Nr. 4 | August 2026 - Energy Resilience Amid Geopolitical Tensions
by Dr. Sanad Al-Quran
The 2026 Hormuz crisis exposed a weakness in conventional approaches to energy security. A country can maintain physical supply while remaining vulnerable to disruption elsewhere in the energy system. The subsequent cycle of escalation, attempted ceasefire, renewed military action, and diplomatic openings reinforced the same lesson. Against this background, the paper asks what the Hormuz crisis reveals about the vulnerabilities of Jordan’s energy transition and how the Kingdom can strengthen its energy resilience amid persistent regional geopolitical tensions.
Jordan enters this period with significant achievements, particularly in the electricity sector. However, the wider energy economy remains far more exposed. Oil products accounted for 63% of final energy con sumption, natural gas remains crucial for power system balancing, and water security is becoming increas ingly dependent on reliable and affordable electricity. The central problem is that progress in one part of the energy system has not produced equivalent resilience across the economy. Vulnerability persists through fuel price transmission, fiscal pressure, power system inflexibility, and regional gas dependence. The paper argues that energy resilience provides a more useful strategic objective than literal energy in dependence. For a small, resource-constrained, and trade-dependent economy, eliminating external de pendence is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable. The more relevant objective is to prevent depend ence from becoming a source of systemic failure. The paper assesses this through four interdependent capabilities: continuity, flexibility, affordability, and optionality.
Jordan should move from possessing individual resilience assets to organizing them within a coherent national resilience architecture. This requires institutionalized stress testing, stronger continuity of fuel imports and distribution through the Aqaba port, product-specific strategic stocks and contingent supply, greater power system flexibility, disciplined development of the Risha gas field, and closer integration of transport and water into energy planning. The broader lesson extends beyond Jordan. Import-dependent economies do not become resilient simply by replacing one fuel, supplier, or route with another. The rel evant measure of success is whether disruption in any one external link becomes progressively less able to cascade into a wider crisis of supply, affordability, public finance, and essential services.
