MPIA shows: Political will is decisive!
A good example of how a coalition of the willing can continue to develop the rules-based order despite opposition from other member states is the alternative dispute settlement body MPIA[1], which now has around 60 signatories. This plurilateral initiative became necessary because the WTO's actual appellate body had become incapacitated due to the United States' refusal to agree to the appointment of new judges. In April 2020, the participating states notified the WTO of the creation of the MPIA.
However, the inclusion of the MPIA in Annex 4 of the WTO's founding treaty (the Marrakesh Agreement) would require a unanimous decision by all WTO members – including those who do not wish to participate in the procedure. The MPIA has not yet cleared this hurdle, meaning that it is not officially part of WTO law. However, this does not prevent the procedure from being applied in practice. This shows that as long as individual WTO members agree among themselves and there is political will, mutual agreements can be reached which, although not part of WTO law, nevertheless create reliable rules for international trade.
Where there is no will, there is no right!
Unfortunately, the opposite is also true: agreements that are binding under international law are only valid as long as there is the political will to observe them. The behaviour of the United States, which under Donald Trump's leadership has rapidly become the enfant terrible of the global trading system, underscores this point impressively: It has been of little help that the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle is one of the two central pillars of WTO law. With the announcement of tariffs on Liberation Day, Donald Trump unilaterally abandoned this principle.
At least the other countries have not yet followed the destructive example set by the US. In response to the tariff threats from Washington, some bilateral agreements have been concluded which themselves violate the MFN principle because they grant the US tariff reductions that are not available to other WTO members. However, in their relations with all other trading partners, countries continue to apply existing international trade law. This shows that the value of a rules-based order is recognised and appreciated even in times of global fragmentation.
The consequence must be: Just do it!
Despite their blatant violations of the rules, the US will not leave the WTO. Other players such as India, South Africa and Turkey will also continue to use their veto power to block changes to WTO law. Reform of the organisation is therefore not possible in the foreseeable future. For the coalitions of the willing, which vary in composition depending on the issue, the conclusion must therefore be: don't wait for the unwilling, but go ahead and do it! Plurilateral initiatives such as those on e-commerce or investment facilitation can be agreed and implemented between interested parties, even if their inclusion in WTO law is blocked. Such progress in important areas would be a welcome signal for trade governance, which is currently under pressure. The binding effect of such agreements would not be impaired by the lack of approval from other WTO members, as the MPIA example mentioned at the beginning shows.
However, it would be important to make these agreements open so that other willing parties can join at any time if they are prepared to abide by the agreed rules. This would enable these thematic coalitions to provide impetus for the multilateral trading system, provided that a critical mass is reached that cannot be ignored by the others. The EU should use the dialogue with the Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTPP[2] that began in November 2025 to promote such thematic coalitions, even in the face of resistance from destructive forces within the WTO. Areas such as digital trade, paperless trade, and the handling of subsidies and non-market practices offer great potential that could also be attractive to other partners.
[1] Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement
[2] Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
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