Partnership Opportunities in the Gulf of Guinea

The debate around the diversification of international partnerships continues to underestimate the potential in Europe’s southern neighbourhood. It is clear simply from the geographical proximity of West Africa that the challenges and development potential of the two regions are closely intertwined and that their political, economic, and security dynamics impact one another. Nevertheless, the German and European perspective on West Africa is still often dominated by a two-fold oversimplification: On the one hand, there is an excessive focus on crisis dynamics, fragile statehood, and “shrinking spaces”, while on the other hand, the consideration of economic potential focuses almost exclusively on Nigeria as the putative economic giant of the region. However, this perspective fails to consider the countries on the Gulf of Guinea even though many of them can look back on decades of relatively stable democratic development, economic growth, and both openness and willingness to cooperate in terms of foreign policy.

Against this backdrop, the strategic question is increasingly whether and in what form a realignment is needed in German and European policy towards West Africa. One possible answer lies in a deliberate broadening of perspectives that moves away from an almost-exclusive focus on the Sahel and its downward spiral in terms of security and economic governance and towards a nuanced consideration of West Africa as a whole – particularly the coastal states on the Gulf of Guinea. Whereas the scope for international cooperation in the Sahel has narrowed in recent years in terms of politics and security, it remains strong in the coastal states. This scope ranges from collaboration on security to economic relations, trade and investment potential, energy and raw material partnerships, and cooperation in the areas of education and skilled worker migration.

Despite structural and governance challenges, countries such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have relatively stable political systems, dynamic economies, and an eagerness to engage in international partnerships. Against the backdrop of an increasingly multipolar world order as well as Germany and Europe’s need to further diversify relations in terms of foreign and security policy, these countries are therefore increasingly gaining in strategic importance. They provide an opportunity for forms of partnership that are aimed not primarily at short-term crisis management or stabilisation, but rather at building up long-term resilience, economic development, shared interests, and normative reference points, such as constitutional statehood, democracy, fundamental freedoms, and a market-oriented economic model.

It seems to be a good time for a strategic reorientation of this kind. Many coastal states fundamentally offer the structural requirements for enhanced cooperation and at the same time have considerable political interest in international collaboration. In parallel, however, there is growing competition by external actors such as China, India, Russia, the Gulf states, and Turkey for political, economic, and security influence in the region. Meanwhile, there is also a notable increase in security pressure from the countries of the Sahel. It thus seems advisable to utilise existing opportunities for cooperation and influence at an early stage before political and security upheaval also becomes consolidated in the coastal states.

On the other hand, it would be overly simplistic to view the region solely from the perspective of opportunities. Indeed, deficits in governance – such as a disproportionately strong executive, weak state institutions, widespread corruption, infrastructural bottlenecks, social inequalities, and the influence of external actors – represent serious challenges that call for a nuanced and contextual analysis.

Ghana – An anchor of stability with regional influence

For decades, Ghana has been seen as one of the most reliable democratic anchor states of West Africa. Since the transition to the Fourth Republic in 1992, the country has undergone several peaceful changes of government and maintains stable institutions, an active civil society, and high societal acceptance of democratic processes.¹ This continuity not only provides Ghana with domestic political stability but also makes the country a reliable and predictable partner in a region where many countries are characterised by political upheaval. Ghana traditionally maintains close relations with Europe, engages actively in regional and multilateral structures such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and regularly acts as a mediator and significant stabilising factor in the region. Initiatives such as the Accra Initiative illustrate the country’s active participation in regional security architecture and the important political impetus that it brings to the region’s dynamics. Ghana also underscores this ambition at the multilateral level – for example, with regard to its chairship of the African Union next year. The openness of the country’s foreign policy is also reflected in a great willingness to develop pragmatic, interest-driven international partnerships, whether in relation to economic development and trade, infrastructure, or security policy. Above all, the last of these areas has been the focus of increasing attention in recent years – and for good reason.

