An article by Paul Kennedy, the Author of „Rise and Fall of the Great Powers“, which was recently discussed with considerable interest, elaborates on the astounding fall of Japan: a sluggish economy, collapsing share market, increasing unemployment, a worrisome development in demography and a light-weight in international politics. One could possibly say the same of Germany – and as a matter of fact – the international public has been increasingly asking whether Germany is suffering from the Japanese Sickness. Both these countries who were allies in the Second World War and both of whom suffered ignominious defeat, practised restraint in foreign policy – a restraint which was viewed positively by the rest of the world and which also enabled the two countries to achieve unprecedented economic success. Had there been a successful reform of the UN, these two countries - given their economic muscle – would have been very good candidates for a permanent seat in the World Security Council. Quite apart from the fact that I have always been in favour of a European seat in the Security Council and have thus not held much about these German ambitions, the matter now seems to have receded into the far future in any case.
I will not exaggerate the parallels between Germany and Japan. Japan was not divided in the post-war period; Germany however was; and it thus became the focus of international conflict in the Cold War for a long time. European unity and Trans-Atlantic partnership were cornerstones of German foreign policy. In fact, this policy of a double integration into the West, was so successful, that Germany achieved its unity again and the force of attraction of this European –Atlantic model was ultimately able to overcome and remove the Iron Curtain.
After the reunification of West and East Germany in 1989/1990 we have managed to avoid pursuing a policy which would tend to lead us into a more national direction which would disregard a politics of European integration. We have till now resisted the urge to regard ourselves as a “Central Power in Europe. On the contrary, we have used the reunification of our divided country as an impulse for strengthening the inherent dynamics of European enlargement and integration. The knowledge that German integration into the European Union and into NATO would make it easier for our partners to accept German reunion has always been acknowledged by both the governing party and the political opposition in Germany. Both have recognized the importance of the fact that our most valuable capital is the feeling of our partners that we can be trusted and that we are stable in our relationships. As far as the offer made by President Bush in 1991 to become partners in leadership is concerned, we have in essence replied, that we shall strive to create a united Europe which would stand together in strong partnership with the USA.
And now well over 10 years later, we realize that after all a lot has changed - and it has changed all too quickly. Germany played an important role when in 1991 ex-Yugoslavia started to disintegrate. Not everyone found this to be an unproblematic role. Even at that time one could feel how quickly, old political structures and lines of conflict, which were thought to have been a thing of the past, could come to life again . There were some aspects in the different positions held by London, Paris and at that time even by Bonn, in regard to the Balkans, that for a time almost harked back to the political constellation of states at the beginning of the 20th century. Fortunately at the beginning of the 90s Europe was able to avoid the old pitfalls arising out of a critical situation.
And then we had to deal with the fact that others are of the view that equal rights imply equal duties. In other words, after the state had been united in unrestricted sovereignty, it was expected of us that we accept our responsibility and contribute towards crisis prevention and conflict resolution, to the extent befitting our situation - and if need be, with military means. This was not easy, and to those who were critical of our restraint in military matters, we were able to answer that Europe and the world had not made any good experiences with a Germany which in the past had not made any bones about using its military power. However partnership is not a one-way street, and we therefore had no niche we could retreat back to and we had no choice. And then things started moving, and the speed was faster than most of us would have thought possible. Volker Rühe, who had been minister of defence since 1993 said that the Bundeswehr – the German army – would need at least 10 years in order to prepare itself for such tasks. I replied that I was not sure whether we really had that kind of time and whether history would grant us so much time. History did not in fact give us this respite.
And then came Kosovo, and that showed us once more that history can be very cunning. Without the change in Government in 1998 we would not have been able to carry out the Kosovo operations – if at all - without considerable and dramatic internal differences. Even today if the leftist government of Schroeder and Fischer were to be in opposition, they would use all their powers to fulfil the promises which the chancellor had made to the Americans. Schroeder did in fact use the challenge posed by foreign policy in 1999 to gain new stature after the initial disaster of the red and green parties till the time that Lafontaine left the active political scene. I often ask myself nowadays whether this could be his motivation for his inexplicable behaviour in foreign policy which can neither be explained or be regarded as responsible.
