Recommendations for a Realignment of German Development Cooperation

German development cooperation is under considerable pressure. Following budget cuts at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) under the country’s former three-party coalition, the new federal government has likewise announced reductions in development cooperation spending. Surveys show that public support for development cooperation expenditure is declining, though a majority of the public still supports German involvement in principle.¹ While there are legitimate points of criticism regarding the orientation and effectiveness of German development cooperation, nationalist populist forces such as the AfD seek to undermine the legitimacy of German development policy altogether, at times in highly polemical fashion. This situation is compounded by major upheavals at the international level, as reflected – inter alia – in an intensifying systemic conflict and in uncertainty in transatlantic relations. Of particular importance is the new development policy approach adopted by the United States, which has resulted in significant gaps in funding for development projects and has fundamentally altered the conditions under which development cooperation takes place.

Coherent foreign policy

German development cooperation will have no choice but to confront these financial and political realities and to realign accordingly. In adopting a holistic approach, Germany should do much more than before to align the promotion of development and democracy – and the protection of so-called global public goods, such as climate and health – with the pursuit of strategic goals in the areas of security, migration, and the economy. If this goal is to be achieved, development policy must be more closely coordinated with German foreign, security, and economic policy so as to increase the coherence of Germany’s external actions. In this context, the decision by the new governing coalition to introduce a National Security Council with a central coordinating role is an important first step towards a genuinely coherent foreign policy.

Values-based pragmatism

German development policy should be guided by a pragmatic stance that does not abandon the value orientation of development cooperation and that, at the same time, gives greater weight to geostrategic and geoeconomic considerations. Clear criteria are needed to determine how and where Germany is to engage in development policy, and a willingness to more extensively involve domestic business is also necessary. It is additionally worth taking an open look at the approaches adopted by countries that have long used their development cooperation in a highly strategic way and with the extensive involvement of domestic economic actors. In addition, German development policy should work more consistently to ensure that its offerings are based on real needs on the ground rather than being guided by the passing fashions of domestic debate. When it comes to communication with the domestic audience, it makes sense to place greater emphasis on explaining both why Germany can also benefit from effective development cooperation and why development policy is an important instrument of statecraft – one that many other countries use in a targeted manner.

Realistic goals

Such a “values-based pragmatism” has no hesitation in openly stating Germany’s strategic interests and is aware of both the potential and the limits of development engagement. This pragmatism stands for a form of development cooperation that sets realistic goals. However, what it does not do is pander to the forces that would recommend retreating into a nationalist protectionist fortress, that would discredit multilateral cooperation and that, in so doing, would advocate policies directly opposed to Germany’s interests. As an export nation and the world’s third-largest economy, Germany depends on trade, on cooperation and connectivity, and on benefits from positive developments in other world regions provided that Germany has good relations with them. This situation underlines the importance of efficient development cooperation, which – with its wide range of actors – can achieve tangible improvements and can positively influence Germany’s external image and international reputation.

Part of Germany’s soft power

Despite the undeniable challenges in ensuring that development cooperation is accurately targeted, Germany has built a strong reputation through its development engagement over recent decades along with what experts describe as a remarkable network by international standards – one “that is capable of supporting the work of diplomacy in both good times and bad”.² A complete departure from this development policy course would diminish Germany’s international standing and scope of influence while at the same time opening up new opportunities for systemic competitors such as Russia and China. Against the backdrop of the US withdrawal from multilateral forums and the severe consequences of the loss of a large amount of US development funding, expectations towards Germany and Europe are increasing. Germany should regard this situation as an opportunity: While the country obviously cannot replace the United States, it can demonstrate itself to be a reliable partner – especially now – through stable development cooperation and can also help to go at least some way towards countering the credibility crisis facing Western policy in many regions – a crisis that has been greatly accelerated by current US policy. Germany should view development policy as a relevant pillar of a strategically oriented foreign policy. In addition to promoting development in partner countries, development cooperation can also serve as an element of soft power that helps to advance Germany’s own foreign policy goals: After all, when pursued effectively, development cooperation enhances Germany’s political weight and power of persuasion internationally.³

Making development cooperation more strategic

Beginning around one decade ago, international relations have steadily shifted from a rules-based order – with comparatively broad acceptance of multilateral institutions – towards systemic rivalry and a revival of the notion of spheres of influence and power blocs. The main drivers of this development are Russia and China, which seek to undermine the world order established since the early 1990s – an order they believe guarantees the dominance of the “political West”. Russia’s goal is to weaken NATO and the EU in order to regain significant influence, particularly in the former Soviet republics, while China’s core foreign policy aim is to achieve hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and to overtake the United States as the world’s leading power within the next two decades.

