The ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and Belarus’ role as an enabler have significantly increased insecurity along Poland’s north-eastern border. As this frontier also forms part of NATO’s and the EU’s Eastern Flank, the threat carries strategic implications for the broader Euro-Atlantic community. In response to this deteriorating security environment, Poland has raised defence spending to nearly 5 percent of GDP and launched a series of ambitious defence initiatives. Chief among them is the “East Shield National Deterrence and Defence Program”, the most extensive defence infrastructure project on NATO’s Eastern Flank since the Alliance’s creation.
Launched in 2024 and planned for completion by 2028, the East Shield covers a 700-kilometer stretch of Poland’s border with Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast. In a security belt extending up to 50 kilometres inland, the government aims to improve deterrence and preparedness through an integrated approach combining surveillance, counter-mobility, and dual-use infrastructure. The project pursues four strategic goals:
- Enhancing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
- Impeding enemy movement in the event of an attack
- Facilitating the mobility of Polish and Allied troops
- ncreasing security for soldiers and civilians in border areas
These objectives are pursued through a wide range of civil and military measures. ISR capabilities are being expanded across all domains, from satellite-based reconnaissance to radar towers and thousands of drones. To delay and channel enemy forces, the project combines reinforced physical barriers – such as anti-tank hedgehogs and trenches – with natural obstacles like forests and wetlands. For rapid deployment during crises and civilian protection, the project entails the construction of roads and bridges as well as bunkers and shelters. A joint program between the MoD and Health Ministry is also training hospital staff in combat medicine to strengthen civil preparedness in the event of conflict.
The East Shield should not be viewed as an isolated national endeavour. It is closely integrated with the Baltic Defence Line and Finland’s efforts to expand its deep strike capabilities. Together, these initiatives form a continuous deterrence architecture spanning from the Gulf of Finland to the Carpathians, anchored in both natural and engineered barriers and increasingly coordinated through shared command structures, common procurement, and joint logistics.
This regional convergence comes at a time when a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe appears increasingly likely. Regardless of who occupies the White House, Washington is shifting its focus to the Indo-Pacific and expects Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defence. The East Shield is part of Poland’s response to this shift: a forward-leaning, European-led project that operationalizes strategic autonomy while reinforcing NATO’s Eastern Flank.
With the upcoming Zapad-25 military exercise giving Russia a pretext to amass troops near the Suwałki Gap, European partners must prepare for worst-case scenarios. Germany’s planned deployment of 5,000 troops and their families to Lithuania underscores this urgency – should the corridor be breached, these forces risk being cut off from Western reinforcements. Supporting the East Shield would thus be an investment in Europe’s collective security.
