The Pact for the Mediterranean as a Building Block for Diversifying European Partnerships

If the question for Europe is how to diversify its partnerships, there is one region for which the answer should be obvious: the Southern Mediterranean. Almost no other region is simultaneously so nearby and so strategically important to Europe, with the questions of energy supply, migration, security, and trade all having a direct impact on European interests. Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) has failed for three decades – since the Barcelona Process^I – to turn geographical proximity into closer political relations. This has been due less to a lack of initiatives than to a series of crises ranging from the collapse of Libya to the war in Syria and the migration crises of recent years, which have seen long-term partnership repeatedly take a back seat to short-term crisis management.

Adopted in October 2025, the Pact for the Mediterranean^II marks the EU’s latest attempt to revert this situation by setting out a new strategic framework for the EU when it comes to cooperation with its ten partners in the Southern Mediterranean. Unlike previous initiatives, the pact neither creates a new financing instrument nor replaces existing formats, instead combining them for the first time into a common strategic approach with a focus on people and mobility, economic integration and energy, as well as security and migration. Other new features include the fact that the pact is the result of a consultation process involving all ten southern partner countries. The ambition is different than on previous occasions because Brussels is placing the emphasis on the participation of neighbouring countries and is promoting shared responsibility and agency. Likewise, it is clear from the institutional line-up that there is a serious intention to realign the partnership: With Dubravka Šuica, the European Commission has for the first time appointed a specific commissioner for the Mediterranean, while the pact’s implementation is being coordinated by the new Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, which was established in February 2025. Whether this is merely a rebranding exercise by Brussels will depend on questions that the pact itself does not answer: How does the south view Europe, and how does Europe view the south? Is this yet another initiative that will end up as a paper tiger, or will we see a serious paradigm shift that moves away from crisis management and towards mutual partnership in a region where Europe’s influence has successively declined over the last ten years?

Many programmes, little sense of direction: the difficult path to genuine partnership

The EU has been developing new formats for cooperation with its southern neighbours for three decades. The problem has rarely been a lack of initiatives; instead, what has proven more challenging is to derive a clear sense of political direction from the multitude of programmes, partnerships, and dialogue formats.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – launched in 2004 – aims to gradually turn neighbouring countries into a ring of stable, rules-based partners through association agreements, market opening, and legal approximation. This model has worked better in the east than in the south: Countries in the south that have not been able to – and have not wanted to – become a member have had little incentive to adopt European standards without the quid pro quo of genuine market access or political recognition.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – established in 2008 at the initiative of then–French President Nicolas Sarkozy – was intended to replace the lack of political momentum with specific projects. Ultimately, the organisation foundered because many Arab member states were no longer willing to hold meetings attended by Israel – also a member of the UfM – after the Middle East conflict had flared up again. This also put an end to the interest of European states in reviving the Euro–Mediterranean process within the UfM. Headquartered in Barcelona, the UfM now acts as a technical forum for sectoral collaboration on everything from energy to employment and the blue economy. Having long since forfeited its original political ambitions, it is now intended to accompany the implementation of the new pact, primarily in a low-threshold capacity. From 2011 onwards, the Arab Spring became the real stress test for both instruments at the same time: Neither the ENP nor the UfM was in a position to react strategically to the political upheaval in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The fact that the EU was unable to respond to these challenges appropriately was partly down to the lack of a coherent common foreign and security policy that could have provided support for the instruments.¹

Finally, the Global Gateway initiative is less a strategic design than a defensive reaction: Conceived as an answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it focuses on infrastructure investments and responds primarily to China’s growing presence instead of formulating its own political vision for Europe’s southern neighbourhood.²

The pact has entered this field with greater ambition than its predecessors. The Commission talks of an “ambitious paradigm shift” – that is, of shared responsibility instead of a one-sided Brussels agenda.³ This sounds like more than institutional cosmetics, and that is indeed the intention. The limitations lie elsewhere: As noted by the European Policy Centre, the pact makes do without new financing commitments. Existing programmes are to be mobilised rather than being topped up with additional resources.⁴ Conversely, this means that it is vital to strike a balance between reducing classical funding, ensuring that our southern neighbours have a voice, and guaranteeing the effectiveness of the measures. Whether this actually results in new partnership dynamics will therefore not be decided by organigrams or strategy papers; instead, the key factor will be whether the member states are prepared to set political and financial priorities – and whether the partner countries find the pact’s ambition credible in the first place.

The south is not a homogeneous bloc: country-specific interest profiles

One of the main weaknesses of European policy on the Mediterranean has always been the tendency to treat the south as a homogeneous bloc. The pact may be able to counter these deficits, but only if it is geared towards the partner countries’ actual interests and development priorities.

