The Foreign Policy Dimension of Germany’s New Approach to Migration

In its first year in office, the German government initiated a new direction in German migration policy that is already producing measurable results. The focus was on implementing a series of domestic policy measures aimed primarily at effectively reducing irregular migration to Germany. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that migration is not a policy area that can be addressed through domestic measures alone. Instead, Germany increasingly depends on effective foreign relations and partnership-based approaches to migration policy.

Over the last few decades, Germany has gained extensive experience in European and international migration cooperation and has concluded a wide range of agreements and partnerships in order to improve migration management – from the early guest worker agreements and bilateral readmission agreements to comprehensive migration arrangements at the European level with neighbouring and transit countries as well as mobility partnerships for recruiting skilled workers. One of the best-known examples is the EU–Turkey statement concluded ten years ago under Chancellor Angela Merkel,¹ which – despite its structural shortcomings – is still regarded today as a blueprint for migration cooperation with non-EU countries.

In light of current geopolitical and economic upheavals, Germany will continue to need strong European and international partners in order to manage migration in the future. The strategic design of such partnerships should therefore be guided by three key migration policy objectives, which are outlined below:

1. managing and reducing irregular migration through effective control of irregular entries into the European Union,
2. strengthening protection and reception systems worldwide in order to prevent onward movement and regional destabilisation, and
3. recruiting skilled and other workers from non-EU countries in order to enhance the competitiveness of the German labour market.

Managing and reducing irregular migration

The current priority of German migration policy is to ensure effective control of irregular entries into Germany and – more broadly – the European Union. One point is clear: Effective protection of the European Union’s external borders is indispensable in order to bring temporary internal border controls to a permanent end and uphold the fundamental principle of free movement guaranteed by the Schengen Agreement. This requires close cooperation with Germany’s European partners.

In this context, the agreement² reached in May 2024 between the EU Member States and the European Parliament on the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) following years of negotiations is of crucial importance in addressing a range of dysfunctions in European asylum policy that have long fuelled public dissatisfaction across Europe and strengthened populist forces.

The CEAS reform establishes a new foundation for European cooperation in asylum policy³ with the aim of bringing asylum migration to the EU under better control by introducing uniform procedures and standards and redefining responsibilities among the Member States in order to ensure a fairer sharing of responsibility.

A key element of the new rules – which have applied since June 2026 – is the introduction of accelerated border procedures at the Schengen external borders. Applications from people with few prospects of being granted protection are to be decided within 12 weeks, while new arrivals with no valid protection claim are to be returned more quickly to their countries of origin or to other third countries.

Alongside closer cooperation within the EU, the joint implementation of the new rules therefore places greater cooperation with non-EU countries at the heart of migration policy solutions. Partnership-based solutions with third countries are essential to the successful implementation of accelerated procedures at the EU’s external borders. For this reason, stronger integration of migration into international relations is a mandatory component of the European asylum reform – the so-called “external dimension”.⁴

Against this backdrop, the German government joined an initiative launched by like-minded European countries earlier this year to work with the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, and Greece on the implementation of so-called “return hubs”,⁵ which are facilities outside the European Union where the return of rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin would be organised on an extraterritorial basis. More far-reaching models involving so-called “safe third countries”⁶ are also under discussion, including the possibility of conducting asylum procedures outside the European Union.

The fact that Germany is now increasingly seen at the European level as a driving force behind structural reform and common solutions in asylum and migration policy rather than as an obstacle sends an important signal to its European partners. At the same time, implementing such approaches in practice may prove challenging, as demonstrated by the attempts of individual European governments in recent years to relocate asylum procedures to third countries. The most prominent examples are the Italy–Albania agreement⁷ and the UK government’s Rwanda plan.⁸ Both models have ultimately foundered on legal uncertainties and have also exposed the practical challenges that can arise during implementation.

The absence of successful case studies makes one point clear: The implementation of safe third-country models is a question not only of legal permissibility or political will, but also of the institutional capacity of potential partner countries.⁹ Several questions arise in this regard: Which countries outside the European Union can be persuaded to engage in this kind of cooperation while also meeting the stringent legal conditions (also with regard to human rights) and logistical requirements? Moreover, where can fair procedures and decent living conditions actually be guaranteed on the ground? These considerations highlight the foreign and development policy dimension inherent in the question of partner countries.

