The EU and China are celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations – but at a time of numerous serious differences, ranging from the EU's trade deficit with China to Beijing's continued support for Russia's war in Ukraine. On the EU side, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa travelled to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The summit was originally planned to take place in Brussels. According to press reports, Xi Jinping had declined to travel to Brussels, which is why the meeting ultimately took place in China. It is the first in-person summit since 2023.
1. Background
The fundamental importance of the relationship was emphasised repeatedly in the run-up to the summit; the EU and China account for almost 30 per cent of global trade in goods and services. Even though there was a slight decline in 2024, bilateral trade still amounted to over 700 billion euros. China is the EU's second largest trading partner after the United States.[1] At the same time, discord has increased in recent years: the flooding of the European market with subsidised goods from China, the resulting growing trade imbalance between the two sides, the restriction of market access for European goods and export restrictions on rare earths are causing discontent on the European side. At the beginning of von der Leyen's first term as Commission President, the slogan in Brussels was that China was a partner, competitor or rival, depending on the issue at hand. In recent years, however, the focus has increasingly been on competition and rivalry – partly due to concerns about excessive dependence on Beijing. The EU's decision to impose countervailing duties on electric vehicles prompted a corresponding response from China.
Politically, too, China's de facto support for Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine has significantly changed the EU's view of China over the past three years – not to mention concerns about China's actions towards Taiwan, its support for authoritarian regimes worldwide, and its attempts to shape the discourse in multilateral organisations more strongly and change it in Beijing's favour. The statement made in June by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that China cannot afford a Russian defeat, as this would mean that the US and its Western allies would then turn their attention to Asia [2], reinforced the conviction in Brussels that China is supporting Russia in the conflict not only with words but also with deeds. A few days before the summit, the EU imposed sanctions on Chinese banks for violating sanctions against Russia, prompting China to threaten retaliatory measures. [3]
In the weeks leading up to the summit, there was little indication that these points of contention would be resolved. Even Washington's tougher stance towards both sides in recent months had not led to a reduction in the discord. At the same time, the EU finds itself under increasing pressure to strike a balance between the strategic interests of the US and China. China is promoting greater ‘strategic autonomy’ through investment, while the US is pushing for a hard line against Beijing, for example on export controls for critical raw materials. At the G7 summit in Canada, President von der Leyen accused China of using its dominance in raw materials as a weapon against its competitors.[4] Beijing rejected the criticism. The fight against climate change is seen as the only topic on which there is any degree of consensus in Brussels, even though China is a competitor challenging the EU in the field of green technology, for example in electric cars and photovoltaics.
As the controversial vote on tariffs for electric vehicles showed, EU member states do not always agree when it comes to China.[5] Some see China primarily as an important economic partner, others struggle with China's punitive tariffs, and still others see the country as an authoritarian centre of gravity that threatens their own security through its support of Russia or cyber attacks. Recently, in addition to Hungary, which has been considered one of Beijing's closest partners in the EU for years, Spain's socialist government has also distinguished itself with a charm offensive towards China.
The difficulties in relations with China have prompted the EU, particularly in the new legislative period, to significantly diversify its economic and political external relations: immediately prior to the EU-China summit, closer cooperation was agreed with Japan – also with the aim of reducing strategic dependence on China.[6]
2. China’s Expectations for the Summit
On the Chinese side, expectations for the summit were limited from the outset – at least as far as concessions were concerned. In its official communications, Beijing struck an unusually sharp tone in the run-up to the summit. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun warned the EU not to harm the interests of Chinese companies. Otherwise, China would take measures to protect their rights. At the same time, Guo criticised the new EU sanctions against Russia, which also affect Chinese banks. Normal exchanges between Chinese and Russian companies should not be disrupted, he said. Beijing continues to reject the formula used by the EU of ‘partner, competitor, systemic rival’ – as well as what it sees as unfounded accusations regarding the war in Ukraine.[7] This clear defensive stance is also reflected in public debate. In the state-controlled social media, the summit was sometimes commented on mockingly in the run-up to the event: Europeans would beg on their knees for rare earths, while a strong China would graciously dictate the rules of the game. This self-promotion is an expression of increased self-confidence in Beijing – and at the same time a signal: China does not see itself in the role of supplicant, but as a shaper of events.
Specifically, Beijing hopes for a reversal of the new EU import tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, for which, according to the Chinese side, ‘final price negotiations’ are underway. From the perspective of European officials, however, the process has been stagnating for months. Further points of friction lie in China's response to European sanctions – such as the recent introduction of punitive tariffs on French cognac and new restrictions on the procurement of medical equipment. The threat of action against European milk and pork exports also fits into this picture.
