Please check the German version of this analysis for sources.

Belarusians were asked to cast their votes in the presidential elections until Sunday, October 11th 2015. However, they didn’t have a real choice in both senses of the word: On the one hand, many Belarusians didn’t see a genuine alternative to president incumbent Alexander Lukashenko with respect to the current situation in the country. On the other hand, the electoral process deserved being deemed “elections“ with great reservations, at best.

Belarus was shaken up shortly before the elections: Svetlana Alexievich won the Nobel Prize in Literature as the first Belarusian in history. She is also the first Nobel Laureat¬e in Literature from a post-Soviet nation, who has won the Prize since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The event proved to be politically disconcerting for Lukashenko, as the Belarusian political system he presides over, had oppressed Ms. Alexievich for years. Not only have her books been banned or designated as undesired in the country up until now, as the writer critically explores the history of the Soviet Union and Red Army and addresses the treatment of the victims of the catastrophe in Chernobyl, but her public appearances were also impeded by the authorities. Bestowing the Prize upon her, and especially shortly before the elections in Belarus, additionally conveyed a clear message: Despite all potential for rapprochement between the EU and Belarus, that was also discussed in Sweden, the West predominantly keeps supporting freedom of speech in the neighboring country.

The announcement of the Nobel Prize for Ms Alexievich symbolically also reflects the inner turmoil that many Belarusians faced shortly before the elections: While Svetlana Alexievich may confront the Soviet past and the present status quo in Belarus, the Belarusian writes in her native tongue, Russian. This was a contentious issue for many pro-national intellectuals in the past, albeit only about 10 to 15 percent of Belarusians actually speak the Belarusian language. At heart, Svetlana Alexievich symbolizes the ongoing dilemma Belarus faces - finding its own identity despite the massive Russian super-formation of Belarusian language, economy, and politics, and the increasing demand for autonomy and dissociation from Russia by the majority of Belarusians.

Sovereignty and Independence

Belarus has been caught in a political and social debate on dissociation from the bigger brother in the east and the indispensable follow-up question of rapprochement with the EU, especially ever since the Russian Federation annexed Crimea. Neither Lukashenko, nor other politicians have been able to ignore that attitudes on security policy have at least differed between their country and their eastern neighbor in the past months. However, this hasn’t yet led to a clear dissociation from Russia – Belarus depends upon resources and financial support from Moscow too strongly and concerns, that cutting the cord could lead to adverse reactions from Moscow, are too great. Hence, Lukashenko stressed that he envisions a steadfast bond between Belarus and Russia throughout his campaign and even on election day. In these elections, the population didn’t have much of a choice but between supporting him or boycotting the elections. Ultimately, not a single member of the opposition presented themselves with a clear, alternative program on the ballot. 38-year-old Tatiana Korotkevich remained the only opposition candidate on the ballot, but even in her case the objectives of sovereignty and independence, Lukashenko’s issues, where high on her agenda. Changes - yes, but slowly and in a dialogue with the government – were at the core of her approach, that indeed is new to the opposition in Belarus. Voters weren’t presented with tangible economic proposals, even though Belarus currently is caught in a serious economic crisis: Neither by Korotkevich, nor by Lukashenko, nor by the two other candidates that are tied to the system.

The election campaign was greatly dominated by two paradigms: Firstly, all candidates promoted the primary objective of the stability of Belarus. Secondly, it was a clear objective of Lukashenko to conduct the elections in a manner, so that he would be perceived as a strong leader in the sphere of domestic politics, and that there would be little critique of the elections abroad.

He widely succeeded in that, according to the present approximations and numbers. In its first interim report, the OSCE only cautiously criticized the circumstances under which the pre-election phase took place. There were no occurrences of larger unrests, riots, arrests, or other such events in the run-up to the elections. Even an opposition protest against the planned construction of a Russian military airport in Belarus a day before the elections, that wasn’t approved by officials, didn’t lead to state intervention. It should not be overlooked, of course, that significant deficits with regards to political liberties and the freedom of the press still exist in Belarus. In Belarusian standards, the electoral campaign took place, as desired by Lukashenko: Quietly and inconspicuously, to a large extent.

Results of the Elections

Alexander Lukashenko received a record 83.5 percent of the votes, according to the official preliminary results. This is the highest result in an election since 1994 and 3.8 percent higher than in 2010. Lukashenko will be able to govern the country for at least another five years. Against expectations, Tatiana Korotkevich, the only opposition politician who took part in the elections, didn’t even achieve a symbolic success, a succès d’estime, with only 4.4 percent of the votes: With regards to official numbers, she received a smaller percentage of the vote than all seven opposition candidates in the 2010 elections altogether. As a matter of that fact, she missed out on the opportunity to convey the long-anticipated signal that opposition politicians are capable of attaining results in the two-digits, as well. Her new approach, her involvement, and her modern campaign strategy didn’t make a lasting impression on the official numbers. Even the token candidates Sergei Gaidukevich (3.3 percent) and Nikolai Ulakovich (1.7 percent) achieved about the same result as she did, albeit they didn’t campaign and don’t represent changes in the country. The proportion of voters that voted “against all candidates” according to the official statistics, fell from the indicated 6.5 percent (2010) to 6 percent.