From Germany’s perspective, alongside advancing new European pilot projects such as return hubs, conventional bilateral readmission agreements with rejected asylum seekers’ countries of origin remain of central importance when it comes to controlling irregular migration. Given the persistently low return rates for individuals who are legally required to leave the country, effective agreements with key countries of origin or transit – such as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan – are a crucial means of strengthening public confidence in the state’s ability to act.

Until the new control and management mechanisms at the EU’s external borders begin to deliver lasting results, cooperation agreements with third countries such as Turkey and the Maghreb states that are designed to curb irregular migration and migrant smuggling along the main migration routes will also remain an important pillar of German and European migration policy.

Strengthening international protection and reception systems

Alongside improving the management of irregular migration both at the EU’s external borders and along the main migration routes, Germany has a fundamental interest in ensuring that protection and reception systems for people fleeing war and displacement remain functional beyond Europe.

From a humanitarian perspective, this means continuing to uphold the obligations under international law arising from an international refugee protection system based on shared responsibility. This includes in particular the principle of non-refoulement – enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention – under which no one may be returned to a place where they face an immediate threat.¹⁰ Today, 149 states are legally bound by this fundamental principle.¹¹

Over recent decades, the presence of multilateral organisations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – together with numerous humanitarian and development actors – has helped establish structures in many places that ensure the humane reception of and basic support for people seeking protection. However, these multilateral structures on which countries around the world have relied have not been sufficiently adapted to changing geopolitical realities. This has become particularly evident in the United Nations system, which is currently undergoing a profound transformation and has come under pressure in many areas as a result of a dramatically altered geopolitical landscape combined with substantial funding cuts.

Against this backdrop, stabilising reception and support structures is also of great importance from a foreign and security policy perspective. If protection and support systems collapse in key host countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, or Uganda, this can trigger political tensions, socio-economic crises, or secondary migration movements that further destabilise entire regions and that may also have indirect repercussions for Europe.

The rapid spread of wars and conflicts around the world is not only leading to a sharp increase in refugee movements and internal displacement: Indeed, the growing erosion of statehood across entire regions means that over the medium term, fewer and fewer countries will have sufficient reception capacity to provide protection for large numbers of people fleeing conflict. The situation is particularly challenging in fragile contexts such as the Sahel, where weak state institutions and increasing geopolitical influence exerted by external actors such as Russia are reducing the scope for action precisely where needs are greatest.¹² The war in Sudan – which has developed into the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis – is also destabilising neighbouring major host countries such as Ethiopia, Egypt, and Chad, all of which are increasingly reaching the limits of their reception capacity.

Countering this dynamic requires an effective combination of foreign, security, and development policy approaches. Germany has an important role to play here thanks to its extensive network of partners in the areas of foreign policy and development policy. Given the increasingly scarce financial resources and declining public support for development policy, the challenge is to maintain international partnerships – such as those with the UNHCR – and to continue strengthening multilateral structures for the reception and support of people seeking protection while at the same time promoting reforms that – in the face of limited resources – improve coordination among the actors involved and sharpen their strategic focus.

Effective protection and reception systems are most likely to emerge where humanitarian assistance, a minimum degree of state stability, and public willingness to receive those in need reinforce one another. Achieving this requires not only cooperation between states, but also closer coordination within the international community and a reliable network of relationships with local actors and civil society. Organisations such as the political foundations that operate at this interface can make an important contribution to strengthening partnership structures that enhance the institutional capacity and societal resilience of host countries.

International recruitment of workers and skilled professionals

Demographic trends in Germany and Europe are leading to labour and skills shortages that are set to intensify for the foreseeable future and that will not be capable of being offset solely by increasing the domestic or European labour supply. In addition to systemically important sectors such as healthcare, construction, and logistics, this particularly concerns STEM professions (i.e. science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), which are crucial to economic transformation and international competitiveness.¹³

In recent years, Germany has concluded a number of agreements with countries outside the European Union designed to strengthen the immigration of qualified workers into the labour market. The migration and mobility agreement concluded between Germany and India in 2022 has proved particularly successful,¹⁴ with a substantial proportion of labour migration to Germany from outside Europe now coming from India. These Indian skilled workers are of particular importance to Germany’s STEM sector as they work in shortage occupations for which there are insufficient numbers of German or European university graduates. Between 2012 and 2024, the number of people from India in socially insured employment in academic STEM professions increased more than eightfold – from just under 4,000 to almost 33,000.¹⁵