Morocco is the partner country with the clearest ambitions – and with the strongest sense of self-confidence. For years, Rabat has been positioning itself as a regional energy hub: With the Offre Maroc hydrogen initiative, which was presented in March 2024, the kingdom created an investment programme with a target volume of over 319 billion dirhams (around 30 billion euros) for green hydrogen, with the first five investment consortia being identified in March 2025.⁵ Although the political framework is provided by the EU–Morocco Green Partnership of 2022,⁶ Morocco is thinking in broader terms than this one agreement. Rabat increasingly views itself as an aspiring middle power with a firmly multipolar approach to foreign policy. Indeed, Morocco is building up the Atlantic Initiative of 2023 as a strategic gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa through port connections, bilateral agreements, and targeted investments in the Sahel that systematically expand Rabat’s influence in the region.⁷ For Morocco, the Abraham Accords of 2020 are less of a trade agreement and more of a geopolitical calculation: In return for the normalisation of relations with Israel, Rabat has secured US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara – a diplomatic win that no European initiative had ever put on the table.⁸ Against this backdrop, what Morocco expects from Europe is not development aid, but rather an industrial partnership complete with market access, technology transfer, and recognition as a political partner that knows its options and how to leverage them.

Tunisia is starting out from a fundamentally different position and serves as an example of the failure of Europe’s policies aimed at democratisation in its southern neighbourhood. In the years after 2011, Tunisia was considered a model case of the Arab Spring due to its being the only functioning democracy in the region and having the highest levels of EU support per capita in the entire neighbourhood.⁹ However, the euphoria soon gave way to stagnation. The key economic promise of those years – a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) – fell through due to a combination of European reticence in terms of agricultural market access, resistance from Tunisian civil society and politics, and chronic instability on both sides of the negotiating table.¹⁰ The decade of this privileged partnership can be summarised by political engagement and economic disappointment. Faced with the consolidation of power by President Saïed from 2021 onwards and with the extensive hollowing out of democratic institutions, the EU made a pragmatic course correction. This turning point was marked by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 2023, which links cooperation on migration with the question of economic aid. For the first time, the EU placed stabilisation above democratisation and placed cooperation above conditionality. Human rights organisations rightly criticise the fact that the agreement fails to sufficiently safeguard minimum standards in the area¹¹; however, it would be overly simplistic to view this merely as a sell-out in terms of the bloc’s values. At some point, a partnership that has promised a great deal politically and delivered very little economically over the course of a decade is no longer viable. That is the difficult conclusion that led to the MoU of 2023. The fact that only one in ten Tunisians rates the country’s economic situation as good underlines the urgency of this course correction.¹²

Egypt is the most complex case – and in some ways, it is also the most informative. With almost 106 million inhabitants, it is the most populous Arab country, a key regional power, and – under President Al-Sisi – an interlocutor that makes a dispassionate assessment of the logic of interdependence. The EU needs Egypt for cooperation on migration, for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a channel for dialogue with the Arab world, and as an energy corridor. Indeed, the GREGY project – which is intended to link Egypt and Greece via a 954-kilometre submarine cable with a capacity of 3,000 megawatts – is an example of Cairo’s growing strategic importance.¹³ Likewise, Egypt needs the EU for investment, market access, and macroeconomic stabilisation. The 7.4-billion-euro package from March 2024 – predominantly comprising low-interest loans (5 billion euros) supplemented with investments (1.8 billion euros) and subsidies (600 million euros) – exemplifies this reciprocity: that is, money in exchange for a willingness to adopt reforms.¹⁴ This points to a new maturity in Europe’s policy towards its southern neighbours that is moving away from the illusion of being able to export values and towards a partnership based on shared interests. Rather than discreetly circumventing this logic, the pact was intended to proactively espouse it.

Finally, Jordan is something of a special case. Having received refugees from the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Syria for decades, the country supports one of the highest numbers of refugees per capita in the world.¹⁵ For the EU, Jordan is much more than a recipient of aid: Indeed, it is the most important humanitarian corridor to Gaza, a moderating actor in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and a migration buffer whose stability directly relieves the burden on Europe. This was openly recognised by President of the European Council António Costa at the first EU–Jordan Summit in Amman in January 2026, where Costa said that Jordan’s contribution to the humanitarian air bridges and land corridors to Gaza “ha[d] been truly remarkable, and valued by all”.¹⁶ The 3-billion-euro package from January 2025 is therefore not development aid in the traditional sense, but rather a quid pro quo for strategic services that Europe cannot afford to lose, and it sent a political signal at a time when aid had been temporarily frozen by the US – Jordan’s key external backer.¹⁷ Again, the total amount is made up of a mixture of loans, investments, and subsidies. The EU should also take the opportunity – through the enhanced partnership with Jordan – to position itself as a reliable actor in the Middle East against the backdrop of increasingly unpredictable US foreign policy. The pact is a chance to institutionalise this logic as well as to anchor Jordan as an equal partner in a Mediterranean order for the first time instead of leaving it to rely bilaterally on the good will of individual donor states.