Accordingly, the joint agenda of Moscow and Beijing in this systemic rivalry is to divide Western states, weaken or reshape multilateral organizations to serve their own purposes, and to discredit liberal democracies, not least through disinformation. These efforts also target countries outside the contested spheres of influence and power in Eastern and Central Europe and East Asia – notably in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In place of the Western-oriented liberal development paradigm, China and Russia promote infrastructure projects, trade relations, and military cooperation and additionally seek to build a global counter alliance and ultimately an alternative world order, not least through initiatives such as the expansion of the BRICS alliance. These efforts by Russia and China are now taking place against a backdrop of profound uncertainty in transatlantic relations – a situation that not only requires Europe to massively increase defence spending, but also raises the question as to the extent to which the United States still views itself as part of a Western community of values.

Given these heightened geopolitical tensions, Germany – as a central EU actor – will have to advocate more assertively at the international level for European interests and values. Development cooperation should play a role in this context and should be deliberately positioned as a counter-model to the authoritarian approaches of China and Russia, in which human rights and rule of law standards have no place. Given that resources are limited, it is important to give greater emphasis to the strategic significance of development cooperation without suggesting that German development cooperation could – on its own – solve complex challenges such as global migration movements, poverty reduction, or the stabilization of fragile regions. Development cooperation can only ever be one element of a broader approach to tackling these major issues: After all, their resolution depends first and foremost on the quality and political will of the governments concerned. This acknowledgement does not diminish the importance of development cooperation, but it does help guard against inflated expectations, which – as critics note – are by no means rare in the German development policy debate.⁴ A more strategic orientation of German development cooperation should include the following aspects:

Countering the appeal of anti-Western narratives

It is in Germany’s and Europe’s strategic interest not to leave the field open to actors such as Russia or China, particularly in geopolitically significant developing countries. The different players involved in German (and European) development cooperation can help counter Moscow’s and Beijing’s aggressive conduct and can also deprive of traction the narratives that predict the decline of the West, that praise China as the more “solidary” alternative, and that find a receptive audience in many developing countries.

In this context, particular importance is attached to development cooperation projects whose target groups are institutions and individuals capable both of influencing public debate in “systemically contested” countries and of helping to expose propaganda and disinformation. Examples include academic institutions, the research services of ministries or parliaments, think tanks, media outlets, and political parties as well as prominent individuals from politics, society, and academia. German development cooperation should thus place greater emphasis on building and strengthening such network-based cooperation, which can also yield geopolitical dividends.⁵ When it comes to public debate in strategically important countries, German development cooperation actors also need to be more aware of how the dissemination of certain elements drawn from post-colonial theory can play into the hands of systemic rivals seeking both to delegitimise the rules-based world order and to stir up anti-Western sentiment. German development cooperation should thus avoid uncritically perpetuating such “post-colonial reinterpretations and assumptions”.⁶ The same applies to the artificial and – in light of the enormous development progress made by many countries – no-longer-timely division of the world into a “Global North” and a “Global South”.

Development cooperation and security policy

Crises in ostensibly distant regions can spill over – as in the case of the so-called Islamic State – and can have direct consequences in Germany. Successful measures for conflict prevention therefore also have a positive impact on Germany’s own security. In line with the concept of “comprehensive approach”, development cooperation can contribute to stabilizing fragile states and to improving life prospects, thereby helping to make it more difficult, for instance, for terrorist actors from the Islamist spectrum to recruit new members.

As such, development cooperation should be understood as part of a broader strategy for achieving security policy objectives. Sustainable security policy is based not only on the indispensable strengthening of military capabilities – that is, on the promotion of hard power – but also on complementing these steps by investing in soft power. Ahead of the last Munich Security Conference, experienced politicians and diplomats stressed the “security policy dimension” of development cooperation in a cross-party appeal calling for adequate funding of German development cooperation: “Development policy is security policy”,⁷ they declared.