At the same time, Beijing is highlighting the fruits of decades of cooperation: bilateral trade has grown from 2.4 billion to almost 786 billion US dollars over the last 50 years, with mutual investments reaching almost 260 billion. President Xi Jinping therefore called on the EU to stick to ‘open cooperation’. ‘Decoupling’ or even ‘building walls’ would only lead to isolation, he warned. China is therefore insisting on further market access in Europe – especially in key areas such as automotive manufacturing, high-tech and medical technology – and feels increasingly discriminated against by European protective measures.
However, preliminary reporting on the meeting in the state media was conciliatory, as usual. The focus here is primarily on powerful images, portraying China as a responsible player on the global stage. In an article published by the state news agency Xinhua shortly before the summit, it was stated that the meeting offered an opportunity to ‘consolidate the common interests of China and Europe in the midst of global upheaval.’ China Daily also struck a cooperative tone on 24 July, warning against jeopardising relations ‘through protectionist reflexes or proxy conflicts in foreign policy’. Europe, the paper said, must decide whether to ‘continue to make independent strategic decisions – or blindly copy Washington's course’.[8]
However, the Chinese account fails to mention that many of these shared goals currently exist mainly on paper. Accusations of competition-distorting subsidies, China's role in the Ukraine war, and restrictions on European companies are dismissed as misunderstandings at best. From Beijing's perspective, it seems that the summit was primarily a diplomatic showcase – rather than a venue for meaningful rapprochement.
3. Expectations of the EU
Anyone on the EU side who had expected major breakthroughs in light of the anniversary was likely disillusioned by early July at the latest: The reduction of the two-day summit to just one day was a first setback; statements from Chinese ministers and EU leaders in the weeks leading up to the summit did not suggest that there would be any fundamental change in the divergences in foreign, economic and trade policy.
The EU is seeking to rebalance relations. According to Commission President von der Leyen in the run-up to the summit, these relations have reached a turning point and concrete solutions are now needed. The EU's most important economic concerns include the withdrawal of China's punitive tariffs, measures to reduce the massive trade deficit and counter the diversion of China's overcapacity to the European market, the creation of a level playing field, and export licensing requirements for critical raw materials.[9] In the weeks leading up to the summit, there were no signs of China making concessions in any of these areas. Expectations were also low with regard to geopolitical conflicts, even though the EU's foreign policy chief had once again clearly called on China to stop supporting Russia at the beginning of July.
In the run-up to the summit, observers no longer expected a joint comprehensive communiqué; at best, a joint statement on climate policy with a view to COP30 in Belém, Brazil, was still considered possible. The prevailing opinion was that the main focus would be on stemming the deterioration in relations. Some observers still hoped for small steps forward on economic issues.
At least there were diplomatic signals from Beijing in the run-up to the EU-China summit. For example, Mikko Huotari, director of the German think tank Merics, was allowed to enter China for the first time in four years. Merics had been banned from entering China in 2021 as part of Chinese countersanctions against the EU for its criticism of human rights in Xinjiang. The lifting of sanctions against individual (former) EU parliamentarians was also seen as a positive political signal in Brussels.[10] However, sanctions have not yet been completely lifted, and travel is currently only possible under certain conditions – for example, at the invitation of Chinese institutions, with no guarantee of freedom of research. Observers emphasised that these relaxations were ‘cost-effective’ concessions for China.
4. Results of the Summit
At least the low expectations in the run-up to the summit were not disappointed. [11]. In their choice of words before and after the summit, both sides tried to strike a respectful tone. Commission President von der Leyen and EU Council President Costa certainly addressed the familiar critical issues (the need for concrete solutions to realign trade relations, market access for European companies, end of material support for Russia's war by China), but at the same time emphasised the immense importance of the relationship, the shared responsibility for a rules-based international order, and expressed respect for China's enormous achievements in recent years and decades.[12] Xi Jinping, on the other hand, did not directly address the differences between the two sides, but emphasised the importance of mutual respect, consolidating cooperation, dealing openly with differences of opinion and cooperation at the multilateral level.
Contrary to some particularly pessimistic forecasts, the summit produced two fairly concrete results: Firstly, an export supply mechanism for rare earths is to be created to address supply problems faced by European companies. This will enable companies to contact the EU directly to clarify the reasons for delays in exports of critical raw materials.[13] It is still unclear exactly how this mechanism will work in practice.