Today, West Africa is considered a hotspot for terrorist violence – a development that has been a long time in the making.² This dynamic is still principally concentrated in the countries of the Sahel – in which almost half of all global terror-related deaths are now being recorded – and in Nigeria, although the spillover effects have long since reached the (other) coastal states.³ Particularly in the northern parts of Côte d’Ivoire, expanding areas of operation and increasing acts of violence by extremist actors have been observed for several years. Meanwhile, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have thus far barely been affected by these processes – if at all. The region is therefore moving into Europe’s immediate neighbourhood in terms of its relevance to security policy. For Germany, this situation presents a dual challenge: On the one hand, it involves traditional security issues in the narrower sense, such as the expansion of terrorist networks and their areas of operation; on the other hand, these developments are closely linked to organised crime – and particularly to international drug trafficking. Indeed, West Africa now acts as a key global transit corridor for drugs – and especially for cocaine, which is smuggled in from Latin America to Europe via West African ports. Thus far, there has been too little recognition of this problem in German domestic politics, although the impact is increasingly apparent in the public arena.

Although Ghana is affected by these developments, the impact has thus far been much smaller than for many neighbouring countries. However, therein lies the country’s strategic importance: Despite weaknesses in governance, Ghana has relatively functional state structures, reliable security institutions, and a highly resilient society. At the same time, however, the first signs of a gradual expansion of criminal and extremist networks are also appearing, particularly in the north of the country. Terrorist groups are already using Northern Ghana as a place of refuge as well as for supplies and financing – for example, through links to illegal gold mining or drug trafficking. For Germany and Europe, a strategic time window is opening up in which to counteract this development together: Unlike in the Sahel states, there is still real scope for preventive action in Ghana. Investments in stability and security are being made not in crisis mode, but rather in a forward-looking manner with a view to stabilisation. Germany is already engaged in various areas ranging from the development and expansion of military infrastructure and advice on collaboration with security authorities – such as police and border security – to the stabilisation of the economy and civil society. In April 2026, the European Union (EU) also agreed on a new broad-based cooperation framework for an intensified security and defence partnership with the Ghanaian government. This cooperation is set to focus on areas including the fight against terrorism, (regional) early-warning systems, border security, and elements of governance and peace-building – areas in which there is still a need for support. The security challenges are structural in nature and are likely to get worse rather than better over the coming years. At the same time, there are still significant capacity shortfalls with regard to the equipment, training, and coordination of Ghanaian security actors, particularly when it comes to border and rural areas. Without ongoing external support, there is a risk that the existing weak points could be consolidated and the scope for preventive action lost.

Looking beyond security cooperation, there is no doubt that Ghana also has economic potential, although this has thus far only been exploited to a limited extent due to structural challenges and a political cycle that impedes development. However, the Ghanaian government is pursuing ambitious objectives and wants to position the country as a key location for the region – and beyond – in promising new sectors. For example, there is a clear, multi-stage strategy to convert Ghana into a West African digital hub that will use technologies including artificial intelligence as a strategic leapfrog.^I Only recently, a national AI strategy was developed and presented in collaboration with German development cooperation. Although the strategy’s implementation currently appears to be limited in light of numerous challenges, particularly in terms of electricity supply and internet connectivity, this approach highlights potential areas for future bilateral cooperation. There is an opportunity for German stakeholders to enter emerging digital ecosystems at an early stage and actively help to shape them. In addition, Ghana has ambitious plans to position itself as a supraregional production and distribution centre for vaccines and medicines. Germany is already providing substantial support for this build-up within the framework of initiatives including Team Europe – for example, through programmes such as PharmaVax Ghana from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).⁴

Another key factor underpinning these economic ambitions is the relatively high level of education among the Ghanaian population. Ghana has a well-developed education system, free access to secondary schools, and a diverse higher-education landscape with numerous universities and specialised courses of study. This gives rise to a growing pool of qualified professionals that is not only of vital importance for building up the country’s own industries but also increasingly being viewed in a broader international context.⁵ In this regard, there is additionally an increasing focus on Ghana as a potential partner for the migration of skilled labour. Over recent years, there has been greater interest both in migration to Germany for work or education and training and in the demand from German companies for suitable professionals. Initial experiences indicate that Ghanaian professionals can integrate very effectively into Germany and that companies consistently evaluate them positively. Thus far, however, the actual placement process has been complex and has offered only limited scalability. In addition to shortfalls in practical training, key obstacles include language teaching, recognition procedures, and visa processes. Better staffing and further process optimisations would be needed in order to actually scale up existing programmes – and it is precisely this scaling up that offers real potential to convert existing interest into genuine mobility. In this regard, migration could potentially be seen as a mutually advantageous process that benefits both the German labour market and Ghana’s economic development.