Strengthen cooperation and multilateralism

To pursue its foreign policy goals, Germany needs functioning multilateral organizations and the willingness of other states to support its objectives, for example, in the UN context. Development policy is one instrument for enhancing Germany’s reputation and power of persuasion, thereby facilitating the formation of alliances and expanding its scope of influence.⁸ A further value of development cooperation lies in Germany’s contribution to establishing reliable relationships and multiple channels of communication in developing countries as well as in generating detailed, on-the-ground knowledge of the local context – knowledge that can be put to use in foreign policy.⁹

It is in Germany’s interest to strengthen both multilateral institutions and the cooperative elements of the international order, which are under severe pressure, for example, from the neo-imperial ambitions of Russia and from the global resurgence of national protectionist tendencies. A system of global powers based on spheres of influence – such as that which Moscow is seeking to impose by force through its war against Ukraine – disregards the sovereignty and self-determination of other states and fundamentally contradicts German and European interests and values.

With regard to the protection of global public goods such as climate and health, effective multilateral organizations are also vital. It is therefore important for Germany to maintain a high level of support both for UN bodies – not least including the WHO – and for initiatives such as the Global Fund and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. This commitment is gaining in importance because current US development policy is already having serious consequences in the field of global health and is threatening to reverse significant progress that has been made in recent years. This situation applies to the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as well as to issues such as maternal health and child health.¹⁰ According to experts, Germany plays a leading role in promoting global health. The country should maintain this role, particularly because development cooperation measures in this area are considered especially effective and are also highly relevant for the well-being in Germany itself, for example when it comes to pandemic prevention.¹¹

Support for multilateral initiatives has also long become a fundamental question of Western credibility. A lack of credibility makes it more difficult to form alliances and can prompt (potential) partners to turn to other actors, thereby undermining a country’s own geopolitical position. This is another reason why it is important for Germany to continue to engage actively and reliably at the multilateral level and to take the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals as a point of reference for its own development policy. At the same time, and in line with the subsidiarity principle, there should also be regular scrutiny of which tasks are best addressed at the global, European, or national level.

Limit irregular migration

Irregular migration is the key mobilization issue for right-wing populist and right-wing extremist forces in Europe – forces that seek to undermine the central pillars of liberal democracy from within, to roll back the European integration process, and to act as influential amplifiers of pro-Russian narratives. If their further rise is to be prevented, a tangible reduction in irregular immigration to Europe is essential.

Development cooperation should be understood as one element in a strategy aimed at reducing irregular migration and at helping to ensure that people do not embark on the often-life-threatening journey to Europe. Strategic and ethical considerations can be well aligned in this regard. For instance, ensuring that facilities and relief organizations are adequately resourced to provide war refugees with dignified accommodation close to home is not only ethically defensible, but also in Germany’s interest since this reduces incentives to continue on to Europe. The 2015 refugee crisis demonstrated this point clearly, for instance, when cuts to food aid for Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries were one of the factors that prompted so many to make their way to Europe.¹² Given today’s acute humanitarian needs and large numbers of refugees, adequate funding for the relevant aid organizations (UNHCR, UNOCHA) is essential. It is also important to support fragile key countries in conflict regions that host particularly large numbers of refugees. As a key element of Germany’s soft power, development cooperation can also increase the willingness of partner countries to take back rejected asylum-seekers. Countries such as the UK, France, and Sweden have also integrated the issue of migration into their development policy. German development cooperation should place greater emphasis on reducing the causes of displacement while also critically examining the extent to which past approaches have been successful or have even created undesirable incentives (as in Afghanistan).

Promote democracy pragmatically

The promotion of democracy and the rule of law remains crucial as part of a development policy that is more closely oriented towards strategic interests. The examples of Canada and France show that a values-driven development policy and the pursuit of one’s own interests need not be mutually exclusive. However, the case of the UK does illustrate that finding the right balance can be challenging: In recent years, Britain has aligned its development policy more closely with foreign policy priorities by merging its development and foreign ministries, but according to critics, the nation has lost development relevance – and thus also international standing and influence overall – due to budget cuts and an excessive focus on short-term goals.¹³

Germany is well advised to promote democracy and the rule of law. A strong rule of law increases the likelihood that investments will not be dissipated, while stable and representative institutions reduce the risk of instability. Democracies are generally assumed to make better allies: The likelihood of good relations with Germany and the EU is greater in democratic societies, so we might speak of a “geopolitical dividend of promoting democracy”. Some countries – especially in Latin America – prefer Germany and Europe as partners precisely due to shared values.