On the one hand, Lukashenko’s result doesn’t come as a surprise. Even shortly before the elections he had indicated, that a good president needed to be confirmed in office with at least 80 percent of the votes. On the other hand, an independent poll found approval rates for him to be only around 45 percent. The causes of this significant difference will remain a subject for further analyses. Those should also clarify why Tatiana Korotkevich, who had attained approval rates of about 17.9 percent, fared significantly worse in the elections. Furthermore, the high turnout of 86.8 percent of all voters is equally difficult to account for. It neither reflects the data of pre-election polls, nor the resignation and political passivity that often surfaces in conversations in Belarus.

Voting Process

It remains unclear how reliable the results announced on election day are. After several fraudulent elections that Lukashenko even partially admitted to, mistrust in the validity of the votes is deep-seated. This was confirmed by reports on the 2015 elections: Belarusians were asked to cast their votes from October 6th on. A record 36 percent of voters supposedly took advantage of this possibility – an increase of 13 percent in comparison to the 2010 elections, the rate was at 31 percent in 2006. The practice of early voting in Belarus traditionally is widely criticized by election observers, as it greatly limits the means for monitoring the process of casting and counting the votes. In the case of these elections, accusations of fraud have surfaced, as well. “Right to Choose”, an election monitoring organization, stated that more cast votes were documented in the polling places than voters were observed casting their votes by the election monitors. The difference was at 3.75 percent, on the first day alone. In the five days after early voting commenced, this difference was at about 6.2 percent on average and as high as 70 percent in some polling places, according to the reports at hand. The president of the Central Electoral Commission dismissed all relevant explanations and complaints as provocations. There also were reports on dismissal from the polling places, prohibition of the usage of cameras and mobile-phone cameras, as well as threats to the election observers that they would be dismissed from their jobs. Additionally, over 230.000 persons in the Frunzenski district in Minsk reputedly didn’t find themselves on the register of voters. In many instances, election observers allegedly weren’t granted direct access to the count of votes on election day.

Outlook

German chancellor Angela Merkel had designated the presidential elections, as well as the treatment of political prisoners as important indicators that would be decisive for a potential rapprochement. When Lukashenko freed all political prisoners on August 22nd in 2015, at least one of these conditions was fulfilled. To what extent the presidential elections may be evaluated in a positive manner, depends upon the final electoral analysis by the OSCE, amongst others, as well as the political evaluation in the aftermath of the elections.

How future ties between the EU and Belarus will be effectively shaped based upon this, will be determined by any further political signals Alexander Lukashenko will send. His course of opening the country slightly in the past months, his role in the Mink peace negotiations, as well as a photo-op with U.S. president Barack Obama in September, and initial suggestions by a federal politician of the CDU, to examine a potential means of including Belarus in the Council of Europe, are favorable preconditions for a further rapprochement. It remains to be seen whether Lukashenko will be interested in following this course or whether his somewhat more liberal stance in the past months mainly has to be attributed to tactics in internal politics to reach an election success

If the EU-member states would like to continue the path towards a rapprochement, lifting or pausing the sanctions in place against the Belarusian leadership will need to be evaluated, as they are a significant obstacle to a more profound dialogue with the country. A variety of EU member states appears at least to be willing to discuss the potential of doing so. Even though observers contest the results of the current elections in Belarus, at least there recently haven’t been any arrests of political opponents, as they were the cause of the 2010 sanctions.

All considerations for enabling more talks with Minsk don’t address the main concern that still exists: Will pro-European forces in Belarus be able to stabilize the cautious opening and what can the West offer to promote this? As long as Lukashenko remains dependent upon Russian support almost exclusively and is not willing to change in principal, the objective of any improvement of relations with the West remains unclear. This and further aspects need to be clarified, if Europe wishes to engage with Belarus in a more strategic manner, not at least due to considerations in security policy. However, one thing needs to be kept in mind: While there have been many attempts of rapprochement between Minsk and the EU in the past, none of them has proved to be stable.

The former opposition may play a less important role in this process of rapprochement: Due to an internal focus of tactics and majority boycotts of the elections, opposition again missed the opportunity to offer voters an actual alternative in these elections. In doing so, it further weakened its role as a conveyer of ideas of change in the country and as a focal point of contact for foreign nations With Tatiana Korotkevich, at least there now is a new, moderate contact for the West - she may be perceived more strongly internationally in the future, as well. Korotkevich announced that she will remain politically active despite her defeat in the elections. She faces a lot of work in doing so: She needs a more pronounced political profile and will have to assert herself against other oppositional forces, that almost all stand up for a boycott of the elections and are critical of her current participation in them. Notwithstanding, Korotkevich will face the question of her inner party role: She is presided by an ambitious party leader, and both are lacking a powerful organization with a large membership to support a potential new bearer of hope – especially with regards to the imminent parliamentary elections in Belarus in 2016. Korotkevich received a substantive accolade before the elections, at least. Svetlana Alexievich announced that she wouldn’t participate in the elections, as the result was fixed beforehand, anyways. If she were to vote, however, she would cast her vote for Korotkevich, the Nobel Laureate stated.

Translation of this text from German: Johanna Renoth.