September 11th 2001 has drastically changed the world just as the 9th of November 1989 – the reunification of Germany had. The exceptional point in the case of both these events was that one could immediately feel the ramifications of these events – something that is usually rare in history. From the declared aim of the government and of official declarations of „unlimited solidarity“ there was a quick jump to the new “normality of Germany. This led to what was called “the German way; and what we now have is an axis which includes Paris-Berlin-Moscow. The speed of all this is breath-taking and one is tempted to ask which of the two implications is worse: the one which implies that there is a calculated aim, or the other which takes-off from reasons based on internal politics as compared to those based on ignorance or ruthlessness in foreign policy.
In the Iraq debate it seems that we are more concerned with the question of what, according to our viewpoint, should be the right kind of American policy. On the other hand we tend to neglect the question of what should be the proper kind of German policy. This paradox is apparent in the fact that fear is expressed in certain circles that the Americans may act unilaterally. At the same time however the same persons declare that no matter what the United Nations decide, Germany will not participate under any circumstances. And to make matters worse, this illogical behaviour is taken a step further: on the 13th of February the Chancellor of Germany declared to the Bundestag that requests had been made to Germany to give concrete military help, and that decisions had already been taken on these – namely to give protection to American bases, grant the Americans rights of using German air space, AWACS participation of the Germans, providing of patriot rocket defence systems and ABC-detection tanks as well as sanitary and maritime components. This is not really a matter of differences about actual participation. It is rather a matter of providing political support and showing determination. And it is exactly this which is being denied.
Those who would like to avoid unilateralism must be ready to strengthen multilateral structures. In refusing solidarity, the foreign policy of Germany will at best manage just the opposite. The discomfort in exercising force and the anger at injustice and suffering is by itself not a proper concept of foreign policy. Those who would like to disarm Iraq in a peaceful manner must also be ready to exercise pressure on Saddam Hussein. That this view is not being contested has as a matter of fact been mentioned in the declaration of France and Germany. It is only under pressure that a dictator like Saddam Hussein will be ready to toe the line – even if it is at the very last minute. And that is because he will see no other alternative. The pressure which is necessary for subduing Saddam Hussein cannot be increased as desired if the impression is created that the Europeans are not united, the Atlantic partners have differences amongst themselves and there are deep differences in opinion among the members of the U.N. Security Council.
It is true that the transatlantic debate is burdened by a plethora of many different experiences. For the Europeans and especially for us, the Germans, the experience of war has been such an existentialist experience that even the mention of the word “war makes us recoil. War for the Americans has not been an immediately threatening experience involving civilian casualties, and furthermore the risk for US soldiers has in the past been minimised by the use of extensive materiel and technology. As of now, the risk for the soldier has been reduced even more, because the great advances in technology allow for better strategic thinking and planning. On the other hand, since the shock of September the 11th America has gone through a entirely new experience, namely, that it is no longer unassailable in this age of globalisation, failed states, international terrorism and assymetrical warfare. Faced with these challenges the Americans are reacting with their typical qualities of facing the problems head-on, in keeping with their primeval instincts which tell them that problems can be solved, provided there is the technology, materiel and the will to back up their plans. 175 years ago de Tocqueville described the American mentality as follows: “ The inhabitant of the United States of America learns from birth on that in the fight against evil and against the obstacles of life he has to depend on himself there is nothing that the human will cannot hope to achieve if it is able to use the united power of individuals. In a reminiscence of this spirit John F. Kennedy trying to counter the Soviet sputnik shock, said the following words: “ We will get a man to the moon in ten years.