When promoting democracy, however, a realistic mindset and long-term commitment are essential: Indeed, expecting far-reaching progress in a short time inevitably leads to disappointment. All development cooperation efforts in this field must be seen in light of the fact that more than 70 per cent of the world’s population lives under regimes with autocratic characteristics. According to an OECD study, around 80 per cent of all public development funds in 2021 went to autocracies. Development policy cannot avoid working with autocracies, but it must be aware that development cooperation funds can indirectly stabilize authoritarian rule. This situation makes it particularly important to assess the weighting of individual instruments, priorities, target groups, and recipient countries.

In the case of transition countries and fragile democracies, the focus should be much more than at present on strengthening representative political institutions (parliaments and parties). The aim here is explicitly not to impose ready-made (democracy) templates; rather, considering the presence of illiberal donor states, development cooperation funds should be used more to strengthen networks and – where they exist – representative institutions, which can act as multipliers and can promote democratic approaches. Combating disinformation should also take on greater importance.

It is not uncommon to hear from countries where German development cooperation is active that Germany’s offerings do not reflect local needs. In order to ensure relevant thematic priorities, it is essential to detach from domestic socio-political debate and to focus both on what is in demand in partner countries and on what resonates with their societies. An overly didactic approach – be it on social issues or on climate matters – triggers defensive reactions and must be avoided at all costs.

Think of development cooperation in more European terms

German development cooperation alone cannot possibly provide solutions to the multitude of global challenges; therefore, it will need to prioritize more clearly in terms of both substance and geography. Any debate about realigning German development cooperation should thus take account of the European context and should note strategic changes both in other EU member states and in Brussels. Stronger intra-European coordination does not mean abolishing national development policies. The conditions for a full Europeanization of development cooperation – as some have called for – are not (yet) in place because the interests and priorities of EU member states sometimes differ too starkly. Moreover, the European Commission would likely still be overburdened with such a task.

Nonetheless, German development cooperation should be more closely aligned with that of the EU and its member states so as to avoid redundancies, to make good use of resources, and to present competitive offers to key partners. It makes sense to strengthen coordination between national development policies (with the medium- to long-term goal of task-sharing within Europe) so that the specific expertise of individual states can be drawn on more systematically. For instance, Estonia could take a stronger role in supporting digitalization in partner countries, whereas Denmark and Germany have extensive capabilities in water management. No other EU state has such in-depth expertise in strengthening the rule of law, in building institutions (especially in work with parties and parliaments), or in promoting democracy as Germany does.

The success of the Global Gateway initiative – which was launched by the European Commission at the end of 2021 – is also in Germany’s interest. The aim should primarily be to promote sustainable infrastructure projects in partner countries, to do more to involve the private sector, and to deliver not only geopolitical benefits, but also an economic dividend for the EU. However, the initiative has not yet achieved the anticipated impact. Germany should also take an active role in discussions on a long-term reform of European development cooperation and – in negotiations on the EU Multiannual Financial Framework (2028 to 2035) – should advocate for a European development and partnership policy that is not geopolitically “blind”; that seeks a sound balance between Global Gateway projects, democracy promotion, and traditional development policy; that takes a more incentive-based approach (also by reducing direct budget support for certain autocratic countries); and that more closely addresses the reduction of causes of displacement based on a strategy for fragile states in the EU’s extended neighbourhood. Germany should additionally press for the amendment or suspension of legislative acts (such as the deforestation regulation and sustainability reporting requirements) where these hamper cooperation with key partner countries and place disproportionate burdens on the engagement of European businesses.

Develop clear criteria

In order to make German development cooperation more strategic, a criteria catalogue – which has been called for in the past – should be drawn up as the basis for government-to-government development cooperation – that is, for the “financially intense” projects implemented by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the KfW Development Bank. Within the group of countries eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA), this catalogue should prioritize countries that are of particular relevance politically or economically. The terms “geostrategic” and “geoeconomic” could be operationalized using categories such as demographics, geographical location, resource endowment (especially rare earths), and diplomatic relevance. Existing Russian or Chinese influence should not in itself be a disqualifying factor, though countries that have effectively become satellite states of Beijing or Moscow should no longer receive development funds.