What the south really thinks: scepticism, expectations, red lines

On a political level, the debate around the Pact for the Mediterranean is conducted almost exclusively north of the Mediterranean Sea. This is problematic because the key question as to whether the pact is perceived as a serious offer or simply as another rebranding exercise by Brussels can only be answered by listening to what the partner countries have to say.

Three decades after the Barcelona Process, the overall picture in the Southern Mediterranean is a mixed one. Many problems remain, but scepticism towards new European initiatives doesn’t automatically mean disinterest. That is the finding of the IEMed consultation process involving some 300 representatives from the Euro–Mediterranean region in 2025.¹⁸ The south knows the history of European initiatives well enough to approach new announcements with caution, including the Barcelona Process, the ENP, and the UfM. The list is long, and the memories of such initiatives are not particularly good.

This is in addition to a shift that has yet to be fully recognised in European capitals. Specifically, the Southern Mediterranean is no longer merely a passive recipient region that waits for offers from Europe. Indeed, Richard Youngs of Carnegie Europe has accurately concluded that none of the previous approaches to an EU Mediterranean policy have been able to stem the bloc’s waning influence in the region.¹⁹ In his view, the Mediterranean has become a geopolitically complex region in which Europe is no longer the only dominant actor. Morocco negotiates simultaneously with the EU, Israel, the Gulf states, and Washington and is in no doubt about its objectives. In recent years, Turkey has developed its own agenda as a regional power – from Syria to the Red Sea, and from the Sahel to growing arms cooperation with North African states. In this regard, Morocco and Turkey are not only claiming a role as middle powers, but also actively helping to shape the regional order – with or without European involvement. Other actors are filling the gaps that Europe has left behind: China has invested heavily in the region since 2010, the Gulf states are providing capital and infrastructure, and Russia is securing strategic ties by supplying defence equipment.²⁰ A pact that ignores this dynamic runs the risk of talking at cross purposes to a region whose thinking has already moved on.

From the Euromed Survey 2025, it is clear what exactly the south expects: Headline issues include climate change, support with conflict management, and investment in skills and employment²¹ – but not migration, which is a dominant theme in European domestic policy narratives. Moreover, the south wants not a partnership that is simply designed by Brussels and sent over to be signed, but rather to have a credible say. In particular, three points of criticism frequently come up in discussions: Europe calls for reforms, but in the view of many partners, it too rarely offers an appropriate quid pro quo, be it in the form of easier market access, visa liberalisation, or genuine technology transfer. Moreover, there is a strong focus on migration, which is often understood in the region as an expression of a problem-oriented view of the bloc’s neighbours. Lastly, many European initiatives lack continuity, with changes of government in EU member states bringing changes in priorities, programmes, and interlocutors.²²

What is missing in the south is not the political will for cooperation, but rather the confidence that Europe will act this time as a reliable partner and honour its promises.

Europe delivers – but not quickly enough

Brussels has long since started to think in terms of Realpolitik, although this rarely enters the public debate. The MoU with Tunisia in 2023, the 7.4-billion-euro package with Egypt in 2024,²³ and the strategic partnership with Jordan in 2025 indicate an EU that is placing stability above conditionality and that is openly acknowledging its own interests.²⁴ In this respect, the pact is not a paradigm shift in itself, but instead creates the institutional framework for a practice that has already changed.²⁵ The problem is not that Europe offers nothing, but rather that many decisions are made too slowly and that there is often a lack of visibility.

In the Mediterranean, China operates as a flexible partner that tailors strategies to the needs of each individual country without long tendering procedures or conditionality mechanisms.²⁶ Gulf states deliver capital quickly and visibly. Europe also delivers, albeit slowly, bureaucratically, and with room for improvement in terms of communication. In contrast to the bloc’s competitors, the EU’s contract-awarding procedures, for example, are complex and geared more towards the needs of budget experts in Brussels than to local stakeholders. Moreover, investment packages and benefits are often delivered without communication campaigns, whereas China in particular ensures that its investments are visible to the general public. As decision-makers in the region repeatedly emphasise to their European interlocutors, business with China is quick and easy, while business with the EU involves complicated decision-making processes and comes with numerous attached conditions as well as with a lack of certainty as to the outcome.²⁷ This is not a fundamental rejection of Europe, but a critical perception of the wheels of bureaucracy in Brussels.

