors in Central Asia.

Turkey as another key player

Turkey is also expanding its influence in Central Asia. Through the Organisation of Turkic States, which was founded in 2009, Ankara is expanding its cultural, economic, and political ties with the Turkic-speaking countries of the region. Educational programmes, media cooperation, and infrastructure and economic projects play an essential role in this regard. These economic projects also serve to deepen bilateral ties and strengthen the long-term position of Turkish companies in the region. Turkey deliberately uses shared linguistic, cultural, and historical ties as the foundation of its soft power and regional policy. Turkish influence does not amount to hegemonic dominance, instead forming part of a multipolar competition involving Russia, China, and other external actors. Central Asia is thus increasingly developing into a region where the interests of competing middle and major powers converge.

Outlook for German foreign policy

In order to maintain its position alongside China, Russia, and Turkey, Germany must not remain passive but instead offer the Central Asian states a reliable long-term partnership. Success will depend on ensuring that German initiatives are not merely strategic in conception but are implemented more quickly, more visibly, and more effectively if Germany is to remain competitive with other actors, particularly China. Economic cooperation and skilled worker agreements should be expanded, the potential of energy partnerships should be harnessed, and numerous opportunities for cooperation in counter-terrorism should be taken advantage of.

Additionally, the role of the German language in the region should be strengthened in order to build long-term influence and societal ties through this form of soft power. Meanwhile, Germany’s development policy in Central Asia has thus far been strongly shaped by normative considerations: It should now be reviewed more critically and aligned more closely with strategic interests, regional realities, and long-term effectiveness. However, this does not preclude Germany from addressing human rights violations, restrictions on press freedom, and corruption in its discussions. Nonetheless, Germany must clearly define and communicate its own interests in Central Asia.

At the same time, it is also important to remain realistic: Russia’s and China’s influence cannot be prevented for geographical reasons alone. Instead, the key will be to create a reliable and attractive alternative that strengthens the West’s influence in the region. Against this backdrop, an update of the EU Strategy for Central Asia appears urgently needed. The German government should also consider developing its own Central Asia strategy in order to articulate its economic, security, and geopolitical interests more clearly. The strategic importance of the region for Germany and the European Union is likely to continue growing in the years ahead.

– translated from German –

André Algermißen is Director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Central Asia based in Tashkent.

1. Kullik, Jakob et al. 2026: Das Ende der Rohstoffpartnerschafts-Illusion?, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 27 Mar 2026, p. 50, in: https://ogy.de/l4ts [16 May 2026].↩︎
2. Strohbach, Jens Uwe 2025: Usbekistan in Zahlen 2025, Germany Trade and Invest, Deutsche Wirtschafts­vertretung in Zentralasien, 29 Sep 2025, p. 7, in: https://ogy.de/l7v1 [10 May 2026].↩︎
3. Skyner, Louis 2024: Wider dem geopolitischen Sturm. Usbekistans grüner Wandel zwischen Energiereform, Erdgasabhängigkeit und regionale Kooperation, Zentralasien-Analysen no. 165, 30 Sep 2024, pp. 2–7, here: p. 5, in: https://ogy.de/mejk [10 May 2026].↩︎
4. Ansari, Dawud et al. 2024: Die Golfstaaten, China und Zentralasiens grüner Energiesektor, SWP-Aktuell 63, 04 Dec 2024, p. 2, in: https://ogy.de/okey [10 May 2026].↩︎
5. Skyner 2024, n. 3, p. 2.↩︎
6. Deutscher Bundestag 2025: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Clara Bünger, Anne-Mieke Bremer, Mandy Eißing, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke, Drucksache 21/2374, 22 Oct 2025, p. 3, in: https://ogy.de/fulq [10 May 2026].↩︎
7. RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland 2025: Fünf Tote bei Gefechten an der tadschikisch-afghanischen Grenze, 25 Dec 2025, in: https://ogy.de/rb95 [10 May 2026].↩︎
8. Parlament Österreich / Parlamentsdirektion 2025: Dossier EU & Internationales zum Thema Zentralasien, 23 May 2025, p. 46, in: https://ogy.de/qtin [10 May 2026].↩︎
9. Ibid., p. 34.↩︎
10. Ibid., p. 36.↩︎
11. Ricker, Rebecca 2026: Machtkampf in Zentralasien, Deutschlandfunk, 26 Mar 2026, in: https://ogy.de/fg4m [10 May 2026].↩︎