It is not possible to ever fully resolve the tension between engaging with strategically important actors – often with autocratic systems – on the one hand and the aspiration to promote democracy on the other hand. Examples can be found in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea littoral states. Although the framework conditions for development cooperation in countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia often leave much to be desired, the influence of China, Russia, and Middle Eastern actors; individuals’ migration potential; the competition for resources; and the region’s location along a key shipping route are – from the perspective of Germany and its allies – weighty arguments for maintaining a presence on the ground. Only such a presence can limit the influence of competing actors and secure or indeed create Germany’s own channels of communication. Another strategically important region – not least from a security and migration policy perspective – is the Sahel. Additionally, Germany and Europe have an obvious interest in bringing about a successful stabilization process in Syria.

Make development cooperation more business-oriented

Economic development is crucial when it comes to reducing poverty and increasing prosperity. Despite undeniable progress, the challenges in many countries remain substantial. It is thus hardly surprising that in many development partnership countries, priorities such as private sector promotion, infrastructure development, the expansion of trade relations, greater investment, and improved vocational training rank high on the agenda.

German companies can also make an important contribution to development in partner countries by creating jobs, generating local added value, and transferring technology and know-how, particularly given these companies’ strong reputations for environmental and social standards and for vocational training. In considering the role that development cooperation can play here, it is worth looking at other countries that regard greater involvement of domestic business actors as integral to their own development policies. The Netherlands, for example, is seen as a pioneer in this area, implementing close linkages between development and foreign trade policy with the goal of strengthening both trade and sustainability. The country relies in particular on public-private partnerships that promote cooperation between companies and state actors. However, the extent to which the cuts announced by the outgoing Dutch government will alter the development cooperation policy of the Netherlands remains unclear.

German development cooperation should be aligned more closely with business, thereby bringing it more into line with the approach adopted by other countries. Critics of development cooperation point out that under the former German government in particular there was an almost-complete disregard for the interests of German companies¹⁴  – something that is also damaging to the broad public acceptance of development cooperation in general. Instead, German development cooperation should take more targeted action at various levels to make it easier for German companies to engage in developing and emerging economies.

More opportunities, fair competition

Many geostrategic competitors tie development assistance to the condition that their own companies be involved in implementing projects (tied aid). OECD countries also frequently link their engagement in developing countries to the inclusion of domestic firms: According to the Federation of German Industries, Japan, the US, France, and the UK awarded between 60 and 85 per cent of their contract volume to domestic companies in 2019/2020 even though they declared the bulk of their ODA-eligible spending to be untied aid. In Germany, by contrast, the proportion of domestic companies benefiting from state-funded development cooperation projects was significantly lower, at around 11 per cent.¹⁵ German development policy must address this imbalance in the interest of creating a level playing field and must also make use of the flexibilities allowed under OECD rules on tying aid in the same way that other OECD competitors clearly do.

Compounding this situation, Chinese companies are often favoured in awards that prioritize cost above all else thanks to state subsidies. Award practices for development cooperation funds managed by the KfW that emphasize sustainability, social factors, and high technical quality standards can improve the prospects of German (and European) companies in developing countries.¹⁶ There should also be a fundamental discussion on whether the current tendering practices – which often benefit systemic rivals – are still appropriate in light of present geopolitical developments.¹⁷

In addition, there should be a move towards increased competition between the GIZ and other major players (e.g. industry associations, the consulting sector) through open tenders for development cooperation programmes that promote economic development. This move would not only bring greater transparency, but also give specialist industry associations the opportunity to contribute their expertise to the implementation of development cooperation measures in the interest of German business.