Of 138 Global Gateway flagship projects for 2024, only 22 are dedicated to the Mediterranean, though the region is of direct strategic interest to Europe.²⁸ The direct benefit to Europe comes primarily from infrastructure projects, such as energy corridors, submarine cables, and port connections: What flows through the Mediterranean to Europe depends on the quality of these links. In this respect, funding for Mediterranean infrastructure represents not development aid, but rather an investment in Europe’s own interests. Too rare are the occasions on which Europe openly states that many such investments benefit not only the partner countries, but also European interests – and this is precisely why the strategic value of these investments is frequently underestimated.

Berlin’s moment: leadership in the Mediterranean begins in Europe

Germany is not a Mediterranean power. Unlike France and Italy, Berlin is unencumbered by colonial legacy and acute regional conflicts when it comes to the Southern Mediterranean. Under Macron, France has restored relations with Morocco after a several-year freeze, with the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in October 2024 marking a decisive step in this diplomatic thaw. Since then, however, relations with Algeria have been at a historic low. Under Meloni, Italy is pursuing quite an ambitious policy towards its southern neighbours with the Mattei Plan^III in parallel with tough migration policies. However, Germany is starting from a different position, with Berlin currently maintaining good relations with Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan as well as with Turkey since Merz’s first visit to Ankara in October 2025.²⁹

Chancellor Merz has articulated Germany’s ambition to assume a leadership role in Europe early on and in unequivocal terms: “I know that many of you expect more German leadership than we have seen in the last years. You can count on us, we will be ready to deliver.”³⁰ Whether this ambition also extends to the Mediterranean region, which continues to rank below Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic relations in German foreign policy priorities, remains to be seen. There are ample reasons for a stronger focus: energy security, migration flows, and the stability of a neighbourhood marked by fragile states and simmering conflicts. Green hydrogen from Morocco and Egypt is more than just a side-note when it comes to Germany’s energy transition: Indeed, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is already providing over 200 million euros to support specific projects in both countries, and the first industrial-scale reference plant for green hydrogen on the African continent is set to begin operating in Morocco in 2026. The effect of events taking place around the Mediterranean is being felt in Berlin, as is abundantly clear from the migration debate of recent years.

The success of this package will be decided not only in the Southern Mediterranean, but also within the EU. Many Eastern European member states do not see the region as their strategic priority because it pales in comparison to the Russian threat on the eastern flank. However, it is also worth their while to look southwards: Indeed, a stable Mediterranean also means less migratory pressure, greater energy security, and additional economic opportunities for the whole EU. In this regard, Germany’s role in Europe has traditionally been based less on dominance than on the ability to bring different interests together. It is precisely this mediating role that is also in demand in the Mediterranean region. Rather than lecturing Warsaw, Vilnius, or Prague, Germany must convey to them the importance of the southern neighbours as a shared European interest because those who invest in the south are simultaneously investing in their own stability in the long term.

The same applies to Turkey. Indeed, almost no other actor illustrates the different perspectives within Europe as clearly. Whereas Greece and Cyprus view Ankara primarily as an adversary, many Baltic and Eastern European states view it primarily as a NATO ally. Germany could help to unite these different perspectives, particularly given its improved relations with Turkey. The aim should be to integrate Ankara more closely as an actor in the Mediterranean region without immediately reducing the debate to the stalled question of accession.³¹

The right initiative at the right time – but the clock is ticking

The pact represents a move in the right direction. Brussels has understood that there is no future in a neighbourhood policy that treats its neighbours primarily as a problem. However, that alone will not be enough.

Partner countries have already experienced the Barcelona Process, the ENP, and the UfM. They will measure the pact based not on its objectives, but rather on whether projects get underway, investments are made visible, and political decisions follow within the next 12 to 18 months. A pact that is sustained only by Mediterranean countries will remain a regional response rather than becoming a European project.

At the same time, it is also accurate to say that instead of simply waiting around, our southern neighbours are building new partnerships and tapping into new markets – and they have significantly more options today than just ten years ago. The question is not, therefore, whether the south has an interest in Europe; rather, it is whether Europe remains sufficiently interesting. This pact is Europe’s attempt to answer that question.

– translated from German –

Lukas Kupfernagel is Policy Advisor for the Middle East and North Africa in the Division of European and International Cooperation at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

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