In this aspect Europeans are more sceptical. And if the American plans for a new post-war order for stabilisation not only in Iraq but also in the whole area of the Near and Middle East are seen through European eyes, doubts remain whether this can function step by step in a purely mechanical manner. The pointer that Germany and Japan became democratic states after the Second World War is not very convincing, given the very different history and pre-conditions in Japan and Germany. And yet there are very solid reasons which press for a containment of Saddam Hussein. There is no questioning certain facts: that Saddam Hussein continues to be a potential danger, at least for the immediate region; that in an age of international terrorism the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a danger not only for all of humanity but especially for the Western world. All this is valid even if the connection between Al Quaida and Saddam Hussein cannot be directly proved at the moment. What is important is that Saddam Hussein has time and again flaunted the injunctions imposed on him by the Security Council and the question which arises is whether he should be allowed to continue this with impunity. It is a question which touches on the relevance of the United Nations in the international context. All these are facts which have to be considered and not just be brushed aside.
Unfortunately, it seems to be increasingly evident that at the end of the day, the choice will be one between two evils – that between war with all its terrible consequences which are not hard to visualise even now, and that between a situation which will lead to a calculated humiliation of the USA internationally in its role as a dominating power. War is surfeit with hidden risks and the aftermath is not easy to calculate. And yet the scenario of American humiliation would pose a serious risk for stability in view of the threats which lurk in the future. A demeaning of America would pose serious risks for American and Trans-Atlantic developments. America as the sole superpower which has no competitor on the global scene would appear weak, it would lose its credibility and eventually its function to strive for order in order to avoid chaos.
However there is another point which has to be said gently but nevertheless stated very clearly: if a war would indeed be unavoidable, then it appears to me that it had better be waged with the legitimation granted by a solidly united vote of the Security Council. This is better than a dispute as to the legitimacy of waging a war outside the confines of international law. And if the USA are determined to wage war in any case, as many critical voices contend, then one also has to ask the next logical question as to how anyone can prevent them from doing so. And if the answer to the question is no, then one must think even further as to whether it would not be more reasonable to cooperate with the USA in a partnership of multilateral structures. It is just possible that an axis comprising Paris-Berlin-Moscow could ultimately force the USA to go it alone, as critics have accused it of intending to do in any case.
At the moment two trains are heading inexorably towards a collision in the Security Council. It seems that nothing can change their course. As far as I am concerned, I will continue to look for a way out of this critical situation: The need of the hour is to set precise time limits to Iraq , which allow for just a narrow margin. There should be threats which would be ultimatums by nature. There should be a permanent and robustly controlled disarmament in Iraq and an agreement between the Europeans and the USA and possibly other powers regarding constant pressure on Saddam Hussein through a military presence which would have to be of long duration. This is necessary if there is to be stability in the region. It could turn out to be the appropriate solution. However one has to admit that the chances for this are waning by the hour.
German policy has contributed to this dilemma in considerable measure and it would have been up to Germany to avoid this very situation. I do not aver that the American Administration has done everything correctly and that reservations about the course of the USA are baseless. That is not my topic. What I am trying to say is that in the context of our chances, our interests and our responsibility, German policy has been wrong on all these points. Our aim should have been to persuade Iraq to disarm in a peaceful manner and to persuade the USA to act on the basis of consultations with their partners. It is quite evident that the policy of disunity practised by Germany at the moment has produced no dividends – neither in the case of Iraq nor with Washington. We have not achieved the objective we had stated to achieve. The damage which has been caused till now is so stupendous that one can easily say that the worst is still to come. There has been dramatic damage to the trans-Atlantic partnership and the process of European integration is stuck in a crisis of a kind we have not experienced for decades.
The development of alternative positions which has been pushed against the Americans – in contravention of all the tenets of diplomatic logic – decreases their flexibility. This will not lead to a compromise in positions. On the contrary it will lead to a hardening of positions, which in turn would have fatal consequences for the authority of the Security Council.