Overall, however, labour migration from outside Europe remains at a very low level compared with other forms of immigration. In 2023, just over 70,000 people from non-EU countries were granted a residence permit for the purpose of employment.¹⁶ By comparison, more than 500,000 third-country nationals came to Germany for humanitarian reasons, more than 100,000 for family reasons, and almost 60,000 for educational purposes. As a result, fewer than ten per cent of immigration to Germany from outside Europe was labour market related.¹⁷

Government initiatives in recent years designed to increase labour migration from outside Europe have fallen short of their potential in practice. This also applies to the agreements initiated through the Office of the Federal Government Special Commissioner for Migration Agreements, which was created under the previous coalition government with Morocco, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kenya, and Colombia. While these agreements have sent out an important political signal and opened up new channels of cooperation, their impact in numerical terms has thus far fallen short of expectations.

In order to improve labour migration, Germany needs to fundamentally rethink its partnerships in this field by adopting a strategy based more firmly on economic realities by involving private-sector actors at an early stage and responding to the actual needs of German employers.

The example of India reveals that market-oriented mobility partnerships^I with economically and demographically dynamic third countries can in principle work and deliver benefits for all parties. Cooperation with India works so well because talent mobility is at the heart of the partnership, aligning demand, skills profiles, and institutional conditions in a mutually reinforcing way.

Particularly favourable conditions for comparable partnerships exist in populous, market-oriented countries whose labour markets are unable to absorb younger – and in some cases, well-qualified – generations, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America. Making greater use of this potential in future remains an important objective of both migration and economic policy.

Understanding migration management as an ongoing task of foreign policy

In the years ahead, migration will increasingly evolve for Germany from a policy area shaped primarily by domestic political debate into a central field of action and strategic interest in the country’s foreign relations. When it comes to addressing the challenges of the future, robust partnerships both within and beyond Europe will be a necessity rather than a luxury.

A modern migration policy guided by the principle of “humanity and order” – while also seeking to strengthen Germany’s competitiveness – should consistently take account of all three migration policy objectives outlined in this paper in its international relations, linking them strategically wherever possible.

Aligning the objectives of migration partnerships across government

A fundamental prerequisite for establishing and expanding international migration partnerships is that Germany’s migration policy objectives and interests in individual countries and regions be coordinated across government and presented externally in a coherent manner.

To that end, the current German government appointed Ludwig Jung as Ambassador for Migration Cooperation at the beginning of 2026.¹⁸ In so doing, it replaced the Office of the Special Commissioner for Migration Agreements, which had been created in 2023 under the previous coalition government. One of Jung’s initial priorities is bilateral agreements and European projects aimed at improving returns of rejected asylum seekers to their principal countries of origin.¹⁹

In the longer term, however, the objective is more ambitious: to develop a form of migration diplomacy that coordinates international migration cooperation across government and that strategically links migration policy objectives with other policy areas. As the ongoing debates on return and reconstruction in Syria demonstrate, this requires integrating complex interests in the areas of domestic, foreign, and development policy as well as resolving competing policy objectives, which calls for diplomatic skill, also when engaging with difficult actors.

Some European governments view migration more explicitly as a strategic field of foreign policy action and influence. For instance, countries such as Switzerland and Sweden pursue so-called “whole-of-government” approaches, closely integrating migration, foreign, and development policy instruments, while countries such as Italy and Greece have successfully embedded migration as a central issue within their European and Mediterranean diplomacy. Some of these approaches and experiences could also be incorporated into Germany’s migration diplomacy. However, this would require closer strategic cooperation across government departments, for example, in determining how conditionality should be effectively applied in development cooperation or how different policy areas could be more effectively linked within Germany’s foreign relations.

Distinguish policy objectives conceptually, but link them strategically

In order to achieve tangible results in international migration cooperation, the first step is to identify suitable partners more precisely according to the relevant migration policy priorities and objectives. The relevant partner countries and institutional frameworks may differ depending on whether the primary objective is to manage and reduce irregular migration, to stabilise crisis and conflict regions, or to recruit skilled workers.

One fundamental weakness of existing cooperation approaches is that they do not sufficiently differentiate between these different policy objectives. Public debate is dominated by simplified “win-win” narratives suggesting that Germany can automatically reduce irregular migration by making legal migration pathways easier.