Good governance in the raw materials sector

Given the need to reduce economic dependencies that are potentially harmful from a security policy perspective, Germany and the EU face the challenge of diversifying their procurement markets, especially for critical raw materials. Countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa in particular can play an important role here. A raw materials strategy should be backed up by development policy measures.¹⁸ Beyond supporting economic actors in meeting supply chain requirements, this strategy also involves promoting “good governance in the raw materials sector”.¹⁹ However, while these requirements clearly pursue laudable goals, it is worth questioning the extent to which extensive supply chain regulations ultimately have counterproductive effects given that they impose a high administrative burden on companies. If German companies ultimately shy away from investing in developing countries due to high hurdles and if firms from systemic rival countries with lower labour or environmental standards step in instead, this situation benefits neither Germany’s diversification efforts nor the country’s development policy objectives.²⁰

Do more to highlight the benefits of development cooperation

At a time when public consensus on development cooperation is eroding, a greater focus on geostrategic and geoeconomic interests can help restore acceptance of the policy field. Partner countries also generally welcome it when Germany communicates its own interests openly because doing so is perceived not only as legitimate, but also as a sign of transparency and respect. By contrast, measures and concepts should be avoided that can fuel accusations of paternalism in partner countries and that can polarize debate at home, thereby weakening public support for development cooperation in Germany itself.²¹

In order to reverse the trend of declining support for development cooperation, it makes sense to explain more clearly why development engagement in various fields also benefits people in Germany. In addition to migration, security, and economic issues, these benefits are also easily understandable in global health and climate protection. The COVID-19 pandemic in particular has shown that in an interconnected world, regional developments can have potentially devastating global repercussions. The same is obviously true of climate change, which does not stop at borders. This observation shows that using development cooperation funds in these areas not only is sound in itself, but is also easy to communicate to large sections of the German public since the link to individuals’ own lives and well-being is self-evident. A similar approach is adopted by the UK (clean energy, climate resilience, biodiversity), France (climate change, epidemic prevention), Norway (combating infectious diseases, environmental and climate protection), and Sweden (health protection, climate adaptation).

Better communication also means openly acknowledging failures and avoiding unrealistic objectives that not only overestimate Germany’s influence, but – when inevitably unmet – hand (right-wing) populist forces arguments for their blanket criticism of development engagement. Conversely, positive trends to which development cooperation has – according to experts – “significantly and comprehensively”²² contributed should be communicated more clearly, such as reductions in child mortality as well as improvements in healthcare and education.²³

Regardless of the necessary closer integration with other policy areas, development cooperation requires a certain degree of autonomy,²⁴ which also means taking account of premises that go beyond cost–benefit considerations. From a Christian Democratic perspective in particular, it remains an ethical duty to pursue development cooperation with the aim of alleviating suffering, reducing poverty, and improving people’s prospects. Voices in public discourse that seek to discredit ethical considerations in development policy outright should be confidently rebuffed. The Christian Democratic development policy narrative additionally differs from that of the Green and left-wing political spectrum because it is rooted in Christian personalism and in a Christian ethic of responsibility while striving for a balance between global responsibility and pragmatic interest-based policy and also adhering to the principles of the social market economy, which include solidarity as well as freedom, individual responsibility, and subsidiarity. Development cooperation is not an end in itself; rather, its ultimate goal is to make itself redundant.

Conclusion

Development cooperation is increasingly caught up in the vortex of geopolitical rivalries. This situation may be regrettable, but it cannot be changed. German development cooperation must thus respond accordingly. It should pursue a pragmatic approach that takes strategic and economic interests more fully into account than has been done in the past, also as a way of halting the trend of declining support for development cooperation measures at home.

One thing is clear: Many developing countries have little interest in aligning themselves with any particular geopolitical bloc. And today, they have a choice: Alongside China, actors such as Turkey and the Gulf states are also courting the favour of these developing countries in highly strategic ways and view development cooperation as a key element of their foreign policy. Germany and the EU will thus only play an important role in (potential) partner countries if they offer proposals that meet actual demand on the ground – and communicate their own interests openly rather than concealing them.

 

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– translated from German –

 

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Ingo Badoreck is Policy Adviser for Economics and Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Dr Susanne Conrad is Policy Adviser for Rule of Law and Security in Sub-Saharan Africa and for Anglophone West Africa at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Magdalena Jetschgo is Policy Adviser for Development Policy at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Fabian Wagener is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Media Programme Asia. Until April 2025, he was Multimedia Editor for International Reports.

Dr Olaf Wientzek is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Multinational Development Policy Dialogue Brussels.

Nils Wörmer is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa, based in Kampala.