Secondly, both sides agreed on a communiqué on climate policy in which they reaffirmed their cooperation in the field of climate change, including the reduction of greenhouse gases. The communiqué mentions support for the Paris Agreement and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Both sides commit to fair and effective implementation in line with national circumstances. The goal is to promote a just global climate transformation, support Brazil at COP30 and improve global access to green technology. By COP30, both sides agreed to present new climate targets for 2035 and to expand their cooperation in areas such as energy transition, methane reduction and low-carbon technologies.[14] There was also some progress towards closer cooperation on emissions trading, the circular economy, financial regulation, the fight against drugs and geographical indications. A new roadmap for regional policy (2024–2029) was adopted. On the sidelines of the summit, a round table was also held with around sixty representatives of European and Chinese companies.
For its part, the EU expressed concern in the aftermath of the summit about China's opaque data protection rules and cyberattacks. It also addressed the situations in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, as well as the persecution of human rights defenders. It also expressed concern about tensions in the Taiwan Strait and in the East and South China Seas. It rejects unilateral violent changes to the status quo and calls for peaceful solutions in accordance with international law.[15]
5. Outlook
Despite all the differences, the tone of public communication remained respectful. However, the summit made little tangible progress, particularly on trade issues, which are central to Brussels. As expected, the EU had to leave without any concrete commitments. It remains to be seen whether the announced mechanism for exporting rare earths will bring substantial added value.
From the EU's perspective, the summit seems to have confirmed one thing above all else: the increasingly sceptical – and in some cases alarmed – view of China has not changed. Beijing showed no willingness whatsoever to make any substantial concessions. Instead, the Chinese leadership demonstrated self-confidence and conveyed the message that it did not need to make any concessions to a weakened Europe.
At the same time, the EU succeeded in clearly articulating key concerns – in particular, the expectation that Beijing will use its influence on Moscow to facilitate progress towards peace negotiations. The clear message is that China's relationship with Russia will play a decisive role in its relations with the EU in the future.
One positive aspect from Brussels' point of view: the appearances of Commission President von der Leyen, Council President Costa and Estonian Prime Minister Kallas appeared coherent and well-coordinated – an important signal of European unity in difficult times. In addition, the Chinese leadership has begun to address overcapacity in domestic industry under the banner of ‘involution,’ von der Leyen said. The latter was seen as another positive development from a European perspective. According to media reports in EU circles, Chinese representatives had previously always denied in talks that massive overcapacity was a problem at all.[16] Now, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang have declared their intention to take countermeasures against what they see as destructive price wars in sectors such as steel, electric mobility and solar panels. The leadership uses the term ‘involution’ to describe the increasingly intense competition caused by price dumping.
Even if some observers consider the joint communiqué on climate change a success, it should be clear from a European perspective that China is causing massive distortions of competition in the green tech sector through state subsidies and targeted industrial policy – with the aim of creating new global dependencies.
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly important that the summit took place. It must be assumed that the political system in China – similar to that in Russia or in the Trump administration – functions like an echo chamber; that Xi Jinping therefore probably hears little criticism of his actions from his own people. ‘That is why it is important for EU leaders to tell him to his face where the shoe pinches,’ emphasised Jörg Wuttke, long-standing president of the European Chamber of Commerce.[17] At the same time, it says a lot about the state of relations when simply talking to the EU's second most important trading partner is considered a success at a summit.
[3] Neue Russland-Sanktionen: China droht EU mit Gegenmaßnahmen | tagesschau.de
[4] Präsidentin von der Leyen beim G7-Gipfel
[6] AGENCE EUROPE - Faced with economic and security challenges, EU emphasises i...
[7] Vgl. China.Table: EU-Gipfel: Pekinger Außenministerium schlägt härtere Töne an, 23.07.2025.
[9] Handelskonflikt: China verursacht Rohstoffkrise – Erste Firmen drosseln Produktion
[11] Other summaries can be found here: https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13687/1 or in this thread: https://x.com/fbermingham/status/1948242830595391697
[12] EU warns China to push Putin to end war as relations hit ‘inflection point’ – POLITICO, the press conference can also be found here: https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/permalink/264159 , https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/permalink/264160
[13] EU-China-Gipfel: Probleme bei Seltenen Erden gelöst?
[14] Joint EU-China press statement on climate
[15] 25th EU-China summit - EU press release - Consilium
[16] Vgl. China.Table: EU-China-Gipfel: Peking will gegen Überkapazitäten vorgehen, 25.07.2025.
[17] Experte Wuttke über EU-China-Gipfel: "Xi will Europa dominieren"
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