Côte d’Ivoire – A dynamic economic powerhouse of the Gulf of Guinea

Whereas Ghana is primarily gaining in importance as a democratic anchor of stability and a security partner, Côte d’Ivoire is increasingly becoming the economic powerhouse of the Gulf of Guinea. As such, the country exemplifies the economic opportunities that the German and European perspective on West Africa has failed to sufficiently recognise thus far. Côte d’Ivoire combines high rates of growth, regional market access, and considerable investment opportunities with relatively stable economic development. Following a serious political crisis between 2002 and 2011, the country experienced a remarkable economic recovery. Today, with growth rates regularly exceeding six per cent, Côte d’Ivoire is one of the most dynamic economies on the African continent and has increasingly established itself as an economic hub of francophone West Africa.⁶ This development is particularly apparent in the economic metropolis of Abidjan, which has developed into a pivotal trading, finance, and logistics centre in recent years and symbolises the country’s rapid economic growth. The modern skyline, extensive infrastructure projects, and planned “Tour F” – which is set to become the tallest skyscraper in Africa by 2026 – are symbolic of the country’s desire to shape economic development. At the same time, there is a growing urban middle class, and innovative companies are expanding – particularly in the areas of technology, agriculture, and the creative economy. With its relatively large internal market compared with that of other countries in the region as well as its regional integration and ambitious industrial and infrastructure programmes, Côte d’Ivoire is increasingly becoming one of the most attractive investment locations in West Africa – a trend that is of particular interest to Germany and the EU.

Other international actors have long recognised this potential: France has traditionally been – and remains – one of the country’s key economic partners, while China has massively expanded its presence in recent years, particularly in the infrastructure and energy sectors. For German companies, the question is less about whether Côte d’Ivoire is strategically relevant and more about how visibly these companies want to position themselves in an increasingly competitive environment. There is considerable economic potential in agri-processing and food processing – especially in relation to cocoa, cashews, and coffee – as well as in renewable energies, infrastructure, port logistics, industrial processing, digitalisation, and vocational training. For Germany, Côte d’Ivoire is also strategically important as a key supplier of the German cocoa and food industry. The planned expansion of renewable energies by 2030 opens up substantial opportunities for German companies, particularly in the areas of solar and grid technology, storage solutions, energy efficiency, and water and waste management. Potential also lies in the agricultural sector – for example, in machine construction and agricultural technology. Furthermore, the country’s industrialisation is boosting demand for dual vocational training, technical qualifications, and industry partnerships – areas in which Germany has particular strengths. Intensified collaboration in these areas could build on existing cooperation, such as the existing climate and development partnership, with its focus on forest conservation, biodiversity, energy efficiency, and renewable energies. This is in addition to measures that support vocational training, economic development, and good governance with active support from German institutions such as the GIZ, the KfW, Invest for Jobs, the political foundations, and the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad. The Goethe-Institut in Abidjan also offers targeted support for Ivorian professionals seeking to migrate to Germany for work.

However, the available potential and increasing engagement should not obscure the fact that challenges remain both for the further overall economic development of the country and for greater German engagement. On the Ivorian side, there are structural deficits that limit the country’s potential for development. For example, there are still considerable social inequalities, significant differences in the development of urban and rural areas, and high levels of youth unemployment. There also remains a widespread lack of basic infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. The country’s ostensible political stability is founded – in societal terms – on relatively low participation, while trust in state institutions remains limited and there are increasing democratic setbacks. There is thus a need for institutional reforms and stronger national dialogue in order to combat the growing disconnect between the political system and societal participation. With the National Development Plan 2026–2030, the government is pursuing ambitious goals in terms of industrial and economic policy in order to specifically address structural challenges. This will see investments of some 175 billion euros with a view to accelerating the country’s transformation to an upper-middle-income economy by 2030.⁷ Market entry is also not without its obstacles for German companies. The significant challenges for German engagement include strong competition from countries such as France and China, regulatory complexity and bureaucracy, and a lack of both French-speaking market expertise and risk-oriented financing options. Meanwhile, Germany’s competitive advantages lie above all in sustainable industrial development, green infrastructure, vocational training, and high-quality production. In the long term, the key question will be whether German stakeholders can expand their presence in the Ivorian market more visibly, faster, and on a more lasting basis.