 

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2. Thomas Bonschab and Robert Kappel, “Für eine Neujustierung der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit der Wirtschaft”, in Thomas Bonschab et al. (eds.), Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in der Diskussion (2025): pp. 51–54, here p. 51, https://ogy.de/iwje, accessed 31 July 2025. ↩︎
3. Robert Kappel, “Neuaufstellung der Entwicklungspolitik erforderlich”, in ibid., pp. 32–37, here p. 35; Stephan Klingebiel, “Offene strategische Autonomie: eine entwicklungspolitische Standortbestimmung und Positionierung für die deutsche Entwicklungspolitik”, IDOS Policy Brief, no. 26 (2024), German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), p. 8, https://ogy.de/aa66, accessed 31 July 2025. ↩︎
4. Thomas Bonschab and Robert Kappel, “Nach den Etatkürzungen: Welche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit will Deutschland?”, in ibid., pp. 26–31. ↩︎
5. Kappel 2025, n. 3, p. 36. ↩︎
6. Andreas Jacobs, “Westuntergang – Über die Ziele postkolonialer Dekonstruktion”, Die Politische Meinung Website, published 6 December 2024, https://ogy.de/5pjj, accessed 31 July 2025. ↩︎
7. Marina Kormbaki, “Prominente Ex-Politiker fordern mehr Geld für Globalen Süden”, Der Spiegel Website, published 15 February 2024, https://ogy.de/8u0j, accessed 2 July 2025; Charles Martin-Shields and Julia Leininger, Warum Entwicklungspolitik zentral für den Erfolg deutscher Sicherheitspolitik ist, Table Media Website, published 11 March 2025, https://ogy.de/gl8c, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
8. Klingebiel 2024, n. 3. ↩︎
9. Martin-Shields and Leininger 2025, n. 7. ↩︎
10. Christoph Strupat and Srinivasa Srigiri, Weltgesundheitstag 2025 – Deutschlands Führungsrolle in der globalen Gesundheit stärken, IDOS Website, published 7 April 2025, https://ogy.de/oxv4, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
11. Ibid. ↩︎
12. Thomas Gutschker, Wie der Hunger die Syrer in die Flucht trieb, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Website, published 8 November 2015, https://ogy.de/m15n, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
13. Stephan Klingebiel, “Beyond Mergers: Charting Germany’s Development Policy in a Changing World”, in Global Policy Journal, published 28 November 2024, https://ogy.de/3cn5, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
14. Bonschab and Kappel 2025, n. 2, pp. 52–53. ↩︎
15. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Zeit für eine entwicklungspolitische Zeitenwende, BDI Website, published 20 February 2024, p. 27, https://ogy.de/n3lr, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
16. BDI 2024, n. 15, p. 15 and p. 28; Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der CDU/CSU, Drucksache 20/7485, Deutscher Bundestag Website, published 27 June 2023, p. 3, https://ogy.de/luym, accessed 2 July 2025; Subsahara-Afrika Initiative der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Mehr Wirtschaft mit Afrika – Was die Politik beitragen kann, BDI Website, published 6 June 2017, p. 9, https://ogy.de/l5ax, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
17. BDI 2024, n. 15, pp. 25 and 27. ↩︎
18. Inga Carry, Melanie Müller and Meike Schulze, “Elemente einer nachhaltigen Rohstoffaußenpolitik”, AP no. 1, SWP Berlin Website, published June 2023, p. 3, https://ogy.de/tgaa, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
19. Ibid., p. 20. ↩︎
20. Gerhard Wahlers, “Was wird aus der Globalisierung?”, in Auslandsinformationen 2/2024, Editorial, published 20 August 2024, https://ogy.de/9hki, accessed 2 July 2025. ↩︎
21. Sebastian H. Schneider et al., “Die öffentliche Unterstützung für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sinkt – Fünf Erklärungsansätze”, in DEval, Policy Brief 1/2025, published 2025, https://ogy.de/n63l, accessed 31 July 2025; Nora Sassenhagen, Sebastian H. Schneider and Martin Bruder, “Feministische Entwicklungspolitik: Was denkt die Bevölkerung? Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Umfrage”, in DEval, Policy Brief 2/2025, published 2023, https://ogy.de/8f5o, accessed 31 July 2025. ↩︎
22. Theo Rauch, “Warum die Welt weiterhin internationale EZ braucht. Und warum diese sich grundlegend ändern muss”, in Bonschab et al. (eds.) 2025, n. 2, pp. 39–49, here p. 43. ↩︎
23. Ibid. ↩︎
24. Klingebiel 2024, n. 3. ↩︎