Agreements designed in this way may be persuasive from a communications perspective; in practice, however, this conflation of different policy objectives has proved to be of limited effectiveness. For example, the stated objective of the migration agreement that was concluded with Kenya in September 2024 was to create legal pathways for skilled professionals and other workers from Kenya while at the same time reducing irregular migration, thereby achieving both objectives simultaneously. In numerical terms, however, the agreement has fallen well short of expectations. This is due firstly to the fact that the number of Kenyan nationals entering Germany irregularly has always been very low. Secondly, the existing potential for training and placing Kenyan skilled and other workers has thus far not been sufficiently exploited.

In principle, closer cooperation on the issue of skilled workers with countries such as Kenya and Uzbekistan should be welcomed since Germany enjoys good bilateral relations with these countries and the political and demographic conditions offer mutual opportunities. Initial pilot projects may well produce positive results, such as the targeted recruitment of bus drivers from Kenya for local public transport in Schleswig-Holstein. However, these projects are not underpinned by targets capable of bringing about structural improvements or sustainably reducing the still-substantial skills shortages in key sectors of the economy.

The Western Balkans Regulation that was introduced in 2015 is regarded as a positive example in this respect, granting workers from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia privileged access to the German labour market subject to certain conditions. Between 2019 and 2024, the number of citizens from the Western Balkan countries in socially insured employment in Germany increased from 356,000 to 521,000.²⁰ Many of these citizens work in skilled occupations or shortage sectors such as construction and care.²¹ At the same time, asylum application numbers from the Western Balkans have declined steadily since 2016.

The Western Balkans model can only be transferred to other regions outside the European Union to a very limited extent. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that strategically designed partnerships that effectively combine the management of irregular migration with the immigration of skilled workers can produce measurable results over the longer term. Compared with other migration agreements with third countries, the success of this partnership lies in its stronger labour market orientation and its lesser emphasis on development policy.

However, a clearer conceptual distinction and differentiation between policy objectives should not lead to an overly one-dimensional view of partnerships. Some countries are important partners to Germany and Europe in several respects. In the German debate, countries such as Uganda are discussed primarily as potential partners for extraterritorial approaches to curbing irregular migration to Europe, such as the planned return centres. In this connection, the fact that Uganda is already one of the principal host countries for refugees in East Africa and – through its comparatively open protection system – provides refuge for almost two million refugees from neighbouring countries such as South Sudan is often overlooked.²² In addition, the country’s young population gives it considerable potential as a source of labour and skilled migration. An overly one-sided approach to migration cooperation would fail to reflect Uganda’s actual role and could unnecessarily limit opportunities for cooperation.

Taking the societal dimension into account

The societal dimension should also be factored into migration partnerships. The track record of migration agreements to date has often been disappointing in more than only quantitative terms.

A European approach to migration cooperation that has in some cases focused too narrowly on preventing irregular entry into the EU – described by critics as a “gatekeeper policy” – has in many places led to growing societal disengagement from Europe. In the Maghreb countries and the Middle East, easier access to the EU for skilled workers and graduates has repeatedly been promised. In most cases, however, these promises have not been fulfilled.

This situation not only results in younger generations increasingly turning away from Europe but also weakens public support and the political willingness to expand migration cooperation with Europe. The Memorandum of Understanding on a “strategic and comprehensive partnership”²³ signed between the EU and Tunisia in the summer of 2023 – which envisaged not only the improved management of irregular migration, but also a mobility partnership and closer cross-sectoral cooperation – has thus far seen little practical implementation.²⁴

This example illustrates an important point: Ultimately, sustainable partnerships in the field of migration are also built on societal ties and personal contacts and not merely on political agreements or declarations of intent. They require an in-depth understanding of the political systems, societal dynamics, and economic conditions of the countries and regions concerned.

Germany has an extensive global network of foreign policy and development policy actors. These connections could be used in shaping a new migration-focused foreign policy with the aim of establishing and expanding binding migration partnerships based on shared interests and mutual understanding.