Sierra Leone and Liberia – Diversification of supply chains and raw material cooperation

Whereas Ghana primarily acts as an anchor of stability and Côte d’Ivoire as a driver of economic growth, the strategic potentials of Liberia and Sierra Leone lie elsewhere. In Europe, the two countries are still too often seen through the prism of their past civil wars or the Ebola crisis, which reflects a structural weakness in Germany’s foreign economic policy: namely that potential is often not recognised until other international actors have already built up long-term positions. Indeed, Liberia and Sierra Leone are becoming significantly more important in light of growing geopolitical competition, global supply chain crises, and the increasing competition for strategic raw materials. For Germany and Europe, these two countries could in future play a key role in the diversification of supply chains and raw material partnerships. With initiatives such as the Critical Raw Materials Act, the EU is expressly pursuing the aim of reducing strategic dependencies and building up resilient supply chains.⁸ In addition to significant resource endowment, the two countries benefit from their location on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, from their integration into regional cooperation structures, and from their use of English as an official language, which can provide a better basis for German investors when it comes to communication and liaising with institutions.

Both Sierra Leone and Liberia have made remarkable progress in terms of democratic reconstruction since the end of their respective civil wars in 2002 (Sierra Leone) and 2003 (Liberia). Both countries are characterised by relatively stable political development, which is reflected in elections held in accordance with the constitution and in peaceful changes of government – neither of which is a matter of course in the region – as well as in an advancing institutionalisation of state structures. This development is supported by international cooperation and regional networking. In addition, the countries’ active engagement in multilateral organisations – particularly the UN Security Council – underlines their growing importance in terms of foreign policy. This political stabilisation is instrumental in creating the opportunity to tap into economic potential and strategic partnerships in the long term. With the ARREST Agenda for Inclusive Development for the years 2025 to 2029, Liberia is pursuing a strategy aimed at economic diversification and infrastructure development.⁹ Although the Liberian market is often assessed as being small, infrastructure projects in the country can send a strong signal for the region. Investments in roads, energy supply, and port infrastructure not only encourage growth at the local level but also strengthen long-term economic and political relations across the region as a whole.¹⁰ Similar developments can be seen in Sierra Leone, which has significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, bauxite, and especially rutile – the most important titanium mineral. Titanium raw materials are becoming increasingly important for aviation, solar technologies, and special steel production, and Sierra Leone is therefore gradually becoming a rising frontier market.¹¹

As in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, structural challenges also remain in Liberia and Sierra Leone, including ongoing dependence on raw material exports, development shortfalls, limited state capacity, and challenges in terms of governance. German companies also continue to face significant obstacles, including administrative hurdles, visa restrictions, financing issues, and a lack of market knowledge. However, many of these challenges are not specific to Liberia or Sierra Leone; rather, as we have seen, they are characteristic of the economic environment in large parts of West Africa. What ultimately matters is therefore not whether challenges exist, but rather how Germany and Europe deal with these challenges. The cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone in particular illustrate that a country’s strategic importance should not be measured solely by its current market size, but rather – increasingly – based on its role in future supply chains, raw material partnerships, and regional stability architectures.

Towards a new West Africa strategy for Germany?

Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia serve as examples of a wider trend in the Gulf of Guinea. Not only does potential exist, but there is also political scope and considerable interest in international partnerships. In terms of the time frame, there are now concrete opportunities for action that we must make the most of. The actual challenge therefore lies not so much in a lack of opportunities as it does in recognising these opportunities in good time and seizing them consistently. One factor that helps to create the conditions for enhanced cooperation is the generally positive perception of Germany in these countries. Germany is widely associated with high quality, reliability, technical expertise, and long-term collaboration on comparatively equal footing. Unlike with some other international actors, German engagement is often perceived not so much as being primarily geopolitical or driven by short-term interests, but rather as being more strongly associated with vocational training, good governance, economic development, and sustainable infrastructure. At the same time, Germany has limited visibility in comparison with other international partners – particularly China, the US, the United Kingdom, and France. However, this is precisely where the potential lies: The established trust and positive image could provide an important basis for the specific expansion of economic, political, and social partnerships. Whether Germany is perceived as a strategic partner in West Africa in the future will therefore crucially depend on whether it succeeds in engaging today with markets and partnerships that will not be the focus of geopolitical and economic interests until tomorrow. Against this backdrop, it is possible to derive several specific priorities for action that must be heeded in order for Germany to strategically expand its cooperation:

