Paper 2 - ISIS and Cross-Border Threats Beyond Iraq
Ashleigh Whelan
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 changed the ground on which ISIS operates. Syria’s transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa has won international recognition and joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Its state, however, remains thin, power runs largely through personal networks, and former armed factions are being integrated unevenly. The mass escape from Al Hol in January 2026 and the transfer of thousands of ISIS detainees to Iraq have raised the risk on both sides of the border.
Ashleigh Whelan argues that the group has moved from conquest to disruption, and that attack counts no longer capture what it is doing. ISIS now survives inside a cross-border illicit economy it does not control. The smuggling routes, checkpoints and protection arrangements across the Jazira and Badia deserts are dominated by other armed actors, above all Iran-aligned militias, who have their own reasons to keep the corridor semi-governed. The reopening of the Rabia and al-Waleed crossings in 2026 revived legal trade, but it also reshaped the opportunities for illicit flows.
Cooperation has not kept pace. Mutual suspicion between Baghdad and Damascus has kept ISIS-specific coordination informal, Arab League discussions on a regional counter-extremism body have stalled, and the end of the Coalition’s military mission in Iraq leaves open how the desert corridors will be monitored. Turkey, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are all engaged, though each pursues its own priorities rather than treating ISIS as the main concern. The paper draws on discussions with Iraqi and Syrian policymakers, security analysts, community organisers and international experts. Finally, it sets out policy pathways in six areas, ranging from investigatory capacity on both sides of the border to multi-year reintegration support, and closes with a case for treating basic public administration as a security investment in its own right.