– translated from German –

Caroline Schmidt is Policy Advisor for Migration in the Division of Analysis and Consulting at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

1. European Council 2016: EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, press release, 18 Mar 2016, in: https://ogy.de/dttf [27 May 2026].↩︎
2. Federal Ministry of the Interior 2023: “Wir schaffen die Voraussetzungen dafür, dass wir Menschen schützen, die unseren Schutz dringend brauchen.”, Press Release, 20 Dec 2023, in: https://ogy.de/m4c5 [27 May 2026].↩︎
3. Federal Ministry of the Interior 2026: FAQ zur Reform des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems, 27 Mar 2026, in: https://ogy.de/jtr5 [24 Jun 2026].↩︎
4. European Commission 2024: Pact on Migration and Asylum, 14 May 2024, in: https://ogy.de/elop [27 May 2026].↩︎
5. Federal Ministry of the Interior 2026: Working group on innovative third-country models launched – Germany and the Netherlands host first meeting, press release, 22 Jan 2026, in: https://ogy.de/nqwb [27 May 2026].↩︎
6. Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration: Glossar. Sichere Drittstaaten, in: https://ogy.de/fan5 [27 May 2026].↩︎
7. Ernst, Andreas 2025: Italien schickt erste abgewiesene Asylbewerber nach Albanien in Abschiebehaft, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 Apr 2025, in: https://ogy.de/oxve [27 May 2026].↩︎
8. Walsh, Peter William 2024: Q&A: The UK’s former policy to send asylum seekers to Rwanda, The Migration Observatory, 25 Jul 2024, in: https://ogy.de/2npd [27 May 2026].↩︎
9. Thym, Daniel 2024: Gutachten über Anforderungen an sichere Drittstaaten im Asylrecht und praktische Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten, Forschungszentrum Ausländer- & Asylrecht, 3 Apr 2024, p. 6, in: https://ogy.de/hzvp [27 May 2026].↩︎
10. UNHCR: The 1951 Refugee Convention, in: https://ogy.de/8oae [27 May 2026].↩︎
11. UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe: Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention, in: https://ogy.de/cpk6 [1 Jun 2026].↩︎
12. Bialecki, Martin / Peetz, Katharina 2026: Dauerkrise im Sahel: “Die Region bricht wie ein Kartenhaus zusammen” (mit Ulf Laessing), Internationale Politik, 22 May 2026, in: https://ogy.de/5vs5 [27 May 2026].↩︎
13. Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (INSM) 2026: 133.900 MINT-Arbeitsplätze trotz Wirtschaftskrise unbesetzt, 7 May 2026, in: https://ogy.de/bfam [27 May 2026].↩︎
14. Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat 2023: Bekanntmachung des deutsch-indischen Abkommens über eine umfassende Migrations- und Mobilitätspartnerschaft, Bundesgesetzblatt II, 5 May 2023, in: https://ogy.de/37e0 [27 May 2026].↩︎
15. Plünnecke, Axel 2026: Indische Beschäftigte verdienen weiterhin am meisten, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 2 Jan 2026, in: https://ogy.de/c6ov [27 May 2026].↩︎
16. Federal Ministry of the Interior 2025: Migrationsbericht der Bundesregierung 2023, 9 Sep 2025, p. 13, in: https://ogy.de/sda3 [27 May 2026].↩︎
17. Ibid., p. 12.↩︎
18. Jaeger, Mona / Wyssuwa, Matthias 2025: Aus dem Beauftragten wird ein “Botschafter” für Migration, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 Dec 2025, in: https://ogy.de/4ozw [27 May 2026].↩︎
19. Sievert, Sara 2026: BMI: Neuer Migrationsbotschafter soll mehr Druck bei Rückführungen und Return Hubs machen, Table.Briefings, 13 Jan 2026, in: https://ogy.de/js6o [27 May 2026].↩︎
20. Geis-Thöne, Wido 2025: Zuwanderung aus dem Westbalkan: Ein Gewinn für Deutschland, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 1 Apr 2025, in: https://ogy.de/zz7b [29 Jun 2026].↩︎
21. Mediendienst Integration 2025: Fragen und Antworten zur Westbalkanregelung, 11 Apr 2025, in:
    https://ogy.de/emz6 [29 Jun 2026]. [29 Jun 2026].↩︎
22. UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe 2026: Uganda ist zentrales Zufluchtsland in Afrika, May 2026, in: https://ogy.de/wh45 [27 May 2026].↩︎
23. European Commission 2023: Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic and global partnership between the European Union and Tunisia, press release, 16 Jul 2023, in: https://ogy.de/4rqj [1 Jun 2026].↩︎
24. Meiners, Sophie / Niederfranke, Svenja 2025: Bedingt blaupausentauglich, Internationale Politik, 18 Aug 2025, in: https://ogy.de/dlcd [27 May 2026].↩︎