Columbia should hence not only concentrate on the negotiations in Havana but also on achieving a consensus within society on the issue of peace negotiations. This is vital for the country since important reforms need to be introduces in order to create a sustainable future for the post-conflict phase following the signing of an agreement.

Colombia in dispute over peace: the legacy of the 2014 elections

The presidential elections of 2014 left be-hind a highly polarized political atmosphere in Colombia because the election campaign focused on a false distinction between “friends” and “enemies” of peace. In the election campaign, “friends” of peace were regarded as those who supported incum-bent President Santos’s proposal to con-tinue the peace talks with the FARC guerrillas and be prepared to compromise so as to achieve a quick end to the armed conflict. On the other hand, critics of the president’s way of conducting the negotiations were classed as “enemies” of peace. The arguments of the sceptics were here above all directed towards a possible impunity for the vio-lent crimes of the guerrillas.

This tension led to Santos being re-elected as president for a further four years in June 2014, but paradoxically also put him in an awkward situation. Because the election victory with 51% was very narrow and because he had presented his government as being the one that would achieve peace in Colombia, the political evaluation of his work as president hinges on the result of the peace talks in Havana. Thus he has to achieve a peace agreement not only for the sake of his voters and for sympathiz-ers of the “Unidad Nacional” government coalition but also for the sake of the more oppositional parties from the left wing, such as the “Polo Democrático Alternativo” and the “Partido Verde”, which only joined Santos’s coalition for the re-election campaign on the second round of voting on the condition that the peace negotiations would be continued and brought to a successful conclusion.

So much for one half of the voters, who supported Santos in the presidential election. The other half, who voted for Óscar Iván Zuluaga, the candidate of so-called “Uribism” (followers of Santos’s predecessor as president, Álvaro Uribe), should not be disregarded either in assessing the political situation in Colombia or by Santos himself in the peace negotiations. Firstly, it was not without reason that the candidate of the “Uribism” obtained the majority of votes in the first round of voting, thus winning against Santos in that first round. Secondly, with their vote for “Uribism” this half of the voters very clearly expressed their dissatisfaction and their criticism of Santos’s way of conducting the negotiations so far and thus also their criticism of the general development of the country.

The main points of criticism by the Uribe wing of Colombians regarding the peace process were, and still are, firstly, that the way negotiations have been conducted has raised the level of insecurity in the country and that there is a high risk that the crimes committed by the guerrillas against the population over the past 50 years could go unpunished. A legal analysis as to the extent to which these fears are actually justified would go beyond the scope of this report. The fact that the presidential candidate Zuluaga also gained a noteworthy 45% of the votes in the second round of voting should thus not be underestimated by Santos in the peace negotiations.

Of course, the FARC also knows that Santos is under great pressure to succeed and they are pushing things to the limit with their actions and demands at the negotiating table, which leaves the government with only a little leeway. As a result, the government ultimately seems to be a “prisoner” itself of the peace process and of all the commitments it has made in order to reach a peace agreement quickly.

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