1. Harnessing the potential for a coherent West Africa strategy and the strategic realignment of instruments

   An independent West Africa strategy could help to integrate interests in terms of foreign, raw materials, security, and development policy more effectively. Thus far, there has been an absence of an overall political strategy for the region. West Africa should no longer be seen as a region affected by crises and migration, but rather as a geopolitical market of the future with growing global importance. In particular, a strategy of this kind could aim to address the countries of the region more as partners for stability and growth. For Germany, there is an opportunity to forge new partnerships at an early stage, to strategically gauge the geopolitical competition, and to further expand its role as an actor in economic diplomacy. The aforementioned countries in West Africa offer a particular opportunity to establish long-term future partnerships before other actors consolidate their positions on a lasting basis. In parallel, it seems sensible to review the German approach to risk in foreign trade promotion with respect to West African markets. Empirical loss data indicate that the risk of default in Sub-Saharan Africa is by no means significantly higher than in other emerging regions.¹²

2. Providing starting points for the stronger dovetailing of security, economic, and development policy

   The stabilisation of West Africa from a security perspective is increasingly becoming a prerequisite for successful economic cooperation. Against this backdrop, long-term security collaboration with these countries could be further integrated with economic and development-oriented approaches and partnerships. This would simultaneously strengthen the role of the coastal states as anchors of regional stability.

3. Strengthening preventive partnerships in order to curb drug trafficking and terrorist infiltration

   In a mutually beneficial arrangement, Germany could orient its cooperation more strongly towards the early disruption of links between organised drug trafficking, illegal financing structures, and influence from extremist groups. The focus should be less on traditional counter-terrorism in crisis mode than on building up long-term resilience. Specific lines of action would include the expansion of shared capacities of the police, customs authorities, border security, and financial intelligence units; greater support for maritime security and port and container inspections along key transit routes; and greater assistance with detecting and combating illegal financial flows, money laundering, and links between drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, and the financing of extremism.

4. Creating opportunities for the expansion of economic, industrial, and future partnerships

   Considerable potential lies in the greater interlinking of raw materials strategy on the one hand and industrial, innovation, and infrastructure partnerships on the other hand. Against the backdrop of the European Critical Raw Materials Act as well as the increasing importance of digital technologies, the modern healthcare industry, and sustainable industrial development, there is an opportunity to specifically expand long-term future partnerships. This effort should focus not solely on securing the supply of raw materials, but also on building up shared ecosystems for value creation and innovation – for example, in the areas of raw material processing, renewable energies, digitalisation, the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry, and modern manufacturing industries. Compliance with supply chain legislation, labour rights, and environmental standards remains a key component of such partnerships.

5. Harnessing quality-oriented infrastructure policy as a strategic competitive advantage

   Germany’s competitive advantages in terms of technology and quality could be communicated even more effectively. In many West African countries, significant long-term quality defects can now be discerned in Chinese infrastructure projects. At the same time, there is a growing willingness on the part of West African governments to make greater investments in long-term and sustainable infrastructure. A good starting point continues to be the prestige associated with the “Made in Germany” seal of quality.

6. Understanding mobility as a prerequisite for successful economic diplomacy

   Current bureaucratic procedures represent a considerable obstacle in the development of economic cooperation. Lengthy processing times – for example, for visas – undermine Germany’s competitiveness in comparison with that of other international actors. As mobility is key to successful economic diplomacy, vital impetus could be provided by offering special economic and investment visas for African businesspeople and professionals as well as accelerated procedures for partner states in West Africa.

7. Providing targeted support for SMEs in order to enter West African markets

   SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) in particular often lack sufficient market knowledge or institutional capacities for entering West African markets. Existing instruments – for example, via the KfW, the German–African Business Association (AV), or Germany Trade & Invest – could therefore be pooled more effectively and given greater visibility.

It is clear from these recommendations that the goal is not simply to intensify existing cooperation; rather, the question is whether Germany is ready to design its West Africa policy more strategically, on a longer-term basis, and with a more cross-ministerial approach. Security, economic cooperation, raw material partnerships, mobility, and development cooperation should no longer be seen as separate political fields, but rather as mutually reinforcing elements of a common regional strategy. West Africa and the countries on the Gulf of Guinea in particular are therefore not only part of European neighbourhood policy, but increasingly also a space for strategic decisions about the future.

– translated from German –

Dr Stefanie Brinkel is Director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Political Dialogue West Africa based in Abidjan.

Anna Lena Sabroso-Wasserfall is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Ghana Office based in Accra.

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