What remains to be done? No matter what end the Iraq crisis takes, German foreign policy has to become clearer and more reliable. I will elucidate seven points:
- The process of European integration has to be continued in the sense of enlargement and consolidation. Only a large, strong, politically united and operatively dynamic Europe can represent the interests and responsibilities of Europe in the globalised world of the 21st century. However this Europe will not be an alternative to an Atlantic partnership – it will be an integral part of it. Europe cannot be united against the USA. After the 1st World War European integration was not achieved because the Americans left Europe much too early. After the Second World War European unification and the Trans-Atlantic partnership were two sides of the same coin, a partnership which could not be broken apart. Recent weeks have shown that those who want to unite Europe against the USA will only cause a rift among the community of the Europeans. European integration means that stability is guaranteed within the territories of Europe. That is why the enlargement of Europe towards the East is a project to be tackled even before the Balkans are placed on the agenda. In our own interests the enlargement eastwards is important because it will demonstrate that Europeans have the ability to act when necessary and that they are ready for the future. The position of Germany in the centre of Europe makes the accession of the new neighbours from the East not just a matter of showing largesse or favour; it is a matter of working towards a positive future. Just as in the 90s, the Europeans were not able to pacify the Balkans, they will not be able to achieve a permanent stabilisation of East-Central and Southeast Europe without the cooperation of the USA - or in opposition to them. This is also true for the irrevocable link-up of the Russians with European and Trans-Atlantic structures which will have to become a central objective of European politics. The cooperation between Germany and France is an essential element of European integration. Franco-German cooperation is not everything but without it little in Europe will move in the right direction. And even this demands sensitive handling. France has always inclined towards a greater independence in relations with the USA and with the Atlantic Alliance. This was at times also the case in its relations with Great Britain and the smaller member states of the European Union. There are many reasons for this and they have their roots in history and in historical experiences. The interests of Germany dictated a course of balancing relations with the USA and France and not getting into a position where the alternative was either Washington or Paris. Germany had to maintain its friendship with Paris and at the same time be an attorney for the smaller states of the European Union. In this way the privileged friendship and partnership of France and Germany worked well for the common interests of Europe.
And even Central Europe for which Karl Lamers and I have a kind of copyright has always been in our eyes a motor for the unification of Europe and not just an element of separation. Schroeder has now lost this balance. He has created a position in which Germany is isolated and there is now a marginalisation of options open to the Germans. He is now dependant on France to such an extent that French policy may tend towards arrogance. As a matter of fact many are of the opinion that in the medium run current French policy would enable France to show – less so the USA – than Germany, its political limitations. Some of the highlights of recent weeks like the conflict resolution in the Ivory Coast, the French-African summit and the State visit to Algeria show clearly how differently France views its international responsibilities – and in which context the new good-pal friendship between Chirac and Schroeder is viewed on the other side of the Rhine.
- A Europe which has ambitions of fulfilling its responsibilities in the 21st century and of taking care of its own interests will have to have larger political, economic and above all military capabilities. Those who propagate multilateral structures must also be able to offer adequate contributions. It is in the interests of the USA and the Trans-Atlantic partnership to have a strong European partner. If today, Europe marginalises itself because of ever increasing differences in political and military capabilities, there is little purpose in criticising the American partner. All depends on the larger capabilities of the Europeans themselves. Whether Germany is integrated in the NATO, in the EU, in inter-governmental institutions or in “coalitions of the willing, Germany will in any case have to be ready to contribute in a more substantial measure. This demands a reform of the Bundeswehr in the manner that the parliamentary party of the CDU/CSU in the German Parliament has described. As we see it, it would also require a sustainable increase in the defence budget. There is a special need to gradually close the technology gap and update our capabilities by investing in research and logistics. No European country can do this alone on a large scale, cooperation and sharing of the tasks is therefore essential within Europe. This however demands trust and reliability. In view of the embarassing fights in the NATO Council in the matter of preparing possible aid measures for Turkey this situation is doubly poisonous. The identity of the Bundeswehr must be such that it is confident of its capability to operate just as NATO, the GASP or the ESVP do. The Bundeswehr must be able to take on international responsibilities. It is essential to understand that security and security threats are an inseparable part of the present international situation.
- A realistic analysis of the security threat and an impartial search for answers are prerequisites for an assessment of responsibility in foreign policy. We Europeans must concern ourselves with the questions which have arisen out of the new American strategy against security threats, even if we do not necessarily have the answers yet. This is a necessary condition for a Trans-Atlantic partnership as well as for strengthening multilateral structures. Today security is not guaranteed as it was in the period of the Cold War by a fear of certain mutual destruction. Concepts of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and the prohibition of external intervention will become problematic when the world will have to deal with states which are falling apart and which become threats to international security. This is the problem in Afghanistan and of Al Quaida, but it is also a problem when we consider Somalia for example. The right to self-defence – including emergency help and the prohibition of external intervention are concepts which will not fulfil the needs of the world today. For the purpose of securing peace these concepts will have to be carefully developed. In situations where the concept of sovereignty is losing force due to the collapse of public order, the legitimacy of regulated processes of decisions of International law become more important. And it is especially because of this need that the United Nations have to be strengthened. It also means that the process of giving legal importance to international relations must be promoted intensively. That is the reason why we must not allow the UN to be weakened by disunity and the building of various axes. This is possible by cooperating with the USA and not by being against it.
- International order is necessary for stability and for securing peace but these can only be guaranteed if the execution is guaranteed. Though military force may be necessary for this, it alone will not suffice. That is why concepts and efforts for prevention and resolution of political conflicts are important . Equally important are sustainable development, international dialogue, freedom of intercultural and inter-religious exchange with inherent guarantees for free exercise of identity, tolerance and fundamental human rights. This must be valid for poor regions even as it should be valid for international heavyweights like China and Russia. European unity and the Trans-Atlantic partnership must be a partnership in leadership which is committed to development and international stability. In these efforts American capability and European expertise and experience can complement each other. Now that everything has gone so wrong in the Iraq crisis we should make all possible efforts to cooperate in the Trans-Atlantic partnership to combat international terror. We have to cooperate in the matter of North Korea and we have to make all efforts to stabilise the Near and Middle East as well as to work to defuse the Kashmir conflict.
- The special historical experience of Germany has forces on us the burden of personal responsibility for the right to live of Israel and for a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem. This should help us to maintain our good relations with the Arab world. The relations with the Arab world are of special importance for control and reduction of present tensions. The long tradition of good relations with Turkey and the Arab world and the fact that Europe has become home to a growing number of Muslims gives us a special reason for respecting the different development of cultures. We have the chance to combine the necessity of enlightening and modernising and at the same time of practising tolerance. Through the centuries Europe has gained experience at a great cost. We have gone through mistakes and we have had our victims. We have learnt to distinguish between worldly power and the power of the church. At the same time we have been able to develop a system of justice which is tolerant and takes into consideration the need for free exercise of religious convictions. These experiences have to be made available for the 21st century.
- Sustainable development cannot blind us to the fact that the resources of the earth are limited. We have therefore to develop a global concept of ecology which we would support. This would help us to prevent individual countries from following their own energy policies and would at the same time take into consideration the increasing energy needs of less developed nations. This would include a policy which would guarantee world-wide access to energy sources and prevent the formation of energy monopolies that may desire to destabilise the status quo. Globalisation means the opening up of markets and the chance of fair competition for less developed countries. If destabilisation caused by mass migrations and immigration is to be avoided, the process of more intensive world-wide distribution of labour has to be practised in a manner which respects the different developments of societies and cultural identities.
- To achieve all this the requirement is to win back our economic dynamism and competitiveness. We have to deregulate our labour market, abandon structures of bureaucracy which are stifling and introduce reform in the welfare system which would strengthen social security. We will have to take into consideration the changing demographic patterns, concentrate on education and research so that we can once again be among the leaders in knowledge and research. We need to promote foreign trade very actively. This has been neglected under the present government. All this is connected to our potential capabilities in foreign policy. If we are not economically competitive our influence on the international political scene will be marginal. Furthermore we will have to guard against complacency because a society which shows signs of fatigue as far as affluence and success is concerned may succumb to the temptation to be left in their own glorious isolation. A society of this kind would tend to hold on to the riches it has accumulated and would then reject any innovations. Stagnation and the quality of introversion are closely related. One can study this in the USA and in Japan on totally different levels. We should learn from this.